Huang v. Murray

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion
motions and petitions for certification is the “officially
released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut
Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports
or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is
to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an
opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and
subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut
Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the
State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced
or distributed without the express written permission of
the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial
Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Huang v. Murray

SHAOHUA HUANG v. BRIAN CONSTANTINE
MURRAY ET AL.
(AC 47364)
Suarez, Westbrook and Wilson, Js.

Syllabus

The named defendant, M, appealed from the trial court’s judgment of pos-
session for the plaintiff landlord in the plaintiff’s summary process action.
M claimed, inter alia, that the court had misapplied the law in rendering the
judgment of possession. Held:

M failed to demonstrate that the trial court’s legal conclusion regarding
his right to occupy the premises was not legally and logically correct or that
the relevant facts that the court had relied on were not supported by the
evidence in the record, and, accordingly, this court affirmed the judgment
of possession rendered against M.

This court dismissed the appeal with respect to M’s claims regarding the
trial court’s rulings against the other defendants because it concluded that
M was not aggrieved relative to those claims, and, therefore, the claims were
jurisdictionally defective, and this court could not adjudicate their merits.

Argued January 22—officially released February 24, 2026

Procedural History

Summary process action, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Hous-
ing Session, where the court, Cirello, J., granted the
plaintiff’s motions for default for failure to appear and
judgment of possession against the defendant Jane Doe
#1, also known as Dana Lynn Dalrymple, et al.; thereaf-
ter, the court, Cirello, J., entered a default judgment of
possession against the defendant Jonathan Dalrymple;
subsequently, the court, Cirello, J., entered default judg-
ments against the defendant John Doe #1, also known
as Sean Dalrymple, et al.; thereafter, the case was tried
to the court, Cirello, J.; judgment of possession for the
plaintiff, from which the named defendant appealed to
this court. Appeal dismissed in part; affirmed.
Huang v. Murray

Brian Constantine Murray, self-represented, the
appellant (named defendant).

Opinion

PER CURIAM. In this summary process action, the
defendant Brian Constantine Murray1 appeals from the
judgment of possession rendered by the trial court in
favor of the plaintiff, Shaohua Huang.2 Murray claims
on appeal that the trial court improperly (1) misapplied
the law in rendering the judgment of possession, (2)
determined that the plaintiff had established her owner-
ship of the premises and, thus, her standing to bring the
summary process action, (3) granted motions for default
and rendered default judgments of possession against
other defendants, and (4) allowed the court-appointed
attorney for the defendant Jonathan Dalrymple to with-
draw from representation.3 We disagree with claims
one and two and conclude that Murray is not aggrieved
with respect to claims three and four. Accordingly, we
1
Also named as defendants in the action were Murray’s wife, Jane Doe
#1, also known as Dana Lynn Dalrymple; his two adult sons, Jonathan
Dalrymple and John Doe #1, also known as Sean Dalrymple; and John
Doe #2, Jane Doe #2 and Jane Doe #3, whose names were not known to
the plaintiff at the time the action was commenced. Jane Doe #2 and
Jane Doe #3 were later identified as, respectively, Ashlee N. Dalrymple
and Kaitlyn M. Dalrymple. Prior to trial, the court granted motions
for default for failure to appear and entered default judgment of pos-
session against Ashlee N. Dalrymple, Kaitlyn M. Dalrymple and Dana
Lynn Dalrymple, none of whom is a participant in the present appeal.
2
We note that the plaintiff did not file an appellee’s brief with this
court nor did she appear at oral argument. Therefore, the appeal was
considered on the basis of Murray’s brief and oral argument and the
record only.
3
Murray’s appellant brief is not a model of clarity. We nevertheless are
mindful of the fact that Murray is a self-represented party, and we have
attempted to be solicitous in our review of his claims, restating them
as necessary for clarity. See C. B. v. S. B., 211 Conn. App. 628, 630,
273 A.3d 271 (2022) (“[i]t is the established policy of the Connecticut
courts to be solicitous of [self-represented] litigants and when it does
not interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of
practice liberally in favor of the [self-represented] party” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Huang v. Murray

