D. K. v. D. F.

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2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
D. K. v. D. F.

D. K. v. D. F.*
(AC 47860)
Moll, Westbrook and Pellegrino, Js.**

Syllabus

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff had previously been dis-
solved, appealed from the trial court’s judgment denying his motion to
modify custody of the parties’ minor children and to allow him visitation.
The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly concluded that
joint legal custody and visitation was not in the best interests of the chil-
dren. Held:

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion
for modification of custody and visitation, as the trial court considered many
factors in determining whether modification of custody and visitation was
in the children’s best interests and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
which was not present in this case, this court presumed that the trial court
properly weighed all the evidence before it.

The trial court properly articulated its basis for concluding that modification
of custody and visitation was not in the children’s best interests pursuant
to the statute (§ 46b-56), as the court stated that it had considered all of
the statutory factors set out in § 46b-56 (c) and it was not required to
consider any particular factors or to assign weight to the factors that it
considered.

The trial court did not impermissibly delegate its judicial authority to the
plaintiff by giving her discretion to decide the nature and scope of the
defendant’s visitation rights, as the court’s initial custody order in the dissolu-
tion judgment granted the plaintiff sole legal custody of the children and
did not grant the defendant any visitation rights, and the fact that the court
left open the possibility of visits at the discretion of the plaintiff did not
transform the court’s decision-making into impermissible delegation.

* In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as
amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022,
Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person
protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective
order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through
whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
** This appeal originally was argued before a panel of this court consisting
of Judges Prescott, Moll and Westbrook. Thereafter, Judge Pellegrino was
added to the panel in place of Judge Prescott, who did not participate in
the decision of the case. Judge Pellegrino has read the briefs and appendices
and listened to a recording of oral argument prior to participating in this deci-
sion.
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D. K. v. D. F.
This court declined to review the defendant’s inadequately briefed claim
that the trial court failed to apply § 46b-56 (g) when it denied his motion
for modification.
Argued February 14—officially released September 9, 2025

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Waterbury and tried to the court, Ficeto, J.;
judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain
other relief; thereafter, the court, Rapillo, J., denied
the defendant’s motion for modification of custody and
visitation, and the defendant appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
D. F., self-represented, the appellant (defendant).
Opinion

WESTBROOK, J. In this postdissolution matter, the
defendant, D. F., appeals from the trial court’s denial
of his postjudgment motion for modification of custody
and visitation.1 Although the self-represented defen-
dant’s appellate brief is not a model of clarity, we con-
strue his claims to be that the court improperly (1)
concluded that joint legal custody and visitation is not
in the children’s best interests pursuant to General Stat-
utes § 46b-56, (2) delegated its judicial authority to the
plaintiff, D. K., by giving her discretion to decide the
nature and scope of the defendant’s visitation rights,
and (3) failed to apply § 46b-56 (g). We disagree and,
accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.
The following facts, which are undisputed in the
record, and procedural history are relevant to this
appeal. The defendant and the plaintiff were married on
December 16, 2014, and they have two minor children
1
The plaintiff, D. K., did not file a brief with this court. We therefore
decide the appeal on the basis of the record and the defendant’s brief and
oral argument. See Batista v. Cortes, 203 Conn. App. 365, 366 n.1, 248 A.3d
763 (2021).
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D. K. v. D. F.

together, E and F. E was born in February, 2016, and
F was born in June, 2022.
In July, 2022, the defendant was arrested following
a domestic violence incident, and the criminal court
subsequently issued a protective order prohibiting the
defendant from contacting the plaintiff. Later that
month, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant repeat-
edly attempted to contact her through text messages,
emails, and phone calls. As a result, on August 1, 2022,
the state obtained a warrant to arrest the defendant
for, inter alia, violating a protective order in violation
of General Statutes § 53a-223 (criminal matter). On
August 2, 2022, the defendant was arrested, and, on
August 3, 2022, the criminal court, under a new docket
number, issued another protective order prohibiting the
defendant from contacting the plaintiff.
In August, 2022, after the defendant had been arrested,
the plaintiff initiated dissolution proceedings against
the defendant (family matter). In the family matter, the
plaintiff filed a motion for custody of the parties’ minor
children. The defendant filed an objection to the plain-
tiff’s motion, arguing that the court should deny her
motion and, instead, grant him sole custody of the chil-
dren. The plaintiff filed proposed orders that provided,
inter alia, that she be given sole legal and physical
custody of the children. In December, 2022, the family
court dissolved the parties’ marriage and ordered that
the plaintiff have sole legal and physical custody of
their minor children. The court did not order visitation
for the defendant. The court also approved the plain-
tiff’s proposed orders and attached them to the judg-
ment.
On April 4, 2023, in the criminal matter, the defendant,
pursuant to a plea agreement, pleaded guilty to criminal
violation of a protective order. On June 27, 2023, the
court, Schwartz, J., sentenced the defendant to eigh-
teen months of incarceration and issued a standing
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D. K. v. D. F.

