Akinyele v. Huntington Condominium Assn., Inc.

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Akinyele v. Huntington Condominium Assn., Inc.

AKINTAYO AKINYELE v. HUNTINGTON
CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION,
INC., ET AL.
(AC 47624)
Moll, Clark and Wilson, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, who owned a condominium unit at the defendant condominium
complex, appealed from the trial court’s judgment dismissing, on the basis
of res judicata, his claims against the defendant. He claimed that the court
improperly determined that his claims were barred by res judicata because
he did not have the opportunity to fully litigate those claims sounding in,
inter alia, breach of contract, in a prior, related foreclosure action. Held:

The trial court improperly concluded that the plaintiff’s claims were barred
by res judicata, as, applying the rationale of Coach Run Condominium, Inc.
v. Furniss (136 Conn. App. 698), this court concluded that the plaintiff
was unable, as a matter of law, to bring his claims against the defendant
in the prior foreclosure action and, thus, he did not have an opportunity to
litigate fully those claims; accordingly, this court reversed the trial court’s
judgment of dismissal.

Argued September 25, 2025—officially released May 5, 2026

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, breach of
contract, and for other relief, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, where the defen-
dant McCarthy Associates, LLC, et al. were defaulted
for failure to appear; thereafter, the plaintiff withdrew
the complaint as to the defendant County Management
Services, LLC; subsequently, the court, Hon. William
Holden, judge trial referee, dismissed the plaintiff’s
claims against the defendant McCarthy Associates, LLC,
et al. and granted the named defendant’s motion to dis-
miss, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court.
Reversed; further proceedings.
Donald M. Brown, for the appellant (plaintiff).
David Corbett, for the appellee (named defendant).
Akinyele v. Huntington Condominium Assn., Inc.

Opinion

MOLL, J. The plaintiff, Akintayo Akinyele, appeals
from the judgment of the trial court dismissing, on the
basis of res judicata, his claims against the defendant
Huntington Condominium Association, Inc., also known
as Huntington Condominium Association-Bridgeport,
Inc.1 On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court
improperly determined that his claims were barred by
res judicata because, the plaintiff argues, he did not have
the opportunity to fully litigate his claims in a prior,
related foreclosure action. We agree and, accordingly,
reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, which are undisputed, and pro-
cedural history are relevant to our resolution of this
appeal. At all relevant times, the plaintiff owned a con-
dominium unit at the defendant’s condominium complex
in Bridgeport (condominium unit). On May 19, 2018,
the defendant commenced a separate action against the
plaintiff to foreclose its statutory lien on the condo-
minium unit for unpaid monthly common charges, late
fees, attorney’s fees, and costs in accordance with General
Statutes § 47-258 (foreclosure action).2 See Huntington
1
The plaintiff originally filed the present action against three other
defendants: Jerry McCarthy, also known as John Doe (McCarthy);
McCarthy Associates, LLC, doing business as McCarthy Associates
(McCarthy Associates); and County Management Services, LLC. On
February 25, 2021, McCarthy and McCarthy Associates were defaulted
for failure to appear; however, on July 24, 2024, the trial court, Hon.
William Holden, judge trial referee, dismissed the plaintiff’s claims
against these nonappearing defendants on the basis of his failure to
comply with a prior court order requiring him to move for judgment on
his claims against them or to request a hearing in damages. The plaintiff
has not appealed from the judgment of dismissal as to McCarthy and
McCarthy Associates. Additionally, on December 5, 2022, after his
claims against County Management Services, LLC, had been stricken, the
plaintiff withdrew those claims. Accordingly, we refer in this opinion to
Huntington Condominium Association, Inc., also known as Huntington
Condominium Association-Bridgeport, Inc., as the defendant.
2
General Statutes § 47-258 provides in relevant part: “(a) The associa-
tion has a statutory lien on a unit for any assessment attributable to
that unit or fines imposed against its unit owner. Unless the declaration
otherwise provides, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, other fees,
charges, late charges, fines and interest charged pursuant to subdivi-
sions (10), (11) and (12) of subsection (a) of section 47-244 and any
Akinyele v. Huntington Condominium Assn., Inc.

Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Akinyele, Superior Court,
judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-
S.3 On July 31, 2018, the plaintiff filed an answer and
asserted a special defense alleging payment of the dis-
puted amounts. On July 23, 2020, the defendant filed
(1) a reply denying the plaintiff’s special defense and (2)
a certificate of closed pleadings. On August 24, 2020,
other sums due to the association under the declaration, this chapter,
or as a result of an administrative, arbitration, mediation or judicial
decision, are enforceable in the same manner as unpaid assessments
under this section. If an assessment is payable in installments, the full
amount of the assessment is a lien from the time the first installment
thereof becomes due.
“(b) . . . [A] lien under this section is prior to all other liens and encum-
brances on a unit except (1) liens and encumbrances recorded before the
recordation of the declaration and, in a cooperative, liens and encum-
brances which the association creates, assumes or takes subject to, (2)
a first or second security interest on the unit recorded before the date
on which the assessment sought to be enforced became delinquent, or,
in a cooperative, a first or second security interest encumbering only
the unit owner’s interest and perfected before the date on which the
assessment sought to be enforced became delinquent, and (3) liens for real
property taxes and other governmental assessments or charges against
the unit or cooperative. In all actions brought to foreclose a lien under
this section or a security interest described in subdivision (2) of this
subsection, the lien is also prior to all security interests described in
subdivision (2) of this subsection to the extent of (A) an amount equal to
the common expense assessments based on the periodic budget adopted
by the association pursuant to subsection (a) of section 47-257 which
would have become due in the absence of acceleration during the nine
months immediately preceding institution of an action to enforce either
the association’s lien or a security interest described in subdivision
(2) of this subsection, excluding any late fees, interest or fines which
may be assessed by the association during the nine-month period, and
(B) the association’s costs and reasonable attorney’s fees in enforcing
its lien. A lien for any assessment or fine specified in subsection (a) of
this section shall have the priority provided for in this subsection in an
amount not to exceed the amount specified in subparagraph (A) of this
subsection. This subsection does not affect the priority of mechanics’
or materialmen’s liens or the priority of liens for other assessments
made by the association. . . .
“(j) The association’s lien may be foreclosed in like manner as a mort-
gage on real property. . . .”
Section 47-258 was amended on October 1, 2023; see Public Acts
2023, No. 23-119, § 1; however, that amendment is not relevant to this
appeal. Accordingly, unless otherwise noted, we refer to the current
revision of the statute.
3
The defendant also named JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., a junior
lienholder, as a defendant in the prior foreclosure action.
Akinyele v. Huntington Condominium Assn., Inc.

the plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend his special
defense and to file a counterclaim, which the trial court,
Spader, J., denied without comment on October 19, 2020.
On November 4, 2020, the plaintiff filed a second motion
for leave to amend his special defense and to file a counter-
claim.4 On November 23, 2020, the court denied the plain-
tiff’s second motion for leave, seemingly on timeliness
grounds, reasoning that, “[u]nder the current circum-
stances . . . the court does not see a need to allow amended
pleadings herein after pleadings have been closed.”
On December 4, 2020, the plaintiff commenced the
present action. In his eleven count revised complaint
filed on March 26, 2021, the plaintiff asserted three
claims against the defendant that are relevant to this
appeal: (1) breach of contract (count one); (2) breach of
the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing (count
five); and (3) negligence (count eleven).5 In support
thereof, the plaintiff alleged, respectively, that (1) the
defendant committed a breach of contract by failing to
provide “notices and hearings” to the plaintiff, as well
as by not accepting payment from the plaintiff, (2) the
defendant breached the implied duty of good faith and
fair dealing by, in bad faith, failing to send a timely notice
of default, not accepting the plaintiff’s payments, and
“creating a dispute in order to bill attorney’s fees and
[to] take the plaintiff’s property by foreclosure,” and
4
On November 17, 2020, the plaintiff filed a revised second motion for
leave to amend his special defense and to file a counterclaim, to which he
attached a proposed pleading setting forth (1) a second special defense
asserting unclean hands and (2) a five count counterclaim sounding in
(a) breach of contract, (b) breach of the implied duty of good faith and
fair dealing, (c) a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices
Act, General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., (d) breach of fiduciary duty,
and (e) negligence.
5
In this revised complaint, the plaintiff directed two additional counts
to the defendant, which sounded in (1) breach of fiduciary duty (count
four) and (2) a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act,
General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. (count six). On October 31, 2022, the
court, Moses, J., granted a motion filed by the defendant and County
Management Services, LLC, to strike several counts from the revised
complaint, including the two aforementioned counts. Thereafter, the
plaintiff did not plead over; rather, on December 5, 2022, the plaintiff
withdrew the counts that had been stricken from the revised complaint.
Akinyele v. Huntington Condominium Assn., Inc.

