State v. Dukes

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State v. Dukes

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MALCOM
ELTON DUKES
(AC 48115)
Alvord, Suarez and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, who had been on probation as a result of prior criminal con-
victions, appealed from the trial court’s judgment revoking his probation
and sentencing him to eight years of incarceration. The defendant claimed,
inter alia, that the court erroneously found him in violation of his probation
when it relied on evidence the police seized during an inventory search of his
vehicle and inculpatory statements he made to the police. Held:

This court declined to review, pursuant to State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233),
the defendant’s unpreserved claim that the trial court improperly relied
on the warrantless seizure by the police of his cell phone and ammunition
from his vehicle, as the record was inadequate to review that claim, the
defendant having failed to raise any fourth amendment claim or request that
the court exclude the evidence at the violation of probation hearing, and the
court made no findings concerning the validity of the inventory search or
whether the police had engaged in misconduct so as to warrant application
of the exclusionary rule.

The record was inadequate for this court to review, pursuant to Golding,
the defendant’s unpreserved claim that the inculpatory statements he made
while in police custody should have been excluded at the violation of proba-
tion hearing because he had not been advised of his rights under Miranda
v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436) prior to questioning, as the trial court did not
make any factual findings or legal conclusions as to whether the defendant
had been in custody or subject to interrogation, the record was unclear as to
whether he had been advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda and he did
not seek to exclude the statements or raise a Miranda claim at the violation
of probation hearing.

The evidence was sufficient for the trial court to find that the defendant
violated his probation by engaging the police in a motor vehicle pursuit,
evading responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle and possessing
a firearm in the vehicle, as the court’s factual findings underlying those
conclusions were not clearly erroneous.

The trial court’s finding that the defendant violated his probation by pos-
sessing ammunition in his vehicle was clearly erroneous, as the presence of a
passenger in the vehicle during the incident at issue meant that the defendant
did not have exclusive control over the vehicle’s interior, there was no evidence
that he knew of the ammunition’s character or presence in the vehicle, and
the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of constructive possession.

This court determined that a new sentencing hearing was not required as a
result of the trial court’s erroneous finding that the defendant had possessed
State v. Dukes

ammunition in his vehicle, as the court made no mention of the ammunition
during sentencing but focused instead on the seriousness of the conduct of
the defendant, as a convicted felon, in possessing a firearm when he was on
probation for the same offense, and the record was devoid of any indication
that the sentence imposed may have been impacted by the court’s erroneous
finding so as to warrant a new sentencing proceeding.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking the defendant’s proba-
tion and imposing a sentence of incarceration, as the court’s determination
that the beneficial purposes of probation were no longer being served was
supported by ample evidence from which it reasonably could have determined
that the defendant no longer was a good risk for continued probation because
his behavior was adverse to his own rehabilitation and to the public’s safety.

Argued February 18—officially released June 9, 2026

Procedural History

Information charging the defendant with violation of
probation, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Bridgeport and tried to the court, McShane,
J.; judgment revoking probation, from which the defen-
dant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Nicole P. Britt, assigned counsel, with whom, on the
brief, was Christopher Y. Duby, assigned counsel, for
the appellant (defendant).
Alexander A. Kambanis, deputy assistant state’s attor-
ney, with whom, on the brief, were Joseph T. Corradino,
state’s attorney, and Candace C. Solis, assistant state’s
attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

SEELEY, J. The defendant, Malcom Elton Dukes,
appeals from the judgment of the trial court finding him
in violation of, and revoking, his probation pursuant
to General Statutes § 53a-32.1 On appeal, the defen-
1
General Statutes § 53a-32 provides in relevant part: “(a) At any time
during the period of probation . . . the court or any judge thereof may
issue a warrant for the arrest of a defendant for violation of any of the
conditions of probation . . . .
***
“(c) Upon notification by the probation officer of the arrest of the
defendant or upon an arrest by warrant as herein provided, the court
State v. Dukes

dant claims that the trial court erred in finding him in
violation of his probation because, (1) in making that
finding, the court improperly relied on certain evidence
that should have been suppressed, namely, (a) evidence
recovered from his vehicle following an inventory search
of the vehicle conducted by the police, allegedly in viola-
tion of his fourth amendment rights, and (b) inculpatory
statements he had made to the police, allegedly in vio-
lation of his Miranda rights,2 and (2) the evidence was
insufficient to establish that he violated his probation.
The defendant also claims that the court abused its dis-
cretion in revoking his probation and sentencing him to
eight years of incarceration. We decline to review both
aspects of the defendant’s first claim and disagree with
his second claim, although we conclude that one of the
four grounds on which the court found the defendant in
violation of his probation was not supported by sufficient
evidence. Moreover, because we are confident that the
court’s erroneous finding did not impact the sentence
imposed, and because we conclude that the court did not
abuse its discretion in revoking the defendant’s probation
shall cause the defendant to be brought before it without unneces-
sary delay for a hearing on the violation charges. At such hearing the
defendant shall be informed of the manner in which such defendant is
alleged to have violated the conditions of such defendant’s probation
or conditional discharge, shall be advised by the court that such defen-
dant has the right to retain counsel and, if indigent, shall be entitled
to the services of the public defender, and shall have the right to cross-
examine witnesses and to present evidence in such defendant’s own behalf. . . .
“(d) If such violation is established . . . the court may . . . (4) revoke
the sentence of probation . . . . If such sentence is revoked, the court
shall require the defendant to serve the sentence imposed or impose
any lesser sentence. Any such lesser sentence may include a term of
imprisonment, all or a portion of which may be suspended entirely or
after a period set by the court, followed by a period of probation with
such conditions as the court may establish. No such revocation shall be
ordered, except upon consideration of the whole record and unless such
violation is established by the introduction of reliable and probative
evidence and by a preponderance of the evidence. . . .”
2
Pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602,
16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), prior to a custodial interrogation, a criminal
suspect must “be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he
has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.”
State v. Dukes

and imposing the eight year sentence of incarceration,
we affirm the judgment of the court.
The following facts, which the court reasonably could
have found, and procedural history are relevant to our
resolution of this appeal. The defendant had been con-
victed in 2018, on a guilty plea, of assault in the first
degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1),
carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of Gen-
eral Statutes § 29-35 (a), and criminal possession of a
firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-217, for
which he had been sentenced to a total effective term
of fifteen years of incarceration, execution suspended
after seventy-eight months, followed by five years of
probation.3 The defendant’s probationary period com-
menced on September 29, 2021. On two separate occa-
sions—October 4 and November 4, 2021—he met with a
probation officer and reviewed and signed the conditions
of his probation. Those conditions included, inter alia,
the standard condition that he not violate any criminal
law of this state or the United States, and court-ordered
special conditions that he, inter alia, not possess any
weapons, ammunition, narcotics or drugs; pay restitu-
tion; submit to random urine tests; and maintain verifi-
able employment.
On October 10, 2023, the defendant was arrested by the
Bridgeport police and charged with, inter alia, criminal
possession of a firearm, ammunition or an electronic
defense weapon in violation of § 53a-217, carrying a pistol
without a permit in violation of § 29-35 (a) (1), illegal
possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle in violation of
General Statutes § 29-38, carrying a dangerous weapon
in violation of General Statutes § 53-206, possession of a
large capacity magazine in violation of General Statutes
§ 53-202w (c), violation of the deadly weapon registra-
tion requirements under General Statutes § 54-280a,
possession of a weapon on school grounds in violation of
3
A certified copy of the defendant’s conviction record and the order of
the defendant’s probation were admitted into evidence at the violation
of probation hearing.
State v. Dukes

General Statutes § 53a-217b, possession of more than the
legal limit of cannabis in violation of General Statutes §
21a-279a (d) (1), engaging police in pursuit in violation
of General Statutes § 14-223 (b), evasion of responsibil-
ity in the operation of a motor vehicle in violation of
General Statutes § 14-224 (b) (3), disobeying a signal of
an officer in violation of § 14-223 (a), reckless driving
in violation of General Statutes § 14-222, illegal opera-
tion of a motor vehicle while his registration or license
was under suspension in violation of General Statutes §
14-215 (a), operating a motor vehicle without carrying
an operator’s license in violation of General Statutes
§ 14-213, illegal operation of a motor vehicle without
minimum insurance in violation of General Statutes §
14-213b, and failure to obey a stop sign in violation of
General Statutes § 14-301.
As a result of the defendant’s arrest on those charges,
he was arrested pursuant to a warrant dated December 1,
2023, and charged with violating his probation. A hear-
ing was held before the court, McShane, J., on August
26 and 27, 2024. During the evidentiary phase of the
hearing, the state presented the following evidence in
support of the violation of probation charge.
On the evening of October 8, 2023, Officer Roberto
Rivera of the Bridgeport Police Department was working
as a patrol officer in a marked patrol car when he observed
a vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed. The vehicle, an
orange Dodge Challenger (Challenger),4 “hit a dip in the
road, which caused the front of the vehicle [to] scrape in
the front [and then move] in a motion as if it was going to
go airborne, all the while accelerating.” While the vehicle
was accelerating, the driver of the Challenger failed
to come to a complete stop at two intersections, after
which Rivera activated his vehicle’s emergency lights
and siren and attempted to conduct a motor vehicle stop
of the Challenger. The driver of the Challenger, however,
accelerated at a high rate of speed and failed to come to a
4
In the transcript of the violation of probation hearing, this vehicle
also is referred to as a Dodge Charger, which is inaccurate.
State v. Dukes

complete stop at another intersection. Rivera’s pursuit
of the Challenger was recorded on a police dashboard
camera, which was activated when Rivera engaged his
vehicle’s lights and siren. That recording was played
during the hearing and admitted into evidence as state’s
exhibit five.
During his pursuit of the Challenger, Rivera observed
the license plate number and ran it through his mobile
police computer in his patrol car, which showed that the
Challenger was registered to the defendant and that the
registration of the vehicle was suspended due to insur-
ance compliance issues. Rivera also provided the license
plate number to police dispatch, which informed him
of the defendant’s address and that the Challenger’s
owner had a suspended driver’s license. At that point,
the Challenger had failed to come to a complete stop for
a third time, and Rivera exercised his discretion to dis-
continue his pursuit of the Challenger. Rivera, instead,
proceeded to the defendant’s address, where he parked his
vehicle and waited to see if the defendant would arrive
there. After waiting several minutes, Rivera left and pro-
ceeded down Reservoir Avenue in a southerly direction
to make his way toward police headquarters. As Rivera
approached the intersection of Ortega and Reservoir
Avenues, he observed a small crowd in the roadway. To
his left, Rivera observed the orange Challenger that he
had been pursuing. The Challenger appeared to have been
in an accident, as it had gone through a fence and was
resting in bushes on residential property. A still image
of the accident scene involving the Challenger, taken
from Rivera’s body camera, was admitted into evidence
as an exhibit.
Immediately upon his arrival at that scene, Rivera first
made sure that everyone was safe and that no injuries
had occurred. He then spoke with several witnesses who
provided him with information, which he then relayed to
police dispatch and to other officers who were canvassing
the area. Thereafter, Rivera called for the fire depart-
ment because the Challenger was emitting smoke and
State v. Dukes

was locked. There was no one inside the vehicle. After
members of the fire department opened the vehicle and
made it safe for towing, Rivera conducted an inventory
search. During her direct examination of Rivera, the
prosecutor asked whether the Bridgeport Police Depart-
ment has a policy regarding inventory searches, to which
Rivera responded, “[y]es.” He explained that, when, as
in this case, there is no driver or occupant present, “the
vehicle gets towed,” and “you do an inventory search of
the vehicle and make sure there’s no valuables inside of
the vehicle” so that, if the owner does retrieve the vehicle,
the owner cannot say that valuables were left in it that
have disappeared. Rivera testified further that, pursuant
to police department policy, he can look inside a vehicle’s
closed containers, such as the glove box, trunk and center
console.5 During his inventory search of the Challenger,
Rivera located a cell phone on the front driver’s side
floor, a digital scale in the glove compartment, small
sandwich bags on the rear passenger side floor, a black
plastic bag with .45 caliber ammunition in it that was in
the “[r]ear passenger seat, center console,”6 and a plastic
ziplock bag that had a “green-like substance in it.” When
5
During his cross-examination of Rivera, defense counsel briefly
questioned him regarding the inventory search. First, counsel elicited
testimony that Rivera had searched the Challenger prior to calling for
a tow truck, without a warrant, and that his intent in conducting the
search was to look for “[a]nything of value.” Defense counsel then asked
if it is “Bridgeport police policy to document what might be valuables in
a car at the scene of an accident,” to which Rivera responded, “[y]es.”
Defense counsel then asked whether “that’s always the case” and whether
Rivera ever waits “until the car is towed to a specific area,” and Rivera
responded that he could not “speak on other people” or about how things
are done by other officers. Defense counsel then stated, “[s]o, your
objective in going into the car with your flashlight and looking around
is to look for valuables,” and Rivera responded, “[c]orrect.” No further
questions were asked regarding the inventory search or any policies of
the Bridgeport Police Department regarding such searches.
6
When asked on cross-examination specifically where in the vehicle
the ammunition was located, Rivera initially testified that it was “[i]n
the rear seat by the center console.” (Emphasis added.) After refresh-
ing his recollection by viewing his police report, he clarified that it was
found in the “[r]ear passenger seat, center console.” By “center console,”
Rivera was referring to a compartment in the backseat of the vehicle.
State v. Dukes

