State v. Hopson-El

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
)
v. ) Cr. ID. No. 2111002732
)
)
JEWANN HOPSON-EL, )
)
Defendant. )

Submitted: November 15, 2024
Decided: February 11, 2025

COMMISSIONER’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION THAT
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF SHOULD
BE DENIED

Matthew A. Casale, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.

Jewann Hopson-El, Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Wilmington,
Delaware, pro se.

SALOMONE, Commissioner
This 11th day of February, 2025, upon consideration of the Motion for

Postconviction Relief filed by Defendant Jewann Hopson-El (“Hopson-El” or

“Defendant”);1 the State’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction

Relief;2 the Affidavit of defense counsel;3 and the record in this matter, the following

is my Report and Recommendation.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 5, 2021, Hopson-El was arrested by the Wilmington Police for

charges stemming from a motor vehicle stop that occurred on the same date.4 While

on patrol, Wilmington police officers observed a blue-colored Buick LeSabre,

bearing Delaware registration.5 The vehicle pulled out of a parking space and into

traffic, failing to utilize a turn signal.6 The officers ran an inquiry into the vehicle’s

registration, revealing that the purchaser of the vehicle had failed to register it with

the Delaware DMV.7

1
Superior Court Criminal Docket, State v. Jewann Hopson-El, Case No. 2111002732 at Docket
Item 30. For purposes of this Report and Recommendation, all docket item references relate to
Superior Court Criminal Case No. 2111002732 (hereinafter, “D.I. ___”).
2
D.I. 41.
3
D.I. 40.
4
D.I. 1, Adult Complaint and Warrant, State v. Jewann Hopson-El, Case No. 2111002732 at Ex.
B.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
1
The police conducted a motor vehicle stop for the above violations.8 When

the officers made contact with the driver of the vehicle, they positively identified the

person as Hopson-El based on their numerous prior contacts with him.9 The officers

were already aware that Defendant did not possess a valid Delaware driver’s license

and had multiple previous firearm arrests.10 The front passenger of the vehicle was

positively identified as Tejeha Bordley (“Bordley”), a co-defendant in this matter.11

From a conversation with Bordley, the officers learned that the vehicle belonged to

her and that she had recently consumed marijuana.12 Thereafter, without being

prompted, Defendant also admitted that he had recently consumed marijuana and

that he does not possess a valid driver’s license.13

Throughout the stop, the officers could smell the odor of marijuana emanating

from inside the vehicle.14 The police proceeded with a search of the vehicle and

found a black Star Arm, Modelo Super, semi-automatic handgun under the center

console.15 It was loaded with two live rounds of 9MM ammunition in the magazine

8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
2
and one live round in the chamber.16 The firearm was seized and Hopson-El was

subsequently placed into custody.17

On December 20, 2021, a New Castle County grand jury indicted Defendant

for the following crimes: (i) Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon; (ii) Possession

of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited; (iii) Possession of Ammunition by a Person

Prohibited; (iv) Possession of Marijuana; (v) Driving While Suspended; and (vi)

Failure to Signal before Turning.18 On October 27, 2022, Defendant pleaded guilty

to Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon.19 This Court followed the sentencing

recommendation and following the plea immediately sentenced Defendant to eight

years at Level V, suspended for one year at Level III.20 Defendant did not appeal

his conviction and sentence. From Defendant’s sentencing until August 17, 2023,

he repeatedly violated the terms of his probation and frequently incurred new

criminal charges.21 Due to his numerous violations of probation, Defendant was

committed to serve additional time on his original eight-year sentence.22

16
Id.
17
Id.
18
D.I. 2, Indictment.
19
D.I. 12, Plea Agreement.
20
D.I. 13, Sentence Order.
21
D.I. 12-27.
22
D.I. 27. On May 6, 2024, Defendant was found in violation of probation in this case and
sentenced to 8 years level V, suspended after 6 months, for 12 months level IV work release,
suspended after 6 months, for 18 months level III, hold at level V until space is available at level
IV work release.
3
MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

On September 29, 2023, Defendant filed a pro se Motion for Postconviction

Relief (the “Motion”).23 In the Motion, Defendant raises three claims. First, he raises

an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, asserting that appointed counsel “should

have filed a motion to dismiss but didn’t even though [he] asked him to.”24 Second,

Defendant argues that the charges brought against him constitute double jeopardy

under the Fifth Amendment because he and his co-defendant cannot both be found

guilty of the same crime.25 Third, he asserts that there was insufficient evidence to

support his conviction.26

On August 8, 2024, defense counsel submitted an Affidavit in response to

Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel allegations.27 In response to