dismiss the appeal with respect to claims three and four
and otherwise affirm the judgment of the court.
The following facts, which were found by the court
or are undisputed in the record, and procedural his-
tory are relevant to our disposition of this appeal. The
plaintiff is the landlord and owner of premises located
at 38 Drumlin Road in Westport. She leased the prem-
ises to Murray for a two year term between February,
2021, and February, 2023. The premises was occupied
by Murray and his immediate family members, who also
were named as defendants in this action. See footnote
1 of this opinion. In November, 2023, following service
of the statutorily required notice to quit, the plaintiff
brought the underlying summary process action, in which
she alleged termination of the lease by lapse of time, that
the defendants’ right or privilege to occupy the premises
had terminated, that the defendants never had the right
or privilege to occupy the premises, and the nonpayment
of rent or use and occupancy payments. Murray entered
an appearance as a self-represented litigant. Attorney
Richard Rapice was appointed by the court and entered
an appearance on behalf of Jonathan Dalrymple. The
defendant Sean Dalrymple and the remaining defendants
were nonappearing in the trial court action.
The court, Cirello, J., conducted a trial on the plain-
tiff’s summary process complaint on February 8, 2024,
following which, on the same day, it issued an order
rendering a judgment of possession in favor of the plain-
tiff. In its order, the court explained that, during the
hearing, it had excused Rapice from his representation
of Jonathan Dalrymple on the basis of the court’s in cam-
era review of correspondence indicating that Jonathan
Dalrymple had requested that Rapice’s representation
be terminated. The court further explained that the
summary process trial had proceeded with the plaintiff,
her counsel, and Murray present. The trial court stated
that it had rendered a default judgment of possession
against Jonathan Dalrymple because “he was aware of
the matter and failed to appear or retain counsel for
Huang v. Murray

the scheduled trial date.” Moreover, the court provided
that it was entering “default [judgments] against John
Doe #1 [also known as] Sean Dalrymple and John Doe
#2 upon oral motion of the plaintiff during trial,” after
“conclud[ing] that the nonappearing defendants wilfully
failed to file an appearance in the action for the purposes
of delay.” In addition to the default judgments, the court
concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment
against Murray on the ground that his right or privilege
to occupy the premises had terminated and, as a result,
the court rendered judgment of immediate possession
for the plaintiff against all of the defendants. Murray
thereafter timely filed the present appeal.4
“Summary process is a special statutory procedure
designed to provide an expeditious remedy. . . . It enable[s]
landlords to obtain possession of leased premises without
suffering the delay, loss and expense to which, under the
common-law actions, they might be subjected by ten-
ants wrongfully holding over their terms. . . . Summary
process statutes secure a prompt hearing and final deter-
mination. . . . Therefore, the statutes relating to sum-
mary process must be narrowly construed and strictly
followed. . . . As a condition precedent to a summary
process action, proper notice to quit is a jurisdictional
necessity.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) HUD/Willow Street Apartments v. Gonzalez,
68 Conn. App. 638, 642–43, 792 A.2d 165 (2002). In
an appeal challenging a judgment of possession, “it is
the function of this court to determine whether the
decision of the trial court is clearly erroneous. . . . This
4
On April 12, 2024, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss this appeal
as frivolous, which this court denied on May 8, 2024. Prior to oral argu-
ment, this court notified the parties “to be prepared to address at oral
argument to what extent Murray is raising claims on appeal regarding
the trial court’s rulings against the other defendants in this action, Sean
Dalrymple and Jonathan Dalrymple, and whether such claims should
be dismissed as jurisdictionally defective for lack of aggrievement. See
U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Healey, 224 Conn. App. 867, [874–75, 315
A.3d 1112] (dismissing appeal by summary process defendants because
they sought to assert claims involving legal interests of another party),
cert. denied, 350 Conn. 910, [324 A.3d 141] (2024).”
Huang v. Murray