criminal protective order (protective order) that was
to remain in effect until April 4, 2048. The protective
order, inter alia, prohibits the defendant from con-
tacting the plaintiff. It also provided that ‘‘[c]ontact with
[F] . . . [was] permissible if approved by [the] family
court.’’ The defendant completed his sentence and was
released from prison on February 1, 2024.
In February, 2024, the defendant filed in the family
matter a postjudgment motion for modification of cus-
tody and visitation, seeking joint custody of and visita-
tion with his children. The family court subsequently
ordered the defendant to participate in a parenting edu-
cation program, which he completed.
On April 26, 2024, in the criminal matter, the defen-
dant filed a motion to modify the protective order, ask-
ing the court to terminate the protective order so that
he could develop a relationship with the plaintiff that
would be beneficial for their children. On May 23, 2024,
the defendant filed a supplemental motion to modify
the protective order, requesting that the court terminate
or modify the protective order to ‘‘allow the defendant
[to have] contact with [the plaintiff] strictly within the
scope of the interests of the children according to the
approved . . . parenting plan . . . .’’ In his supple-
mental motion, the defendant argued that the ‘‘protec-
tive order is a significant impediment for restoring and
developing a normal relationship between the defen-
dant and the children.’’
On June 3, 2024, the criminal court held a hearing
on the defendant’s motion to modify the protective
order.2 The court thereafter issued an order denying
2
At the hearing, the following colloquy took place between the criminal
court and the defendant concerning the family matter:
‘‘The Court: All right, well, have you gone to family court and looked to
have custody of your children?
‘‘The Defendant: Yes, as I mentioned, we’re scheduled for [a hearing]
. . . .
‘‘The Court: Okay. And there’s nothing in the [protective order] that pre-
vents you from having contact with your children, right?
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D. K. v. D. F.

the defendant’s motion to modify the protective order,
and the defendant appealed from that decision.3
On July 24, 2024, the family court, Rapillo, J., held
a hearing on the defendant’s motion for modification
of custody and visitation. The plaintiff was not present.4
At the hearing, the following colloquy took place
between the court and the defendant:

‘‘The Court: So, you filed a motion to modify. Under-
stand that with a motion to modify, the court can’t make
any orders that I don’t find to be in the child’s best
interest. I know under the judgment file, it gives the
[plaintiff] sole legal custody and doesn’t make any
orders with regard to visitation.
‘‘The Defendant: Except that they live with [the plaintiff] [and] it becomes
really difficult to contact them. . . .
‘‘The Court: . . . As far as your children, there’s nothing in [the protective]
order that says you can’t contact your children. But I get that if [the plaintiff]
has sole custody and you can’t contact her, it’s very difficult for you to have
any relationship with your children. . . . But the real place to have this
argument is in family court, not here. And if you file your motion and [the
family court] say[s] that the standing criminal protective order is an issue
for [the court] . . . then come back here, and you can talk to me. But as
its stands right now, there’s nothing preventing you, by this court’s order,
from having a relationship [with your children]. So, I’d say talk to family
court and work it out there. But I’m going to deny your motion to modify
[the protective order] at this time. . . .
‘‘The Defendant: And I can return . . . if the family court decide[s] that
. . . the [protective order] is [an] impediment? . . .
‘‘The Court: . . . What I’m saying is go to family court, ask to have contact
with your children, and if the judge says well, you can’t because of my
order, then you can come back and you can tell me that. But I wouldn’t tell
any judge in family court that I’m willing to do anything. Because as of right
now, all I’m doing is denying your motion.’’
3
Contemporaneously with this opinion, this court issued a memorandum
decision affirming the judgment of the criminal court denying the defendant’s
motion to modify the protective order. See State v. Denis F., 235 Conn.
App. 901, A.3d (2025).
4
The defendant was unable to locate the plaintiff’s residence for the
purpose of serving her with notice of the hearing. After several attempts to
serve notice on the plaintiff, the court ordered that the defendant serve a
notice by publication. Notice was subsequently published in the Legal
Notices section on the Judicial Branch website from June 5 through 19, 2024.
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D. K. v. D. F.

