Collins v. State

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

JOHN COLLINS, §
§ No. 27, 2024
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, §
§ Court Below: Superior Court
v. § of the State of Delaware
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§ Cr. I.D. Nos. 2111014293
Plaintiff Below, § 2111014214
Appellee. §

Submitted: October 23, 2024
Decided: January 13, 2025

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and LEGROW, Justices.

ORDER

This 13th day of January 2025, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and

the record below, it appears to the Court that:

(1) Defendant-Below, Appellant John Collins was indicted for Reckless

Endangering First Degree, Assault First Degree, five counts of Possession of a

Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony (“PDWDCF”), three counts of

Attempted Murder First Degree, three counts of felony Criminal Mischief, Resisting

Arrest, Receiving Stolen Property, Criminal Trespass Second Degree, and

Attempted Misdemeanor Theft. The State dismissed the reckless endangering
charge before trial, and the remaining sixteen counts were tried to a jury in December

2022.

(2) At the conclusion of the five-day trial, the jury found Collins guilty of

Assault Second Degree (as a lesser-included offense of Assault First Degree), five

counts of PDWDCF, three counts of Attempted Assault First Degree (as lesser-

included offenses of Attempted Murder First Degree), three counts of felony

Criminal Mischief, Resisting Arrest, Receiving Stolen Property, and Attempted

Misdemeanor Theft. The Superior Court sentenced Collins to sixteen years and nine

months of unsuspended Level V time followed by probation.

(3) On appeal, Collins argues that the Superior Court abused its discretion

by (i) precluding him from arguing during closing that evidence of his voluntary

intoxication created a reasonable doubt as to the intentionality of his conduct, and

(ii) failing to include the full statutory definition of “recklessly” in its charge to the

jury. We disagree and affirm Collins’ convictions.

(4) In the early hours of November 29, 2021, Delaware State Police

responded to a report of a vehicle theft from Hertrich Collision Center (“Hertrich”).

On that morning, Michael Wyatt, a Hertrich employee, received a security alert of

an alarm activated on the premises. Wyatt accessed the surveillance footage on his

phone and observed a man, later identified as John Collins, rolling underneath the

fence of Hertrich’s property from the vicinity of a parked tow truck. Collins

2
appeared to be searching through and removing objects from vehicles and removing

mail from Hertrich’s mailbox.

(5) Wyatt contacted the police, and Corporal Derek Balaguer responded to

the scene, where he spotted the tail lights of what appeared to be a “big truck” driving

away from Hertrich. Balaguer relayed that information over his police radio and

proceeded down Buckley Boulevard to find the vehicle. Balaguer located the tow

truck as it was making a U-turn, and he attempted to stop Collins by parking his

police vehicle so that it was facing the truck head-on. When he realized that the

truck was not going to stop, Balaguer exited his car, drew his firearm, and ordered

Collins to exit the vehicle. Collins did not comply and instead reversed the truck

before driving toward Balaguer. Balaguer jumped back into his squad car, and

Collins proceeded to drive directly into the vehicle. The collision caused the police

vehicle’s airbags to deploy.1 Balaguer reported the collision by radio.

(6) Corporal Zachary Drake and other officers then arrived at the scene and

saw Collins driving the tow truck towards them at a high rate of speed. Drake and

the other officers drove out of the tow truck’s path, and Drake followed the truck up

Brandywine Drive and out to Pulaski Highway. Collins drove west on Route 40

before cutting across the oncoming lanes of traffic. Drake testified that he was

1
Corporal Balaguer felt the airbags hit him in the face, felt pain in his left hip, and experienced a
massive headache.
3
driving approximately seventy miles per hour as he pursued Collins, but he was

unable to catch up. Collins then made a left turn from the far-right lane into a

shopping center, hitting the curb and median with such force that the tow truck was

lifted into the air.

(8) Trooper Heather Swain and Corporal Sean Rodrigues pursued Collins

westbound through the shopping center while Drake positioned his vehicle behind

them. Collins then exited the shopping center—cutting across multiple lanes of

Route 40 and a grassy median—to turn left onto the westbound side of the highway.