Defendant’s claims, defense counsel explained that he had sent a letter to Defendant

describing the frivolity of a motion to dismiss for lack of evidence. 28 Defense

counsel further explained that the State could proceed with its prosecution of

23
D.I. 30.
24
Id.
25
Id. Defendant explains his claim for double jeopardy as follows: “my co-defendant plead guilty
to CCDW before me, all evidence lead to them and they didn’t drop the charges against me even
thought [sic] there was no evidence.” Defendant similarly argues in his third claim that there was
insufficient evidence against him.
26
Id. Defendant claims that “there was no evidence against me at all and all evidence pointed to
someone else.”
27
D.I. 40. In addition to the Affidavit, counsel attached a record of his correspondence with
Defendant, explaining his lack of a good faith basis to file a motion to dismiss for lack of evidence,
the State’s plea offer and legal standing to proceed on charges despite his co-defendant pleading
guilty, and his opinion regarding the State’s ability to prove the charges at trial.
28
D.I. 40.
4
Defendant for possession of the firearm, despite his co-defendant pleading guilty.29

Defense counsel outlined specific facts setting forth a prima facie case against

Hopson-El and explained that Defendant was facing a mandatory period of

incarceration, so it was in his best interest to enter into the offered plea as a means

of avoiding such incarceration.30

On October 1, 2024, the State submitted a response to Defendant’s Motion,31

arguing that (1) Defendant has not met his burden of establishing defense counsel’s

ineffectiveness in failing to file a motion to dismiss;32 (2) Defendant’s double

jeopardy claim is not applicable in the present case as Ms. Bordley’s guilty plea “has

no bearing on double jeopardy”; and (3) Defendant was jointly charged with

knowingly and unlawfully carrying a concealed firearm with Ms. Bordley, of which

the State had sufficient evidence to prosecute.

The deadline for Defendant to file a reply was November 15, 2024, if he

desired to do so. Defendant elected not to file a reply. The matter is now ripe for

decision.

29
Id.
30
Id.
31
D.I. 41.
32
Id. The State further argues that defense counsel would have filed a motion to dismiss prior to
the entry of Defendant’s plea, and since Defendant did not assert that his plea was the result of
coercion or entered into involuntarily, Defendant cannot establish that if defense counsel had filed
a motion to dismiss, irrespective of whether it was granted or denied, that he would not have
pleaded guilty but would have insisted on going to trial.
5
APPLICABLE LAW

a. Rule 61 and Procedural Bars to Relief

Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”) governs the procedures by

which an incarcerated individual may seek to have his conviction set aside on the

ground that the court lacked jurisdiction or any other ground that is a sufficient

factual and legal basis for a collateral attack upon the conviction.33 In any motion

for postconviction relief, this Court must first determine whether a defendant has

satisfied the procedural requirements of Rule 61 before considering the merits of any

underlying claim.34 Rule 61(i)(1) requires the motion to be filed within one year of

the final judgment of conviction or a newly recognized retroactive right.35 Rule

61(i)(2) prohibits successive motions and requires that any second or subsequent

postconviction motion be summarily dismissed, unless the movant was convicted

after trial and he pleads with particularity that either (a) new evidence exists creating

a strong inference that he is actually innocent of the charges of which he was

convicted; or (b) a new, retroactive rule of constitutional law applies to the movant’s

case that would render the conviction invalid.36 Rule 61(i)(3) provides that any

claims the movant failed to assert in the proceedings leading to conviction are barred,

33
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1).
34
Taylor v. State, 32 A.3d 374, 388 (Del. 2011) (quoting Shelton v. State, 744 A.2d 465, 474 (Del.
1999)).
35
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
36
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2) & (d)(2).
6
unless he is able to show cause for the relief from the procedural default and

prejudice from violation of his rights.37 And finally, Rule 61(i)(4) provides that any

ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated is thereafter barred.38

This is Defendant’s first Motion, and it was timely filed on September 29,

2023, approximately 11 months after this Court imposed sentence. Thus, the

procedural bars set forth in Rule 61(i)(1) and (2) are not at issue. Rule 61(i)(3),

however, prohibits the filing of “any ground for relief not asserted in the proceedings

leading to the judgment of conviction…unless the movant shows (A) cause for relief

from the procedural default, or (b) prejudice from a violation of the movant’s

rights.”39 Applying this to Defendant’s Motion, Hobson-El’s second and third claims

asserting double jeopardy and insufficient evidence are procedurally defaulted

because he failed to assert them in the proceedings leading to the judgment of

conviction or on direct appeal, and he has not demonstrated cause for relief from the

procedural default nor prejudice from an alleged violation of his rights.40

As this Court has previously held, this Court will not consider the merits of a

postconviction claim if it is procedurally barred.41 Therefore, Defendant’s second

