State v. Church

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
v. ) I.D. No. 2403005415
)
CHRISTIAN CHURCH )
)
Defendant. )

Submitted: February 18, 2025
Decided: May 15, 2025

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Upon Defendant’s Motion For Judgment Of Acquittal

DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART

Upon Defendant’s Motion For New Trial

DENIED

Angelica S. Endres, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Dover,
Delaware, Attorney for the State.

Alicia A. Porter, Esq., Benton & Shockley Law, P.A., Dover, Delaware, Attorney
for the Defendant.

Primos, J.
INTRODUCTION
After Christian Church (“Defendant”) was indicted for (1) assault in the first
degree of one victim, and (2) assault in the second degree of another victim, the
charges were tried before a Superior Court jury. At the close of the State’s case-in-
chief, Defendant moved for judgment of acquittal. The Court denied that motion.
In a renewed motion for judgment of acquittal, Church contends that the Court erred
in holding that the State presented legally sufficient evidence of intent to support
count one of the indictment, and legally sufficient evidence of causation and serious
physical injury to support count two. The Court today reaffirms its holding as to
count one. However, the Court also holds that the jury heard insufficient evidence
that Church in fact caused serious physical injury to victim Amarion Nutter, as
required to convict him on count two. Accordingly, Church’s motion for judgment
of acquittal is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART. Church also urges
the Court to grant him a new trial on the ground that a video depicting him beating
Nutter was improperly admitted at trial, citing the purportedly insufficient
authentication of that evidence. The Court concludes that the video was properly
authenticated, and that Church fails to raise a genuine question of its authenticity.
Thus, Church’s motion for a new trial is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND1
A. Procedural History
On May 6, 2024, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Defendant with
the assault in the second degree of Kaden Handte (“Handte”).2 On August 5, 2024,
Defendant was reindicted for assault in the first degree of Handte and assault in the
second degree of Amarion Nutter (“Nutter”). 3 As to the first count, the indictment

1
Citations in the form of “D.I. ___” refer to docket items.
2
D.I. 5.
3
D.I. 12. On January 21, 2025, the State entered a nolle prosequi on the May 6, 2024, indictment
for assault in the second degree. D.I. 24.
2
read as follows:
ASSAULT FIRST DEGREE, a felony, in violation of Title 11, Section
613(a)(2) of the Delaware Code of 1974, as amended.
CHRISTIAN R. CHURCH, on or about the 9th day of March, 2024, in
the County of Kent, State of Delaware, did intentionally disfigure-
seriously-and-permanently or destroy or amputate or disable-
permanently Kaden Handte.4
As to the second count, the indictment read as follows:
ASSAULT SECOND DEGREE, a felony, in violation of Title 11,
Section 612(a)(1) of the Delaware Code of 1974, as amended.
CHRISTIAN R. CHURCH, on or about the 9th day of March, 2024, in
the County of Kent, State of Delaware, did intentionally or recklessly
cause serious physical injury to Amarion J. Nutter. 5
The Court held a six-day jury trial. At the close of the State’s case-in-chief,
Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, contending that there was insufficient
evidence of Defendant’s intent to support a conviction on count one of the
indictment, and insufficient evidence of causation and serious physical injury to
support a conviction on count two. The Court denied that motion. At the prayer
conference following the close of the evidence, the Court granted 6 the State’s request
to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of assault in the second degree as
to Handte7 and assault in the third degree and offensive touching as to both Handte
and Nutter. On January 29, 2025, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the lesser