Rivera picked up the cell phone, an image appeared on
its lock screen wallpaper. A photograph was taken of the
cell phone depicting the lock screen wallpaper image on
October 9, 2023, and a copy of that image, which was a
photograph of the defendant, as well as a photograph of
the ammunition, were admitted into evidence without
objection.7
In light of Rivera’s discovery of the ammunition in
the Challenger and the fact that no driver or other occu-
pant of the vehicle was present, Rivera communicated
via radio to other officers canvassing the area that the
driver, who had fled the scene, might be in possession
of a firearm or be attempting to dispose of one. Rivera
also was contacted by an officer with a police intelligence
gathering unit (intelligence unit) and was provided with
information about the possible location of the firearm; as
a result, Rivera walked toward the location. After moving
a yellow garbage can, Rivera found a firearm between a
fence and a pallet near a dumpster located on the prop-
erty of an elementary school. Photographs of that area,
along with a still photograph from Rivera’s body camera
of Rivera retrieving the firearm, were admitted into
evidence as exhibits.8
The elementary school has exterior cameras that are
monitored by the Bridgeport police. The school is located
approximately one block from where the Challenger was
found. A photograph depicting an aerial view of where
the Challenger was located in relation to the elementary
school was admitted into evidence. The police recovered
video footage from the elementary school’s cameras and
from cameras facing the intersection where the acci-
dent involving the Challenger had occurred. A digital
7
Photographs of the defendant that were taken during the booking
process on October 8, 2023, also were admitted into evidence.
8
Rivera testified that the firearm had a barrel of less than twelve inches
and that it was loaded with thirteen rounds in the magazine. The firearm
was put into an evidence bag and transported to police headquarters
with the other evidence. The ammunition discovered in the Challenger
was the same type of ammunition as the ammunition in the firearm in
that both were .45 caliber.
State v. Dukes

video disc of that footage collected by the intelligence
unit was admitted into evidence without objection and
played at the hearing on August 26, 2024. That footage
depicts two individuals leaving the scene of the accident
and walking toward the elementary school. The surveil-
lance footage from the side parking lot of the elementary
school shows a male individual approaching a ramp at the
elementary school and then running on the ramp with
an object in his right hand that appears to be a firearm.
In video footage from the exterior main entrance of the
elementary school, the male figure can be seen running
toward a dumpster at the end of an alleyway, moving a
garbage bin that was adjacent to the dumpster and, after
a few seconds, moving the garbage bin to its original
position and then fleeing the area. Subsequently in the
video footage, Rivera can be seen retrieving a firearm
from that same area near the dumpster and garbage can
at the elementary school and taking photographs of the
firearm. Upon discovering the firearm, Rivera made it
safe to handle “by taking the magazine out and making
sure there [were] no rounds in the chamber.” Rivera
testified that the firearm was loaded, as he had found
thirteen rounds in the magazine.
Still photographs taken from the video footage also
were admitted into evidence. Rivera testified as to exhibit
twenty-four, which shows the side parking lot of the
elementary school, stating that “you could see a male
individual on the school ramp holding a[n] object in
his right hand.” Rivera testified that exhibit twenty-
three is a still photograph of the side parking lot of the
elementary school “with the male party by the ramp,”
and stating that “what sticks out about this is his jeans
have either reflective or white lining going straight
down and the color of his [dreadlocks].” With respect to
exhibit twenty-two, a still photograph of the same side
parking lot of the elementary school, Rivera testified that
it “shows the same male individual with what appears
to be, in his right hand, a firearm that he is holding by
the slide.” Exhibit twenty-seven shows the defendant’s
clothing at the time he was apprehended; specifically, he
State v. Dukes

was wearing pants with a white stripe running vertically
down the legs. Photographs of the defendant at the time
of his arrest also were admitted into evidence and show
that he has dreadlocks that are red and yellow in color.
Michael Bourke, a forensic science examiner with the
DNA unit of the state forensics laboratory, testified
regarding his testing of DNA swabs of the firearm9 and
magazine that had been submitted to the laboratory.
The DNA found on the swab of the firearm generated
a DNA profile that contained a mixture of DNA from
five contributors. Bourke testified that “one of the con-
tributors contributed considerably more DNA than the
others,” and was considered to be a “major contributor,”
and that he was able to develop a specific DNA profile for
that contributor.10 He entered that DNA profile into the
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) database,11 which
allows for a search against convicted offender samples
in the database. A match was generated in the database,
indicating that the forensic profile from the sample taken
from the firearm “was a match to the offender DNA
profile” from a sample submitted into the database that
came from the defendant.
Officer Christopher Matarazzo of the Bridgeport Police
Department testified regarding his assistance appre-
hending the defendant during the evening of October
8, 2023. Other officers had advised over the police radio
9
Paul Nikola, a detective with the Major Crimes ID Forensic Unit of
the Bridgeport Police Department, testified that he first examined the
firearm for latent fingerprints but did not find any that were usable.
Thereafter, he took DNA swabs of the firearm that were sent to the state
laboratory for testing. He also test-fired the weapon and concluded that
it functioned properly.
10
Because there was no major contributor to the DNA sample taken
from the magazine, no further testing was done with respect to that
sample.
11
“ ‘CODIS contains DNA profiles from unsolved crimes and compares
them to known samples from convicted felons that are periodically added
to the database. See, e.g., State v. Webb, 128 Conn. App. 846, 852–53
n.3, 19 A.3d 678, cert. denied, 303 Conn. 907, 32 A.3d 961 (2011).’ State
v. Rodriguez, 337 Conn. 175, 180 n.2, 252 A.3d 811 (2020).” Jones v.
Commissioner of Correction, 212 Conn. App. 117, 133 n.4, 274 A.3d
237, cert. denied, 343 Conn. 933, 276 A.3d 975 (2022).
State v. Dukes

that they had observed a male matching a description
that had been provided to them in the area of Funston
Avenue and Soundview Avenue. The defendant was
found near a house on Funston Avenue at about 11:45
p.m. Video footage from Matarazzo’s body camera was
admitted into evidence without objection and played
during the hearing.12 In the footage, Matarazzo asked
the defendant, who was lying face down on the ground
with his hands behind his back, to turn over, at which
time the defendant stated, “I don’t have no guns, bro.
. . . I never had no guns. I was drinking, and I ran from
you.” The defendant also stated that he had “weed” on
him that he had thrown away, that he had “crashed” and
ran from the “orange car” because he had been drinking
and “panicked,” and that he was by himself at the time.
At the conclusion of Matarazzo’s testimony, the pros-
ecutor rested the evidentiary portion of the state’s case.
Thereafter, the court canvassed the defendant concern-
ing his right to testify. The next morning, the defendant
informed the court that he would not be testifying, and,
after the court canvassed him further and questioned his
counsel about that decision, the court made a finding that
the defendant had knowingly and voluntarily waived his
right to testify. Defense counsel did not call any witnesses
during the evidentiary phase of the hearing.13
After hearing brief arguments from the prosecutor
and defense counsel, the court made the following rel-
evant findings. Specifically, the court first noted the five
witnesses14 who testified at the hearing and “found all
12
Still photographs taken from the body camera footage also were
admitted into evidence. Matarazzo testified that the photographs
depicted what he was doing and what he saw when he captured the
defendant, as well as the clothing worn by the defendant at the time of
his capture, which included pants with a white stripe running vertically
down the pant legs.
13
During cross-examination of Bourke, defense counsel offered, and the
court admitted, into evidence one exhibit, which consisted of a CODIS
profile entry form relating to the swabs of the firearm.
14
Marvin G. Saddler, the defendant’s probation officer, also testified
during the evidentiary portion of the hearing regarding the conditions of
the defendant’s probation and certain documents from the defendant’s
State v. Dukes

the witnesses to be credible.” It also noted the evidence
presented by the prosecutor demonstrating that the
defendant was on probation, that the defendant’s pro-
bationary period began in October 2021, that the viola-
tion of probation warrant had been signed on December
5, 2023, and that the defendant had acknowledged and
signed the written conditions of his probation.
The court found “by a fair preponderance of the evi-
dence [that] the state ha[d] proven that the defendant,
while on probation at the time, engaged in criminal con-
duct, specifically, [he] violate[d] the motor vehicle . . .
and criminal laws of this state. The motor vehicle laws
include . . . engaging a pursuit and evading responsibil-
ity.” The court stated further: “And, there . . . certainly
[was] circumstantial evidence that he, in fact, was the
individual in that orange [Challenger] on the night of
October 8, 2023. Specifically, I point to the following that
indicates that he is the one: One, his cell phone was left
behind, with [a photograph of him on the lock screen] . . .
. [Y]ou look at it and it’s, in fact, him. . . . [H]e admitted
that he drove that car and was involved in an accident
and left the scene. I will note that I know that counsel
may dispute that with regard to a trial, with regard to a
motion to suppress, but those were the statements that
were made, probably—although there’s no evidence—
before any advisement of rights, but certainly they were
made by the defendant at the time without being really
questioned by the police. So, I find that the statements
were voluntary and that the defendant admitted to vio-
lating the laws, at least of engaging and evading. . . .
“I think [that the] police do have a safety or a need to
engage in what we call an inventory search, and that
inventory search is to protect them, meaning the police,
so someone doesn’t claim, ‘I had five gold bars in there,
and now they’re not there.’ It’s . . . to . . . [protect] the
police from false claims of any property loss. It also
probation file that were admitted into evidence, which showed, inter
alia, that the defendant had signed the written conditions of his proba-
tion on October 4 and November 4, 2021.
State v. Dukes

protects the police from anything that may be in there
that’s dangerous while the car is in police custody. So,
as part of that search, the police found three bullets. . . .
“[W]e learned that, after the accident, two people
left the orange Dodge Challenger. They’re followed by
city cameras to a school. I will note that the defendant’s
appearance in there—they’re not the clearest videos in
the world—but the appearance is consistent with the
defendant. . . . [O]ne of the things I found perhaps most
compelling was, if you look at the video, particularly
when they’re at the school on what, counsel, you’ve
described as the ramp, the defendant’s indications, his
theatrics, so to speak—which I’ve noted in this court-
room—throwing his hands around and the manner in
which he held himself, his disposition, his demeanor
certainly seems like the same person we have here in
court. And I’ve seen him in court. I’ve seen him when
there’s answers that he doesn’t like, when there’s ques-
tions he doesn’t like. His mannerisms, his gestures, are
similar to that of what I saw on the video. Now, the police
. . . put together [a] video of the individuals leaving the
Challenger and going to the area of the school, and in that
[area the] police were able to find a gun on the ground. It
just so happens [that] the gun has . . . DNA [on it] that
is consistent with a previous submission by the defen-
dant, probably from this conviction. So, I find that the
circumstantial evidence certainly indicates [that] the
defendant violated the laws of this state, particularly
possession of a weapon . . . to wit, a Glock pistol, [for]
which the defendant would be in violation of his proba-
tion. I also find that possession of the bullets is also
consistent with that.
“There was evidence with regard to a green, plant-
like material that tested positive—there was no clear
evidence whether it tested positive. I will not find that
that is a violation of his probation or violation of a law,
but I will find that there is substantial other evidence
that indicates that the defendant engaged in criminal
law violations while on probation.” (Emphasis added.)
State v. Dukes

