Bank of America, N.A. v. Street

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion
motions and petitions for certification is the “officially
released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut
Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports
or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is
to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an
opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and
subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut
Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the
State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced
or distributed without the express written permission of
the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial
Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Bank of America, N.A. v. Street

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. v. GRAEME
L. STREET ET AL.
(AC 48109)
Alvord, Elgo and Keller, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant property owners appealed from the trial court’s judgment
of strict foreclosure rendered for the second substitute plaintiff, C Co. The
defendants claimed that the court improperly granted C Co.’s motion for
summary judgment because, inter alia, a genuine issue of material fact
existed as to whether the original plaintiff, A Co., had standing when it
commenced the action. Held:

This court affirmed the trial court’s judgment on an alternative ground, as the
record unequivocally indicated that the trial court properly granted A Co.’s
motion to substitute the first substitute plaintiff, the real party in interest,
pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 9-20), thus curing any jurisdictional defect
that may have existed when A Co. commenced the action.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants’ requests
to conduct additional discovery prior to the court’s ruling on C Co.’s motion
for summary judgment, as the defendants did not provide any valid reason
why C Co.’s motion for summary judgment should have been denied or the
ruling delayed due to their requested discovery, and the defendants’ reli-
ance on JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn. v. Lakner (347 Conn. 476)
was misplaced, as that case was inapplicable because the defendants in the
present case not only received discovery, but received the very discovery
required by the court to affirmatively decide the standing issue raised by
the defendants in summary judgment.

Argued December 15, 2025—officially released March 24, 2026

Procedural History

Action to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property
owned by the named defendant et al., and for other relief,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district
of Middlesex, where U.S. Bank National Association,
Trustee for the RMAC Trust, Series 2016-CTT, was
substituted as the plaintiff; thereafter, U.S. Bank Trust
National Association, Trustee for RCF 2 Acquisition
Trust, was substituted as the plaintiff; subsequently,
the court, Hon. Edward S. Domnarski, judge trial
referee, granted the substitute plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment as to liability only; thereafter, the
court, Hon. Edward S. Domnarski, judge trial referee,
Bank of America, N.A. v. Street

granted the substitute plaintiff’s motion for a judgment
of strict foreclosure and rendered judgment thereon,
from which the named defendant et al. appealed to this
court. Affirmed.
Thomas P. Willcutts, for the appellants (named defen-
dant et al.).

Opinion

ELGO, J. The defendants Graeme L. Street and
Katherine L. Street appeal from the judgment of strict
foreclosure rendered by the trial court in favor of the
second substitute plaintiff, U.S. Bank Trust National
Association, Trustee for RCF 2 Acquisition Trust.1 On
appeal, the defendants claim that the court improperly
granted the second substitute plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment. More specifically, the defendants
contend that (1) a genuine issue of material fact exists
as to whether the original plaintiff had standing when
the action commenced and (2) the court misapplied the
holding in JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Assn. v.
Lakner, 347 Conn. 476, 298 A.3d 249 (2023), when it
ruled on the motion for summary judgment despite the
1
The second substitute plaintiff appeared, but has not participated,
in this appeal. Because it did not file an appellate brief, we ordered that
the appeal shall be considered on the basis of the defendants’ brief, oral
argument, and the record. See, e.g., Ammar I. v. Evelyn W., 227 Conn.
App. 827, 830 n.2, 323 A.3d 1111 (2024).
In addition, we note that, although Bank of America, N.A., commenced
this foreclosure action, the court granted Bank of America, N.A.’s
motion to substitute U.S. Bank National Association, Trustee for the
RMAC Trust, Series 2016-CTT, as the substitute plaintiff. The court
subsequently granted that party’s motion to substitute U.S. Bank Trust
National Association, Trustee for the RCF 2 Acquisition Trust, as the
second substitute plaintiff. For clarity, we refer to Bank of America,
N.A., as the original plaintiff, U.S. Bank National Association, Trustee
for the RMAC Trust, Series 2016-CTT, as the substitute plaintiff, and
U.S. Bank Trust National Association, Trustee for the RCF 2 Acquisi-
tion Trust, as the second substitute plaintiff in this opinion.
Lastly, we note that the Bank of America, N.A., also was named as a
defendant in this action, but did not appear. Accordingly, all references
herein to the defendants are to Graeme L. Street and Katherine L. Street.
Bank of America, N.A. v. Street