Collins crossed several lanes of westbound traffic and crossed the median again

before proceeding in the wrong direction down Route 40. As he crossed the median,

Collins sideswiped a vehicle operated by Corporal Rosendo Luna.2

(9) After the collision with Luna, Collins continued to drive westbound in

the eastbound lanes with Rodrigues and Swain in pursuit. Numerous vehicles had

to swerve out of Collins’ path as he weaved between lanes trying to avoid police.

Drake testified that if he had seen a vehicle being driven in that manner, and all the

other events had not happened, he would have suspected that Collins was under the

influence of drugs or alcohol.

2
As a result of the collision, Luna suffered a minor abrasion near his left thumb, and his vehicle
was completely disabled.
4
(10) Collins then turned left into a small shopping center and brought the

tow truck to a stop. Swain and Rodrigues stopped their vehicle about twenty feet

from the tow truck and opened their doors. Rodrigues exited the vehicle and ran

toward the truck, but Collins began to reverse at a high rate of speed, striking the

police vehicle, disabling it, and injuring Swain.3 Rodrigues fired his weapon towards

Collins, believing that Collins intended to kill or seriously injure Swain. Collins

then pulled away through the shopping center and back toward Route 40.

(11) Collins drove over the median again and crashed into a pole, disabling

the tow truck. Rodrigues moved around the front of the tow truck and saw Collins

running in the distance. Corporal Alexander Ricketts and a New Castle County

police officer finally apprehended Collins after a foot chase. Police found a

hypodermic syringe in Collins’ possession when they searched him upon his arrest.

Detective Mark Csapo of the Delaware State Police testified that possession of a

syringe would raise concern that the individual “could be a diabetic and/or they could

be a drug addict.”4

(12) Before closing arguments, Collins’ counsel sought permission to argue

to the jury that the State had not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that Collins was

not intoxicated, and the possibility that he was intoxicated could mean that Collins

3
Swain, attempting to exit the vehicle, was thrown approximately six feet, bruising her left leg
and shin.
4
App. to Opening Br. at A389.
5
did not understand the severity of his actions.5 The Superior Court denied that

request and denied Collins’ related request to include within the jury instructions the

reference to voluntary intoxication that appears in the statutory definition of a

“reckless” state of mind. Collins now appeals both of those rulings, arguing that the

Superior Court abused its discretion by (i) precluding the defense from arguing that

there was reasonable doubt as to the intentionality of Collins’ conduct due to the

possibility that he was acting recklessly as a result of voluntary intoxication, and (ii)

excluding a reference to voluntary intoxication from the jury instructions.

(13) This Court reviews the Superior Court’s determination of the proper

bounds of closing arguments for abuse of discretion.6 In addition, this Court reviews

the record to determine whether competent evidence supports the Superior Court’s

findings of fact and whether its conclusions of law are not erroneous.7 Questions of

law are reviewed de novo.8

(14) Collins first argues that the Superior Court abused its discretion by

prohibiting him from arguing during closing that the jury should infer that he was

intoxicated during the car chase and that his intoxication created reasonable doubt

as to his state of mind. He contends that sufficient evidence existed in the record

5
App. to Opening Br. at A582–83.
6
Crosby v. State, 108 A.3d 291, 292 (Del. 2015).
7
Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1196 (Del. 1996).
8
Id. at 1190; Outten v. State, 720 A.2d 547, 551 (Del. 1998).
6
from which the jury could reasonably infer that he was intoxicated when he

committed the crimes in question. That inference, Collins contends, would support

his argument that “his conduct could have been the reckless byproduct of his

intoxication,” rather than the result of an intentional state of mind.

(15) Collins’ argument regarding the permissible scope of closing argument

fails for two independent reasons. First, the trial court correctly concluded that there

was not sufficient evidence from which Collins could urge the jury to infer that he

was intoxicated. Second, even if sufficient evidence existed to support such an

inference, voluntary intoxication is not a defense to any criminal act and cannot be

used to negate specific intent, making Collins’ argument legally impermissible.9

(16) The Superior Court limited the scope of closing argument based on the

court’s conclusion that the record did not contain sufficient evidence that Collins

was intoxicated. Collins’ argument to the contrary rests on testimony elicited during

cross examination that officers thought he was driving erratically, along with the

testimony that a syringe was found on his person at the time of his arrest. The State

responds that Collins was driving erratically to escape arrest, not because he was

intoxicated, and no evidence showed that he had used drugs via syringe or any other

method.