involves a two part function: [if] the legal conclusions
of the court are challenged, we must determine whether
they are legally and logically correct and whether they
find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of
decision; [if] the factual basis of the court’s decision is
challenged we must determine whether the facts set out
in the memorandum of decision are supported by the
evidence or whether, in light of the evidence and the
pleadings in the whole record, those facts are clearly
erroneous.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Getty
Properties Corp. v. ATKR, LLC, 315 Conn. 387, 406,
107 A.3d 931 (2015).
Murray’s first two claims on appeal challenge the pro-
priety of the judgment of possession rendered against
him. Specifically, Murray argues that the plaintiff “has a
history of filing defective and erroneous summary process
actions” and implies that there was a problem with the
notice to quit in the present case without explaining the
precise nature of the purported defect or how the court
misapplied the law. He additionally argues that the plain-
tiff failed to properly establish that she was the owner
of the property with standing to litigate this action.
The court, however, found that the plaintiff owned the
property and that finding is not clearly erroneous because
it is supported by the plaintiff’s testimony at trial. See
Sullivan v. Lazzari, 135 Conn. App. 831, 846, 43 A.3d
750 (“As the trier of fact, it was the court’s exclusive
province to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine
the credibility of witnesses and determine whether to
accept some, all or none of a witness’ testimony. . . . The
function of the appellate court is to review, and not retry,
the proceedings of the trial court.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 305 Conn. 925, 47 A.3d
884 (2012). Finally, Murray argues that the lease had
an arbitration clause that should have precluded the
court from hearing the summary process action, but he
fails to analyze how such a clause would bar this eviction
action, which was not premised upon a dispute regarding
the lease, which had expired, and nothing in the record
shows that Murray sought to exercise his rights under
Huang v. Murray

the arbitration clause. Having thoroughly reviewed the
underlying record, including the relevant pleadings,
exhibits and transcripts, as well as the briefs of the par-
ties, we conclude that Murray has failed to demonstrate
that the court’s legal conclusion regarding his lack of a
right to occupy the premises was not legally and logically
correct or that the relevant facts that the court relied on
were not supported by evidence in the record. Accord-
ingly, with respect to claims one and two, we affirm the
judgment of possession rendered against Murray in favor
of the plaintiff.
With respect to Murray’s remaining claims, claims
three and four, we construe them as seeking to challenge
the judgment of possession rendered against his sons.
Specifically, Murray claims that the court improperly
allowed Rapice to withdraw his representation of Jona-
than Dalrymple and subsequently rendered a default
judgment of possession against Jonathan Dalrymple.
Murray further claims that the court improperly ren-
dered a default judgment of possession against Sean
Dalrymple without properly taking into account that
Sean Dalrymple was a military reservist and by failing to
provide him proper notice pursuant to the Servicemem-
bers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. § 3901 et seq.5
“The terms aggrievement and standing have been
used interchangeably throughout most of Connecticut
5
Murray filed his appellant’s brief on November 13, 2024. Jonathan
Dalrymple filed an appellee’s brief as a self-represented litigant on
March 27, 2025, and Sean Dalrymple filed an appellee’s brief as a self-
represented litigant on July 23, 2025. In his appellee’s brief, Jonathan
Dalrymple claims that the trial court misapplied the governing law in
rendering a judgment of possession in favor of the plaintiff, improperly
allowed Rapice to withdraw his representation, and improperly rendered
a default judgment of possession against him. The appellee’s brief filed
by Sean Dalrymple is substantively similar to the briefs filed by Murray
and Jonathan Dalrymple insofar as he appears to claim that the trial
court improperly rendered a default judgment against him, arguing
that he was a military reservist and that the plaintiff did not comply
with the notice requirement of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50
U.S.C. § 3901 et seq. Neither Jonathan Dalrymple nor Sean Dalrymple,
however, is listed on the appeal form as an appellant, and neither filed
a cross appeal. Moreover, neither sought to formally participate in this
Huang v. Murray