(3) the defendant was negligent by breaching its duty
to the plaintiff by continuing “to send the plaintiff to
collection” and failing “to investigate the issues with the
plaintiff’s payments.”6 With respect to these counts, the
plaintiff’s prayer for relief requested “money damage”
and “punitive damage.”
Meanwhile, on December 9, 2020, in the foreclosure
action, the plaintiff filed a motion to consolidate that
action and the present action.7 The court denied that
motion on January 11, 2021, reasoning that “[t]here
are different parties in the two actions and contractual
claims beyond the basic claim in [the foreclosure action].”8
Further, on February 15, 2023, in the foreclosure action,
the court, Hon. William Holden, judge trial referee,
granted an oral motion made by the defendant to default
the plaintiff for failure to appear at trial. On July 5,
2023, the court rendered a judgment of foreclosure by
sale, as later amended on July 11, 2023, determining,
inter alia, that the condominium unit’s fair market value
was $145,000 and that the outstanding debt, including
attorney’s fees, totaled $63,389.40. The plaintiff filed an
appeal in the foreclosure action on August 1, 2023, but
he withdrew that appeal on October 31, 2023, following
a satisfaction of the foreclosure judgment.9
On November 7, 2023, in the present action, the defen-
dant filed a motion titled “motion to dismiss and/or
motion for summary judgment,” with an accompanying
supporting memorandum of law, in which it claimed
6
On December 2, 2022, the defendant filed an answer, denying the
material allegations of the plaintiff’s revised complaint and asserting
special defenses alleging (1) failure to mitigate damages vis-à-vis all
remaining counts against it and (2) comparative negligence as to count
eleven. On December 7, 2022, the plaintiff filed a reply denying the
defendant’s special defenses.
7
The plaintiff argued that the two actions should be consolidated
because “there is complete unity in the fact patterns” and the actions
were both filed in the same judicial district.
8
In the present action, the plaintiff also filed a motion to consolidate
the two actions, which the court denied.
9
On September 25, 2023, in the foreclosure action, the defendant filed
a satisfaction of judgment representing that JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A., a junior lienholder, had paid the debt.
Akinyele v. Huntington Condominium Assn., Inc.

that (1) the present action should be dismissed as moot
in light of the satisfaction of the foreclosure judgment,
or (2) alternatively, it was entitled to summary judg-
ment because the plaintiff’s claims were barred by res
judicata.10 On November 30, 2023, the plaintiff filed
an objection to the defendant’s “motion to dismiss and/
or motion for summary judgment,” and, on December
7, 2023, the defendant filed a reply memorandum. On
December 13, 2023, during a status/discovery confer-
ence held on the record, the court heard argument on
the defendant’s “motion to dismiss and/or motion for
summary judgment.”
On January 31, 2024, the court granted the defen-
dant’s “motion to dismiss and/or motion for summary
judgment,” reasoning that “the plaintiff’s claim in this
matter is barred based on the doctrine of res judicata.
The argument presented by the plaintiff has previously
been argued in other cases in this courthouse. The court
has found the argument by the plaintiff unpersuasive to
allow the plaintiff to be compensated as mentioned within
[his revised] complaint. The plaintiff’s damages stem
from missed payments by the plaintiff to the defendant
that required additional compensation to account for
fees incurred in bringing [the foreclosure action]. There-
fore, the court hereby grants the defendant’s motion to
dismiss.” This appeal followed. Additional facts and
procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
The plaintiff claims that the court erred in granting the
defendant’s “motion to dismiss and/or motion for sum-
mary judgment” on the basis of res judicata because he
10
Additionally, on November 7, 2023, the defendant filed (1) a motion
for leave to amend its special defenses in order to add a third special
defense alleging that the present action was barred by the doctrines of
res judicata and collateral estoppel, with a proposed amended pleading
filed separately, and (2) a motion for permission to file a motion for
summary judgment, as the case had already been assigned for trial. See
Practice Book § 17-44 (“[i]f no scheduling order exists but the case has
been assigned for trial, a party must move for permission of the judicial
authority to file a motion for summary judgment”). The court did not
adjudicate these motions, and we do not deem it necessary to discuss
further the lack of rulings thereon. See footnote 15 of this opinion.
Akinyele v. Huntington Condominium Assn., Inc.