‘‘The Defendant: No, there is nothing.
‘‘The Court: Right, because she has sole legal custody,
so that means it’s up to her. That’s what sole legal
custody means. So, you filed a motion to modify. What
is it that you are looking [for], and why do you believe
that would be in the children’s best interest[s]?’’
The defendant thereafter argued that joint legal cus-
tody and visitation is in the children’s best interests
because he has a good relationship with E and he has
concerns about the plaintiff’s parenting. He additionally
argued that there had been a substantial change in cir-
cumstances because his incarceration was the basis for
awarding the plaintiff sole legal custody, and he is no
longer incarcerated. The court asked the defendant
whether he had engaged in services or therapy since
he had been released from incarceration, and the defen-
dant responded that he had completed a parenting edu-
cation program. The court also asked the defendant
when he had last seen his children, which the defendant
explained was before he was incarcerated. The defen-
dant additionally explained to the court that the protec-
tive order allows him to contact F if the family court
approves. The following exchange then took place
between the court and the defendant:
‘‘The Court: You haven’t had any contact [with the
children]. You’re basically asking to assume full control
over their lives for kids that [you] haven’t had contact
with in a number of years. . . . I will find that there’s
been a change in circumstances since you’ve been
released from prison, but I can’t make a finding today
that . . . changing the orders would be in the kids’
best interest[s] . . . . This is based on what the record
shows would be in the kids’ best interest[s]. So, I’m
going to deny the motion to modify, and I would suggest
that, before you file another one, you get yourself
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D. K. v. D. F.

engaged in some sort of therapy . . . that will hope-
fully give you some insight and be able to think about
what would be in the kids’ best interest[s]. . . .
‘‘The Defendant: Can I have a visit? . . . Can I con-
tact them?
‘‘The Court: For now, I’m not going to order that, no.
‘‘The Defendant: Why?
‘‘The Court: Because I don’t think it would be in the
kids’ best interest[s], and that’s what the court has to
consider.’’
Later that day, the court issued an order denying
the defendant’s motion for modification of custody and
visitation. This appeal followed.
After filing the present appeal, the defendant, pursu-
ant to Practice Book § 66-5, filed a motion for articula-
tion. In his motion for articulation, the defendant argued
that the family court failed to ‘‘state the reasons upon
which the court rejected the postjudgment motion for
modification’’ pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-56a
(b).5 He also argued that the court ‘‘failed to undertake
all available measures to locate [the plaintiff] to be
served with the notice, such as: ask the plaintiff’s attor-
ney, contact relatives, [and] contact current and previ-
ous employers.’’ He requested that the court articulate:
(1) ‘‘the statutory authority the court relie[d] upon in
denying the postjudgment motion for modification of
the sole custody into [a] joint custody and visitation’’;
and (2) ‘‘the statutory authority the court relie[d] upon
5
General Statutes § 46b-56a (b) provides: ‘‘There shall be a presumption,
affecting the burden of proof, that joint custody is in the best interests of
a minor child where the parents have agreed to an award of joint custody
or so agree in open court at a hearing for the purpose of determining the
custody of the minor child or children of the marriage. If the court declines
to enter an order awarding joint custody pursuant to this subsection, the
court shall state in its decision the reasons for denial of an award of
joint custody.’’
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D. K. v. D. F.