jurisprudence. We previously have stated that [t]he ques-
tion of aggrievement is essentially one of standing . . . .
Although these two legal concepts are similar, they are
not, however, identical. Aggrievement is established if
there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty,
that some legally protected interest . . . has been adversely
affected. . . . Aggrievement, in essence, is appellate
standing. . . . It is axiomatic that aggrievement is a basic
requirement of standing, just as standing is a fundamen-
tal requirement of jurisdiction. . . . There are two general
types of aggrievement, namely, classical and statutory;
either type will establish standing, and each has its own
unique features.6 . . . The test for determining [classi-
cal] aggrievement encompasses a well settled twofold
determination: first, the party claiming aggrievement
must demonstrate a specific personal and legal interest
in the subject matter of the decision, as distinguished
from a general interest shared by the community as a
whole; second, the party claiming aggrievement must
establish that this specific personal and legal interest has
been specially and injuriously affected by the decision.”
(Citations omitted; footnote added; internal quotation
marks omitted.) U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Healey, 224
Conn. App. 867, 873–74, 315 A.3d 1112, cert. denied,
350 Conn. 910, 324 A.3d 141 (2024).
In Healey, this court dismissed an appeal in a summary
process case taken from the denial of the self-represented
defendants’ motion to open and dismiss the judgment of
possession rendered against them because the basis for
appeal as an appellant rather than as an appellee. Therefore, insofar
as their briefs also seek reversal rather than affirmance of the trial
court’s judgment, we treat them as briefs filed by appellees who sup-
port the position of the appellant in accordance with Practice Book §
67-3A, notwithstanding their noncompliance with the provision that
“an appellee who supports the position of the appellant shall meet the
appellant’s time schedule for filing a brief.”
6
There is no statute relevant to this appeal that would provide a basis
for Murray to claim aggrievement with respect to the rulings made as to
Sean Dalrymple and Jonathan Dalrymple, and Murray has not argued
to the contrary. Accordingly, statutory aggrievement is not at issue,
and we limit our discussion to classical aggrievement.
Huang v. Murray

the motion to open was the plaintiff’s alleged failure to
serve a nonparty adult resident of the premises with a
statutorily compliant notice to quit. Id., 875–77. This
court determined in Healey that the specific, personal,
and legal interest asserted by the defendants belonged
only to the nonparty, such that their appeal from the
denial of a motion based wholly on the nonparty’s interest
was jurisdictionally defective for lack of aggrievement.
Id., 875. Here, Murray raises claims on appeal regard-
ing the trial court’s default judgments rendered against
Sean Dalrymple and Jonathan Dalrymple, as well as the
trial court’s ruling regarding the termination of Rapice’s
representation of Jonathan Dalrymple. Although Sean
Dalrymple and Jonathan Dalrymple were named as defen-
dants in the trial court action, unlike the nonparty at
issue in Healey, Healey nonetheless is instructive insofar
as Murray, like the defendants in Healey, seeks appel-
late relief in part on the basis of rulings regarding Sean
Dalrymple and Jonathan Dalrymple that do not affect
his own specific, personal, and legal interest because a
separate judgment of possession was rendered against
him on the merits of the plaintiff’s claims. See id. “[If]
a defendant has not established individual standing .
. . this court is without subject matter jurisdiction to
consider the merits of his underlying claim.” State v.
Bradley, 341 Conn. 72, 91, 266 A.3d 823 (2021); see also
Zenon v. Mossy, 114 Conn. App. 734, 734 n.1, 970 A.2d
814 (2009) (holding that self-represented plaintiff could
not represent interests of another party); Third Taxing
District v. Lyons, 35 Conn. App. 795, 798, 647 A.2d 32
(“[g]enerally . . . a party does not have standing to raise
another person’s rights”), cert. denied, 231 Conn. 936,
650 A.2d 173 (1994).
To the extent that Murray makes claims on appeal
regarding the trial court’s rulings against other defen-
dants, such as Sean Dalrymple and Jonathan Dalrymple,
we conclude that Murray is not aggrieved relative to
those claims, and, therefore, we cannot adjudicate their
merits. Stated plainly, to the extent that Murray seeks to
vindicate claims belonging to his sons, those claims are
Huang v. Murray

jurisdictionally defective and, thus, not properly before
us. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal with respect to
those claims.
The appeal is dismissed with respect to the named
defendant’s claims regarding the default judgments of
possession against Jonathan Dalrymple and Sean Dal-
rymple; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion
motions and petitions for certification is the “officially
released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut
Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports
or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is
to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an
opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and
subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut
Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the
State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced
or distributed without the express written permission of
the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial
Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Huang v. Murray