was precluded from bringing his claims in the foreclosure
action and was instead required to bring such claims in
the present action. The defendant argues in response that
the plaintiff was able to bring his claims against it in the
foreclosure action because he could have raised them as
defenses to the foreclosure and that, therefore, the res
judicata doctrine precludes the plaintiff’s claims against
it in the present action. We agree with the plaintiff.11
We begin our analysis by setting forth the applicable
standard of review and the well settled principles of res
judicata. “The issue of whether the [doctrine] of res
judicata . . . [applies] to the facts of this case presents
a question of law. Our review, therefore, is plenary.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Speer v. Brown
Jacobson P.C., 222 Conn. App. 638, 648, 306 A.3d 1105
(2023).
“[T]he doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion,
[provides that] a former judgment on a claim, if rendered
on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action on
the same claim. . . . The doctrine of res judicata applies
if the following elements are satisfied: the identity of
the parties to the actions are the same; the same claim,
demand or cause of action is at issue; the judgment in the
first action was rendered on the merits; and the parties
had an opportunity to litigate the issues fully.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Wells Fargo Bank, National
Assn. v. Doreus, 218 Conn. App. 77, 83–84, 290 A.3d
921, cert. denied, 347 Conn. 904, 297 A.3d 198 (2023).
“[A] judgment on the merits is one which is based on legal
rights as distinguished from mere matters of practice,
procedure, jurisdiction or form. . . . A decision with
respect to the rights and liabilities of the parties is on
the merits where it is based on the ultimate fact or state
11
The plaintiff also asserts in passing that the mootness doctrine
does not apply to the present case. Insofar as the plaintiff properly
has raised such a claim, it need not be addressed in this opinion, as the
court did not grant the defendant’s “motion to dismiss and/or motion
for summary judgment” on mootness grounds, and the defendant does
not claim, as an alternative ground for affirmance, that the plaintiff’s
claims are moot.
Akinyele v. Huntington Condominium Assn., Inc.

of facts disclosed by the pleadings or evidence, or both,
and on which the right of recovery depends.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Speer v. Brown Jacobson
P.C., supra, 222 Conn. App. 649.
“Res judicata, as a judicial doctrine . . . should be
applied as necessary to promote its underlying purposes.
. . . But by the same token, the internal needs of the
judicial system do not outweigh its essential function in
providing litigants a legal forum to redress their griev-
ances. . . . The judicial doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel are based on the public policy that a
party should not be able to relitigate a matter which it
already has had an opportunity to litigate. . . . Stability
in judgments grants to parties and others the certainty
in the management of their affairs which results when
a controversy is finally laid to rest. The doctrines of
preclusion, however, should be flexible and must give
way when their mechanical application would frustrate
other social policies based on values equally or more
important than the convenience afforded by finality in
legal controversies. . . .
“We review the doctrine of res judicata to emphasize
that its purposes must inform the decision to foreclose
future litigation. The conservation of judicial resources
is of paramount importance as our trial dockets are del-
uged with new cases daily. We further emphasize that
where a party has fully and fairly litigated his claims,
he may be barred from future actions on matters not
raised in the prior proceeding. But the scope of matters
precluded necessarily depends on what has occurred in
the former adjudication.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 649–50.
We next review foreclosure procedures under the Com-
mon Interest Ownership Act (act), General Statutes §
47-200 et seq., which provide context for the foreclo-
sure action. “The [act] is a comprehensive legislative
scheme regulating all forms of common interest own-
ership that is largely modeled on the Uniform Common
Interest Ownership Act. Public Acts 1983, No. 83-474.
Akinyele v. Huntington Condominium Assn., Inc.