9
See 11 Del. C. § 421 (stating that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to any crime).
7
(17) Counsel may argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the

record.10 A trial judge, however, has the discretion to restrict arguments that do not

have a rational basis in the evidentiary record.11 The trial court correctly held that

there was no rational basis in the record from which Collins’ counsel could ask the

jury to infer that he was intoxicated.

(18) The trial testimony about Collins’ erratic driving attributed it only to

his attempts to evade police, and the syringe found in his possession was not

connected by any testimony or any other evidence to Collins’ actual use of drugs.

Drake’s statement regarding suspicion of intoxication, taken in context, was a

response to the defense’s hypothetical question: “[i]f you had seen somebody driving

in that manner and all the other things hadn’t happened, would you have pulled that

vehicle over?” In a hypothetical situation where none of the other events of this case

took place, it would certainly be reasonable for a police officer to suspect that the

operator of a tow truck driving into oncoming traffic, crossing the median, and

swerving across multiple lanes was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. But this

hypothetical is not evidence of Collins’ actual state. Collins was driving in the stated

manner amidst a police chase and “all the other things” did occur. The Superior

Court therefore did not abuse its discretion in determining that Drake’s testimony

10
State v. Bennefield, 567 A.2d 863, 867 (Del. 1989).
11
Crosby, 108 A.3d at 292.
8
and the presence of a syringe were not sufficient to warrant closing arguments or

jury instructions on voluntary intoxication.

(19) More critically, however, any argument that Collins was voluntarily

intoxicated would have been legally impermissible and therefore was properly

excluded on that basis as well. As Collins concedes, “[i]t is well-established in

Delaware that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a criminal charge.”12

Delaware law is clear on this point and prohibited Collins from arguing that he could

not have formed—or did not form—the required intent based on voluntary

intoxication.13

(20) For example, in Davis v. State, this Court analyzed a jury charge used

in State v. Gist, which stated, in relevant part:

If the evidence in the case leaves the jury with a reasonable doubt
whether, because of the degree of his intoxication, the accused
was capable of forming, or did form, the intent to cause death,
the jury should acquit the accused of murder in the first degree.14

(21) The Court concluded that its previous decision in Wyant v. State made

the jury instruction in Gist legally erroneous.15 Under Davis and Wyant, a jury is not

12
See Red Dog v. State, 616 A.2d 298 (Del. 1992); Wilson v. State, 534 A.2d 657, 1987 WL 4690
(Del. Supr. Nov. 6, 1987) (TABLE); State v. Censurato, 1995 WL 717618 (Del. Super. Dec. 1,
1995)).
13
See, e.g., 11 Del. C. § 421 (stating that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to any crime);
Davis v. State, 522 A.2d 342, 343 (Del. 1987); Wyant v. State, 519 A.2d 649, 657 (Del. 1986).
14
Davis, 522 A.2d at 345 (emphasis added).
15
Id. (citing Wyant, 519 A.2d at 654–58 (finding that the Superior Court correctly barred the
defendant from introducing any testimony for the purpose of establishing that he, by reason of
being voluntarily intoxicated, lacked the intent to commit kidnapping, rape or robbery)).
9
permitted to use evidence of voluntary intoxication to find reasonable doubt as to

whether a defendant formed the required intent to commit a charged crime.16

(22) Collins attempts to avoid this settled law by arguing that “evidence of

intoxication is admissible not to persuade the jury that he was incapable of forming

a specific mens rea, but rather to raise a reasonable doubt that he was, in fact, acting

intentionally.”17 That argument draws a distinction without a difference. Under 11

Del. C. § 421, voluntary intoxication is not a defense and does not negate specific

intent.18 The State bears the burden of proving intent beyond a reasonable doubt,

but “the trier of fact is simply precluded from using [a] defendant’s intoxication as

a basis for finding [the] defendant [] lack[ed] the requisite intent for conviction of

[an] offense.”19 Consequently, the court properly prohibited Collins from arguing

that he acted recklessly, not intentionally, on the basis that his voluntary intoxication

created a reasonable doubt as to his intentionality.