in disregarding to resort to all available means to locate
an individual to be served.’’
On August 28, 2024, the court issued an order, which
provides: ‘‘After hearing testimony from the [defendant]
and considering all the statutory factors set out in . . .
§ 46b-56 (c), the court determined by a preponderance
of the evidence that a modification of the orders would
not be in the best interests of the minor children. The
court declines to articulate on the [defendant’s] second
request related to efforts to locate the [plaintiff]. The
statutes and case law do not place a duty on the court
to locate parties. The [defendant] was afforded ample
opportunity to effectuate service and effective service
was accomplished.’’ We turn now to the defendant’s
claims on appeal.
I
The defendant first claims that the family court
improperly concluded that joint legal custody and visita-
tion is not in the children’s best interests pursuant to
§ 46b-56.6 Specifically, he argues that the court failed
6
General Statutes § 46b-56 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) In any contro-
versy before the Superior Court as to the custody or care of minor children
. . . the court may make or modify any proper order regarding the custody,
care, education, visitation and support of the children . . . . [T]he court
may assign parental responsibility for raising the child to the parents jointly,
or may award custody to either parent or to a third party, according to its
best judgment upon the facts of the case and subject to such conditions
and limitations as it deems equitable. . . .
‘‘(b) In making or modifying any order as provided in subsection (a) of
this section, the rights and responsibilities of both parents shall be consid-
ered and the court shall enter orders accordingly that serve the best interests
of the child and provide the child with the active and consistent involvement
of both parents commensurate with their abilities and interests. Such orders
may include, but shall not be limited to: (1) Approval of a parental responsibil-
ity plan agreed to by the parents pursuant to section 46b-56a; (2) the award
of joint parental responsibility of a minor child to both parents, which shall
include (A) provisions for residential arrangements with each parent in
accordance with the needs of the child and the parents, and (B) provisions
for consultation between the parents and for the making of major decisions
regarding the child’s health, education and religious upbringing; (3) the
award of sole custody to one parent with appropriate parenting time for
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D. K. v. D. F.

to (1) consider evidence regarding the plaintiff’s parent-
ing or (2) articulate which factors it considered pursu-
ant to § 46b-56 (c). We are not persuaded.
We begin by setting forth the relevant principles of
law and our standard of review. ‘‘[Section] 46b-56
bestows upon the trial court the statutory authority to
modify an order of custody or visitation. The statute
directs the court to consider the best interests of the
the noncustodial parent where sole custody is in the best interests of the
child; or (4) any other custody arrangements as the court may determine
to be in the best interests of the child.
‘‘(c) In making or modifying any order . . . the court shall consider the
best interests of the child, and in doing so, may consider, but shall not be
limited to, one or more of the following factors: (1) The physical and emo-
tional safety of the child; (2) the temperament and developmental needs of
the child; (3) the capacity and the disposition of the parents to understand
and meet the needs of the child; (4) any relevant and material information
obtained from the child, including the informed preferences of the child;
(5) the wishes of the child’s parents as to custody; (6) the past and current
interaction and relationship of the child with each parent, the child’s siblings
and any other person who may significantly affect the best interests of the
child; (7) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage
such continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other
parent as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders; (8)
any manipulation by or coercive behavior of the parents in an effort to
involve the child in the parents’ dispute; (9) the ability of each parent to
be actively involved in the life of the child; (10) the child’s adjustment to
his or her home, school and community environments; (11) the length of
time that the child has lived in a stable and satisfactory environment and
the desirability of maintaining continuity in such environment, provided the
court may consider favorably a parent who voluntarily leaves the child’s
family home pendente lite in order to alleviate stress in the household; (12)
the stability of the child’s existing or proposed residences, or both; (13) the
mental and physical health of all individuals involved, except that a disability
of a proposed custodial parent or other party, in and of itself, shall not be
determinative of custody unless the proposed custodial arrangement is not
in the best interests of the child; (14) the child’s cultural background; (15)
the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if any domestic violence
. . . has occurred between the parents or between a parent and another
individual or the child; (16) whether the child or a sibling of the child has
been abused or neglected . . . and (17) whether the party satisfactorily
completed participation in a parenting education program . . . . The court
is not required to assign any weight to any of the factors that it considers,
but shall articulate the basis for its decision. . . .’’
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D. K. v. D. F.