4
D.I. 12.
5
Id.
6
“[T]he trial judge must give a lesser-included offense instruction at the request of either the
defendant or the prosecution—even over the objection of the other party—if the evidence
presented is such that a jury could rationally find the defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense
and acquit the defendant of the greater offense.” State v. Cox, 851 A.2d 1269, 1275 (Del. 2003).
7
The Court’s jury instruction for assault in the second degree as to Handte read, in relevant part:
“In order to find Defendant guilty of Assault in the Second Degree, as an included offense to Count
1 of the indictment, you must find the state has proved the following two (2) elements beyond a
reasonable doubt: (1) Defendant caused serious physical injury to Kaden Handte; and (2)
Defendant acted intentionally or recklessly.” Jury Instr. 9 (D.I. 30).
3
included offense of assault in the second degree of Handte (the “Handte
Conviction”) and the charged offense of assault in the second degree of Nutter (the
“Nutter Conviction”). Defendant timely filed a renewed motion for judgment of
acquittal—re-raising the arguments presented at the close of the State’s evidence—
and a motion for a new trial.
B. Factual Background
The following relevant facts were adduced at trial. Given the procedural
posture, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State, drawing all
reasonable inferences in its favor.8
On the evening of March 8, 2024, Handte, Nutter, and two friends drove to a
bonfire party at a rural property in Sandtown, Kent County, Delaware. Upon
arriving, Handte entered a camping trailer and introduced himself to Defendant
before returning to his friends. Approximately half an hour after the group arrived,
Defendant, Cole Moffett (“Moffett”), and several others approached them. Moffett,
through a megaphone, called Nutter, who is of mixed race and has a dark
complexion, “the N-Word” 9 and told him he was not welcome at the party. Moffett
is white.
Handte, who is also white, objected to Moffett’s use of the racial slur, and an
argument ensued. Shortly after the argument ended,10 Defendant, consistently
described by witnesses as a large, bearded white man in a camouflage shirt,
approached Handte from behind and punched him forcefully in the jaw.11 Handte

8
McGuiness v. State, 312 A.3d 1156, 1187 (Del. 2024) (quoting Hopkins v. State, 293 A.3d 145,
150 (Del. 2023)).
9
This Court follows the Supreme Court’s lead in declining to reproduce the slur, even in redacted
form. See Jewell v. State, 2025 WL 957377, at *1 (Del. Mar. 31, 2025) (en banc) (citation omitted).
10
Handte estimated that fewer than fifteen or twenty minutes elapsed.
11
One of the victims’ friends, Elijah Smith, testified that he saw Defendant approach someone
wearing a dark sweatshirt with a raised hood from behind, punch him, and then continue beating
him. Both Handte and Nutter were wearing dark hooded sweatshirts, and Handte testified that he
had his hood up at the time he was attacked. Smith was some distance away, and therefore may
4
did not see the person who struck him, but Nutter, standing just a few feet away,
recognized Defendant as the assailant. 12 After Defendant struck Handte, Nutter
either shoved or struck Defendant, and the two ended up in a brawl on the ground.
Defendant, who is of much greater size and weight than Nutter, quickly placed
himself on top of the smaller man.13 From this superior position, Defendant
repeatedly punched Nutter in the head. After the brawl, Nutter was “woozy” and
“confused.” He stepped away from the group to vomit. Meanwhile, Handte got to
his feet and escaped to the opposite side of the bonfire.
After Nutter vomited, he searched for Handte to check that his friend was
uninjured, but was waylaid and pushed into a crowd of thirty or forty people. Nutter
then became involved in a fistfight with Moffett. After taking more blows to the
head, Nutter somehow extricated himself from the crowd. The four friends
regrouped and, upon seeing Handte’s condition—bleeding, slurring, and