defendants’ outstanding discovery requests. We affirm
the judgment of the trial court.2
The following facts and procedural history, viewed in
the light most favorable to the defendants, are relevant to
this appeal.3 On July 31, 2007, the defendants executed
and delivered to the original plaintiff a note for a loan
in the original principal amount of $940,000. The loan
proceeds were used to purchase real property located at
23 River Road Drive in Essex (property), and to secure
the note, the defendants mortgaged the property to the
original plaintiff. The mortgage was recorded in the
Essex land records.
On July 1, 2016, the defendants allegedly failed to
make the monthly installment payment on the note,
and the original plaintiff exercised its option to declare
the entire balance due. On August 3, 2016, the original
plaintiff sent notices of default to the defendants. On
August 13, 2016, the notices were received and signed
by the defendants. On November 16, 2016, the original
plaintiff forwarded a bailee letter agreement to its agent,
Hunt, Liebert & Jacobson, P.C. Along with the bailee
2
In their statement of issues in their principal appellate brief, the
defendants also set forth an additional claim that the court abused its
discretion in denying them their requested relief in their motion for
reconsideration. The defendants, however, failed to brief any arguments
related to the court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to reconsider,
and we therefore decline to consider it as it is inadequately briefed.
See Hudson City Savings Bank v. Hellman, 234 Conn. App. 45, 72
n.16, 343 A.3d 781 (“Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion,
is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief
the issue properly. . . . [When] a claim is asserted in the statement of
issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief with-
out substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be
abandoned.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 353
Conn. 920, 345 A.3d 809 (2025).
3
We note that this appeal comes to us with a complicated procedural
history resulting in numerous delays, which we have not delineated
here. Much of this procedural history, which contributed to the unusual
length of time this case was on the docket, included a defendant filing
for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, attempted mediation, and the case being
placed on the dormancy docket. That procedural history is not pertinent
to the present appeal.
Bank of America, N.A. v. Street

letter, the mortgage and note were forwarded to the
original plaintiff’s agent.4
On April 7, 2017, the original plaintiff commenced this
foreclosure action against the defendants. The initial
complaint did not allege that the original plaintiff owned
the note, nor did it include the note as an exhibit. The
initial complaint was not filed by Hunt, Liebert & Jacob-
son, P.C., but, rather, by Marinosci Law Group, P.C.
On July 18, 2017, the original plaintiff assigned and
transferred the mortgage and note to the substitute
plaintiff. On September 20, 2017, the original plain-
tiff filed a motion to substitute that party pursuant
to Practice Book § 9-20.5 In that motion, the original
plaintiff argued that “the mortgage has been assigned
since commencing the action in the name of [the original
plaintiff] through error and inadvertence . . . .” The court
summarily granted this motion.
On September 20, 2018, the substitute plaintiff filed
a revised complaint, the operative complaint. The opera-
tive complaint alleged that the substitute plaintiff took
ownership of the note on July 18, 2017, via an assignment
from the original plaintiff. The substitute plaintiff’s
revised complaint was accompanied by three exhibits:
4
“A bailment involves a delivery of the thing bailed into the posses-
sion of the bailee, under a contract to return it to the owner according
to the terms of the agreement. . . . A relationship of bailor-bailee arises
when the owner, while retaining general title, delivers personal prop-
erty to another for some particular purpose upon an express or implied
contract to redeliver the goods when the purpose has been fulfilled, or
to otherwise deal with the goods according to the bailor’s directions. .
. . In bailment, the owner or bailor has a general property [interest] in
the goods bailed . . . . The bailee, on the other hand, has mere possession
of items left in its care pursuant to the bailment.” (Emphasis omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Fezollari v. Jauzovic, 232 Conn.
App. 20, 36–37, 335 A.3d 861 (2025).
5
Practice Book § 9-20 provides in relevant part: “When any action has
been commenced in the name of the wrong person as the plaintiff, the
judicial authority may, if satisfied that it was so commenced through
mistake and that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter
in dispute so to do, allow any other person to be substituted or added as
the plaintiff. . . .” (Citation omitted.)
Bank of America, N.A. v. Street

the note, the mortgage, and the assignment. The note
produced by the substitute plaintiff was endorsed in
blank. By way of relief, the substitute plaintiff requested
to foreclose the mortgage, possession of the property, a
deficiency judgment against the defendants, the appoint-
ment of a receiver to collect rents and profits from the
property, and costs and fees.
On January 29, 2019, the defendants filed their answer,
in which they largely left the substitute plaintiff to its
proof and claimed, as a special defense, that the origi-
nal plaintiff did not have standing when it commenced
the action. Specifically, the defendants alleged that the
original plaintiff did not own the note when it commenced
the action against them.
On March 23, 2023, the substitute plaintiff filed a
motion to substitute the second substitute plaintiff as
the sole plaintiff pursuant to Practice Book § 9-16,6 which
the court summarily granted. The substitute plaintiff’s
motion noted the assignments of the mortgage that
ended with the second substitute plaintiff in possession
of the mortgage on November 4, 2022. Appended to that
motion as an exhibit were copies of the assignments of
the mortgage and the note from the substitute plaintiff
to DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc., and from DLJ Mortgage
Capital, Inc., to the second substitute plaintiff.
On June 14, 2023, the second substitute plaintiff
moved for summary judgment. In its memorandum in
support of that motion, the second substitute plaintiff
argued that the original plaintiff had standing to com-
mence this foreclosure action, as evidenced by the chain
of ownership of the mortgage and the note, which estab-
lished that standing was maintained throughout the case.
To substantiate that argument, the second substitute
6
Practice Book § 9-16 provides: “If, pending the action, the plaintiff
assigns the cause of action, the assignee, upon written motion, may
either be joined as a coplaintiff or be substituted as a sole plaintiff, as
the judicial authority may order; provided that it shall in no manner
prejudice the defense of the action as it stood before such change of
parties.”
Bank of America, N.A. v. Street