SHAOHUA HUANG v. BRIAN CONSTANTINE
MURRAY ET AL.
(AC 47364)
Suarez, Westbrook and Wilson, Js.
Syllabus

The named defendant, M, appealed from the trial court’s judgment of pos-
session for the plaintiff landlord in the plaintiff’s summary process action.
M claimed, inter alia, that the court had misapplied the law in rendering the
judgment of possession. Held:

M failed to demonstrate that the trial court’s legal conclusion regarding
his right to occupy the premises was not legally and logically correct or that
the relevant facts that the court had relied on were not supported by the
evidence in the record, and, accordingly, this court affirmed the judgment
of possession rendered against M.

This court dismissed the appeal with respect to M’s claims regarding the
trial court’s rulings against the other defendants because it concluded that
M was not aggrieved relative to those claims, and, therefore, the claims were
jurisdictionally defective, and this court could not adjudicate their merits.

Argued January 22—officially released February 24, 2026

Procedural History

Summary process action, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Hous-
ing Session, where the court, Cirello, J., granted the
plaintiff’s motions for default for failure to appear and
judgment of possession against the defendant Jane Doe
#1, also known as Dana Lynn Dalrymple, et al.; thereaf-
ter, the court, Cirello, J., entered a default judgment of
possession against the defendant Jonathan Dalrymple;
subsequently, the court, Cirello, J., entered default judg-
ments against the defendant John Doe #1, also known
as Sean Dalrymple, et al.; thereafter, the case was tried
to the court, Cirello, J.; judgment of possession for the
plaintiff, from which the named defendant appealed to
this court. Appeal dismissed in part; affirmed.
Brian Constantine Murray, self-represented, the
appellant (named defendant).
Huang v. Murray

Opinion

PER CURIAM. In this summary process action, the
defendant Brian Constantine Murray1 appeals from the
judgment of possession rendered by the trial court in
favor of the plaintiff, Shaohua Huang.2 Murray claims
on appeal that the trial court improperly (1) misapplied
the law in rendering the judgment of possession, (2)
determined that the plaintiff had established her owner-
ship of the premises and, thus, her standing to bring the
summary process action, (3) granted motions for default
and rendered default judgments of possession against
other defendants, and (4) allowed the court-appointed
attorney for the defendant Jonathan Dalrymple to with-
draw from representation.3 We disagree with claims
one and two and conclude that Murray is not aggrieved
with respect to claims three and four. Accordingly, we
dismiss the appeal with respect to claims three and four
and otherwise affirm the judgment of the court.
The following facts, which were found by the court
or are undisputed in the record, and procedural history
1
Also named as defendants in the action were Murray’s wife, Jane Doe
#1, also known as Dana Lynn Dalrymple; his two adult sons, Jonathan
Dalrymple and John Doe #1, also known as Sean Dalrymple; and John
Doe #2, Jane Doe #2 and Jane Doe #3, whose names were not known to
the plaintiff at the time the action was commenced. Jane Doe #2 and
Jane Doe #3 were later identified as, respectively, Ashlee N. Dalrymple
and Kaitlyn M. Dalrymple. Prior to trial, the court granted motions
for default for failure to appear and entered default judgment of pos-
session against Ashlee N. Dalrymple, Kaitlyn M. Dalrymple and Dana
Lynn Dalrymple, none of whom is a participant in the present appeal.
2
We note that the plaintiff did not file an appellee’s brief with this
court nor did she appear at oral argument. Therefore, the appeal was
considered on the basis of Murray’s brief and oral argument and the
record only.
3
Murray’s appellant brief is not a model of clarity. We nevertheless are
mindful of the fact that Murray is a self-represented party, and we have
attempted to be solicitous in our review of his claims, restating them
as necessary for clarity. See C. B. v. S. B., 211 Conn. App. 628, 630,
273 A.3d 271 (2022) (“[i]t is the established policy of the Connecticut
courts to be solicitous of [self-represented] litigants and when it does
not interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of
practice liberally in favor of the [self-represented] party” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Huang v. Murray