child and, while not requiring the court to assign weight
to any of the factors that it considers, sets forth seven-
teen enumerated factors that the court may consider
with respect to the modification. General Statutes § 46b-
56 (c).
‘‘Our standard of review of a trial court’s decision
regarding custody, visitation and relocation orders is
one of abuse of discretion. . . . [T]he trial court’s deci-
sion on the matter of custody is committed to the exer-
cise of its sound discretion and its decision cannot be
overridden unless an abuse of that discretion is clear.
. . . The controlling principle in a determination
respecting custody is that the court shall be guided by
the best interests of the child. . . . In determining what
is in the best interests of the child, the court is vested
with a broad discretion. . . . [T]he authority to exer-
cise the judicial discretion [authorized by § 46b-56] . . .
is not conferred [on] this court, but [on] the trial court,
and . . . we are not privileged to usurp that authority
or to substitute ourselves for the trial court. . . . A
mere difference of opinion or judgment cannot justify
our intervention. Nothing short of a conviction that the
action of the trial court is one [that] discloses a clear
abuse of discretion can warrant our interference. . . .
‘‘The trial court has the opportunity to view the par-
ties [firsthand] and is therefore in the best position to
assess the circumstances . . . in which such personal
factors as the demeanor and attitude of the parties are
so significant. . . . [E]very reasonable presumption
should be given in favor of the correctness of [the trial
court’s] action. . . . We are limited in our review to
determining whether the trial court abused its broad
discretion to award custody based upon the best inter-
ests of the child as reasonably supported by the evi-
dence. . . . In employing our abuse of discretion stan-
dard, [t]he trial court’s findings are binding upon this
court unless they are clearly erroneous in light of the
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D. K. v. D. F.

evidence and the pleadings in the record as a whole.
. . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there
is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been commit-
ted. . . .
‘‘Before modifying a custody order, a court must sat-
isfy two requirements. First, modification of a custody
award must be based upon either a material change
[in] circumstances which alters the court’s finding of
the best interests of the child . . . or a finding that the
custody order sought to be modified was not based
upon the best interests of the child. . . . Second, the
court shall consider the best interests of the child and
in doing so may consider [the] several factors [set forth
in § 46b-56 (c)].’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Thomas v. Cleary,
229 Conn. App. 15, 26–28, 326 A.3d 1109 (2024). ‘‘In
considering whether to modify visitation orders, as
opposed to custody orders, a court is not required to
find as a threshold matter that a change in circum-
stances has occurred. . . . Instead, [i]n modifying an
order concerning visitation, the trial court shall be
guided by the best interests of the child . . . .’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) J. Y. v. M. R., 215 Conn.
App. 648, 658–59, 283 A.3d 520 (2022).
In the present case, the court found that there had
been a material change of circumstances since the ini-
tial custody order because the defendant, who was
incarcerated at the time of the initial custody and visita-
tion order, had been released from prison. The court
found, however, that modification of custody and visita-
tion was not in the children’s best interests because
the defendant had not had contact with his children
since before he was incarcerated, and, since he had
been released from prison, he had not engaged in any
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D. K. v. D. F.

therapy or services other than the court-ordered parent-
ing education program.
The defendant does not argue that any of the court’s
factual findings are clearly erroneous. Rather, he argues
that the court ‘‘failed to give weight to the factual issues
presented by [him], particularly, to the facts [showing]
that the [plaintiff] has repeatedly exhibited signs of
hostile behavior toward the children including attempts
to cause physical damage to the children and causing
mental harm to [E].’’ In support of this argument, he
contends that ‘‘the court refused to accept into evidence
[his] written statement where [he] listed factual circum-
stances that might have led the court to reconsider sole
custody on the grounds of the best interest[s] of the
children.’’ We disagree.
There is no indication in the record that the defendant
offered or that the court refused to accept any written
statement by the defendant concerning the plaintiff’s
parenting. At the hearing on the defendant’s motion,
he stated: ‘‘[Y]ou have my postjudgment motion for
modification. I listed there things that, in my opinion,
[raise] serious concern[s] about, you know, [the plain-
tiff’s] real and genuine attitude [toward] the children.’’
The defendant’s motion for modification, however, did
not include or attach any written statements concerning
the plaintiff’s parenting. In fact, the defendant admits,
in his appellate brief, that ‘‘the [alleged] circumstances
had been written in the statement which had not been
attached to the case.’’ (Emphasis added.)
Moreover, there is no indication that the court did
not consider the evidence regarding the plaintiff’s par-
enting. At the hearing on the defendant’s motion for
modification, the defendant testified as follows: ‘‘First
of all, [the plaintiff] likes to drink. Uh, second of all,
she did many things that would have questioned her
love [for] the children. Putting (indiscernible) in the
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D. K. v. D. F.