Thereafter, the court heard testimony from Marvin G.
Saddler, the defendant’s probation officer, after which
the court made a determination that the goals of the
defendant’s probation were no longer being served, and
it balanced the defendant’s liberty interests against the
need to protect the public. A sentencing proceeding was
held on September 3, 2024. The court rendered judgment
revoking the defendant’s probation and sentenced him
to a term of eight years of incarceration.15 This appeal
followed. Additional facts and procedural history will
be set forth as necessary.
We first set forth our standard of review and legal
principles governing violation of probation proceedings.
A violation of probation hearing “involves two distinct
components. Initially, the court conducts an adversarial
evidentiary hearing to determine whether the defen-
dant has indeed violated a condition of probation. . . .
The state must establish a violation of probation by a
fair preponderance of the evidence. . . . That is to say,
the evidence must induce a reasonable belief that it is
more probable than not that the defendant has violated
a condition of his or her probation. . . . This court will
not disturb a trial court’s factual determination that
a violation has occurred unless that determination is
clearly erroneous. . . .
“Second, if the evidence supports a violation, the
court exercises its discretion and determines whether
the beneficial, rehabilitative purposes of probation are
still being served or whether the need to protect the public
outweighs the probationer’s interest in liberty. . . . Thus,
an appellate court will affirm an exercise of discretion
reinstating an original sentence or ordering incarcera-
tion, absent a manifest abuse of discretion or injustice
requiring reversal.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Dennis, 237 Conn. App. 649, 656–57, 352 A.3d
204, cert. denied, 354 Conn. 932, 354 A.3d 728 (2026).
15
We note that, although the record does not contain a written deci-
sion of the trial court, it does include a signed transcript of the court’s
oral decision. See Practice Book § 64-1 (a).
State v. Dukes

“The law governing the standard of proof for a viola-
tion of probation is well settled. . . . [A]ll that is required
in a probation violation proceeding is enough to satisfy
the court within its sound judicial discretion that the
probationer has not met the terms of his probation. .
. . [A] trial court may not find a violation of probation
unless it finds that the predicate facts underlying the
violation have been established by a preponderance of
the evidence at the hearing—that is, the evidence must
induce a reasonable belief that it is more probable than
not that the defendant has violated a condition of his or
her probation. . . . This court has observed that to support
a judgment of revocation of probation, [o]ur law does not
require the state to prove that all conditions alleged were
violated; it is sufficient to prove that one was violated.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Owens, 235
Conn. App. 482, 494–95, 345 A.3d 489 (2025). With
these general principles and standards of review in mind,
we turn to the defendant’s claims on appeal.
I
On appeal, the defendant challenges the court’s find-
ing that he violated his probation and raises a number
of grounds in support of his challenge, which we address
in turn. The defendant also asserts that, to the extent
that any of his claims are deemed unpreserved, this court
should review any unpreserved claims pursuant to State
v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989),
as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120
A.3d 1188 (2015).
A
The defendant claims that the court, in finding that
he violated his probation, improperly relied on certain
evidence that should have been suppressed. Specifically,
he claims that the cell phone and ammunition evidence
recovered from the Challenger following Rivera’s inven-
tory search of the vehicle was obtained as a result of an
illegal warrantless search of the vehicle in violation of
his fourth amendment rights and, thus, should have been
State v. Dukes

excluded and should not have factored into the court’s
violation of probation findings.
The state counters in its appellate brief that the defen-
dant did not preserve his claim that the ammunition
and cell phone evidence recovered from the Challenger
should have been excluded. The state further contends
that the defendant should be deemed to have waived this
claim due to his failure to seek to suppress this evidence
at trial; that, even if the claim is not waived, the record
is inadequate to review the claim pursuant to Golding;
that the claim fails on its merits because there was no
“ ‘egregious, shocking or harassing police misconduct’ ”;
State v. Maietta, 320 Conn. 678, 686, 134 A.3d 572
(2016); involved in this case; and that any alleged error in
the admission of the evidence was harmless, as sufficient
other evidence in the record supported the court’s viola-
tion of probation findings. We agree with the state that
the defendant’s claim is unpreserved, as the defendant
did not request that the court exclude that evidence at
the violation of probation hearing or raise any fourth
amendment claim before the trial court. We also agree
that the record is inadequate to review the defendant’s
unpreserved claim pursuant to Golding. Therefore, we
decline to review this claim.
“Under Golding, a defendant can prevail on a claim of
constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the
following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate
to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of
constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fun-
damental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation
. . . exists and . . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial;
and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state
has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged
constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Sidiropoulos, 237 Conn. App. 262, 296,
351 A.3d 871, cert. denied, 354 Conn. 923, 353 A.3d 842
(2026). “[T]he inability to meet any one prong requires
a determination that the defendant’s claim must fail. . .
State v. Dukes

. The appellate tribunal is free, therefore, to respond to
the defendant’s claim by focusing on whichever condi-
tion is most relevant in the particular circumstances.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Nathan
S., 236 Conn. App. 759, 812, 350 A.3d 544 (2025), cert.
denied, 354 Conn. 931, 354 A.3d 728 (2026).
“The first Golding requirement is that the record be
adequate to review the alleged claim of [constitutional]
error . . . . The defendant bears the responsibility for
providing a record that is adequate for review of his
claim of constitutional error. If the facts revealed by
the record are insufficient, unclear or ambiguous as to
whether a constitutional violation has occurred, we will
not attempt to supplement or reconstruct the record, or
to make factual determinations, in order to decide the
defendant’s claim. . . . State v. Burgos, 170 Conn. App.
501, 546–47, 155 A.3d 246, cert. denied, 325 Conn. 907,
156 A.3d 538 (2017).
“[Connecticut] case law addressing whether a record
is adequate for review under the first prong of Golding
makes clear that this preservation exception operates in
a very restrictive manner, particularly in the fact sensi-
tive context of illegal search and seizure claims. State
v. Jenkins, 298 Conn. 209, 227, 3 A.3d 806 (2010).”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Overstreet,
232 Conn. App. 273, 283, 337 A.3d 31, cert. denied, 352
Conn. 910, 336 A.3d 83 (2025).
The following legal principles are relevant to the defen-
dant’s claim regarding the evidence that should have been
excluded at the violation of probation hearing. “ ‘[T]he
[f]ourth [a]mendment protects the right to be free from
“unreasonable searches and seizures,” but it is silent
about how this right is to be enforced. To supplement
the bare text, [the United States Supreme Court] created
the exclusionary rule, a deterrent sanction that bars the
prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by way
of a [f]ourth [a]mendment violation.’ Davis v. United
States, 564 U.S. 229, 231–32, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 180 L.
Ed. 2d 285 (2011). As such, the exclusionary rule ‘is a
State v. Dukes

prudential doctrine . . . created by [the] [c]ourt to compel
respect for the constitutional guarant[ee]. . . . Exclusion
is not a personal constitutional right, nor is it designed
to redress the injury occasioned by an unconstitutional
search. . . . The rule’s sole purpose is to deter future
[f]ourth [a]mendment violations.’ ” State ex rel. Dunn v.
Connelly, 228 Conn. App. 458, 476, 325 A.3d 1159, cert.
denied, 350 Conn. 933, 327 A.3d 386 (2024), cert. denied
sub nom. Connelly v. Connecticut, U.S. , 146 S. Ct.
119, 223 L. Ed. 2d 20 (2025); see also State v. Romero,
199 Conn. App. 39, 50, 235 A.3d 644, cert. denied, 335
Conn. 955, 238 A.3d 731 (2020).
“[A] probation revocation proceeding [however] is
civil in nature and, therefore, does not require all of the
procedural components associated with an adversary
criminal proceeding.” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Dunbar, 233 Conn. App. 297, 310, 339 A.3d
642, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 913, 344 A.3d 155 (2025).
“[U]nlike criminal trials, in which the exclusionary rule
typically applies, in probation revocation hearings, the
exclusionary rule typically does not apply. . . . Thus, a
probationer has the burden of persuading us that the
exclusionary rule should nonetheless apply. . . . State v.
Jacobs, 229 Conn. 385, 392, 641 A.2d 1351 (1994); see
also Payne v. Robinson, 207 Conn. 565, 571, 541 A.2d
504 (explaining that [t]he purpose of probation revoca-
tion proceedings is to determine whether a probationer is
complying with the conditions of his probation and that,
[i]n such proceedings, the government has an interest in
accurate fact-finding that is likely to be impaired when
otherwise reliable and relevant evidence is excluded),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898, 109 S. Ct. 242, 102 L. Ed.
2d 230 (1988). Our bar on the application of the exclu-
sionary rule to probation revocation proceedings is not
absolute . . . as egregious, shocking or harassing police
misconduct would warrant our application of the rule to
such probation proceedings. . . . State v. Maietta, [supra,
320 Conn. 686–87].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Sykes, 232 Conn. App. 753, 763–64, 337 A.3d
1174, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 906, 343 A.3d 504 (2025).
State v. Dukes

In the present case, the defendant acknowledges that
the exclusionary rule “typically does not apply to proba-
tion revocation hearings” but contends, nevertheless,
that, under the circumstances of this case, an exception
to that general rule applies because Rivera engaged in
“ ‘egregious, shocking or harassing police misconduct’ ”
when he performed an illegal inventory search of the
Challenger. State v. Maietta, supra, 320 Conn. 686.
In support of this claim, the defendant cites to various
“general orders” of the Bridgeport Police Department
(general orders), which consist of internal guidelines and
procedures for Bridgeport police officers with respect
to, inter alia, inventory searches of motor vehicles or
the handling of an abandoned vehicle at an accident
scene, and he included copies of those general orders
totaling more than 100 pages in the appendix to his
appellate brief. Relying on those general orders, the
defendant contends that Rivera’s inventory search of
the Challenger was illegal because it was not conducted
in accordance with those orders. The general orders
on which the defendant relies in support of this claim,
however, were not admitted as evidence at the violation
of probation hearing. We, therefore, decline to consider
them in this appeal. See, e.g., State v. Owens, supra,
235 Conn. App. 498 n.14 (“We decline to consider any
evidence that was not before the court at the probation
revocation hearing. See, e.g., Dushay v. Southern Con-
necticut Hockey League, LLC, 234 Conn. App. 609, 612
n.3, 344 A.3d 175 (2025). ‘A reviewing court cannot go
beyond the proper record before it in the determination
of issues presented on appeal. . . . It is axiomatic that this
court does not take evidence and does not make factual
determinations.’ . . . State v. Dyous, 153 Conn. App.
266, 278 n.10, 100 A.3d 1004 (2014), appeal dismissed,
320 Conn. 176, 128 A.3d 505 (2016).”).16
16
We find no merit to the defendant’s assertion that, because this
court exercises plenary review over the issue of whether the inventory
search was legal, “this court can consider additional materials such
as the Bridgeport police policies to determine whether the search was
legally valid.” First, this claim is premised on the erroneous assump-
tion that the issue of whether Rivera conducted a legal inventory
State v. Dukes