plaintiff attached the sworn affidavit of Nik Fox, a case
manager employed by Selene Finance, L.P., to its memo-
randum of law.7 In that affidavit, Fox averred that the
original plaintiff commenced this foreclosure action
on or about April 4, 2017. He further stated that the
original plaintiff forwarded the note and the mortgage
to its agent via a bailee letter on November 16, 2016, and
commenced the action on April 4, 2017. Accompanying
Fox’s affidavit were multiple exhibits, including a copy
of the note, endorsed in blank; a copy of the mortgage;
and the assignments of the mortgage and the note from
the original plaintiff to the substitute plaintiff, from
the substitute plaintiff to DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc.,
and from DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc., to the second
substitute plaintiff. The assignment of the mortgage
and the note from the original plaintiff to the substitute
plaintiff occurred on July 18, 2017. In addition, Fox
averred that the note and the mortgage currently were
in the physical possession of Marinosci Law Group, P.C.,
attorneys for the second substitute plaintiff. Fox averred
that the second substitute plaintiff currently owns the
note and the mortgage.
On July 28, 2023, the defendants filed a motion for an
extension of time to file an opposition to the motion for
summary judgment, arguing that they needed additional
time to “resolve outstanding discovery disputes . . . to
properly oppose summary judgment.” The court granted
the defendants’ motion.
On December 11, 2023, the defendants noticed a
deposition of the second substitute plaintiff’s affiant,
Fox, wherein the defendants requested that the second
substitute plaintiff furnish the “complete mortgage
file,” including several specific pieces of discovery: all
correspondences to or from the defendants, all trust
7
Selene Finance, L.P., is the loan servicer for the defendants’ mort-
gage, and services the loan on behalf of the second substitute plaintiff,
which owns the debt. In his affidavit, Fox stated that all the documents
attached as exhibits were business records made in the regular course
of the second substitute plaintiff’s business and that, to the best of his
knowledge, are true.
Bank of America, N.A. v. Street

agreements related to the note, all mortgage servicing
agreements related to the note, all pooling and servicing
agreements related to the note, all powers of attorney
related to the note, all assignments or transfers of the
note, all records of mortgage payments by the defen-
dants, and all documents related to the transfer of the
note to the second substitute plaintiff. On January 12,
2024, the defendants deposed Fox. On February 23,
2024, the court scheduled a hearing on the motion for
summary judgment for March 18, 2024.
On March 15, 2024, three days before the hearing, the
defendants filed a memorandum of law in opposition to
the second substitute plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment. The defendants attached the two notices of
deposition and the entire transcript of the Fox deposition
as exhibits. In their memorandum of law, the defendants
argued that the original plaintiff never had standing to
initiate the foreclosure.8 The defendants also argued that
the court should deny or, alternatively, delay ruling on
the second substitute plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment until the second substitute plaintiff produced
the requested discovery.
On March 18, 2024, the court heard oral arguments
on the second substitute plaintiff’s motion for sum-
mary judgment. On the same day, the defendants served
requests for admissions on the second substitute plaintiff
and filed notice with the court. The defendants requested
that the second substitute plaintiff make two admis-
sions: (1) that the original plaintiff transferred owner-
ship of the mortgage and the note prior to commencing
the foreclosure action and (2) that the original plaintiff
was not the owner of the mortgage and the note when
it commenced this foreclosure action.9 Also on March
8
Specifically, the defendants argued at the hearing on the motion for
summary judgment that the missing link in the present case is the bailee
letter from the original plaintiff to Marinosci Law Group, P.C. In light
of this court’s resolution of the standing issue on alternative grounds,
the defendants’ argument is academic. See part I of this opinion.
9
The second substitute plaintiff never responded to the defendants’
requests for admissions.
Bank of America, N.A. v. Street