legs, feeding junk food, uh, not preparing food for the
school as it’s supposed to be, not dressing right, not
feeding her right, not changing the water. So, many
things that shows . . . her attitude. She had these kids
in order to have [an] advantage against me, to manipu-
late me. And during [our] entire time together, she cre-
ated [a] very toxic environment that has really serious
influence on me . . . .’’
‘‘[T]he trier [of fact] is bound to consider all the
evidence which has been admitted, as far as admissible,
for all the purposes for which it was offered and
claimed. . . . [W]e are not justified in finding error
upon pure assumptions as to what the court may have
done. . . . We cannot assume that the court’s conclu-
sions were reached without due weight having been
given to the evidence presented and the facts found.
. . . Unless the contrary appears, this court will assume
that the court acted properly.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Moye v. Commissioner of Correction,
168 Conn. App. 207, 229, 145 A.3d 362 (2016), cert.
denied, 324 Conn. 905, 153 A.3d 653 (2017); see also
Watson Real Estate, LLC v. Woodland Ridge, LLC, 187
Conn. App. 282, 294 n.11, 202 A.3d 1033 (2019) (‘‘[i]t is
difficult . . . for an appellant successfully to challenge
a fact finder’s consideration and weighing of evidence
. . . [as] we . . . are entitled to presume that the trial
court acted properly and considered all the evidence’’
(internal quotation marks omitted)). The court may con-
sider many factors in determining whether modification
of custody and visitation is in the children’s best inter-
ests and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
we presume that the court properly weighed all the
evidence before it.
The defendant additionally argues that the court
improperly failed to articulate which of the factors set
forth in § 46b-56 (c) it considered in concluding that
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modification of custody and visitation was not in the
children’s best interests. We disagree.
Although § 46b-56 (c) provides that the court ‘‘shall
articulate the basis for its decision,’’ the statute also
states that ‘‘[t]he court is not required to assign any
weight to any of the factors that it considers . . . .’’
This court has further explained that the trial court is
not required to consider all of the factors set forth in
§ 46b-56 (c). See In re Paulo T., 213 Conn. App. 858,
875, 279 A.3d 766 (2022) (‘‘the court considered and
balanced the most relevant factors set forth in § 46b-
56 (c) in accordance with our law’’), aff’d, 347 Conn.
311, 297 A.3d 194 (2023); Weaver v. Sena, 199 Conn.
App. 852, 864, 238 A.3d 103 (2020) (holding that court
did not abuse its discretion by focusing on certain § 46b-
56 (c) factors in best interest analysis); Watrous v.
Watrous, 108 Conn. App. 813, 825, 949 A.2d 557 (2008)
(explaining that language of § 46b-56 (c) does not com-
pel consideration of any particular factor or factors
when determining best interests of children).
In the present case, the court stated, in response to
the defendant’s motion for articulation, that it consid-
ered ‘‘all the statutory factors set out in [§] 46b-56 (c)
. . . .’’ At the hearing on the defendant’s motion for
modification, the court indicated that it afforded signifi-
cant weight to the fact that the defendant had not had
contact with the children since before his incarceration
and had not engaged in therapy or services since his
release from prison. Notably, the court suggested that
the defendant should engage in therapy to gain ‘‘insight
and be able to think about’’ the children’s best interests
before he files another motion for modification of cus-
tody and visitation.7 As the court is not required to
consider any particular factors or assign weight to the
7
The defendant is not precluded from filing another motion for modifica-
tion of custody and/or visitation. See Practice Book § 25-26.
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factors that it considered, we conclude that the court
properly articulated its basis for concluding that modifi-
cation of custody and visitation is not in the children’s
best interests pursuant to § 46b-56. The court, therefore,
did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for
modification.
II
The defendant next claims that the family court improp-
erly delegated its judicial authority to the plaintiff by
giving her discretion to decide the nature and scope of
the defendant’s visitation rights. Specifically, the defen-
dant contends that the court ‘‘misinterpreted the law,
particularly . . . § 46b-56 (a) by stating that: ‘because
[the plaintiff] has sole legal custody . . . that means it
[is] up to her . . . to decide the [defendant’s] visitation