have been confused between the object of the initial attack (Handte) and of the subsequent beating
(Nutter).
12
After the events, Handte contacted Defendant through the Facebook Messenger platform. In
full context, Defendant’s responses could reasonably be interpreted as inculpatory. The exchange
read as follows: Handte: “Hey man you feel good about what you did? You got a hell of a punch
dude wish I coulda [sic] seen it coming[.] I’ll be eating though [sic] a straw for a while[.] But I
guess that’s not too bad, get that Facebook time in now son[.] Can’t wait to see that a[**] in
court[.]” Church: “Hey man listen im [sic] sorry for all of this none of that should have happened.”
Handte: “You’re right[.] I coulda [sic] swore [sic] I came up introduced myself to you respectfully
earlier that night? Maybe I’m tripping though[.] I was surprised when I found out it was you[.]”
Church: “I really have never met you[.]” Handte: “You weren’t sitting in the trailer that night?
You definitely were[.] Maybe ya [sic] had too much to drink[.] All good man just had to say my
peace [sic] [.]” Church: “Well my peace [sic] is i [sic] dont [sic] want to argue i [sic] dont [sic]
want to fight i [sic] didnt [sic] ask for any of this trouble or for someone to be really hurt[.]” State’s
Ex. 13. Defendant’s mother testified that Defendant admitted to fighting with Nutter, but that he
denied striking Handte, whereas Moffett confessed to attacking Handte. The jury was not required
to find the exculpatory portion of her testimony credible, and evidently did not credit it. See State
v. Owens, 2010 WL 2892701 (Del. Super. July 16, 2010) (“The jury has ‘the discretion to accept
one portion of a witness’ testimony and reject another part.’” (quoting Pryor v. State, 453 A.2d 98,
100 (Del. 1982))).
13
Defendant is, per driver’s license records, six feet and one inch tall and three hundred pounds.
Nutter is seven inches shorter than Defendant and of relatively slender build.
5
incoherent—left for the nearest hospital.
Handte was clearly in worse condition than Nutter at the end of the night. His
jaw was broken on both the left and right side and required surgery, including the
installation of permanent hardware.14 This hardware later became infected, and
Handte has needed additional surgery and follow-up visits with medical providers.15
Handte lost between twenty and twenty-five pounds of weight because he was
unable to eat regularly for months.16 Handte continues to experience the effects of
the assault. Handte has a likely-permanent divot in his face from the injury and
subsequent surgeries. If he does not regularly stretch his jaw throughout the day, he
will awaken the next morning with his mouth “locked up.” Handte, a recently-
graduated high school athlete, struggles to perform physical activities, such as lifting
heavy weights or playing sports, because it triggers jaw pain. Handte’s doctors have
told him that his jaw will never heal to the point that it is “how it was,” and that he
will “have to take it easy going forward.” The State introduced Handte’s medical
records into evidence.
Nutter suffered a black eye, and his “thumb was a little messed up.” Nutter
testified that, after he returned home from the incident, he vomited again, “but it
wasn’t too bad.” He felt confused and struggled to remember some details of the
incident. His head felt “inflated,” and he went to the doctor four days later because
he was lightheaded, experiencing persistent headaches, and not himself. His
memory of March 8, 2024, remains somewhat “foggy.” No party admitted Nutter’s
medical records.
Shortly after the events of March 8, 2024, Handte’s father became aware of at

14
Surgeons inserted an “Erich arch bar” and four screws. State’s Ex. 11 at 1.
15
Postoperative complications required partial removal of the arch bar and complete removal of
one of Handte’s wisdom teeth. Id. at 16–18.
16
At the time of trial, Handte stated that he had been able to eat regularly for approximately five
months but was still approximately ten pounds under his prior weight.
6
least three social media videos depicting those events. He forwarded those videos
to law enforcement investigators. The State introduced each of those videos into
evidence.
In the first video, introduced as State’s Exhibit 4 (hereinafter “Exhibit 4”),
Defendant, wearing a long-sleeved brown camouflage shirt, is depicted straddling
Nutter, who is prostrate in a black and yellow hooded sweatshirt. Blaring music has
been edited over the video, and there is a “TRILLER” logo in the lower-left corner
of the image. As Defendant sits astride Nutter, he repeatedly brings his right fist
down on Nutter’s head, which Nutter is attempting to cover with his arm. In the
brief eleven-second clip, a large fire is visible in the background, and a thick throng
of people, Moffett among them, surround the two men. It appears that some in the
crowd, including Moffett, may have been kicking Nutter in the ribs and stomach,17
but it is difficult to tell whether this is the case, or if they are merely shoving against
one another in an attempt to get close to (or break up) the fight. Neither the
beginning nor the end of the incident is depicted in the video clip.
In the second video, introduced as State’s Exhibit 5, Nutter and Moffet are
encircled by a large crowd and are engaged in a wild fistfight. As the two whirl
around the clearing, Moffet repeatedly strikes Nutter in the face before pulling him
into a headlock. Defendant then separates the two as a third young white man
repeatedly strikes Nutter in the back and head with two-handed blows. Defendant
intervenes, and the third man desists.
In the third video, introduced as State’s Exhibit 6, Nutter is not immediately
visible through the thick crowd, but Moffett is depicted punching and possibly
kicking someone on the ground before being restrained by bystanders. Someone in
the crowd then lifts a visibly dazed Nutter from the ground.