18, 2024, the defendants filed an affidavit, pursuant
to Practice Book § 17-47,10 and a motion for order of
compliance, pursuant to Practice Book § 13-14.11 In that
affidavit, the defendants’ attorney, Thomas Willcutts,
stated: “During [Fox’s] deposition, [Willcutts] raised
the issue of the [second substitute] plaintiff providing
documents relevant to the [original] plaintiff’s standing,
but [the second substitute plaintiff’s counsel] declined
to discuss the matter at that time and [the] parties, to
date, have made no further progress on the defendants’
outstanding document discovery requests.” In the motion
to order compliance, the defendants requested that the
court compel the second substitute plaintiff to produce
the documents requested at the deposition, which the
defendants claim came due on or about February 9, 2024.
On April 9, 2024, the court granted the second sub-
stitute plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. In its
memorandum of decision, the court determined that the
only disputed issue on summary judgment was whether
the original plaintiff was the holder of the note when
this action commenced. The court found that the note
was signed on July 31, 2007, and the original plaintiff
was the original lender and holder of the note, which
was endorsed by the original plaintiff in blank, and
the endorsement was not dated. While the court found
that the Fox affidavit did not “expressly state” that the
original plaintiff was the note holder on the date the
action commenced, it found that the exhibits “establish
a sequence of events related to dates and ownership of
the subject note.” Specifically, the court found that,
10
Practice Book § 17-47 provides: “Should it appear from the affida-
vits of a party opposing the motion that such party cannot, for reasons
stated, present facts essential to justify opposition, the judicial author-
ity may deny the motion for judgment or may order a continuance to
permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had or may make
such other order as is just.”
11
Practice Book § 13-14 (a) provides in relevant part: “If a party has
failed . . . to comply with any other discovery order made pursuant to
Sections 13-6 through 13-11, the judicial authority may, on motion,
make such order proportional to the noncompliance as the ends of
justice require.”
Bank of America, N.A. v. Street

“[a]lthough physical possession of the documents were
delivered to the bailee, [the original plaintiff] as bailor,
remained the owner and holder of the note.” Although the
court noted a gap in the chain of bailees—between Hunt,
Liebert & Jacobson, P.C., and the Marinosci Law Group,
P.C.—the court found that the documentary materials
furnished by the second substitute plaintiff in support
of its motion for summary judgment established that
the original plaintiff was the note holder on November
16, 2016. Additionally, the court found that the action
was commenced on April 7, 2017, and the assignment
of the note and the mortgage to the substitute plaintiff
occurred on July 18, 2017, “more than three months after
the action was commenced.” The court concluded that
“[the] documentary evidence is sufficient to establish
that [the original plaintiff] was the holder of the note
between November 16, 2016, and July 18, 2017, and
thus, [the original plaintiff] was the holder of the note
when it commenced this action on April 7, 2017.”
Moreover, the court determined that the defendants
“have not submitted any affidavits or other evidence to
establish that an entity other than [the original plaintiff]
was the holder of the note when the action was com-
menced on April 7, 2017. The defendants essentially
speculate that [the original plaintiff] was not the holder
of the note when the action commenced because of the
. . . language in the [September 20, 2017] motion to
substitute plaintiff. . . . The defendants have raised the
issue of standing but they have not provided any proof,
let alone sufficient proof, to establish that [the original
plaintiff] did not have standing to bring this action on
April 7, 2017.”
Regarding the defendants’ discovery requests, the
court noted that the defendants had filed an affidavit
pursuant to Practice Book § 17-47 claiming that not
all the requested documents were produced. The court
stated that “the defendants have not established a valid
reason why the [second substitute] plaintiff’s motion
should be denied, or how additional documents [would
Bank of America, N.A. v. Street

be] necessary. As noted earlier, the [original] plaintiff’s
affiant was deposed and the affidavit and supporting
documents were made exhibits at the deposition. In press-
ing this motion, the [second substitute] plaintiff has not
relied on any documents that have not been provided to
the defendants. . . . The defendants had all of the docu-
ments that the [second substitute] plaintiff submitted
to the court. The affidavit and supporting documents
establish[ed] that the [original] plaintiff [had] standing.
Standing [was] the only issue raised by the defendants
in their motion.” Accordingly, the court rendered sum-
mary judgment as to liability in favor of the second
substitute plaintiff.
On April 29, 2024, the defendants filed a motion to
reargue. The second substitute plaintiff objected to the
defendants’ motion. On May 23, 2024, the defendants
filed an evidentiary supplement to their motion to rear-
gue, in which they argued that the second substitute
plaintiff had failed to respond to its requests for admis-
sion, which amounted to a conclusive admission that
the original plaintiff did not own the note when it com-
menced this action.12 On May 29, 2024, the defendants
filed a memorandum of law in support of their motion
to reargue, wherein they claimed the court misapplied
the holding in JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Assn.
v. Lakner, supra, 347 Conn. 476, and raised the defense
of standing, in part based on the requests for admission
deemed admitted. The court granted the defendants’
request to reargue and heard oral arguments on the defen-
dants’ motion on June 17, 2024. By order dated July 1,
2024, the court summarily denied the relief requested
by the defendants.
12
Practice Book § 13-23 (a) provides in relevant part: “Each matter
of which an admission is requested is admitted unless, within thirty
days after the filing of the notice required by Section 13-22 (b) . . . the
party to whom the request is directed files and serves upon the party
requesting the admission a written answer or objection addressed to
the matter . . . .”
Practice Book § 13-24 (a) provides in relevant part: “Any matter
admitted under this section is conclusively established unless the judi-
cial authority on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the
admission. . . .”
Bank of America, N.A. v. Street

