Christie v. Porter

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

LOTOYA D. CHRISTIE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) C.A. No.: N23C-07-198 FWW
)
KYHEIM L. PORTER, JOHN A. )
JOYCE, JERMAINE N. CLARKE, )
and STATE FARM MUTUAL )
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE )
COMPANY, )
)
Defendants. )

Submitted: September 13, 2024
Decided: November 22, 2024

Upon the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants John A. Joyce and Kyheim
L. Porter,
DENIED.

ORDER

Gary S. Nitsche, Esquire, Rachel D. Allen, Esquire, NITCHE & FREDRICKS, LLC,
305 N. Union Street, Second Floor, Wilmington, DE 19899, Attorneys for Latoya D.
Christie.

David G. Culley, Esquire, TYBOUT, REDFEARN & PELL, Rockwood Office Park,
501 Carr Road, Suite 300, Wilmington DE 19809, Attorney for Defendant Jermaine
N. Clarke.
Daniel P. Bennett, Esquire, MINTZER SAROWITZ ZERIS & WILLIS LLC,
Citizens Bank Center, 919 North Market Street, Suite 200, Wilmington, DE 19801,
Attorney for Defendant John A Joyce.

Erin K. Radulski, Esquire, LAW OFFICE OF DAWN L. BECKER, 200 Continental
Drive, Newark, DE 19713, Attorney for Defendant Kyheim L. Porter.

Jeffrey A. Young, Esquire, YOUNG & McNELIS, 300 South State Street, Dover,
DE 19901, Attorney for Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company.

WHARTON, J.

2
This 22nd day of November 2024, upon consideration of the joint Motion for

Summary Judgment of Defendants John A. Joyce (“Joyce”) and Kyheim L. Porter

(“Porter”)1 (collectively “Movants”), Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile

Insurance Company’s (“State Farm”) Response,2 Defendant Jermaine Clarke’s

(“Clarke”) letter response taking no position,3 Plaintiff Lotoya D. Christie’s

(“Christie”) Response,4 Movant’s Reply,5 and the record in this case, it appears to

the Court that:

1. On May 8, 2022, Clarke was operating a motor vehicle proceeding

southbound on I-95 near Newport, Delaware with Christie as a passenger.6 Joyce’s

vehicle and Porter’s vehicle were both parked near the Newport exit after being

involved in an accident.7 Christie alleges personal injuries from a collision that

occurred between Clarke’s vehicle and Joyce’s parked vehicle.8

2. At the time of the collision, Clarke held a motor vehicle insurance

policy with State Farm.9 On August 11, 2023, State Farm paid Christie the maximum

1
Mot. for Summ. J., D.I. 37.
2
State Farm’s Resp., D.I. 42.
3
Clarke’s Resp., D.I. 39.
4
Christie’s Resp., D.I. 45.
5
Movants’ Reply, D.I. 49.
6
Am. Compl. ¶ 6, D.I. 13.
7
Id. ¶ 7.
8
Id. ¶ 7, 11.
9
See Mot. for Summ. J. at Ex. D, D.I. 37.
3
liability benefits under Clarke’ policy and Christie executed a release in favor of

Clarke (“Release”) stating:

For and in consideration of the sum of twenty five
thousand and 00/00- Dollars, Lotoya Christie hereby fully
and forever release[s] and discharge[s] Jermaine Clarke,
who does not admit any liability to the undersigned but
expressly denies any liability, from any and all claims,
demands, damages, actions, causes of action or suits of
any kind or nature whatsoever, and particularly on account
of all injuries known and unknown, which have resulted
or may in the future develop from an incident on or about
the 8th day of May, 2022, at or near I95, Newark, DE.

The undersigned agrees to be responsible for and to satisfy
out of the proceeds of this settlement, any and all liens,
known and unknown, and/or subrogated interests, for
medical treatment, health care and related expenses, and
attorney’s fees, incurred by, or on behalf of the
undersigned, for any bodily injury arising from the
accident described herein above. A Delaware Personal
Injury Protection subrogation claim is not released where
the tortfeasor knows of or has been placed on notice of the
subrogation interest.