rights.’ ’’ We disagree.
We begin with the standard of review and the relevant
legal principles. ‘‘Whether the trial court improperly
delegated its judicial authority is a legal question over
which we have plenary review. . . .
‘‘It is well settled . . . that [n]o court in this state
can delegate its judicial authority to any person serving
the court in a nonjudicial function. The court may seek
the advice and heed the recommendation contained in
the reports of persons engaged by the court to assist
it, but in no event may such a nonjudicial entity bind
the judicial authority to [issue] any order or [to render
a] judgment so advised or recommended. . . . A court
improperly delegates its judicial authority to [a nonjudi-
cial entity] when that person is given authority to issue
orders that affect the parties or the children. Such
orders are part of a judicial function that can be done
only by one clothed with judicial authority.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) R. H. v. M.
H., 350 Conn. 432, 440, 324 A.3d 720 (2024).
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‘‘[T]he statutory language [of § 46b-56] itself pre-
cludes a trial court from delegating decision-making
authority over whether a parent has visitation rights to
anyone who is not a judge. . . . Only the trial court
can modify its prior order regarding visitation. With
respect to child custody and visitation orders, § 46b-56
grants the trial court continuing jurisdiction to make
or modify any proper order regarding the education
and support of the children and of care, custody and
visitation . . . according to the court’s perception of
the best interests of the child. . . . This judicial respon-
sibility cannot be delegated, nor can the parties abro-
gate it by agreement. . . . In the final analysis, the
court retains jurisdiction to determine and advance the
best interests of the child. . . . [A] trial court improp-
erly delegates its judicial authority [under § 46b-56]
when that court removes itself entirely from the deci-
sion-making process.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 441–42.
Our Supreme Court has differentiated among three
scenarios concerning a trial court’s delegation of its
judicial authority under § 46b-56: (1) the trial court
‘‘plainly decide[s] that [a parent] should not have any
right to custody or visitation,’’ but ‘‘[leaves] open the
possibility of voluntary visits at the discretion of [a third
party]’’; (emphasis in original) Zilkha v. Zilkha, 180
Conn. App. 143, 172, 183 A.3d 64, cert. denied, 328 Conn.
937, 183 A.3d 1175 (2018); (2) the trial court grants a
noncustodial parent visitation rights and issues an order
‘‘allowing [a third party] to alter, change, or modify the
[parent’s] visitation schedule while not permitting [the
third party] to reduce, suspend, or terminate the [par-
ent’s] access to their child’’; (emphasis added) R. H. v.
M. H., supra, 350 Conn. 444; and (3) the trial court
grants a noncustodial parent visitation rights and issues
an order allowing a third party to ‘‘dictate the scope of
[the parent’s] contact with [the child] . . . .’’ (Internal
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quotation marks omitted.) Id., 443. Our Supreme Court
has indicated that the first two scenarios do not consti-
tute an impermissible delegation of judicial authority;
see id., 444–45; but that the third scenario is an improper
delegation of the trial court’s judicial authority because
‘‘a trial court cannot remove itself entirely from the
decision-making process’’ and authorize a third party
to ‘‘modify [a noncustodial parent’s] right to visitation.’’
(Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Id., 444. The present case concerns the first sce-
nario.
In Zilkha v. Zilkha, supra, 180 Conn. App. 143, the
trial court’s postdissolution order limited the defen-
dant’s visitation with his teenage children to voluntary
visitation at their discretion. Id., 165. On appeal, the
defendant claimed that the trial court impermissibly
delegated its judicial authority to the children in giving
them sole discretion over his visitation. Id., 168. This
court rejected the defendant’s claim, stating: ‘‘[R]ather
than delegating its responsibility, the court exercised
its authority and met its obligation to decide issues
of custody and visitation by denying the defendant’s
motions [for modification]. This adjudication by the
court was the antithesis of a delegation because it
plainly decided that the defendant should not have any
right to custody or visitation. The fact that the court’s
order left open the possibility of voluntary visits at
the discretion of the teenagers does not transform the
court’s decision-making into impermissible delegation.’’
(Emphasis altered.) Id., 172.