A ‘common interest community’ is defined chiefly by
the fact that each unit owner is obligated to pay certain
charges, such as taxes and insurance premiums, attrib-
utable to common property held jointly by the owners
through their association.” Nicotra Wieler Investment
Management, Inc. v. Grower, 207 Conn. 441, 447, 541
A.2d 1226 (1988). “Section 47-258 addresses common
interest community liens and their enforcement. An
association has a statutory lien on a unit for common
charges and other assessments attributable to the unit
imposed against its unit owner.” Neighborhood Assn.,
Inc. v. Limberger, 321 Conn. 29, 36, 136 A.3d 581 (2016).
“[Section 47-258] establishes the priority of liens with
respect to foreclosures involving condominiums [and
cooperatives]. As our Supreme Court noted in Hudson
House Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Brooks, 223 Conn.
610, 614, 611 A.2d 862 (1992), [l]iens for delinquent
common expense assessments on individual units within
an association are creatures of statute and the govern-
ing statute, § 47-258 (b), sets forth the priority of these
liens with respect to other liens. Our Supreme Court also
recognized that this legislative scheme departs from the
common law rule of first in time equals first in right. Id.
Section 47-258 (b) establishes a specific priority scheme
and delineates which liens may take priority over assess-
ment liens and the extent to which assessment liens
may take priority over even those priority liens. This
court must respect the intricate priority scheme that
the legislature has established.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Stonybrook Gardens Cooperative, Inc.
v. Newrez, LLC, 225 Conn. App. 1, 11–12, 315 A.3d
337 (2024). “Section 47-258 (b) . . . establishes a super
priority lien, as against a first or second security inter-
est, for those assessments that accrued during the [nine]
months immediately preceding the commencement of
the foreclosure action . . . .” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 12–13. Further, General Statutes § 47-257
(g) provides that “[n]o unit owner may exempt himself
from liability for payment of the common expenses by
waiver of the use or enjoyment of any of the common
Akinyele v. Huntington Condominium Assn., Inc.

elements or by abandonment of the unit against which
the assessments are made.”12
This court previously has held that special defenses and
counterclaims cannot be maintained by condominium
unit owners in actions against them by condominium
associations to foreclose statutory liens on the basis of
failure to pay common charges; instead, such claims must
be brought in separate actions. In Coach Run Condo-
minium, Inc. v. Furniss, 136 Conn. App. 698, 47 A.3d 413
(2012) (Coach Run), a condominium association (associa-
tion) commenced an action against a condominium unit
owner (owner) seeking to foreclose its statutory lien on
the owner’s condominium unit. Id., 700. The owner filed
special defenses alleging that the condominium unit was
unsalable as a result of the association’s failure to make
repairs to the exterior walls and common areas. Id. The
trial court struck the owner’s special defenses and ren-
dered summary judgment as to liability in favor of the
association; id., 701–702; reasoning that, “other than
by contesting nonpayment, a condominium unit owner
has no defense in an action to foreclose a condominium
common charge lien.” Id., 701. The court rendered a
judgment of foreclosure by sale, from which the owner
appealed. Id.
On appeal, this court rejected the owner’s claim that
the act did not preclude defenses to common charge
lien foreclosures. Id., 703. This court observed that
“[a]lmost all of the judges of the Superior Court who have
addressed this issue have held that special defenses and
counterclaims will not lie in an action brought by a con-
dominium association to foreclose a lien based upon a unit
owner’s failure to pay common charges. See Congress
Street Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Anderson, 132 Conn.
App. 536, 541–43 and 542 n.9, 33 A.3d 274 (2011) (cit-
ing cases).” Coach Run Condominium, Inc. v. Furniss,
supra, 136 Conn. App. 705. This court agreed with the
12
Since the events underlying this appeal, the legislature has amended
§ 47-257 (g) in ways that have no bearing on the merits of the present
case. See Public Acts 2025, No. 25-73, § 9. In the interest of simplic-
ity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.
Akinyele v. Huntington Condominium Assn., Inc.