On September 4, 2024, the second substitute plaintiff
filed a motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure. The
court granted the second substitute plaintiff’s motion
and entered a judgment of strict foreclosure on Septem-
ber 23, 2024. The court found that the total debt was
approximately $1.4 million and the fair market value
of the property was approximately $1.25 million. The
court set the first law day for October 28, 2024. This
appeal followed.
As a preliminary matter, we note the standard of
review and relevant legal principles. “Although the party
seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing
the nonexistence of any material fact . . . a party oppos-
ing summary judgment must substantiate its adverse
claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material
fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence
of such an issue. . . . A material fact is one that makes a
difference in the outcome of a case. . . .
“Summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings,
affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
. . . The trial court must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . .
“[T]o establish a prima facie case in a mortgage foreclo-
sure action, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that it is the owner of the note and mort-
gage, that the defendant mortgagor has defaulted on the
note and that any conditions precedent to foreclosure . . .
have been satisfied. . . . Thus, a court may properly grant
summary judgment as to liability in a foreclosure action
if the complaint and supporting affidavits establish an
undisputed prima facie case and the defendant fails to
assert any legally sufficient special defense. . . .
“[T]he party raising a special defense has the burden
of proving the facts alleged therein. . . . If the plaintiff
in a foreclosure action has shown that it is entitled to
foreclose, then the burden is on the defendant to produce
Bank of America, N.A. v. Street

evidence supporting its special defenses in order to create
a genuine issue of material fact . . . . Legally sufficient
special defenses alone do not meet the defendant’s bur-
den. The purpose of a special defense is to plead facts that
are consistent with the allegations of the complaint but
demonstrate, nonetheless, that the plaintiff has no cause
of action. . . . Further . . . [t]he applicable rule regard-
ing the material facts to be considered on a motion for
summary judgment is that the facts at issue are those
alleged in the pleadings. . . . [B]ecause any valid special
defense raised by the defendant ultimately would prevent
the court from rendering judgment for the plaintiff, a
motion for summary judgment should be denied when
any [special] defense presents significant fact issues that
should be tried. . . .
“On appeal, [w]e must decide whether the trial court
erred in determining that there was no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. . . . Because the trial court
rendered judgment for the [plaintiff] as a matter of law,
our review is plenary and we must decide whether [the
trial court’s] conclusions are legally and logically correct
and find support in the facts that appear in the record.”
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Bretoux, 225 Conn.
App. 455, 462–63, 317 A.3d 152 (2024).
I
We first address the defendants’ claim that the original
plaintiff lacked standing when it commenced this fore-
closure action. We conclude that the original plaintiff
properly substituted the real party in interest pursuant
to Practice Book § 9-20, thus curing any jurisdictional
defect that may have existed when the original plaintiff
commenced this action. We thus affirm the court’s ruling
on an alternative ground.13
13
See, e.g., Grady v. Somers, 294 Conn. 324, 349 n.28, 984 A.2d
684 (2009).
Bank of America, N.A. v. Street

“Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery
in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction
of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or
representative capacity, some real interest in the cause
of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest
in the subject matter of the controversy. . . . Where a
party is found to lack standing, the court is consequently
without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the
cause. . . . Our review of this question of law is plenary.
“Generally, in order to have standing to bring a fore-
closure action the plaintiff must, at the time the action
is commenced, be entitled to enforce the promissory
note that is secured by the property. . . . The plaintiff’s
possession of a note endorsed in blank is prima facie
evidence that it is a holder and is entitled to enforce the
note, thereby conferring standing to commence a fore-
closure action. . . . After the plaintiff has presented this
prima facie evidence, the burden is on the defendant to
impeach the validity of [the] evidence that [the plaintiff]
possessed the note at the time that it commenced the . .
. action or to rebut the presumption that [the plaintiff]
owns the underlying debt. . . .
“The rules for standing in foreclosure actions when the
issue of standing is raised may be succinctly summarized
as follows. When a holder seeks to enforce a note through
foreclosure, the holder must produce the note. The note
must be sufficiently endorsed so as to demonstrate that
the foreclosing party is a holder, either by a specific
endorsement to that party or by means of a blank endorse-
ment to bearer. If the foreclosing party shows that it is
a valid holder of the note and can produce the note, it is
presumed that the foreclosing party is the rightful owner
of the debt. That presumption may be rebutted by the
defending party, but the burden is on the defending party
to provide sufficient proof that the holder of the note is
not the owner of the debt, for example, by showing that
ownership of the debt had passed to another party. It is
not sufficient to provide that proof, however, merely by
pointing to some documentary lacuna in the chain of title
that might give rise to the possibility that some other
party owns the debt. In order to rebut the presumption,
Bank of America, N.A. v. Street