The undersigned hereby declares that the terms of this
settlement have been completely read and are fully
understood and voluntarily accepted for the purpose of
making a full and final compromise adjustment and
settlement of any and all claims, disputed or otherwise,
known or unknown, on account of the injuries and
damages above mentioned, and for the express purpose of
precluding forever any further or additional claims arising
out of the incident described above.10

10
Id. at Ex. C.
4
3. Separate text at the bottom of the Release states: “Plaintiff specifically

reserves any claims for UM/UIM and PIP benefits against any entity, including any

insurance company identified herein.”11 On September 11, 2023, State Farm advised

Christie’s counsel that it was accepting her claim for underinsured motorist benefits,

and it enclosed payment of $25,000.12 Christie’s counsel accepted this payment on

her behalf.13

4. Joyce and Porter moved for Summary Judgment on July 31, 2024.14

State Farm responded supporting the motion.15 Christie responded opposing the

motion.16 Clarke took no position.17 Joyce and Porter replied on September 13,

2024.18

5. In moving for summary judgment, Joyce and Porter assert that Christie

continues to impermissibly pursue claims against them despite receiving both the

liability limits and underinsured motorist benefit limits from State Farm.19 Movants

cite 18 Del. C. § 3902(b)(3) contending the exhaustion of all limits of all liability

11
Id.
12
Id. at Ex. D.
13
Id. at Ex. E.
14
Mot. for Summ. J., D.I. 37.
15
State Farm’s Resp., D.I. 42.
16
Christie’s Resp., D.I. 45.
17
Clarke’s Resp., D.I. 39.
18
Movants’ Reply, D.I. 49.
19
Mot. for Summ. J. at ¶ 4, D.I. 37.
5
policies is necessary to obtain underinsured motorist benefits.20 Movants argue that

it must be assumed that State Farm’s payment of liability limits in the amount of

$25,000 to Christie exhausted of all available limits in order for her to have been

eligible to receive underinsured motorist benefits.21 “Otherwise, State Farm would

have had no obligation to pay an additional $25,000 in underinsured motorist

benefits based upon the circumstances in this case.”22 Further, “State Farm’s

payment of the underinsured motorist benefits cannot be deemed gratuitous, even if

made voluntarily, but must be assumed that it was made pursuant to the statute.”23

6. Additionally, Movants assert that “[i]n addition to State Farm’s

payment having to be deemed made in accordance with 18 Del. C. § 3902(b)(3),

Plaintiff’s acceptance and cashing of such monies demonstrates an agreement that

such benefits were paid pursuant to 18 Del. C. § 3902(b)(3).”24 Movants argue that

Plaintiff has implicitly agreed through the acceptance of underinsured motorist

benefits that Clarke is solely responsible for the accident, and that no cause of action

should exist against the other Defendants.25

20
Id. ¶¶ 6-7.
21
Id. ¶ 8.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id. ¶ 9.
25
Id.
6
7. Movants anticipate Christie arguing she is willing to provide a credit to

the other Defendants for the amounts previously received from State Farm.26

Movants argue, however, that this anticipated position has no basis in statutory or

case law.27 Ultimately, Christie chose to resolve her claim against Clarke and to

accept underinsured motorist benefits from State Farm, resulting in the full and

complete resolution of her claim.28 Therefore, Movants contend that Christie is

precluded from pursuing claims against them.29

8. For its part, State Farm contends Christie cannot both accept

underinsured motorist benefits and continue to assert additional liability claims

against Movants.30 State Farm argues that 18 Del. C. § 3902(b)(3) makes a plaintiff

ineligible for underinsured motorist benefits until after the limits of liability have

been exhausted.31 Therefore, Christie is statutorily barred from accepting or even

making a claim for underinsured motorist benefits if she asserts that there are other

liable parties from the accident that have available liability coverage for which she

is also making a claim.32

26
Id. ¶ 10
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
State Farm’s Resp. ¶ 1, D.I. 42.
31
Id.
32
Id.
7
9. State Farm also asserts that its tender of Christie’s underinsured

motorist benefit policy limits “was made based on the assumption (if not

representation) that no other liability coverage remained applicable to the case.”33