37
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
38
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
39
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
40
The procedural default in Rule 61(i)(4) is inapplicable. Additionally, Defendant has not
overcome the strict pleading requirements set forth in Rule 61(i)(5) which could, under certain
circumstances, provide him relief from Rule 61(i)(3)’s procedural default.
41
State v. Riddock, 2022 WL 17820366, at *4 (Del. Super. Dec. 19, 2022) (citing Younger v. State,
580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990)).
7
and third claims are procedurally defaulted pursuant to Rule 61(i)(3) and should be

summarily dismissed. However, ineffective assistance of counsel claims cannot be

raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings and are properly presented in a motion

for postconviction relief.42 Defendant’s first claim—that defense counsel was

ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss—is a claim for ineffective assistance

of counsel and is properly before the Court in this Motion.

b. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must

meet the two-pronged Strickland test43 by showing that: (1) counsel performed at a

level ‘below an objective standard of reasonableness’44 and that, (2) the deficient

performance prejudiced the defendant.45 To meet the requirements of the first prong,

a defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that defense counsel was

not reasonably competent. The second prong requires a defendant to show “that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for the defense counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome.”46

42
Sabb v. State, 2021 WL 2229631, at *1 (Del. May 28, 2021); Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160, 187-
188 (Del. 2020); Whittle v. State, 2016 WL 2585904, at *3 (Del. Apr. 28, 2016); State v. Evan-
Mayes, 2016 WL 4502303, at *2 (Del. Super. Aug. 25, 2016).
43
Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668 (1984).
44
Id. at 688.
45
Id. at 694.
46
Id. at 694.
8
A mere allegation is not enough to satisfy these requirements. A defendant must

indicate faults counsel made that were far removed from reasonable, leading to an

outcome that was measurably worse for the defendant.47

In the context of a plea challenge, it is not sufficient for a defendant to claim

simply that his counsel was deficient. The defendant must also establish that

counsel’s actions were so prejudicial that there was a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel’s deficiencies, the defendant would not have taken a plea but would have

insisted on going to trial.48

c. Defendant’s Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel is Meritless
and was Waived Upon Entry of his Guilty Plea.

Defendant’s first claim, that his appointed counsel was ineffective because he

did not file a motion to dismiss for lack of evidence, is without merit. To succeed

on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file a motion to dismiss,

the defendant must demonstrate that the motion had a reasonable probability of

success and that the failure to file the motion prejudiced the outcome of the case.

Defendant is unable to demonstrate either. Here, Defendant fails to meet his burden

as he has not shown a reasonable probability of success in the Court granting the

47
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.
48
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984); Hickman v. State, 1994 WL 590495
(Del.) (applying Strickland to guilty pleas).
9
motion to dismiss nor has he even alleged that he would not have pleaded guilty and

gone to trial but for the alleged error of counsel.

Through his affidavit, defense counsel explains that he had no good faith

basis upon which to file a motion to dismiss for lack of evidence based solely on the

fact that Hobson-El’s co-defendant pleaded guilty to one count of Carrying a

Concealed Deadly Weapon.49 As counsel explained to Defendant, the State has legal

standing to proceed with the charges against him despite the fact that his co-

defendant accepted responsibility for ownership of the firearm.50 Defense counsel

further explained that, in entering the plea, Ms. Bordley did not admit that she was

the only person who possessed the gun and that her plea would be considered and

weighed by the jury in determining whether the State met its burden of proof in

showing that Hobson-El possessed the firearm.51

Considering the foregoing facts, filing a motion to dismiss would have been

frivolous with virtually no likelihood of succeeding. An attorney does not have an

obligation to file frivolous motions; rather, he has an obligation not to file frivolous

motions.52 Defense counsel’s failure to file a frivolous motion was reasonable and

cannot be found to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.

49
D.I. 40.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
State v. Pandiscio, 1995 WL 339028, * 5 (Del.Super. May 17, 1995), aff'd, 670 A.2d 1340,
1995 WL 715627 (Del. Oct.25, 1995) (TABLE).
10
Moreover, the failure to file a motion to dismiss occurred prior to Defendant

entering his guilty plea and was therefore waived. During the guilty plea colloquy,

the Defendant provided sworn testimony that (1) he reviewed each of the Plea

Agreement, Immediate Sentencing Form, and the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea,

(2) he signed each of the foregoing documents, (3) his attorney addressed any issues,

questions, or concerns he had, and (4) he had not been threatened or forced to plead

guilty.53 The Defendant further represented that he understood the Constitutional

rights he was giving up by entering the plea and admitted his guilt to the sole charge

of Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon as set forth in the Plea Agreement.54 The

Court thereafter found Hopson-El’s plea to be knowing, intelligent and voluntary.55