In the present case, as we previously indicated, Rivera
testified that he had performed an inventory search of
the Challenger, which resulted in his finding the defen-
dant’s cell phone and the ammunition. During her direct
examination of Rivera, the prosecutor asked whether the
Bridgeport Police Department has a policy regarding
inventory searches, to which Rivera responded in the
affirmative. He explained that, when, as in this case,
there is no driver or occupant present, “the vehicle gets
towed,” and “you do an inventory search of the vehicle
and make sure there’s no valuables inside of the vehicle”
so that, if the owner does retrieve the vehicle, the owner
cannot say that valuables were left in it that have disap-
peared. Rivera testified further that, pursuant to police
department policy, he can look inside of a vehicle’s closed
containers, such as the glove box, trunk and center con-
sole. On cross-examination, defense counsel only briefly
addressed the issue, asking whether it is “Bridgeport
police policy to document what might be valuables in a car
at the scene of an accident,” to which Rivera responded,
“[y]es.” See footnote 5 of this opinion. No further ques-
tions were asked regarding the inventory search or any
policies of the Bridgeport Police Department regarding
such searches. That was the extent of any testimony at
the violation of probation hearing concerning the poli-
cies of the Bridgeport Police Department with respect
to inventory searches of vehicles, and no documentary
evidence was offered concerning those policies.
“[Connecticut courts] consistently have declined to
grant Golding review to [claims under the fourth amend-
ment to the United States constitution] wherein the pred-
icate factual record was not completely developed before
the trial court. State v. Jenkins, supra, 298 Conn. 230;
see also id., 223 (the defendant’s failure to litigate the
validity of the patdown during the suppression hearing
search of the Challenger is properly before this court. Furthermore,
case law is clear that we, as a reviewing court, “cannot go beyond the
proper record before [us] in the determination of issues presented on
appeal,” and that this court neither takes evidence nor makes factual
determinations. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Owens,
supra, 235 Conn. App. 498 n.14.
State v. Dukes

rendered the record inadequate for Golding review of this
issue); State v. Canales, 281 Conn. 572, 582, 916 A.2d
767 (2007) (concluding that record was inadequate to
review claim that defendant’s statements were product
of illegal arrest because the defendant did not argue at
the suppression hearing that the arrest lacked prob-
able cause, the state did not offer evidence concerning
probable cause, and the trial court was not called upon
to determine whether probable cause to arrest existed);
State v. Burgos, supra, 170 Conn. App. 547–48 (conclud-
ing that record was inadequate to review defendant’s
fourth amendment claim because he did not contest the
validity of his consent in his motion to suppress or at the
suppression hearing).” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Overstreet, supra, 232 Conn. App. 285.
In State v. Brunetti, 279 Conn. 39, 56, 901 A.2d 1
(2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1212, 127 S. Ct. 1328,
167 L. Ed. 2d 85 (2007), our Supreme Court determined
that the record was inadequate to review the defendant’s
claim, made for the first time on appeal, that a search of
his home was unconstitutional and, thus, that evidence
found in the home should have been suppressed. Specifi-
cally, the defendant in Brunetti had claimed that, even
though the search of his home was performed with the
consent of his father, the search nonetheless was uncon-
stitutional because his mother had declined to consent
to the search. Id., 47. Our Supreme Court declined to
review that claim, concluding that “the facts revealed
by the record [were] inadequate to establish whether
the alleged constitutional violation did, in fact, occur.”
Id., 64. In reaching that conclusion, the court stated
that, “because the defendant’s motions to suppress did
not implicate the mother’s consent or lack thereof, the
state was not on notice that it was required to establish,
on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, that
the defendant’s mother had consented to or acquiesced
in the search. In such circumstances, the state bears no
responsibility for the evidentiary lacunae, and, therefore,
it would be manifestly unfair to the state for this court
to reach the merits of the defendant’s claim upon a mere
State v. Dukes

assumption that the defendant’s mother had declined to
consent to the search.” (Emphasis in original; footnote
omitted.) Id., 59.
In State v. Overstreet, supra, 232 Conn. App. 286,
this court held, similar to Brunetti, that the record was
inadequate to review the defendant’s unpreserved claim
that the trial court should have suppressed evidence of
a machete due to the state’s failure to establish that its
seizure was proper under the plain view doctrine. In Over-
street, this court explained that, “[b]ecause the defendant
did not raise issues related to the seizure of the machete
at [a] suppression hearing [at which he sought to suppress
other evidence], the state was not alerted to the need to
develop a factual record concerning the application of
the plain view doctrine.” Id. As a result, “any decision by
this court concerning the validity of the seizure [of the
machete] would [have been] entirely speculative without
the necessary factual and legal conclusions furnished by
the trial court, [and] [was therefore] unreviewable under
the first prong of Golding.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 288.
In the present case, the defendant never objected at the
hearing to the admission of the evidence recovered from
the Challenger, did not raise any claim before the trial
court concerning the validity of the inventory search
performed by Rivera, and failed to present any evidence
concerning the procedures governing inventory searches
performed by Bridgeport police officers. As a result, the
state was not alerted to any claim regarding the validity
of the inventory search or the need to develop a factual
record relating thereto. “[I]n such circumstances, the
state bears no responsibility for the evidentiary lacunae,
and, therefore, it would be manifestly unfair to the state
for [an appellate] court to reach the merits of the . . . claim
. . . .” State v. Brunetti, supra, 279 Conn. 59. Also, the
court made no findings concerning the validity of the
inventory search or whether the police engaged in any
kind of misconduct, let alone misconduct that could be
construed as “egregious, shocking or harassing,” so as
State v. Dukes

to warrant application of the exclusionary rule to this
violation of probation proceeding.17 (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Maietta, supra, 320 Conn.
686–87. Thus, any decision by this court concerning
the validity of the inventory search, or whether Rivera
complied with police policies in conducting the search or
engaged in any kind of misconduct, would be “entirely
speculative without the necessary factual and legal con-
clusions furnished by the trial court . . . .” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Overstreet, supra,
232 Conn. App. 288.
Accordingly, the record is inadequate18 to review the
defendant’s unpreserved fourth amendment claim con-
cerning the exclusionary rule pursuant to Golding.19
17
During defense counsel’s arguments to the court at the conclusion of
the evidentiary phase of the hearing, defense counsel briefly referenced
the inventory search, questioning whether the police had a policy to
safeguard property that is abandoned at an accident scene. The court
responded and disagreed with defense counsel, stating that it believed
that the police conduct inventory searches to protect themselves from
false claims of property loss. Aside from that statement, the court made
no further references with respect to the inventory search conducted
by Rivera.
18
We reject the defendant’s contention that “the record is clear and
adequate for review” because “[t]he trial court specifically stated that
it found that there was a valid inventory search.” We disagree that
the court made a specific finding that the inventory search was valid.
Rather, our review of the transcript demonstrates that the court made
statements disagreeing with defense counsel’s assertion that the police
do not conduct inventory searches to protect against false claims of
property loss. In making those few brief statements, the court did not
discuss any specific policies or guidelines that the Bridgeport police
must adhere to when conducting inventory searches or whether the
inventory search conducted by Rivera was performed in accordance
with police policies.
19
We note that, even if we were to review the defendant’s claim, it
would fail on its merits, as the defendant has not directed this court to
any evidence that would support a determination that Rivera engaged
in egregious, shocking or harassing police misconduct, nor did the
defendant provide any authority in support of his contention that a
violation of internal police policies and guidelines concerning inven-
tory searches would rise to the level of egregious, shocking or harassing
police misconduct; therefore, the defendant failed to meet his burden
of persuading this court that the exclusionary rule should apply in this
case. See State v. Sykes, supra, 232 Conn. App. 763–64.
State v. Dukes

B
Next, the defendant claims that his inculpatory state-
ments to Matarazzo should have been excluded from evi-
dence at the violation of probation hearing. Specifically,
he contends that his statements admitting that he was
the driver of the Challenger when it was involved in an
accident were obtained in violation of Miranda because
he made the statements while he was in police custody
and under police interrogation, and he had not been
advised of his Miranda rights prior to the questioning by
the police.20 Therefore, he asserts that the court should
not have relied on those statements in finding that he
was the operator of the Challenger and, in turn, finding
that he violated his probation by engaging the police in
a motor vehicle pursuit and evading responsibility in the
operation of a motor vehicle.21
The state, again, contends that this claim is unpre-
served, and we agree, as the video footage, with audio
20
See State v. Waters, 214 Conn. App. 294, 330 n.21, 280 A.3d 601
(“Two threshold conditions must be satisfied in order to invoke the
warnings constitutionally required by Miranda: (1) the defendant must
have been in custody; and (2) the defendant must have been subjected
to police interrogation. . . . State v. Gonzalez, 302 Conn. 287, 294, 25
A.3d 648 (2011).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied,
345 Conn. 914, 284 A.3d 25 (2022).
21
The defendant has not provided this court with any authority indicat-
ing that the prophylactic rules set forth in Miranda, which are designed
to protect an individual’s privilege against self-incrimination under
the fifth amendment and coerced confessions; see Chavez v. Martinez,
538 U.S. 760, 770, 123 S. Ct. 1994, 155 L. Ed. 2d 984 (2003) (plurality
opinion); State v. Purcell, 331 Conn. 318, 343, 359, 203 A.3d 542 (2019);
apply to evidence presented in a violation of probation proceeding, or that
evidence allegedly obtained in violation of Miranda may be excluded from
a violation of probation proceeding if it involves “ ‘egregious, shocking
or harassing police misconduct,’ ” as our Supreme Court held in State v.
Maietta, supra, 320 Conn. 686, in the context of the exclusionary rule
under the fourth amendment. Nevertheless, we need not address this
issue because, even if we assume, without deciding, that such a claimed
Miranda violation may properly be raised in a violation of probation
proceeding, the claim suffers from the same infirmity—an inadequate
record on which to review the claim—as the defendant’s fourth amend-
ment claim seeking to exclude the evidence obtained from the search of
his vehicle, which precludes our review of the claim.
State v. Dukes

of the defendant’s statements, from Matarazzo’s body
camera was admitted into evidence without objection
and played during the violation of probation hearing,
and the defendant never raised any claim of a Miranda
violation before the trial court. The state also argues
that the record is inadequate to review this unpreserved
claim under Golding because the record was not suffi-
ciently developed to support a finding as to whether the
defendant had been provided with Miranda warnings.
The defendant counters that, “because the state failed to
provide any evidence that . . . proper Miranda warnings
[were provided to him], the trial court was precluded
from finding that they were given.” According to the
defendant, the court’s finding that his statements were
made voluntarily “require[d] an implicit finding that
there were no Miranda warnings and that the defendant
was in custody,” which makes the record adequate for
review of this claim. We do not agree with the defendant.
Similar to our conclusion in part I A of this opinion, we
conclude that the record is inadequate to review this
unpreserved claim pursuant to Golding.
“For any Golding claim, [i]t is incumbent upon the
[defendant] to take the necessary steps to sustain [his]
burden of providing an adequate record for appellate
review. . . . Our role is not to guess at possibilities . . .
but to review claims based on a complete factual record
developed by a trial court. . . . Without the necessary
factual and legal conclusions furnished by the trial court
. . . any decision made by us respecting [the defendant’s
claims] would be entirely speculative. . . . State v. Bru-
netti, [supra, 279 Conn. 63]. [W]e will not attempt to
supplement or reconstruct the record, or to make fac-
tual determinations, in order to decide the defendant’s
claim. State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 240.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Leuders, 225 Conn.
App. 612, 641–42, 317 A.3d 69, cert. denied, 349 Conn.
920, 321 A.3d 402 (2024); see id., 642 (record was inad-
equate to review claim that defendant’s statements,
which defendant had sought to suppress, were not result
of knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights).
State v. Dukes