are relevant to our disposition of this appeal. The plain-
tiff is the landlord and owner of premises located at 38
Drumlin Road in Westport. She leased the premises to
Murray for a two year term between February, 2021,
and February, 2023. The premises was occupied by Mur-
ray and his immediate family members, who also were
named as defendants in this action. See footnote 1 of this
opinion. In November, 2023, following service of the
statutorily required notice to quit, the plaintiff brought
the underlying summary process action, in which she
alleged termination of the lease by lapse of time, that the
defendants’ right or privilege to occupy the premises had
terminated, that the defendants never had the right or
privilege to occupy the premises, and the nonpayment
of rent or use and occupancy payments. Murray entered
an appearance as a self-represented litigant. Attorney
Richard Rapice was appointed by the court and entered
an appearance on behalf of Jonathan Dalrymple. The
defendant Sean Dalrymple and the remaining defendants
were nonappearing in the trial court action.
The court, Cirello, J., conducted a trial on the plain-
tiff’s summary process complaint on February 8, 2024,
following which, on the same day, it issued an order
rendering a judgment of possession in favor of the plain-
tiff. In its order, the court explained that, during the
hearing, it had excused Rapice from his representation
of Jonathan Dalrymple on the basis of the court’s in cam-
era review of correspondence indicating that Jonathan
Dalrymple had requested that Rapice’s representation
be terminated. The court further explained that the
summary process trial had proceeded with the plaintiff,
her counsel, and Murray present. The trial court stated
that it had rendered a default judgment of possession
against Jonathan Dalrymple because “he was aware of
the matter and failed to appear or retain counsel for
the scheduled trial date.” Moreover, the court provided
that it was entering “default [judgments] against John
Doe #1 [also known as] Sean Dalrymple and John Doe
#2 upon oral motion of the plaintiff during trial,” after
“conclud[ing] that the nonappearing defendants wilfully
Huang v. Murray

failed to file an appearance in the action for the purposes
of delay.” In addition to the default judgments, the court
concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment
against Murray on the ground that his right or privilege
to occupy the premises had terminated and, as a result,
the court rendered judgment of immediate possession
for the plaintiff against all of the defendants. Murray
thereafter timely filed the present appeal.4
“Summary process is a special statutory procedure
designed to provide an expeditious remedy. . . . It enable[s]
landlords to obtain possession of leased premises without
suffering the delay, loss and expense to which, under the
common-law actions, they might be subjected by ten-
ants wrongfully holding over their terms. . . . Summary
process statutes secure a prompt hearing and final deter-
mination. . . . Therefore, the statutes relating to sum-
mary process must be narrowly construed and strictly
followed. . . . As a condition precedent to a summary
process action, proper notice to quit is a jurisdictional
necessity.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) HUD/Willow Street Apartments v. Gonzalez,
68 Conn. App. 638, 642–43, 792 A.2d 165 (2002). In
an appeal challenging a judgment of possession, “it is
the function of this court to determine whether the
decision of the trial court is clearly erroneous. . . . This
involves a two part function: [if] the legal conclusions
of the court are challenged, we must determine whether
they are legally and logically correct and whether they
find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of
decision; [if] the factual basis of the court’s decision is
4
On April 12, 2024, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss this appeal
as frivolous, which this court denied on May 8, 2024. Prior to oral argu-
ment, this court notified the parties “to be prepared to address at oral
argument to what extent Murray is raising claims on appeal regarding
the trial court’s rulings against the other defendants in this action, Sean
Dalrymple and Jonathan Dalrymple, and whether such claims should
be dismissed as jurisdictionally defective for lack of aggrievement. See
U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Healey, 224 Conn. App. 867, [874–75, 315
A.3d 1112] (dismissing appeal by summary process defendants because
they sought to assert claims involving legal interests of another party),
cert. denied, 350 Conn. 910, [324 A.3d 141] (2024).”
Huang v. Murray