trial court’s analysis, stating: “Ruling in accord with this
majority, the trial court in the present case held that §§
47-257 and 47-258 manifest the legislature’s intention
that a duly constituted condominium association has
an enforceable lien to assist its collection of common
charges. The [trial] court reasoned that the legislature
provided condominium associations with the ability to
impose such a lien in order to protect the condominium’s
common financial interest in timely collection of antici-
pated revenues for the benefit of the community as a
whole. That protection would be jeopardized if any con-
dominium unit owner could withhold payment pending
the resolution of individual complaints or disagreements
regarding the nature and extent of services rendered
by the condominium.” Id. This court further stated in
a footnote that, “[a]s the [trial] court noted, its ruling
did not leave the [owner] without a remedy because any
condominium unit owner may file an independent action
to recover damages for negligence or other misconduct
on the part of the . . . association.” Id., 705 n.7.
Applying the rationale of Coach Run to the present
action, we conclude that the plaintiff was unable, as a
matter of law, to bring his claims for breach of contract,
breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing,
and negligence against the defendant in the foreclosure
action.13 Instead, the plaintiff was required to file a sepa-
13
In a footnote in Coach Run, this court stated that the parties had “not
distinguished between the component parts of the [unit owner’s] indebt-
edness to the [association], but have treated the [owner’s] indebtedness
as falling within the general rubric of common expenses. Accordingly,
we shall do likewise. But see Congress Street Condominium Assn., Inc.
v. Anderson, [supra, 132 Conn. App. 541–44] (holding that pleading
of special defenses and counterclaims, while precluded in actions to
foreclose statutory liens based on nonpayment of common charges,
is permissible in actions to foreclose statutory liens based on nonpay-
ment of fines).” Coach Run Condominium, Inc. v. Furniss, supra, 136
Conn. App. 701 n.4; see also Congress Street Condominium Assn., Inc.
v. Anderson, supra, 544 (concluding that, “due to the inherent dif-
ferences in the application and function of fines and common charges,
they should not be treated interchangeably in a foreclosure action”).
Similarly, in the present action, the defendant has not meaningfully
distinguished between the component parts of the debt sought in the
foreclosure action.
Akinyele v. Huntington Condominium Assn., Inc.

rate action to seek adjudication of such claims. Thus, the
plaintiff did not have an opportunity to litigate fully his
present claims against the defendant in the foreclosure
action, and, therefore, the court improperly concluded
that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by res judicata.14
In sum, we conclude that the court improperly granted
the defendant’s “motion to dismiss and/or motion for
summary judgment” and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims
against the defendant on the basis of res judicata.15
14
We observe that the arguments raised by the defendant sound more
closely in collateral estoppel principles than the doctrine of res judicata.
See Torrington Tax Collector, LLC v. Riley, 354 Conn. 66, 89 n.20,
349 A.3d 551 (2026) (“[a]lthough the doctrines of collateral estoppel
and res judicata share a conceptual closeness . . . the two doctrines
are regarded as distinct” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The
defendant essentially argues that, in the prior action when the court
rendered judgment of foreclosure, the court fully and fairly litigated
issues relating to the common charges, and that those issues were actu-
ally decided and necessary to the judgment. Because collateral estoppel
was not raised in the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and
therefore not adjudicated by the court, we do not address it further,
other than to emphasize that our holding in this decision is limited to
the narrow question of whether the plaintiff’s claims are barred on the
ground of res judicata.
15
The plaintiff also claims that a motion to dismiss is an improper
vehicle for the disposition of a res judicata issue, and, therefore, the
court improperly rendered a judgment of dismissal on the basis of res
judicata. Because we conclude on the merits that the court improperly
determined that the plaintiff’s claims against the defendant were barred
by res judicata, we need not address any purported procedural deficiency
in the manner in which the defendant raised the res judicata issue before
the court. See Speer v. Brown Jacobson P.C., supra, 222 Conn. App.
647 n.10 (in appeal from judgment of dismissal rendered on basis of res
judicata, this court declined to address whether motion to dismiss was
correct procedural vehicle to raise res judicata and collateral estoppel
claims in light of conclusion on merits that trial court’s reliance on
these doctrines was improper). We iterate, however, that, “[u]nlike
claims implicating subject matter jurisdiction, which may be raised at
any time; see, e.g., Bank of New York Mellon v. Tope, 345 Conn. 662,
677 n.6, 286 A.3d 891 (2022); a claim that an action or claim is barred
by res judicata or collateral estoppel must be raised in the trial court
through appropriate pleadings. See, e.g., Labbe v. Pension Commis-
sion, 229 Conn. 801, 816, 643 A.2d 1268 (1994) (‘[r]es judicata does
not provide the basis for a judgment of dismissal; it is a special defense
that is considered after any jurisdictional thresholds are passed’); see
also Practice Book § 10-50 (res judicata is special defense that ‘must
be specially pleaded’).” M&T Bank v. Lewis, 349 Conn. 9, 19 n.6, 312
A.3d 1040 (2024). Thereafter, res judicata may properly be raised by
Akinyele v. Huntington Condominium Assn., Inc.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

way of a motion for summary judgment. See Speer v. Brown Jacobson
P.C., supra, 647 n.10.