The present case is similar to Zilkha. Here, the court’s
initial custody order granted the plaintiff sole legal cus-
tody of the children and did not grant the defendant
any visitation rights. At the hearing on the defendant’s
motion for modification, the court explained that, under
the initial custody and visitation order, the defendant
has no right to visitation and, therefore, visitation is at
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the discretion of the plaintiff. The court thereafter
denied the defendant’s motion for modification, leaving
the initial custody and visitation order in place. Because
the court, like the trial court in Zilkha, decided that
the defendant should not have any right to custody or
visitation, the fact that the court left open the possibility
of visits at the discretion of the plaintiff does not trans-
form the court’s decision-making into impermissible
delegation. See id. Thus, we conclude that the court
did not impermissibly delegate its judicial authority to
the plaintiff.
III
Finally, the defendant claims that the family court
failed to apply § 46b-56 (g).8 We conclude that this claim
is inadequately briefed and, therefore, we decline to
consider it.
‘‘We repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not required
to review issues that have been improperly presented
to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analy-
sis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in
order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief
the issue properly. . . . [When] a claim is asserted in
the statement of issues but thereafter receives only
cursory attention in the brief without substantive dis-
cussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be
abandoned. . . . For a reviewing court to judiciously
and efficiently . . . consider claims of error raised on
appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth
their arguments in their briefs. . . .
‘‘In addition, briefing is inadequate when it is not only
short, but confusing, repetitive, and disorganized. . . .
We are mindful that [i]t is the established policy of the
8
General Statutes § 46b-56 (g) provides: ‘‘A parent not granted custody
of a minor child shall not be denied the right of access to the academic,
medical, hospital or other health records of such minor child, unless other-
wise ordered by the court for good cause shown.’’
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Connecticut courts to be solicitous of [self-represented]
litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights
of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally
in favor of the [self-represented] party. . . . Nonethe-
less, [a]lthough we allow [self-represented] litigants
some latitude, the right of self-representation provides
no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules
of procedural and substantive law.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Thomas v. Cleary, supra, 229 Conn.
App. 35–36.
In the present case, the defendant’s appellate brief
contains two references to § 46b-56 (g). First, the issues
presented section of the defendant’s appellate brief
identifies the following issue: ‘‘Whether the [family]
court committed legal and factual errors as it applied
. . . [§] 46b-56 (g)?’’ Second, the argument section pro-
vides in relevant part: ‘‘The [family] court failed to apply
[§] 46b-56 (g). ‘The noncustodial parent retains a statu-
tory right of access to the academic, medical, hospital
or other health records of the child[ren] unless it is
otherwise ordered by the court for the good cause
shown.’ ’’ In his appellate brief, the defendant merely
recites the language of § 46b-56 (g) and asserts, in a
single conclusory statement, that the court failed to
apply that statutory provision. He does not provide any
legal authority, facts, or analysis to support his claim
that the court failed to apply § 46b-56 (g) or how such
failure rendered improper the court’s denial of his
motion for modification.
Although we ‘‘allow the defendant some latitude as
a self-represented litigant,’’ the sparsity and lack of sub-
stantive argument render his brief ‘‘inadequate for us to
conduct any meaningful review of’’ this claim. (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Thomas v. Cleary, supra, 229
Conn. App. 37; see also C. B. v. S. B., 211 Conn. App.
628, 630–31, 273 A.3d 271 (2022) (declining to review
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claim when briefing was sparse, conclusory, disorga-
nized, and confusing). Because the defendant has failed
to challenge, in any meaningful way, the court’s denial
of his motion for modification on the ground that the
court failed to apply § 46b-56 (g), we decline to review
this claim.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.