challenged we must determine whether the facts set out
in the memorandum of decision are supported by the
evidence or whether, in light of the evidence and the
pleadings in the whole record, those facts are clearly
erroneous.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Getty
Properties Corp. v. ATKR, LLC, 315 Conn. 387, 406,
107 A.3d 931 (2015).
Murray’s first two claims on appeal challenge the pro-
priety of the judgment of possession rendered against
him. Specifically, Murray argues that the plaintiff “has a
history of filing defective and erroneous summary process
actions” and implies that there was a problem with the
notice to quit in the present case without explaining the
precise nature of the purported defect or how the court
misapplied the law. He additionally argues that the plain-
tiff failed to properly establish that she was the owner
of the property with standing to litigate this action.
The court, however, found that the plaintiff owned the
property and that finding is not clearly erroneous because
it is supported by the plaintiff’s testimony at trial. See
Sullivan v. Lazzari, 135 Conn. App. 831, 846, 43 A.3d
750 (“As the trier of fact, it was the court’s exclusive
province to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine
the credibility of witnesses and determine whether to
accept some, all or none of a witness’ testimony. . . . The
function of the appellate court is to review, and not retry,
the proceedings of the trial court.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 305 Conn. 925, 47 A.3d
884 (2012). Finally, Murray argues that the lease had
an arbitration clause that should have precluded the
court from hearing the summary process action, but he
fails to analyze how such a clause would bar this eviction
action, which was not premised upon a dispute regarding
the lease, which had expired, and nothing in the record
shows that Murray sought to exercise his rights under
the arbitration clause. Having thoroughly reviewed the
underlying record, including the relevant pleadings,
exhibits and transcripts, as well as the briefs of the par-
ties, we conclude that Murray has failed to demonstrate
that the court’s legal conclusion regarding his lack of a
Huang v. Murray

right to occupy the premises was not legally and logically
correct or that the relevant facts that the court relied on
were not supported by evidence in the record. Accord-
ingly, with respect to claims one and two, we affirm the
judgment of possession rendered against Murray in favor
of the plaintiff.
With respect to Murray’s remaining claims, claims
three and four, we construe them as seeking to challenge
the judgment of possession rendered against his sons.
Specifically, Murray claims that the court improperly
allowed Rapice to withdraw his representation of Jona-
than Dalrymple and subsequently rendered a default
judgment of possession against Jonathan Dalrymple.
Murray further claims that the court improperly ren-
dered a default judgment of possession against Sean
Dalrymple without properly taking into account that
Sean Dalrymple was a military reservist and by failing to
provide him proper notice pursuant to the Servicemem-
bers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. § 3901 et seq.5
“The terms aggrievement and standing have been
used interchangeably throughout most of Connecticut
5
Murray filed his appellant’s brief on November 13, 2024. Jonathan
Dalrymple filed an appellee’s brief as a self-represented litigant on
March 27, 2025, and Sean Dalrymple filed an appellee’s brief as a self-
represented litigant on July 23, 2025. In his appellee’s brief, Jonathan
Dalrymple claims that the trial court misapplied the governing law in
rendering a judgment of possession in favor of the plaintiff, improperly
allowed Rapice to withdraw his representation, and improperly rendered
a default judgment of possession against him. The appellee’s brief filed
by Sean Dalrymple is substantively similar to the briefs filed by Murray
and Jonathan Dalrymple insofar as he appears to claim that the trial
court improperly rendered a default judgment against him, arguing
that he was a military reservist and that the plaintiff did not comply
with the notice requirement of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50
U.S.C. § 3901 et seq. Neither Jonathan Dalrymple nor Sean Dalrymple,
however, is listed on the appeal form as an appellant, and neither filed
a cross appeal. Moreover, neither sought to formally participate in this
appeal as an appellant rather than as an appellee. Therefore, insofar
as their briefs also seek reversal rather than affirmance of the trial
court’s judgment, we treat them as briefs filed by appellees who sup-
port the position of the appellant in accordance with Practice Book §
67-3A, notwithstanding their noncompliance with the provision that
Huang v. Murray