Defendant does not contend that his plea was involuntarily entered, nor has

he presented any clear, contrary evidence to call into question his testimony at the

plea colloquy or answers on the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form. Absent such

evidence, the Delaware Supreme Court has held that a defendant is bound by those

answers and representations.56 A defendant’s statements during the guilty plea

colloquy are presumed to be truthful and “pose a formidable barrier in any

53
See D.I. 36. Transcript of October 27, 2022 plea colloquy; also see October 26, 2022 Truth-in-
Sentencing Guilty Plea Form executed by Defendant.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Palmer v. State, 2002 WL 31546531, *1 (Del. 2002) (citing Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d
629,632 (Del. 1997).
11
subsequent collateral proceedings.”57 Hobson-El’s valid guilty plea waived his right

to challenge any alleged errors, deficiencies or defects occurring prior to the entry

of his plea, even those of constitutional proportions.58 For the foregoing reasons,

Defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit and should

be denied.

d. Defendant’s Double Jeopardy Claim

Although the Court has determined that Defendant’s double jeopardy claim is

procedurally barred, it is also substantively without merit. Defendant’s argument is

premised on a fundamental misunderstanding of the legal protections afforded by

the Fifth Amendment. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the

United States Constitution provides that no person shall “be subject for the same

offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”59 It protects an individual against

successive prosecutions, against multiple charges under separate statutes, and

against being charged multiple times under the same statute.60 None of the double

jeopardy protections apply to Defendant’s case because Defendant was subject to

only one prosecution and pleaded guilty to only one charge.61

57
Somerville, 703 A.2d 632 (internal citations omitted).
58
Smith v. State, 841 A.2d 308 (TABLE), 2004 WL 120530, at *1 (Del. Jan. 15, 2004); Somerville
v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997); Modjica v. State, 2009 WL 2426675 (Del. 2009); Miller
v. State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Del. 2004).
59
U.S. Const. Amend. V., cl. 2.
60
Williams v. State, 796 A.2d 1281, 1285 (Del. 2002).
61
D.I. 11, Plea Agreement.
12
Although Defendant uses the term “double jeopardy” inaccurately, his

argument seems to lie in the notion that two people cannot both be found guilty of

possessing the same firearm stemming from the same incident. That notion,

however, is incorrect. The State can charge two defendants for possession of the

same firearm under a theory of joint possession, which it intended to do in this case.62

Here, Hobson-El and his co-defendant both pleaded guilty to Carrying a Concealed

Deadly Weapon, eliminating the need for the State to prove constructive

possession.63 For these reasons, Hobson-El’s second claim is also meritless.

e. Defendant’s Claim Regarding Lack of Evidence is Without Merit

Like his double jeopardy claim, Defendant’s claim that there was insufficient

evidence against him is procedurally barred, but it is also substantively without

merit. As defense counsel explained in his affidavit, the prosecution possessed

sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case against Defendant and pointed to

several facts that supported this conclusion, including that (i) Defendant had sole

62
D.I. 40. See Carney v. State, 2024 WL 2808291 (Del. June 3, 2024). In Carney, although the
defendant did not hold the gun during the robbery, the Court found there was a sufficient factual
basis to convict the defendant of a firearm charge based on constructive possession of the firearm;
see also Stevenson v. State, 181 A.3d 631, 2018 WL 1136524, at *2 (Del. Mar. 1, 2018 (TABLE)
(“Possession of an object ‘may be the joint possession of two or more [persons] acting in
concert.’”) (citing Lecates v. State, 987 A.2d 413, 423 (Del. 2006).
63
To demonstrate constructive possession, the State must prove that the defendant “(1) knew the
location of the gun; (2) had the ability to exercise dominion and control over the gun; and (3)
intended to guide the destiny of the gun.” Carney v. State, 2024 WL 2808291, at *4 (Del. June 3,
2024) (quoting Lecates, 987 A.2d at 426 (Del. 2006)). Constructive possession may be proved by
circumstantial evidence. Lecates, 987 A.2d at 426.
13
possession of the vehicle which housed the firearm for some period of time prior to

picking up his co-defendant; (ii) Bordley initially denied the existence of any

contraband in the vehicle, except for marijuana; and (iii) Bordley did not testify

under oath that she placed the gun in the vehicle.64 Moreover, the firearm was

located under the center console of the vehicle Defendant was driving, within reach

of both parties.65 If the case proceeded to trial, Bordley’s plea agreement required

her to testify truthfully at Defendant’s trial.66 In that regard, in entering her plea, she

did not admit that she was the only person who possessed the firearm. 67 Taken

together, these facts were sufficient to support all the charges brought against the

Defendant, including the charge of Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon to which

he ultimately plead guilty. For these reasons, Defendant’s claim of insufficient

evidence is without merit.

64
D.I. 40.
65
D.I. 1.
66
D.I. 40.
67
Id.
14
CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed herein, the Court concludes that Claims 2 and 3 set

forth in Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief are procedurally barred and

should be SUMMARILY DISMISSED. Claim 1 is without merit and should be

DENIED.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

/s/ Janine M. Salomone
The Honorable Janine M. Salomone

15