As we have indicated, the body camera footage that
was admitted into evidence without objection shows the
defendant’s statements to Matarazzo on the evening of
October 8, 2023, in which the defendant stated that he
had been drinking and had “weed” on him, and that he
had crashed the Challenger, panicked, and ran from the
“orange car.” In referencing the circumstantial evidence
in support of its finding that the defendant was the
driver of the Challenger on the night of October 8, 2023,
the court pointed to the fact that his cell phone was left
behind, with a photograph of him on the lock screen,
and stated further: “[H]e admitted that he drove that
car and was involved in an accident and left the scene. I
will note that I know that counsel may dispute that with
regard to a trial, with regard to a motion to suppress, but
those were the statements that were made, probably—
although there’s no evidence—before any advisement of
rights, but certainly they were made by the defendant at
the time without being really questioned by the police.
So, I find that the statements were voluntary and that
the defendant admitted to violating the laws, at least of
engaging and evading.” (Emphasis added.)
As the trial court indicated, there was no evidence pre-
sented at the violation of probation hearing concerning
when the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights,
and the court stated only that the defendant “probably”
had not been advised of his Miranda rights before he
made the challenged statements. Thus, we do not agree
with the defendant’s contention that the record shows
that he was not advised of his Miranda rights prior to
when the police allegedly began to question him. Because
the defendant’s claim is predicated on his assertion that
he was subjected to custodial police interrogation without
having been advised of his Miranda rights, the record
must demonstrate, in the first instance, that he, in fact,
had not been advised of his Miranda rights prior to
making the challenged statements. Such information,
however, is absent from the record in this case. Nor
did the court make any findings regarding whether the
defendant was in custody or subject to interrogation.
State v. Dukes

In State v. Morales, 164 Conn. App. 143, 167–69,
136 A.3d 278, cert. denied, 321 Conn. 916, 136 A.3d
1275 (2016), this court declined to review an unpre-
served Miranda violation claim under Golding due to
an inadequate record. Although, in Morales, unlike in
the present case, it was undisputed that the defendant
did not receive Miranda warnings; id., 164; “the [trial]
court was not asked to make, nor did it make, any factual
findings or legal conclusions as to whether the defendant
was in custody or subject to interrogation.”22 Id., 167.
We explained: “Our Supreme Court has clarified that ‘[a]
record is not inadequate for Golding purposes because
the trial court has not reached a conclusion of law if
the record contains the factual predicates for making
such a determination.’ State v. Torres, 230 Conn. 372,
378–79, 645 A.2d 529 (1994). Nevertheless, ‘[i]f the
facts revealed by the record are insufficient, unclear or
ambiguous as to whether a constitutional violation has
occurred, we will not attempt to supplement or recon-
struct the record, or to make factual determinations,
in order to decide the defendant’s claim.’ . . . State v.
Hampton, 293 Conn. 435, 443–44, 988 A.2d 167 (2009);
see also State v. Torres, supra, 378 (Golding review
unavailable where record lacks factual finding that forms
basis of defendant’s claim, not where record merely
22
As we have stated, “[t]wo threshold conditions must be satisfied in
order to invoke the warnings constitutionally required by Miranda: (1)
the defendant must have been in custody; and (2) the defendant must
have been subjected to police interrogation. . . . The defendant bears the
burden of proving that he was in custody for Miranda purposes. . . . Two
discrete inquiries are essential to determine custody: first, what were the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those
circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at
liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. . . . The first inquiry
is factual, and we will not overturn the trial court’s determination of
the historical circumstances surrounding the defendant’s interrogation
unless it is clearly erroneous. . . . The second inquiry, however, calls
for application of the controlling legal standard to the historical facts.
. . . The ultimate determination of whether a defendant was subjected
to a custodial interrogation, therefore, presents a mixed question of
law and fact, over which our review is de novo. . . . State v. Mitchell,
296 Conn. 449, 459, 996 A.2d 251 (2010).” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Morales, supra, 164 Conn. App. 165–66.
State v. Dukes

lacks factual determination regarding issue appealed).”
State v. Morales, supra, 167. This court stated further:
“[W]e do not know if all of the pertinent facts regard-
ing the alleged interrogation and [the officer’s] conduct
were elicited,” and that “[t]he state did not have the
opportunity to present evidence to meet the defendant’s
claim that his responses to [the officer] were inadmis-
sible under the circumstances. More fundamentally,
the record contains no findings by the court concerning
whether the defendant was subject to interrogation for
Miranda purposes. Even if we were to assume, without
deciding, that the defendant was in custody when [the
officer] handcuffed him . . . there is too scant a basis on
which to determine whether the circumstances ‘reflect a
measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent
in custody itself.’ . . . The defendant thus asks this court
‘to make a determination of fact that the trial court had
not been asked to make.’ State v. Torres, supra, [379];
see State v. Mullins, [288 Conn. 345, 363–64, 952 A.2d
784 (2008)] (first prongs of Miranda custody and inter-
rogation inquiries are factual) [overruled in part on
other grounds by State v. Polanco, 308 Conn. 242, 61
A.3d 1084 (2013)]. Accordingly, the defendant’s claim
is not reviewable under Golding.” (Citations omitted.)
State v. Morales, supra, 168–69.
In the present case, the court did not make any factual
findings or legal conclusions as to whether the defendant
was in custody or subject to interrogation, and, addi-
tionally, the record is unclear as to whether he had been
advised of his Miranda rights before he made the state-
ments. Moreover, because the defendant did not seek to
exclude his statements or raise his Miranda claim at the
violation of probation hearing, the state was not alerted
to the need to dispute this claim. Without the necessary
factual determinations by the trial court concerning the
defendant’s claimed Miranda violation, any decision by
this court with respect to this claim would be entirely
speculative, and it would be unfair to the state for this
court to review the claim under the circumstances. See
State v. Brunetti, supra, 279 Conn. 59 (when “the state
State v. Dukes

bears no responsibility for the evidentiary lacunae . . .
it would be manifestly unfair to the state for [an appel-
late] court to reach the merits of the . . . claim”); State
v. Krzywicki, 39 Conn. App. 832, 840, 668 A.2d 387
(1995) (“An adequate factual record is especially crucial
when dealing with a claim that was not preserved at
trial, since consideration is being sought for review of a
claim for which we lack a trial court ruling. . . . Because
the record presented by the defendant does not indicate
when the defendant received his Miranda warnings, an
adequate record for review of the claim does not exist.”
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.));
see also, e.g., State v. Berube, 256 Conn. 742, 751, 775
A.2d 966 (2001) (declining to review unpreserved claim
of Miranda violation under Golding due to inadequate
record when record was not clear as to when defendant
received Miranda warnings, as it was “essential to know”
timing of defendant’s conversations with police with
respect to his receipt of Miranda warnings); see id., 751–
52 (declining to infer that defendant received Miranda
warnings prior to his conversations with police).
Accordingly, we decline to review this unpreserved
claim pursuant to Golding.
C
The defendant’s next claim is that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to find that he had violated his probation.
Specifically, he contends that there was insufficient
evidence to support the court’s findings that he violated
his probation by engaging the police in a motor vehicle
pursuit and evading responsibility in the operation of
a motor vehicle, and by possessing ammunition and a
firearm. We disagree that the evidence was insufficient
to support the court’s finding that the defendant violated
his probation, as three of the four grounds on which the
court based its finding are supported by sufficient evi-
dence. We conclude, however, that the evidence is insuf-
ficient to support the court’s finding that the defendant
violated his probation by possessing ammunition.
State v. Dukes

The following principles guide our resolution of the
defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence claims. “[A]
defendant who asserts an insufficiency of the evidence
claim bears an arduous burden. . . . [F]or the purposes of
sufficiency review . . . we review the sufficiency of the
evidence as the case was tried . . . . [A] claim of insuf-
ficiency of the evidence must be tested by reviewing no
less than, and no more than, the evidence introduced at
trial.”23 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Daniels, 228 Conn. App. 321, 326–27, 324 A.3d 820,
cert. denied, 350 Conn. 926, 326 A.3d 248 (2024).
Because this claim “concerns the evidentiary phase and
the trial court’s factual finding[s] that the defendant
violated his probation, we are guided by the standard of
review applicable to that phase. . . . [As we have stated]
a trial court may not find a violation of probation unless
it finds that the predicate facts underlying the viola-
tion have been established by a preponderance of the
evidence at the hearing—that is, the evidence must
induce a reasonable belief that it is more probable than
not that the defendant has violated a condition of his or
her probation. . . . In making its factual determination,
the trial court is entitled to draw reasonable and logical
inferences from the evidence. . . . Accordingly, [a] chal-
lenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is based on the
court’s factual findings. The proper standard of review
is whether the court’s findings were clearly erroneous
based on the evidence. . . . A court’s finding of fact is
clearly erroneous and its conclusions drawn from that
finding lack sufficient evidence when there is no evidence
in the record to support [the court’s finding of fact] . .
23
We reject the defendant’s contention that any evidence resulting
from the allegedly illegal inventory search of his Challenger as well as
his inculpatory statements allegedly obtained in violation of Miranda
should not be taken into consideration in our assessment of the suf-
ficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings that he
violated his probation. See State v. Waters, 214 Conn. App. 294, 302,
280 A.3d 601 (“[e]stablished case law commands us to review claims
of evidentiary insufficiency in light of all of the evidence [adduced at
trial]” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 345 Conn.
914, 294 A.3d 25 (2022).
State v. Dukes

. or when although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed. . . . In making this determination, every
reasonable presumption must be given in favor of the
trial court’s ruling.” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Jordan, 236 Conn. App. 168, 174–75, 347
A.3d 912 (2025), cert. denied, 354 Conn. 903, 349 A.3d
18 (2026). In determining whether a court’s finding that
a defendant violated the conditions of his probation is
clearly erroneous, “it is not the role of this court to weigh
the evidence presented or to evaluate the credibility of
witnesses.” State v. Dennis, supra, 237 Conn. App. 658.
“[E]vidence is not insufficient [merely] because it is
conflicting or inconsistent. [The fact finder] is free to
juxtapose conflicting versions of events and determine
which is more credible. . . . It is the [fact finder’s] exclu-
sive province to weigh the conflicting evidence and to
determine the credibility of witnesses. . . . The [fact
finder] can . . . decide what—all, none, or some—of a
witness’ testimony to accept or reject.” (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) State v. Sykes, supra, 232 Conn.
App. 769. “Moreover, it does not diminish the proba-
tive force of the evidence that it consists, in whole or
in part, of evidence that is circumstantial rather than
direct. . . . It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact
of a multitude of facts [that] establishes guilt in a case
involving substantial circumstantial evidence.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Chalupka, 237 Conn.
App. 781, 789, 354 A.3d 264, cert. denied, 354 Conn.
938, A.3d (2026).
1
With respect to the court’s findings that the defen-
dant violated his probation by engaging the police in a
motor vehicle pursuit24 and evading responsibility in the
24
General Statutes § 14-223 (b) provides in relevant part: “No person
operating a motor vehicle, when signaled to stop by an officer in a police
vehicle using an audible signal device or flashing or revolving lights,
State v. Dukes

operation of a motor vehicle,25 the defendant claims that,
although he had made statements that he was alone in
the Challenger, the video evidence, which the court noted
was not clear, shows that there were two individuals leav-
ing the area of the accident, and it cannot be determined
from the video evidence which person was the driver. He
further contends that, “[s]imply being in the car would
not constitute a crime” and that, because “there [was] an
equal likelihood that the other individual was the driver,”
the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that he was
the driver of the Challenger who had engaged the police
in the pursuit and left the scene of the accident. We are
not persuaded.
Central to the court’s finding that the defendant vio-
lated his probation by engaging the police in a motor
vehicle pursuit and evading responsibility in the opera-
tion of a motor vehicle was its determination that the
defendant was the driver of the Challenger. The evidence
supporting that finding includes the following.
First, the court had before it the defendant’s own
admissions at the time he was apprehended that he had
driven the Challenger, was involved in an accident, and
then fled the accident scene because he had been drinking
shall increase the speed of the motor vehicle in an attempt to escape or
elude such police officer. . . .”
25
General Statutes § 14-224 (b) (3) provides: “Each operator of a motor
vehicle who is knowingly involved in an accident that causes injury or
damage to property shall at once stop and render such assistance as may
be needed and shall give such operator’s name, address and operator’s
license number and registration number to the owner of the injured or
damaged property, or to any officer or witness to the injury or damage to
property, and if such operator of the motor vehicle causing the injury or
damage to any property is unable to give such operator’s name, address
and operator’s license number and registration number to the owner of
the property injured or damaged, or to any witness or officer, for any
reason or cause, such operator shall immediately report such injury or
damage to property to a police officer, a constable, a state police officer
or an inspector of motor vehicles or at the nearest police precinct or sta-
tion, and shall state in such report the location and circumstances of the
accident causing the injury or damage to property and such operator’s
name, address, operator’s license number and registration number.”
State v. Dukes