the defendant must prove that someone else is the owner
of the note and debt. Absent that proof, the plaintiff may
rest its standing to foreclose on its status as the holder of
the note.” (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Goshen Mortgage, LLC
v. Androulidakis, 205 Conn. App. 15, 23–25, 257 A.3d
360, cert. denied, 338 Conn. 913, 259 A.3d 653 (2021).
Although lack of standing is generally a jurisdictional
defect, the legislature has deemed it curable: “When any
action has been commenced in the name of the wrong
person as plaintiff, the court may, if satisfied that it was
so commenced through mistake, and that it is necessary
for the determination of the real matter in dispute so
to do, allow any other person to be substituted or added
as plaintiff.” General Statutes § 52-109; see also Prac-
tice Book § 9-20.14 As our Supreme Court explained:
“Although a plaintiff’s lack of standing is a jurisdic-
tional defect . . . it is a type of jurisdictional defect that
our legislature, through the enactment of § 52-109,
has deemed amenable to correction and, therefore, not
irremediably fatal to an action. . . . [Section] 52-109
allow[s] a substituted plaintiff to enter a case [w]hen
any action has been commenced in the name of the wrong
person as [the] plaintiff, and that such a substitution will
relate back to and correct, retroactively, any defect in a
prior pleading concerning the identity of the real party
in interest. . . . Thus, a substitution of a real party in
interest as the plaintiff cures the lack of standing of the
original plaintiff . . . and, further, is permissible even
after the statute of limitations has run. . . . An addition
or substitution is discretionary, but generally should be
allowed when, due to an error, misunderstanding or mis-
conception, an action was commenced in the name of the
wrong party, instead of the real party in interest, whose
presence is required for a determination of the matter in
dispute.” (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Fairfield Merrittview Ltd.
Partnership v. Norwalk, 320 Conn. 535, 552–53, 133
A.3d 140 (2016).
14
See footnote 5 of this opinion.
Bank of America, N.A. v. Street

This court has expressly stated that, in a foreclosure
action wherein the plaintiff commenced the action with-
out standing, the only remedy was either dismissal due
to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction or substitution
of the proper plaintiff pursuant to § 52-109 and Practice
Book § 9-20. See Ion Bank v. J.C.C. Custom Homes, LLC,
189 Conn. App. 30, 42, 206 A.3d 208 (2019) (“[T]he
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action
commenced by a plaintiff without standing. . . . Other
than a dismissal of the action, the only remedy available
if the wrong party commences an action is found in §
52-109 and Practice Book § 9-20.”).
In the present case, assuming arguendo that the defen-
dants are correct insofar as the original plaintiff did
not have standing to commence this action, the record
unequivocally indicates that the original plaintiff filed
a motion to substitute party pursuant to Practice Book
§ 9-20.15 In that motion, the original plaintiff argued
that “the mortgage has been assigned since commencing
the action in the name of [the original plaintiff] through
error and inadvertence, which assignment is identified in
the [attached exhibit].”16 The purpose of a substitution
15
The defendants also argue that the original plaintiff did not have
standing due to the defendants’ requests for admission, which were
deemed admitted by operation of Practice Book §§ 13-23 (a) and 13-24
after the second substitute plaintiff failed to respond to them within
thirty days. The defendants requested the second substitute plaintiff
make two admissions: (1) that the original plaintiff transferred owner-
ship of the mortgage and the note prior to filing the foreclosure action
and (2) that the original plaintiff was not the owner of the note when
it commenced this foreclosure action. The defendants argue that these
two admissions conclusively prove that the original plaintiff did not
have standing when it commenced the action. Our analysis is the same
whether we assume that the original plaintiff lacked standing or take
these admissions as conclusive proof that the original plaintiff lacked
standing.
16
The defendants also argue that this language in the original plain-
tiff’s motion to substitute party implies that the original plaintiff did
not have standing when the action commenced. Insofar as the filing
of a motion pursuant to Practice Book § 9-20 itself suggests that the
original plaintiff did not have standing when the action commenced,
the remedial purpose of § 9-20, which cures a standing defect, renders
the defendants’ contention academic.
Bank of America, N.A. v. Street