jurisprudence. We previously have stated that [t]he ques-
tion of aggrievement is essentially one of standing . . . .
Although these two legal concepts are similar, they are
not, however, identical. Aggrievement is established if
there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty,
that some legally protected interest . . . has been adversely
affected. . . . Aggrievement, in essence, is appellate
standing. . . . It is axiomatic that aggrievement is a basic
requirement of standing, just as standing is a fundamen-
tal requirement of jurisdiction. . . . There are two general
types of aggrievement, namely, classical and statutory;
either type will establish standing, and each has its own
unique features.6 . . . The test for determining [classi-
cal] aggrievement encompasses a well settled twofold
determination: first, the party claiming aggrievement
must demonstrate a specific personal and legal interest
in the subject matter of the decision, as distinguished
from a general interest shared by the community as a
whole; second, the party claiming aggrievement must
establish that this specific personal and legal interest has
been specially and injuriously affected by the decision.”
(Citations omitted; footnote added; internal quotation
marks omitted.) U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Healey, 224
Conn. App. 867, 873–74, 315 A.3d 1112, cert. denied,
350 Conn. 910, 324 A.3d 141 (2024).
In Healey, this court dismissed an appeal in a summary
process case taken from the denial of the self-represented
defendants’ motion to open and dismiss the judgment of
possession rendered against them because the basis for
the motion to open was the plaintiff’s alleged failure to
serve a nonparty adult resident of the premises with a
statutorily compliant notice to quit. Id., 875–77. This
court determined in Healey that the specific, personal,
and legal interest asserted by the defendants belonged

“an appellee who supports the position of the appellant shall meet the
appellant’s time schedule for filing a brief.”
6
There is no statute relevant to this appeal that would provide a basis
for Murray to claim aggrievement with respect to the rulings made as to
Sean Dalrymple and Jonathan Dalrymple, and Murray has not argued
to the contrary. Accordingly, statutory aggrievement is not at issue,
and we limit our discussion to classical aggrievement.
Huang v. Murray

only to the nonparty, such that their appeal from the
denial of a motion based wholly on the nonparty’s interest
was jurisdictionally defective for lack of aggrievement.
Id., 875. Here, Murray raises claims on appeal regard-
ing the trial court’s default judgments rendered against
Sean Dalrymple and Jonathan Dalrymple, as well as the
trial court’s ruling regarding the termination of Rapice’s
representation of Jonathan Dalrymple. Although Sean
Dalrymple and Jonathan Dalrymple were named as defen-
dants in the trial court action, unlike the nonparty at
issue in Healey, Healey nonetheless is instructive insofar
as Murray, like the defendants in Healey, seeks appel-
late relief in part on the basis of rulings regarding Sean
Dalrymple and Jonathan Dalrymple that do not affect
his own specific, personal, and legal interest because a
separate judgment of possession was rendered against
him on the merits of the plaintiff’s claims. See id. “[If]
a defendant has not established individual standing .
. . this court is without subject matter jurisdiction to
consider the merits of his underlying claim.” State v.
Bradley, 341 Conn. 72, 91, 266 A.3d 823 (2021); see also
Zenon v. Mossy, 114 Conn. App. 734, 734 n.1, 970 A.2d
814 (2009) (holding that self-represented plaintiff could
not represent interests of another party); Third Taxing
District v. Lyons, 35 Conn. App. 795, 798, 647 A.2d 32
(“[g]enerally . . . a party does not have standing to raise
another person’s rights”), cert. denied, 231 Conn. 936,
650 A.2d 173 (1994).
To the extent that Murray makes claims on appeal
regarding the trial court’s rulings against other defen-
dants, such as Sean Dalrymple and Jonathan Dalrymple,
we conclude that Murray is not aggrieved relative to
those claims, and, therefore, we cannot adjudicate their
merits. Stated plainly, to the extent that Murray seeks to
vindicate claims belonging to his sons, those claims are
jurisdictionally defective and, thus, not properly before
us. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal with respect to
those claims.
The appeal is dismissed with respect to the named
defendant’s claims regarding the default judgments of
Huang v. Murray

possession against Jonathan Dalrymple and Sean Dal-
rymple; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.