alcohol and panicked.26 In addition, the cell phone recov-
ered from the floor in front of the driver’s seat was the
defendant’s cell phone, which the defendant does not
contest on appeal; instead, he contends that “evidence
that [his] cell phone was in the Challenger . . . does not
indicate that he was the operator.” We conclude that
the fact that the defendant’s cell phone was recovered
from the floor in front of the driver’s seat of the Chal-
lenger, which had just been pursued by the police and
was involved in an accident, supports an inference that it
fell there when the defendant fled from the driver’s seat
of the vehicle following the accident, and that inference
was consistent with the defendant’s statement acknowl-
edging that he had been driving the vehicle. Moreover,
the record shows that the defendant is the registered
owner of the Challenger. See General Statutes § 14-107
(b) (“[w]henever there occurs a violation of section 10a-
79, 10a-92, 10a-139, 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-223,
14-224 or 14-253a, or sections 14-275 to 14-281, inclu-
sive, or a violation of an ordinance, bylaw or regulation
of any town, city or borough in regard to parking, proof
of the registration number of any motor vehicle therein
concerned shall be prima facie evidence in any criminal
action or in any action based on an infraction that the
owner was the operator thereof, except in the case of a
leased or rented motor vehicle, such proof shall be prima
facie evidence in any criminal action that the lessee was
the operator thereof” (emphasis added)).
In addition, Rivera testified about his pursuit of the
Challenger before it was involved in the accident, includ-
ing that he had observed the Challenger traveling at a
high rate of speed and fail to come to a complete stop
at two intersections. Rivera also testified that he had
activated his vehicle’s emergency lights and sirens and
attempted to conduct a motor vehicle stop of the Chal-
lenger, which did not stop and, instead, accelerated at a
high rate of speed and failed to come to a complete stop
26
We note that the defendant acknowledges in his principal appellate
brief that “the evidence shows that the defendant and another person
were in the [Challenger] at the time of the accident.”
State v. Dukes

at another intersection. The police dashboard camera
video of that pursuit was admitted into evidence and
corroborated Rivera’s testimony.
We conclude that the evidence in the record is suffi-
cient to support the court’s finding that the defendant
was the person who operated the Challenger. “Given our
deferential review of the facts found by the trial court,
and the applicable burden of proof, which requires that
the evidence induce a reasonable belief that it is more
probable than not that the defendant has violated a con-
dition of his or her probation”; State v. Jordan, supra,
236 Conn. App. 183; we further conclude that the court’s
findings that the state produced sufficient evidence to
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant had engaged the police in a motor vehicle
pursuit and evaded responsibility in the operation of a
motor vehicle, and thereby violated his probation, are
supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous. See
id., 183 n.9 (“all that is required in probation revocation
hearing is that court is satisfied that probationer has not
met terms of probation by preponderance of evidence
and it is not required that proof of criminal conduct be
sufficient to sustain criminal conviction”).
2
In support of his claim that the evidence was insuf-
ficient to establish that he violated his probation by
possessing the firearm27 that was discovered near the
dumpster at the elementary school, the defendant con-
tends that, even though he was found to be a major con-
tributor to the DNA found on the firearm, “DNA does
27
General Statutes § 53a-217 (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is
guilty of criminal possession of a firearm, ammunition or an electronic
defense weapon when such person possesses a firearm, ammunition or
an electronic defense weapon and (1) has been convicted of (A) a felony
committed prior to, on or after October 1, 2013 . . . .”
The record in this case shows that the defendant, in 2018, was convicted
on guilty pleas of the crimes of assault in the first degree in violation of
§ 53a-59 (a) (1), carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of § 29-35
(a), and criminal possession of a firearm, ammunition or an electronic
defense weapon in violation of § 53a-217, all of which are felonies.
State v. Dukes

not have a time stamp,” and there was “no evidence of
when the defendant’s DNA was transferred onto the
gun.” He further asserts that “DNA can be transferred
in a variety of ways other than the defendant directly
handling the gun” and that, because Rivera found the
gun shortly after he had conducted a search of the defen-
dant’s Challenger, there was “a reasonable probability
that Rivera had transferred the defendant’s DNA onto
the gun after searching the defendant’s [Challenger].”28
Finally, he argues, in the alternative, that the other
occupant of the Challenger “may have possessed the gun
while in the” vehicle and that the presence of his DNA,
“without more,” fails to establish his possession of the
firearm. We disagree.
“The term [p]ossess means to have physical possession
or otherwise to exercise dominion or control over tangible
property . . . . General Statutes § 53a-3 (2). We have pre-
viously explained that there are two kinds of possession,
actual and constructive. Actual possession requires the
defendant to have had direct physical contact with the
[contraband]. . . . Alternatively, constructive possession
is possession without direct physical contact. . . . It can
mean an appreciable ability to guide the destiny of the
[contraband] . . . and contemplates a continuing relation-
ship between the controlling entity and the object being
controlled. . . . To establish constructive possession,
the control must be exercised intentionally and with
knowledge of the character of the controlled object. . . .
A person acts intentionally with respect to a result or to
conduct described by a statute defining an offense when
his conscious objective is to cause such result or to engage
in such conduct . . . . General Statutes § 53a-3 (11).
“Moreover, [when] the defendant is not in exclusive
possession of the premises where the [contraband is]
found, it may not be inferred that [the defendant] knew
of the presence of the [contraband] and had control of
28
We note that the defendant did not present any evidence at the hear-
ing demonstrating the various ways in which DNA can be transferred
or suggesting that the DNA on the firearm was transferred there by
Rivera or by another occupant of the Challenger.
State v. Dukes

[it], unless there are other incriminating statements or
circumstances tending to buttress such an inference. .
. . Such evidence may include, for example, connection
with a gun, proof of motive, a gesture implying control,
evasive conduct, or a statement indicating involvement
in an enterprise . . . . Accordingly, although mere pres-
ence is not enough to support an inference of dominion or
control, [when] there are other pieces of evidence tying
the defendant to dominion [or] control, the [finder of
fact is] entitled to consider the fact of [the defendant’s]
presence and to draw inferences from that presence and
the other circumstances linking [the defendant] to the
crime. . . . [S]ee also State v. Rhodes, [335 Conn. 226,
241, 249 A.3d 683 (2020)] (some connection or nexus
individually linking the defendant to the contraband
is required . . .); State v. Delossantos, 211 Conn. 258,
278, 559 A.2d 164 ([p]resence alone, unilluminated by
other facts is insufficient proof of possession . . .), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 866, 110 S. Ct. 188, 107 L. Ed. 2d 142
(1989). . . . State v. Dawson, 340 Conn. 136, 147–49,
263 A.3d 779 (2021). We emphasize, however, that mere
[temporal and spatial] proximity to contraband, in the
absence of other incriminating conduct, statements,
or circumstances, is insufficient to support a finding
of constructive possession. Id., 152; see also State v.
Porfil, 191 Conn. App. 494, 527, 215 A.3d 161 (2019),
appeal dismissed, 338 Conn. 792, 259 A.3d 1127 (2021);
State v. Nova, 161 Conn. App. 708, 724, 129 A.3d 146
(2015).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Jordan, supra, 236 Conn. App. 185–87.
In the present case, Bourke testified, following his
examination of the DNA swab of the firearm, that “one
of the [five] contributors [to the DNA on the firearm]
contributed considerably more DNA than the others”
and was considered to be a “major contributor.” Bourke
was able to develop a specific DNA profile for that con-
tributor, and he testified that the forensic profile from
the sample taken from the firearm was a match with the
offender DNA profile from a sample submitted into the
database that came from the defendant. We conclude that
State v. Dukes

Bourke’s testimony and the DNA evidence provided a
sufficient nexus connecting the defendant to the firearm.
That nexus is further strengthened when the DNA
evidence is considered in conjunction with other evidence
in the record, including, inter alia, the video surveillance
evidence, which also links the defendant to the firearm.
Although the video footage depicts two individuals leav-
ing the scene of the accident and walking toward the ele-
mentary school, the surveillance footage further shows
a male individual approaching a ramp at the elementary
school, running on the ramp with an object in his right
hand that appears to be a firearm, then running toward
a dumpster, where the individual moved a garbage bin
back and forth and then fled the area. Subsequently in
the video footage, Rivera can be seen retrieving a firearm
from that same area near the dumpster and garbage bin
at the elementary school and taking photographs of it.
Also, photographs of the defendant’s clothing at the
time of his arrest showed that he was wearing pants with
a white stripe that ran vertically down the legs, which
was similar to the clothing worn by the individual in the
surveillance videos from near the elementary school and
the still photographs therefrom.
Notably, the court found, with respect to that video
evidence, that the physical appearance and demeanor of
the individual who walked from the accident scene to the
elementary school was consistent with the defendant’s
appearance. In particular, the court stated: “[O]ne of the
things I found perhaps most compelling was, if you look
at the video, particularly when they’re at the school on
what, counsel, you’ve described as the ramp, the defen-
dant’s indications, his theatrics, so to speak—which I’ve
noted in this courtroom—throwing his hands around and
the manner in which he held himself, his disposition, his
demeanor certainly seems like the same person we have
here in court. And I’ve seen him in court. I’ve seen him
when there’s answers that he doesn’t like, when there’s
questions he doesn’t like. His mannerisms, his gestures,
are similar to that of what I saw on the video. Now, the
State v. Dukes

police . . . put together [a] video of the individuals leav-
ing the Challenger and going to the area of the school,
and in that [area the] police were able to find a gun on the
ground. It just so happens [that] the gun has . . . DNA
[on it] that is consistent with a previous submission by
the defendant, probably from this conviction.”
Rivera also provided testimony, which the court found
to be credible, that was consistent with the video sur-
veillance evidence. For example, Rivera testified as to
exhibit twenty-four, which shows the side parking lot
of the elementary school, in which he stated that “you
could see a male individual on the school ramp holding
a[n] object in his right hand.” Rivera testified that exhibit
twenty-three is a still photograph of the side parking
lot of the elementary school “with the male party by the
ramp,” and stating that, “what sticks out about this,
is his jeans have either reflective or white lining going
straight down and the color of his [dreadlocks].” With
respect to exhibit twenty-two, a still photograph of the
same side parking lot of the elementary school, Rivera
testified that it “shows the same male individual with
what appears to be, in his right hand, a firearm that he is
holding by the slide.” Consequently, we find no merit to
the defendant’s suggestion that the DNA evidence was
the only evidence linking him to the firearm.
As we have stated, “[a]ll that is required in a proba-
tion violation proceeding is enough to satisfy the court
within its sound judicial discretion that the probationer
has not met the terms of his probation. . . . [A] trial court
may not find a violation of probation unless it finds that
the predicate facts underlying the violation have been
established by a preponderance of the evidence at the
hearing—that is, the evidence must induce a reasonable
belief that it is more probable than not that the defendant
has violated a condition of his or her probation.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Owens, supra, 235
Conn. App. 494–95. In light of the evidence presented
at the hearing in the present case, we are satisfied that it
was sufficient to induce a reasonable belief in the mind of
State v. Dukes