pursuant to § 9-20 is to “[cure] the lack of standing of
the original plaintiff . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Goshen Mortgage, LLC v.
Androulidakis, supra, 205 Conn. App. 32. In the pres-
ent case, the court granted the original plaintiff’s § 9-20
motion.17 In so doing, any defect in the original plaintiff’s
standing was cured. We therefore conclude that the trial
court reached the proper determination and affirm its
conclusion on an alternative ground.18
II
The defendants also claim that the court misapplied
the holding in JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.
v. Lakner, supra, 347 Conn. 476, by ruling on the second
substitute plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment
17
Although the original plaintiff did not file the required memorandum
of law with its motion to substitute party pursuant to Practice Book §
11-10 and the court did not make a specific finding that the action was
commenced in the name of the wrong plaintiff due to some mistake in its
summary ruling, the record indicates that the defendants never objected
to the original plaintiff’s motion to substitute party. Further, we “do
not presume error on the part of the trial court.” Brett Stone Painting
& Maintenance, LLC v. New England Bank, 143 Conn. App. 671, 681,
72 A.3d 1121 (2013). Moreover, the defendants have not challenged
the propriety of the court’s ruling on the original plaintiff’s motion
to substitute party in this appeal. See Gosselin v. Gosselin, 110 Conn.
App. 142, 151–52, 955 A.2d 60 (2008) (“It is fundamental that the scope
of appellate review in a given appeal is defined by the claims of error
actually raised by the parties. . . . [I]n the absence of a question relating
to subject matter jurisdiction, the Appellate Court may not reach out
and decide a case before it on the basis that the parties never have raised
or briefed. . . . That precedent is grounded in the principle of judicial
restraint.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)).
18
We note that, after being substituted, the substitute plaintiff filed
an amended complaint, wherein the substitute plaintiff produced a copy
of the note, endorsed in blank; a copy of the mortgage; and a copy of
the assignment from the original plaintiff to the substitute plaintiff.
The defendants do not challenge the substitute plaintiff’s standing in
this action. Likewise, in its motion for summary judgment, the second
substitute plaintiff produced a copy of the note, endorsed in blank, and
the chain of assignments showing the assignments of the note and the
mortgage from the original plaintiff to the substitute plaintiff, from
the substitute plaintiff to DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc., and from DLJ
Mortgage Capital, Inc., to the second substitute plaintiff. The defendants
do not challenge the second substitute plaintiff’s standing in this action.
Bank of America, N.A. v. Street

when several of their discovery requests were outstand-
ing.19 We disagree.
First, we note that the defendants’ framing of this
claim misstates the court’s ruling on the defendants’ dis-
covery requests in its memorandum of decision on sum-
mary judgment, specifically regarding the defendants’
Practice Book § 17-47 affidavit. The court determined
both that the defendants had received relevant discovery
from the second substitute plaintiff and that the defen-
dants had failed to provide a valid reason as to why any
additional documentary discovery would be necessary
to decide the standing issue, the only disputed issue on
summary judgment. The defendants’ argument, thus, is
more properly framed as a question of whether the court
abused its discretion in ruling on summary judgment in
light of the defendants’ § 17-47 affidavit and request to
deny or delay ruling on summary judgment.
Practice Book § 17-47 provides: “Should it appear from
the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that such
19
The defendants also filed a motion to compel pursuant to Practice
Book § 13-14 (a). We note that the court did not explicitly rule on the
defendants’ motion to compel production. Nevertheless, our review of
the court’s memorandum of decision on the second substitute plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment, in which it more generally addressed and
rejected the defendants’ additional requests for discovery, notably filed
on the date of the hearing itself, convinces us that the court implicitly
denied the defendants’ motion to compel. See, e.g., Pryor v. Brignole,
231 Conn. App. 659, 695, 333 A.3d 1112 (2025) (concluding, on basis
of trial court’s memorandum of decision and record, that trial court
implicitly granted defendants’ motions). We note that trial courts have
broad discretion in managing discovery. See Traystman v. Traystman,
141 Conn. App. 789, 802, 62 A.3d 1149 (2013) (“With respect to the
appropriate standard of review [regarding the court’s ruling on discov-
ery requests], Practice Book § 13-14 (a) provides in relevant part that
a trial court may, on motion [to compel production], make such order
as the ends of justice require. Consequently, the granting or denial of
a discovery request rests in the sound discretion of the court . . . and
can be reversed only if such an order constitutes an abuse of that discre-
tion. The ultimate issue in our review is, therefore, whether the trial
court reasonably could have concluded as it did.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.)). In this appeal, the defendants have not raised a claim
regarding their motion to compel. As it is not properly before us, we
will not consider the propriety of the court’s actions with respect to
that discovery request.
Bank of America, N.A. v. Street

party cannot, for reasons stated, present facts essential
to justify opposition, the judicial authority may deny
the motion for judgment or may order a continuance to
permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had or
may make such other order as is just.” We further note:
“A party opposing a summary judgment motion [pursu-
ant to § 17-47] on the ground that more time is needed to
conduct discovery bears the burden of establishing a valid
reason why the motion should be denied or its resolution
postponed, including some indication as to what steps
that party has taken to secure facts necessary to defeat
the motion. Furthermore, under § 17-47, the opposing
party must show by affidavit precisely what facts are
within the exclusive knowledge of the moving party
and what steps he has taken to attempt to acquire these
facts. . . . [A] party contending that it needs to conduct
discovery to respond to a motion for summary judgment
must do more than merely claim the information needed
is within the possession of the opposing party.” (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) CIT Bank,
N.A. v. Francis, 214 Conn. App. 332, 347, 280 A.3d 485
(2022). “A trial court’s adjudication of a motion for a
continuance pursuant to . . . § 17-47 is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. . . . Under the abuse of discretion
standard for review, [an appellate court] will make every
reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial
court’s ruling and only upset it for a manifest abuse of
discretion.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Goody v. Bedard, 200 Conn. App. 621, 627,
241 A.3d 163 (2020).
Additionally, trial courts “ha[ve] wide discretion”
under Practice Book § 17-4920 “to determine whether
the party seeking additional time to conduct discovery
already has had a sufficient opportunity to establish facts
in opposition to the summary judgment motion, and we
will not disturb its exercise of that discretion absent a
clear showing of abuse.” Peerless Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez,
20
Practice Book § 17-49 provides: “The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof
submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Bank of America, N.A. v. Street