And, that her “acceptance of that tender would necessarily indicate her own belief

consistent with that statutory requirement.”34 State Farm contends Christie cannot

assert an underinsured motorist claim in advance of the resolution of other related

liability claims.35 Further, depending upon Joyce’s and/or Porter’s liability, State

Farm argues that there may be no viable underinsured claim at all.36 In State Farm’s

view “Plaintiff is left with the choice of pursuing the remaining alleged tortfeasors

and returning to State Farm the $25,000 paid pursuant to the Plaintiff’s underinsured

motorist coverage, or dismissing the balance of the case as a recognition that there

are no other liable parties.”37

10. In her Response, Christie provides a chronology of events:

The Clarke vehicle was insured by Defendant State Farm.
In June 2023, State Farm on behalf of Clarke offered to
tender the policy limits of $25,000 to resolve the claim
against Clarke. Plaintiff requested on multiple occasions
an Affidavit of No Additional Insurance, before Plaintiff
could agree to that settlement. As the affidavit had not
been provided, Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit which
had claims against Porter, Joyce, and Clarke. Upon receipt

33
Id. ¶ 2.
34
Id.
35
Id. ¶ 3.
36
Id.
37
Id.
8
of the affidavit, Plaintiff was able to accept the settlement
offer on behalf of Clarke and executed a release for the
same. The release was specifically limited to Clarke, and
did not release any other entity. Plaintiff then added State
Farm to the pending litigation, so that if a fact finder found
that Clarke’s portion of damages exceeded his liability
limits, State Farm would stand in Clarke’s shoes for
underinsured motorist benefits (“UIM”). This Amended
Complaint was filed before State Farm made any offers on
the UIM coverage.

On September 11, 2023, State Farm, sent Plaintiff’s
counsel a payment of $25,000, stating that it was paying
this based upon the information it had to date. As noted at
the bottom of the page, State Farm was aware that there
were claims against the other drivers being made at the
time of the letter and yet State Farm did not condition the
payment of the UIM benefits on withdrawal of those
claims. Further, nothing in the letter states that the
payment is for full and complete settlement of the claim,
nor is there any request for a release. Instead, the letter
invites additional information and documentation from
Plaintiff.38

11. Christie argues that “[w]hen considering the facts in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff, it is possible that a jury could find that Clarke’s portion of

Plaintiff’s damages exceed Clarke’s insurance policy and still find Joyce and Porter

are also proportionally responsible but to a lesser amount.”39 Further, “[i]f that were

the case, Plaintiff would obtain recovery from Clarke, Clarke’s UIM, Porter, and

Joyce.”40 Additionally, she argues that the underinsured motorist statute must be

38
Christie’s Resp. ¶¶ 3-4 (internal citations omitted), D.I. 45.
39
Id. ¶ 5.
40
Id.
9
read in its entirety as 18 Del. C. § 3902(b)(4) specifically allows a plaintiff to settle

with one tortfeasor and still pursue claims against others.41 She argues the Court in

Townshend v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.42 noted the legislature amended 18 Del.

C. § 3902(b) by adding subsection (b)(4) to include a provision regarding multiple

tortfeasors.43 Christie argues that under this statute, Joyce and Porter remain jointly

and severally liable for her injuries, and any settlement with Clarke does not

extinguish her claims against them.44

12. Christie adds that there has been not been a determination of the parties’

respective degrees of responsibility, nor has there been a determination regarding the

extent of Christie’s damages.45 Christie asserts that when considering the facts in

the light most favorable to her, a fact finder could find that her damages exceed the

available insurance coverage.46 Moreover, State Farm’s decision to pay UIM

benefits does not signify that she has been fully compensated for her injuries.47 And,

Joyce and Porter still remain liable for their portion of any remaining damages as

41
Id. ¶ 6.
42
1998 WL 281265 (Del. Super. Ct. May 22, 1998).
43
Christie’s Resp. ¶ 6, D.I. 45
44
Id. ¶ 7.
45
Id. ¶ 8.
46
Id.
47
Id.
10
allowed under 18 Del. C. § 3902(b)(4).48 Christie contends that State Farm’s

Response reads like a Motion for Summary Judgment, and writes:

State Farm asserts that it was under the assumption when
it tendered its UIM policy limits that all coverage had been
exhausted, when State Farm’s own letter demonstrates that
it was aware that there were other pending claims, did not
know if the lawsuits had been withdrawn, and was still
tendering its limits. State Farm, nowhere in its
correspondence suggested, implied, or required that the
pending claims with Joyce and Porter be withdrawn in
order to obtain the UIM payment. Further, it should be
noted that State Farm often advances what it believes is
owed in UIM matters, and still allows for continued
negotiation or litigation. Nothing in State Farm’s letter
indicated that the payment would be for full and final
settlement of the entire matter. At the very least the
statement at the bottom of State Farm’s letter creates a
factual question that will need deposition testimony from
the author of the letter.49

13. Christie summarizes that “Delaware law specifically creates the ability

for Plaintiff to execute a release for one of multiple tortfeasors and then that

tortfeasor and UIM will be considered against the remaining tortfeasors under the

Joint Tortfeasor Act.”50 Further, “[t]he proper course of action at this time is to allow

a factfinder to assess the total damages, asses the portions of liability, and then if

there is a need for credits or offset, they can be made at that time.”51

48
Id.
49
Id. ¶ 9.
50
Id. ¶ 11
51
Id.
11
14. In their Reply, Movants first point out that they do not challenge

Christie’s ability to resolve her case against Clarke, and support her ability to do so.52

However, they contend that her acceptance of UIM benefits from State Farm is

directly contrary to statutory law, as is Christie’s continued pursuit of claims against

Movants.53 Movants assert that Christie’s intent in pursuing UIM benefits is at issue,

and the intent of State Farm in tendering its UIM limits is not at issue.54 Additionally,

on this point, Movants contend that it is clear that Christie was accepting the tender

of State Farm’s underinsured motorist limits.55 And, in order to do so, she cannot

accept such limits unless she has already exhausted all other underlying limits from

all other tortfeasors in accordance with 18 Del. C. § 3902(b)(3).56

15. Secondly, Movants reply that Christie’s reliance on 18 Del. C. §

3902(b)(4) is misplaced.57 In consideration of Townshend and the legislature’s

addition of subsection (b)(4) after the Delaware Supreme Court’s prior ruling in

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nacchia,58 Movants argue that it is now clear that a

reservation of rights need not have been present in the Release in order to pursue an

52
Joyce and Porter’s Reply ¶ 2, D.I. 49.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. ¶ 3.
58
628 A.2d 48 (Del. 1993).
12
underinsured action.59 Still, they add that this portion of the statute does not address

the present situation where a plaintiff continues to pursue other tortfeasors after

already accepting underinsured motorist benefits.60

16. Next, Movants point out that Ҥ 3902(b)(4) refers back to (b)(3),

meaning the parties have to act in accordance with (b)(3), and (b)(4) does not

override (b)(3).”61 Movants also point out that “[in] this instance, there were no

benefits paid with respect to either Mr. Joyce’s policy or Mr. Porter’s policy, let alone

the exhaustion of those policies, prior to Plaintiff accepting the underinsured policy

limits from State Farm.”62 Movants assert that neither the statute nor any case law

cited by Christie provides that an underinsured motorist carrier can be held jointly

and severally liable with other joint tortfeasors when those tortfeasors’ policy limits

have not been exhausted.63

17. Superior Court Civil Rule 56(c) provides that summary judgment is

appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”64 The moving party initially bears

59
Joyce and Porter’s Reply ¶ 3, D.I. 49.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. ¶ 4.
63
Id.
64
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); Buckley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 139 A.3d
845, 847 (Del. Super. Ct. 2015), aff'd, 140 A.3d 431 (Del. 2016) (quoting Moore v.
Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680 (Del. 1979)).
13
the burden of demonstrating that the undisputed facts support its claims or

defenses.65 If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving

party to show that there are material issues of fact to be resolved by the ultimate

factfinder.66 When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court's function

is to examine the record, including “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party to determine whether genuine issues

of material fact exist “but not to decide such issues.”67 Summary judgment will only

be appropriate if the Court finds there is no genuine issue of material fact. When

material facts are in dispute, or “it seems desirable to inquire more thoroughly into

the facts, to clarify the application of the law to the circumstances,” summary

judgment will not be appropriate.”68 However, when the facts permit a reasonable

person to draw but one inference, the question becomes one for decision as a matter

of law.69

18. Eighteen Del. C. § 3902(b) provides in relevant part:

(3) The insurer shall not be obligated to make any payment
under this coverage until after the limits of liability under