(23) To summarize, voluntary intoxication is not a defense to any criminal

act and cannot be used to negate specific intent under 11 Del. C. § 421.20 The

evidence of Collins’ intoxication was both factually insufficient and legally

inadmissible. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting Collins

16
Id.
17
Appellant’s Reply Br. at 2.
18
11 Del. C. § 421.
19
Wyant, 519 A.2d at 652.
20
See 11 Del. C. § 421; see also Wyant, 519 A.2d at 658.
10
from discussing during closing any evidence of his possible intoxication for the

purpose of establishing that his conduct could have been the reckless byproduct of

intoxication, rather than an intentional state of mind.

(24) As an extension of his assertion that he should have been able to argue

voluntary intoxication at closing, Collins also contends that the Superior Court erred

by omitting the last sentence of the statutory definition of “recklessly” in the jury

instructions, which “served to hobble [his] ability to present a defense.” As set forth

above, Collins’ proffered defense was not legally available, and the argument fails

on that basis alone. In addition, the court’s instruction was proper because the jury

did not receive evidence of intoxication, and the additional language would not have

assisted Collins’ defense.

(25) Here, the Superior Court defined “recklessly” for the jury according to

the language of 11 Del. C. § 231(e) but omitted the final sentence of the statutory

definition, which pertains to voluntary intoxication. “This Court will review de

novo a refusal to instruct on a defense theory (in any form); and it will review a

refusal to give a “particular” instruction (that is, an instruction is given but not with

the exact form, content or language requested) for an abuse of discretion.”21 The

jury instruction for “recklessly” did not meet the exact content requested by Collins

and we therefore review it for an abuse of discretion.

21
Wright v. State, 953 A.2d 144, 148 (Del. 2008).
11
(26) The Superior Court instructed the jury, in pertinent part, as follows:

“Recklessly” means Defendant was aware of and consciously
disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk serious physical
injury would be caused to a person as a result of Defendant’s
conduct. The State must demonstrate the risk was of such a
nature and degree that Defendant’s disregard of the risk was a
gross deviation from the standard of conduct a reasonable person
would observe under the same circumstances.22

(27) The instruction followed the language of 11 Del. C. § 231(e), but

omitted the final sentence of the statutory definition, which states: “[a] person who

creates such a risk but is unaware thereof solely by reason of voluntary intoxication

also acts recklessly with respect thereto.”23 Collins argues that this omitted sentence

was an accurate statement of the law and the trial court erred by failing to include it

in the jury instruction. We disagree.

(28) The Superior Court declined to include the final sentence relating to

voluntary intoxication because there was no evidence in the record that it was

relevant in this case. Although Collins argues that judicial officers must leave

factual issues to the jury, “[a] decision as to the sufficiency of evidence to warrant a

particular jury instruction is within the sound discretion of the trial judge.”24 As

discussed above, nothing in the record provided the jury with evidence of

22
The trial court provided the same definition for “recklessly” as to all relevant charges.
23
11 Del. C. § 231(e) (emphasis added).
24
Robinson v. State, 676 A.2d 906, 1996 WL 69797 at *2 (Del. Jan. 29, 1996) (TABLE); see
Wright, 953 A.2d at 147 (explaining that it is within the court’s discretion to determine if a
requested jury instruction is available under the facts of the case).
12
intoxication, and therefore the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in

determining that the evidence was not sufficient to warrant a jury instruction on

voluntary intoxication.

(29) Moreover, the sentence at issue in the statutory definition of

“recklessly” is not intended to negate an intentional mens rea, but rather to

emphasize to the jury that a defendant cannot avoid liability for acting recklessly by

arguing that he was unaware of a risk solely because he was intoxicated. 25 The

appellant in Davis similarly urged this Court to construe the definition of

“recklessly” to reduce what would have been an intentional act to a reckless one

based on voluntary intoxication, but this Court rejected that argument under 11 Del.

C. § 421.26

(30) The court’s instruction to the jury on the meaning of “recklessly” was

a correct statement of the law relevant to this case. The omission of the final

sentence related to voluntary intoxication did not hinder the jury’s ability to

intelligently perform its duty in returning a verdict, nor did it hinder Collins’ ability

to present a proper defense, as voluntary intoxication is not a defense to any crime.

Accordingly, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion.

25
See Wyant, 519 A.2d at 657 (explaining that the legislative intent of Section 421 was to extend
the “no defense” of voluntary intoxication for reckless conduct crimes or general intent crimes to
all Code crimes).
26
Davis, 522 A.2d at 344.
13
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment of the

Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Abigail M. LeGrow
Justice

14