241 Conn. 476, 489, 697 A.2d 680 (1997); see also Alvarez
v. New Haven Register, Inc., 249 Conn. 709, 714, 735
A.2d 306 (1999).
The defendants did not file a motion for a continuance
with their Practice Book § 17-47 affidavit. Rather, they
argued, in their memorandum in opposition to summary
judgment, that the court should deny or delay ruling
on summary judgment until the defendants received
requested discovery. The defendants claim that their
requested discovery would address the disputed issue
of standing. In their § 17-47 affidavit, the defendants
stated only that there existed a discovery dispute and the
second substitute plaintiff had “made no further prog-
ress on the defendants’ outstanding document discovery
requests.” The defendants did not describe the requested
documents nor describe what facts those documents sup-
posedly contain. The court stated that the defendants
“have not established a valid reason why the [second
substitute] plaintiff’s motion should be denied, or how
additional documents are necessary. As noted earlier,
the [second substitute] plaintiff’s affiant was deposed
and the affidavit and supporting documents were made
exhibits at the deposition. In pressing this motion, the
[second substitute] plaintiff has not relied on any docu-
ments that have not been provided to the defendants.
. . . The defendants had all of the documents that the
[second substitute] plaintiff submitted to the court.
The affidavit and supporting documents establish the
[second substitute] plaintiff has standing. Standing is
the only issue raised by the defendants in their motion.”
In the present case, the defendants’ affidavit failed to
describe the facts “within the exclusive knowledge of the
moving party” and did nothing more than “merely claim
[that] the information needed is within the possession of
the opposing party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
CIT Bank, N.A. v. Francis, supra, 214 Conn. App. 347.
We are further mindful that the “information needed”
is irrelevant in light of our analysis in part I of this
opinion. In sum, the defendants have not provided any
valid reason why the second substitute plaintiff’s motion
Bank of America, N.A. v. Street

for summary judgment should have been denied or the
ruling should have been delayed due to their requested
discovery.
For this reason, the defendant’s reliance on Lakner is
misplaced. In Lakner, the defendant attempted to secure
documentary discovery in support of his defense of pay-
ment. JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Assn. v. Lakner,
supra, 347 Conn. 482. The plaintiff moved for a protec-
tive order, which the court granted, essentially denying
the defendant all documentary discovery. Id., 483. At
trial, the plaintiff, however, produced an exhibit consist-
ing of the transactions, payments, and loan history of the
defendant’s mortgage to prove the defendant’s debt. Id.,
484–85. On the basis of these documents, the defendant
appeared to have a valid defense of payment related to
the bank overcalculating his interest rate, but the trial
court refused to consider it because the defendant did
not raise that defense before trial. Id., 488–89. Our
Supreme Court, in reversing the trial court’s judgment,
observed that, “[a]lthough many foreclosure cases will
proceed without the need for discovery, it should come as
no surprise, in a contested case, that a defendant or his
or her attorney will need to review those aspects of the
lender’s file that may lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence relating to one or more disputed issues. This is
particularly so when, as here, the defendant raises a spe-
cial defense of payment.” Id., 493. Under the particular
facts of Lakner, our Supreme Court concluded that the
trial court abused its discretion in granting the plaintiff’s
protective order and then concluded that the defendant
was harmed by the protective order, which “substantially
prevented him from having the opportunity to pursue,
develop and support the defense he raised.” Id., 496.
Lakner is inapplicable to the present case because the
defendants not only received discovery, but received the
very discovery required by the court to affirmatively
decide the standing issue raised by the defendants in
summary judgment. Specifically, the court found that
“the [second substitute] plaintiff’s affiant was deposed
and the affidavit and supporting documents were made
Bank of America, N.A. v. Street

exhibits at the deposition.” Additionally, the discovery
the defendants seek is irrelevant in light of our analysis
in part I of this opinion. As such, the trial court did not
err in declining to apply Lakner to the present case. We
thus conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the defendants’ requests to conduct additional
discovery prior to ruling on the second substitute plain-
tiff’s motion for summary judgment.
The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded for
the purpose of making a new finding as to the amount of
the debt, for the setting of new law days, and for other
proceedings according to law.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.