65
Sizemore, 405 A.2d at 681.
66
Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1364 (Del. 1995).
67
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); Merrill v. Crothall-Am., Inc., 606 A.2d 96, 99-100 (Del.
1992).
68
Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 468-69 (Del. 1962) (citing Knapp v.
Kinsey, 249 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1957)).
69
Wooten v. Kiger, 226 A.2d 238, 239 (Del. 1967).
14
all bodily injury bonds and insurance policies available to
the insured at the time of the accident have been exhausted
by payment of settlement or judgments.

(4) An insured who executes a release of a single tortfeasor
owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle in
exchange for payment of the entire limits of liability
insurance afforded by the tortfeasor's liability insurer shall
continue to be legally entitled to recover against that
tortfeasor for the purposes of recovery against the
insured's underinsurance carrier. An insured who executes
a release of 1 of multiple tortfeasors shall have rights
against that tortfeasor and the insured's underinsurance
carrier determined in accordance with the Uniform
Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act [Chapter 63 of
Title 10] and paragraph (b)(3) of this section.

19. The chronology of events and the documents before the Court remove

some facts from dispute: (1) State Farm offered to pay Christie it’s liability policy

limits on behalf of Clarke; (2) at the time Christie accepted that tender and executed

the Release on August 11, 2023, she had filed a Complaint naming Clarke, Joyce,

and Porter as defendants;70 (3) the Release only discharged Clarke with Christie

reserving “any claims for UM/UIM and PIP benefits against any entity, including

any insurance company named herein;”71 (4) on September 11, 2023 State Farm

accepted Christie’s claim for $25,000 in UIM benefits after having evaluated her

claim for those benefits based on the information it had obtained at that time; 72 (5)

70
Compl., D.I. 1.
71
Mot. for Summ. J., at Ex. C, D.I.37.
72
Id. at Ex. D.
15
Christie accepted those UIM benefits;73 and (6) at the time it paid the UIM benefits,

State Farm was a codefendant in Christie’s Amended Complaint with Joyce and

Porter.74 Based on those indisputable facts, at least four scenarios come to mind --

State Farm either conducted a conscientious evaluation of the facts of the accident

and determined that no additional insurance was available because neither Joyce nor

Porter were negligent, it knew the limits of Joyce’s and Porter’s coverage and,

nonetheless, knew it still would have to pay Christie’s UIM benefits, it was misled

about the existence of additional liability coverage, or it prematurely and

improvidently provided UIM benefits it was not statutorily obligated to provide.75

20. Just as certain facts are known and indisputable, certain other facts are

not present in the record before the Court. Among them are: (1) whether Joyce

and/or Porter bear any liability for Christies’ injuries; (2) if so, how much and in

what relative proportions to each other and to Clarke; and (3) what representations,

if any, Christie made to State Farm regarding other liability insurance.

21. The Court is not convinced that, when read in pari materia,

§3902(b)(3), §3902(b)(4) and the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors

Act (10 Del. C. Ch. 63) prohibit Christie from continuing her claims against Joyce

73
Id. at Ex. E.
74
Amend. Compl. D.I. 13.
75
See, 18 Del. C. § 3902(b)(3): “[t]he insurer shall not be obligated to make any
payment until after the limits of liability … have been exhausted by payment of
settlement or judgments.”
16
and Porter. Sec. 3902(b)(3) addresses only when State Farm is obligated to make a

UIM payment to Christie. Certainly, the posture of the case would be different if

State Farm was refusing to make a UIM payment. Then, it might be the party

invoking § 3202(b)(3).76 Here, though, it is non-parties to State Farm’s contract with

its insured who seek collateral benefits from State Farm’s relationship with its

insured.