the trier of fact that it was more probable than not that
the defendant was the person who hid the firearm behind
the dumpster and, thus, that he violated a condition of
his probation by possessing the firearm. Therefore, the
court’s finding that the defendant violated his probation
on this ground is not clearly erroneous.
3
With respect to his claim that there was insufficient
evidence that he possessed the ammunition, the defen-
dant contends that (1) there was no evidence that he actu-
ally possessed the ammunition in the Challenger, and (2)
the evidence did not establish constructive possession, as
there also was a female passenger in the vehicle,29 and,
because he “did not have exclusive control” of the back-
seat area within the Challenger where the ammunition
was found, the “court could not infer that the defendant
possessed it without additional evidence.” We agree
with the defendant that the evidence was insufficient
to establish his constructive possession of the ammuni-
tion found in the Challenger, which consisted of three
.45 caliber bullets.30
In State v. Jordan, supra, 236 Conn. App. 185–90,
this court recently addressed a similar claim regarding
the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that
the defendant in that case had violated his probation by
29
We note that the defendant contends on appeal that there also was
a female passenger with him in the Challenger whose presence under-
mines any conclusion that he had exclusive possession and control of the
ammunition in the backseat of the vehicle. See also footnote 26 of this
opinion. The court stated in its decision that the video evidence shows
that two people left the Challenger after the accident.
30
We note that the court’s finding that the defendant violated his
probation by possessing ammunition, and the defendant’s claim chal-
lenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support that finding, relate
to the three bullets that were recovered from the rear seat of the Chal-
lenger and not to the ammunition recovered from the firearm. See State
v. Williams, 352 Conn. 104, 136, 335 A.3d 792 (2025) (“defendant’s
conviction of both criminal possession of a firearm and criminal pos-
session of ammunition [recovered from the firearm], in the absence of
a clearly discernable legislative intent for multiple convictions under
§ 53a-217 (a) (1), is barred by the double jeopardy clause”).
State v. Dukes

constructively possessing illegal drugs and a firearm
located directly behind him in the rear seat area of a
vehicle that he and another person occupied. In conclud-
ing that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding
that the defendant possessed the contraband, this court
stated: “First, we note that, if the contraband is found
in a place where the defendant does not have exclusive
possession, the presence of the defendant near the contra-
band without more is insufficient to support an inference
of possession. State v. Nova, supra, 161 Conn. App. 719;
see also State v. Williams, 110 Conn. App. 778, 785–86,
956 A.2d 1176 (mere presence is not sufficient to support
inference of dominion and control when illegal drugs are
found in area where defendant does not have exclusive
possession and other pieces of evidence were necessary to
establish that defendant knew substance in question was
drug, knew of its presence, and exercised dominion and
control of it), cert. denied, 289 Conn. 957, 961 A.2d 424
(2008). Additionally, we emphasize that, [t]o mitigate
the possibility that innocent persons might be prosecuted
for . . . possessory offenses . . . it is essential that the
state’s evidence include more than just a temporal and
spatial nexus between the defendant and the contraband.
. . . State v. Gainey, 116 Conn. App. 710, 721, 977 A.2d
257 (2009). The state was required to prove that the
defendant exercised dominion and control over the [con-
traband], in addition to knowledge of [its] presence and
character.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Jordan, supra, 188–89. This court further explained that
“there was nothing in the record to support the finding
that [the defendant] exercised dominion and control over
the contraband. Its presence near him inside the vehicle,
without more, does not meet the necessary threshold to
support the court’s finding that he violated his special
conditions of probation. Simply stated, there was no
evidence that connected the defendant with possession
of the contraband found inside the vehicle.” Id., 193.
In the present case, the evidence shows, and the court
found, that two people had walked away from the Chal-
lenger after the accident. The presence of the second
State v. Dukes

individual means that the defendant did not have exclu-
sive control over the interior of the vehicle. Significantly,
unlike the cell phone, which was recovered from the floor
in front of the driver’s seat of the Challenger, the ammu-
nition was recovered from the rear center console of the
vehicle. As a result, the state needed to present evidence
showing more than just the defendant’s presence in the
vehicle, namely, that “the defendant exercised domin-
ion and control over the [contraband] . . . in addition to
knowledge of [its] presence and character.” Id., 189. The
only evidence presented by the state on this issue dem-
onstrated that the ammunition found in the Challenger
was of the same caliber as the ammunition in the firearm
that was recovered and that the defendant was found to
have possessed. Although we have determined that the
state presented sufficient evidence establishing a nexus
between the defendant and the firearm, we cannot reach
the same conclusion with respect to the ammunition in
the Challenger. The record in this case does not contain
any evidence to support a finding that the defendant
exercised dominion and control over the ammunition
recovered from the Challenger, or knew of its character
or presence in the vehicle. Although we recognize that
there is a lower standard of proof in a violation of proba-
tion proceeding, we nonetheless conclude that, “in the
absence of other incriminating conduct, statements, or
circumstances, [the evidence in the record] is insuffi-
cient to support a finding of constructive possession.”31
31
We note that the state relies on State v. LaVoie, 158 Conn. App. 256,
278, 118 A.3d 708, cert. denied, 319 Conn. 929, 125 A.3d 203 (2015),
cert. denied, 578 U.S. 906, 136 S. Ct. 1519, 194 L. Ed. 2d 604 (2016),
in support of its assertion that the evidence showing that the ammu-
nition found inside the abandoned Challenger was of the same caliber
as the ammunition discovered inside the firearm that the defendant
had discarded by the elementary school was sufficient to support the
court’s finding that the defendant possessed the ammunition inside the
Challenger. We find that the state’s reliance on LaVoie is misplaced.
In LaVoie, this court addressed a claim that the prosecutor had mis-
characterized evidence by stating that a shell casing “ ‘matche[d]’ ” shell
casings of bullets that the defendant had purchased at a sporting goods
store, which the defendant claimed conflicted with testimony of a state
police officer that the shell casing was “ ‘consistent with’ the shell casings
State v. Dukes

State v. Dawson, supra, 340 Conn. 152; see also State
v. Jordan, supra, 236 Conn. App. 193.
Accordingly, we conclude that the court’s finding
that the defendant violated his probation by possessing
ammunition is clearly erroneous.
Having reached that conclusion, we now must deter-
mine whether it requires a new sentencing proceeding.
The defendant argues that, “if this court finds that . .
. there was insufficient evidence to sustain any of the
trial court’s bases for the violation, the matter should be
remanded for further proceedings regarding the defen-
dant’s sentence.” Under the circumstances of this case,
we do not agree.
As we have concluded, the state presented sufficient
evidence from which the court reasonably could have
concluded that the defendant had violated his probation
by engaging the police in a motor vehicle pursuit, evading
responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle, and
possessing a firearm. Our determination that there was
insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that
the defendant had violated his probation by possessing
the ammunition in the Challenger requires us to examine
the record to determine whether the court’s erroneous
finding had any bearing on the sentence imposed. See
State v. Benjamin, 299 Conn. 223, 231–32, 9 A.3d 338
(2010); see also State v. Jordan, supra, 236 Conn. App.
196 (“we cannot be confident that the trial court would
not have exercised its discretion differently in the dis-
positional phase had it sentenced the defendant solely
on the basis of violations of probation for which there
of the bullets the defendant had purchased.” Id., 277. This court found
no impropriety with the prosecutor’s use of the word “ ‘matche[d]’ ” and
stated further that “the other evidence introduced at trial, including
the timing of the purchase and the caliber of the bullets, was sufficient
to support a finding that the bullet shot from the rifle that struck the
victim was one of the bullets that the defendant purchased from [the
sporting goods store].” (Emphasis added.) Id., 278. Thus, this court, in
making that statement, did not rely on the caliber of the bullets alone,
and it also bears noting that the statement was not made in the context
of analyzing a sufficiency of the evidence claim.
State v. Dukes

was sufficient evidence in the record”); State v. Sykes,
supra, 232 Conn. App. 779–80 (same); see also footnote
32 of this opinion.
In the present case, in revoking the defendant’s proba-
tion, the court stated: “[T]he important interests in the
probationer’s liberty and rehabilitation must be balanced
against the need to protect the public. The ultimate
question, as our appellate [courts] . . . [have] indicated,
is whether the probationer is still a good risk . . . . And,
in this case, the answer is a loud and resounding no, he is
not a good risk. In finding [that] the defendant’s proba-
tion can be revoked, the court can continue probation,
modify or enlarge the conditions of probation, extend
the probation up to the statutory maximum, or revoke
the sentence of the probation. The court may also . . .
terminate the probation. Based upon the totality of the
circumstances of this case, including similar conduct to
what he was convicted of—that is, a weapon—including
the fact that he was on probation, he was violated, it was
wrapped into this probation, and now he’s violated again,
based on the fact that there was a new arrest and based
on the seriousness of those offenses—it’s not simply
a motor vehicle offense, it’s not a disorderly conduct,
but possession of a pistol by someone who’s prohibited
to carry one, not just because of a license or lack of [a]
license but the fact that he has a felony conviction—the
fact that this was, as I indicated, a serious case and he is
not compliant with the restitution; sure, he wasn’t the
worst probationer that ever came and reported to the
Office of Adult Probation, but his noncompliance with
treatment was evident in . . . Saddler’s testimony. [The
defendant] did not report as directed, although he did
report eventually, so to speak. The court finds that the
defendant is no longer—that the goals of probation are
no longer being carried out—and will find him in viola-
tion [of his probation] . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
In the sentencing proceeding on September 3, 2024,
the court imposed its sentence, stating: “[The defendant]
has demonstrated throughout two probationary periods,
as well as his appearances here in court, that he’s not
State v. Dukes

able to conform with regulations and rules that are set
forth for him. I want to make it clear that my sentenc-
ing today comes from a lot of factors . . . including a
packet that [defense] counsel has provided . . . [which
included various letters from family members] . . . . It
also includes letters from—that indicate that the defen-
dant has been employed and the various areas in which
he’s been employed . . . . These are all jobs I know that he
did—look, the defendant was able to secure employment,
given his record, given the fact that this is a difficult
time, just immediately post-COVID. . . . [T]he defendant
was able to have—secure not just one, but sometimes
two jobs during the time period.
“So, I have taken all that into consideration. I’ve also
taken into consideration the letters that are very well
written on his behalf. . . . I have looked at the [presen-
tence investigation report], I have considered the previ-
ous cases; I have considered, so to speak as they say in
criminal courts, the totality of circumstances, including
the person and his criminal record and the . . . charges.
He had a previous violation of probation, which he failed
to pay restitution and that was rolled in, so to speak, to
this one, but I didn’t see really anything in his record,
anything in [the presentence investigation report] . . .
that was redeeming. In fact, one of the only times that
[the defendant] is not committing crimes is when he’s
locked up. For that, I think the appropriate sentence
is a significant amount of time, and the . . . court will
sentence him to a sentence of eight years to serve, and
[order] that probation is terminated thereafter.”
Our review of the court’s remarks leads us to conclude
that, even though the court’s sentence was based on a
number of factors, the court focused on the defendant’s
possession of a firearm when he was prohibited from car-
rying one due to his prior felony convictions, as well as
the fact that the defendant had violated his probation by
engaging in similar conduct—criminal possession of a
firearm—of which he previously had been convicted and
for which he was on probation. Nowhere in the court’s
State v. Dukes