22. Nothing in the language of § 3902(b)(3) confers any rights on other

tortfeasors by virtue of State Farm’s payment of UIM benefits. Nor is it evident why

Joyce and/or Porter should benefit if State Farm made a non-judicial determination

that they bore no liability for Christie’s injuries, it would eventually be liable for

UIM benefits anyway, it was misled in believing no other liability coverage existed,

or it made an ill-advised UIM benefit payment. Movants characterize State Farm’s

UIM benefit payment as one made pursuant to § 3902(b)(3) and not made

gratuitously because “it must be assumed” that its payment of its own liability policy

limits exhausted all available liability limits.77 Similarly, they characterize Christie’s

acceptance of the UIM payment as an implicit agreement that Clarke is solely

responsible for the accident.78 But, the cases they cite fail to support those

76
See, e.g., Rostocki v. GEICO General Ins. Co., 2014 WL 663078 (Del. Super. Ct.
Nov. 17, 2014) cited by Movants.
77
Mot. for Summ. J. at ¶ 8, D.I. 37.
78
Id. at ¶ 9.
17
characterizations. They cite Starun v. All American Engineering Co.79 for the

proposition that “State Farm’s payment of the underinsured motorist benefits cannot

be deemed gratuitous, even if made voluntarily, but must be that it was made

pursuant to the statute.”80 Starun was a worker’s compensation appeal where the

Delaware Supreme Court held that an employer who made compensation payments

to an employee for three years was deemed to have done so pursuant to an implied

agreement under the worker’s compensation statute for purposes of the statute of

limitations.81 Similarly, they offer H. H. Rosen Co. v. Chavin,82 in support of their

contention that Christie implicitly understood when she accepted the UIM payment

that Clarke was solely responsible for the accident.83 In that case, our Supreme Court

held that a tenant who remained in possession of a rental property and paid an

increased amount of rent implicitly exercised a renewal option despite not having

given the landlord the required notice.84 Neither case, however, speaks to any effects

the implied agreements had on any third parties rights vis-à-vis the litigants, and,

thus, are inapposite here.

79
350 A.2d 765, 766 (Del. 1975).
80
Mot. for Summ. J. at ¶ 8, n. 12, D.I. 37.
81
Starun, 350 A.2d at 766.
82
257 A.2d 228 (Del. 1968).
83
Mot. for Summ. J. at ¶ 9, n. 13, D.I. 37.
84
H.H. Rosin, Co., 257 A.2d at 230.
18
23. Movants are correct that § 3902(b)(4) was enacted in order to eliminate

the need to include a reservation of rights against a tortfeasor’s UIM insurance

carrier when releasing the tortfeasor from liability. Nonetheless, the second sentence

of § 3902(b)(4) provides:

An insured who executes a release of 1 of multiple
tortfeasors shall have rights against that tortfeasor and the
insured's underinsurance carrier determined in accordance
with the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors
Act [Chapter 63 of Title 10] and paragraph (b)(3) of this
section.85

The clear import of the reference to the Uniform Contribution Among Joint

Tortfeasors Act, in the Court’s view, is that a plaintiff who releases a single tortfeasor

may have recourse to other remaining tortfeasors for compensation. The Act

specifically provides as much:

A release by an injured person of 1 joint tortfeasor,
whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the
other tortfeasors unless the release so provides; but
reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors in the
amount of the consideration paid for the release, or in any
amount or proportion by which the release provides that
the total claim shall be released, if greater than the
consideration paid.86

24. Accordingly, the Court concludes the payment of UIM benefits to

Christie does not resolve the remaining genuine issues of fact concerning whether

85
18 Del. C. § 3902(b)(4).
86
10 Del. C. § 6304(a)
19
either of both Movants are liable for damages sustained by Christie, and if either

Movant is liable, in what amount.

25. The Court is mindful of State Farm’s position that it is entitled to a

refund of the UIM payment it made to Christie if Christie continues to pursue Joyce

and Porter. That issue is not before the Court. Resolution of that question must

await the development of additional facts, including, whether they have any liability

for Christie’s injuries and if so whether the amount of damages for which they are

liable exceeds their liability coverage limits.

THEREFORE, for the reasons stated above, Defendants John A. Joyce and

Kyheim L. Porter’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED

/s/ Ferris W. Wharton
Ferris W. Wharton, J.

20