remarks did the court reference the three bullets recov-
ered from the Challenger or the defendant’s possession
of ammunition as a basis for its sentence. As a result, we
are not left with the impression that the court’s sentence
“may have been impacted” by its erroneous finding that
the defendant had violated his probation by possessing
ammunition. (Emphasis omitted.) State v. Sykes, supra,
232 Conn. App. 779. For that reason, the present case is
distinguishable from Sykes and Jordan, in which this
court could not be confident that the trial court would
not have exercised its discretion differently in the dis-
positional phase had it sentenced the defendant solely
on the basis of violations of probation for which there
was sufficient evidence in the record. See id., 779–80;
see also State v. Jordan, supra, 236 Conn. App. 196. In
Jordan, for example, the trial court made remarks at
sentencing that specifically referenced the basis of an
erroneous finding by the court that the defendant had
violated his probation by possessing contraband found
inside a vehicle. See State v. Jordan, supra, 196.
Likewise, in Sykes, we concluded that there was insuf-
ficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that
the defendant violated the condition of his probation
requiring him to take a polygraph examination; see
State v. Sykes, supra, 232 Conn. App. 777–78; and we
determined that resentencing was necessary because
“the court’s dispositional determination may have been
impacted by” its erroneous conclusion that the defendant
violated his polygraph condition. (Emphasis omitted.)
Id., 779. We reached this determination in light of certain
comments by the trial court indicating that its disposi-
tional determination was based, in part, on its conclusion
“that the defendant had been ‘researching’ [case law] . . .
in a possible attempt to ‘[build] a defense’ for refusing to
take [an] EyeDetect examination”; id.; which was being
used in lieu of a polygraph examination by a treatment
center the defendant had attended. Id., 757. This court
concluded that the trial court’s statements “suggest[ed]
that it may have viewed the defendant’s refusal to ‘take
a polygraph examination [or] its equivalent’ as bad faith
State v. Dukes

misconduct warranting the imposition of a more severe
sentence than he might otherwise have received.”32 Id.,
779.
In contrast, in the present case, the court made no
reference to the three bullets recovered from the Chal-
lenger during its remarks in the dispositional phase of the
proceeding but, rather, focused on the seriousness of the
conduct of the defendant, a convicted felon, in possessing
a firearm, especially when he was on probation for the
same offense, which the court found warranted a sen-
tence that included “a significant amount of time . . . .”
The record is devoid of any indication that the sentence
32
Similarly, in State v. Johnson, 75 Conn. App. 643, 658–61, 817 A.2d
708 (2003), this court set aside a sentence imposed on the defendant
for violating his probation and remanded the case for resentencing on
the basis of an irregularity discovered in the defendant’s conditions
of probation form. In Johnson, the defendant argued, and this court
agreed, that he should not be penalized for his refusal to sign a binding
document that improperly exemplified the orders of the court. After
invoking plain error review of the defendant’s claim, this court exam-
ined the “court’s reasons for revoking the defendant’s probation and
sentencing him to serve the entire three year suspended portion of his
sentence.” Id., 659. In doing so, this court noted that, “[d]uring the
sentencing phase of the defendant’s violation of probation proceeding,
the court specifically stated that ‘it is evident to me that if you [the
defendant], in fact, had abided by the curfew [imposed as a condition of
his probation] that we might not even, in fact, be here today, yet there
is a reason for the violation because up to that point you had refused to
sign the conditions, which alone might have well constituted a violation
of your probation.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id. We concluded that the
court’s statement indicated that it “took into consideration, with much
emphasis, the defendant’s continued refusal to sign the conditions of
probation form.” Id. Accordingly, this court concluded that, “[b]ecause
the court in the revocation proceeding specifically mentioned and took
into consideration the defendant’s repeated refusal to sign [those] forms,
which incorrectly exemplified the court’s own order, we have no way
of determining whether the court, in exercising its discretion, would
have imposed the same sentence if the defendant had, in fact, signed
those forms or if they were not an issue in the proceeding,” which we
determined undermined “[t]he fairness, integrity and public confidence
in the judicial process . . . .” Id., 660–61. Thus, in Johnson, as in Jor-
dan and Sykes, this court did not automatically remand the case for
resentencing after finding an error in the court’s judgment but, rather,
we examined the record, namely, the court’s statements, in an effort to
determine what impact, if any, the error had on the court’s sentence.
State v. Dukes

imposed “may have been impacted” by the defendant’s
possession of the three bullets in the Challenger so as to
warrant a new sentencing proceeding. (Emphasis omit-
ted.) State v. Sykes, supra, 232 Conn. App. 779.
II
The defendant’s final claim is that the court abused
its discretion in revoking his probation and sentencing
him to eight years of incarceration. We do not agree.
The following additional facts are relevant to this
claim. During the dispositional phase of the violation of
probation hearing, the prosecutor recalled Saddler, the
defendant’s probation officer, to the witness stand. Sad-
dler testified concerning the condition of the defendant’s
probation that he pay restitution and that, of the $2700
owed in restitution, the defendant did not make any
payments. Saddler also testified that the defendant was
supposed to receive a tax return from which he could have
made payments but that, instead, the defendant wanted
to use those funds to purchase a Mercedes-Benz vehicle.
Saddler testified further that, in another instance in
which the defendant received money, the defendant
stated that he was going to use it to buy veneers instead
of making the restitution payments. Saddler also testi-
fied regarding the defendant’s work history, his failure
to report for intakes for substance abuse treatment, his
eventual discharge from facilities to which he had been
referred due to lack of attendance, and his failures to
report for office visits with his probation officer. The
prosecutor asked Saddler if he had “formed an opinion
as to whether or not the beneficial aspects of probation
would be served if [the defendant] were continued on
probation,” and Saddler responded: “At this time, I
don’t think [that the defendant] is amenable to proba-
tion based on his new arrest, based on his noncompliance
with the number one condition of probation, as well as
his noncompliance with the court-ordered conditions of
probation.” Saddler acknowledged on cross-examination
that he had been told by another probation officer that
the defendant had purchased the Mercedes-Benz vehicle
State v. Dukes

and that Saddler never saw it for himself. After Saddler’s
testimony concluded and he was excused, defense counsel
indicated to the court that he would not be presenting
any witnesses, but that he had letters from some of the
defendant’s family members that he wanted the court
to take into consideration in sentencing the defendant.
The court stated that it would not sentence the defendant
at that time.
Thereafter, the court stated that it had “to make a
determination [of] whether the goals of probation [were
being served], including whether [the defendant’s behav-
ior was] inimical to [his] own rehabilitation, as well as
to the safety of the public.” The court balanced “the
important interests in the [defendant’s] liberty and reha-
bilitation . . . against the need to protect the public,” and
determined that the defendant no longer was a “good risk
. . . .” On the basis of the totality of the circumstances,
the court concluded that the goals of probation no longer
were being carried out. In reaching that conclusion, the
court emphasized that this is a “serious case” that did not
simply involve motor vehicle offenses, and highlighted
the fact that the defendant was found to be in possession
of a firearm when he was prohibited from carrying one
due to his prior felony convictions. In the subsequent
sentencing proceeding on September 3, 2024, the court
imposed its sentence of eight years of incarceration.
We review a trial court’s decision following the sen-
tencing phase of a revocation of probation hearing under
the abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., State v. Den-
nis, supra, 237 Conn. App. 663. “In determining whether
there has been an abuse of discretion, every reasonable
presumption should be given in favor of the correctness
of the court’s ruling. . . . Reversal is required only [if]
an abuse of discretion is manifest or where injustice
appears to have been done. . . . On the basis of its con-
sideration of the whole record, the trial court may con-
tinue or revoke the sentence of probation . . . [and] . . .
require the defendant to serve the sentence imposed
or impose any lesser sentence. . . . In making this sec-
ond determination, the trial court is vested with broad
State v. Dukes

discretion. . . . In determining whether to revoke proba-
tion, the trial court shall consider the beneficial purposes
of probation, namely rehabilitation of the offender and
the protection of society. . . . The important interests in
the probationer’s liberty and rehabilitation must be bal-
anced, however, against the need to protect the public.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
At the outset, we note that the defendant argues on
appeal that the court abused its discretion in revok-
ing his probation and sentencing him to eight years to
serve because the search of his Challenger was illegal
and involved gross police misconduct and, thus, that
the contraband found in the vehicle should have been
excluded; that his inculpatory statements were elicited
in violation of Miranda and should have been excluded;
and that there was insufficient evidence to substantiate
the four different grounds on which the court based its
violation of probation findings. He contends that, if we
agree with any of those claims, the matter should be
remanded to the trial court for resentencing. Because we
already have addressed and either rejected or declined
to review these claims, we do not address them further
in our review of the defendant’s claim concerning the
court’s dispositional decision to revoke his probation and
to sentence him to eight years of incarceration.
The defendant further contends that “the evidence
shows that [he] maintained contact with probation
throughout [his] probationary period,” rescheduled any
missed appointments, and maintained work during his
probation period, which occurred during the time of the
COVID-19 pandemic. He asserts that his “liberty interest
in avoiding incarceration and capacity for rehabilitation,
when balanced with public safety, should merit him
the opportunity to continue his rehabilitative efforts
on probation. Thus, the court abused its discretion in
imposing a significantly long incarceration in this case.”
We do not agree.
The record in this case reveals that the court care-
fully considered the relevant factors and, in deciding to
State v. Dukes

revoke the defendant’s probation, properly considered
the beneficial purposes of probation and balanced the
defendant’s interests in liberty against the need to pro-
tect the public. In reaching its determination that the
beneficial purposes of the defendant’s rehabilitation
were no longer being served, the court had before it evi-
dence demonstrating that the circumstances of this case
involved conduct that was similar to what the defendant
previously had been convicted of and for which he was
on probation. The court also noted that the defendant’s
new arrest was not simply for motor vehicle violations,
but for serious offenses, including possession of a fire-
arm by a convicted felon who is prohibited from carry-
ing one. Other evidence that factored into the court’s
decision was the defendant’s failure to comply with the
condition of restitution, his noncompliance with treat-
ment, and the fact that he did not report to probation
as directed, although “he did report eventually . . . .”
Thus, the court did take into consideration the fact that
the defendant ultimately attended appointments that
had been missed. Its determination that the beneficial
purposes of rehabilitation were no longer being served
was amply supported by the record.
With respect to the sentence imposed, the court found
that the evidence demonstrates that the defendant is
not able to “conform with regulations and rules that
are set forth for him.” After taking into consideration
letters submitted on behalf of the defendant, as well as
his employment record while on probation and the pre-
sentence investigation report, and finding that “one of
the only times that [the defendant] is not committing
crimes is when he’s locked up,” the court determined that
eight years of his remaining eight and one-half years of
incarceration was an appropriate sentence.
It appears that the defendant would like this court
to reweigh the evidence and reach a different conclu-
sion, which we cannot do. See, e.g., State v. Gamer, 215
Conn. App. 234, 249, 283 A.3d 16 (2022) (“[w]e will not
substitute our judgment for that of the trial court”),
appeal dismissed, 348 Conn. 331, 304 A.3d 146 (2023)
State v. Dukes

(certification improvidently granted). Moreover, the fact
that the court imposed a lengthy sentence that comprised
most of the defendant’s unexecuted sentence did not, by
itself, constitute an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State
v. Santos T., 146 Conn. App. 532, 535, 77 A.3d 931
(“On the basis of its consideration of the whole record,
the trial court may continue or revoke the sentence of
probation . . . [and] . . . require the defendant to serve
the sentence imposed or impose any lesser sentence. . . .
In making this second determination, the trial court is
vested with broad discretion.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.)), cert. denied, 310 Conn. 965, 83 A.3d 345
(2013); see also State v. Greene-Pendergrass, 228 Conn.
App. 695, 700, 324 A.3d 239 (2024) (trial court did not
abuse its discretion in revoking defendant’s probation
and imposing sentence requiring defendant to serve five
years of five years and four months unexecuted portion
of his sentences).
“[T]he ultimate question [in the probation process is]
whether the probationer is still a good risk . . . . This
determination involves the consideration of the goals of
probation, including whether the probationer’s behavior
is inimical to his own rehabilitation, as well as to the
safety of the public.” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Hill, 256 Conn. 412, 427, 773 A.2d 931
(2001). In the present case, on the basis of the evidence
presented, the court reasonably could have determined
that the defendant no longer was a “ ‘good risk’ ” because
his behavior was adverse to his own rehabilitation and
to public safety. See id. Affording every reasonable
presumption in favor of the correctness of the court’s
decision and, on the basis of this record, we conclude
that the court did not abuse its discretion in revoking
the defendant’s probation and sentencing him to eight
years of incarceration, which was within its discretion
to impose. See State v. Santos T., supra, 146 Conn.
App. 535.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.