17
Handte testified that, when he recovered from his own assault, he witnessed Moffett, three to
five feet away, either punching or stomping on Nutter.
7
At trial, defense counsel objected to the admission of Exhibit 4 through
Nutter’s testimony, arguing that he was unable to properly authenticate it under
Delaware Rule of Evidence 901. During voir dire, Nutter testified that he recognized
himself, Defendant, and Moffett in the video. He stated that he recognized the
sweatshirt he was wearing that night and his distinctive long hair, and that he
remembered being hit in the head while on the ground, although he could not recall
many details. The Court overruled Defendant’s objection, and Exhibit 4 was thus
admitted through Nutter after the jury returned.
At trial, Defendant called private investigator Robert Workman, evidently for
the purpose of casting doubt on Exhibit 4. Workman testified that the “TRILLER”
watermark was an apparent reference to a smartphone application. Workman stated
that the application allows users to add music to videos and that it has artificial
intelligence features that can autonomously edit or “shuffle” videos. Stating the
obvious, Workman told the jury that edited videos do not include content that has
been cut out of them, such as prior and subsequent footage. Workman ultimately
opined, without objection, that “most” of the videos shown in the trial were “out of
sequence,” in that certain events might have been edited to appear in a different order
than they occurred.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Defendant’s Motion For Judgment Of Acquittal Must Be Denied
As To The Handte Conviction And Granted As To The Nutter
Conviction Given The Evidence Relevant To Each Charge.
1. Standard of Review
Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal is governed by Superior Court
Criminal Rule 29.18 Under that rule, “[t]he Court will grant a defendant’s motion

18
State v. Ford, 293 A.3d 372, 377 (Del. Super. Apr. 19, 2023), aff’d, 2025 WL 1257476 (Del.
May 1, 2025).
8
‘only when the state presented insufficient evidence to sustain a verdict of guilt.’”19
As the Court must be careful not to supplant the jury’s role as factfinder, 20 the
question on a motion for judgment of acquittal is “whether any rational trier of fact,
viewing the evidence and all the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the State, could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of all the elements of the crime.”21
2. The State Produced Sufficient Evidence Of Intent To Support
The Handte Conviction
The Court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal
on count one at the close of the state’s evidence. A rational juror could have found,
based on the evidence presented, that Defendant possessed the necessary mens rea
for assault in the first degree of Handte, the then-pending charge. Pursuant to that
charge, the jury would have been required to find that Defendant “intentionally
disfigure[d] another person seriously and permanently, or intentionally destroy[ed],
amputate[d] or disable[d] permanently a member or organ of another person’s
body.” 22 Defendant contends that “[t]he State failed to provide any evidence as to
Count 1 regarding Defendant’s intention to disfigure seriously and permanently or
to disable [Handte] permanently.”23 To the contrary, the State presented sufficient
evidence for the jury to infer that this was Defendant’s intent.

19
Id. (quoting Vouras v. State, 452 A.2d 1165, 1169 (Del. 1982)) (emphasis in original).
20
State v. Thomas, 2019 WL 669934, at *3 (Del. Super. Feb. 8, 2019) (quoting Washington v.
State, 4 A.3d 375, 378 (Del. 2010)).
21
McGuiness, 312 A.3d at 1187 (quoting Hopkins, 293 A.3d at 150).
22
11 Del. C. § 613(a)(2). The charge of which the jury ultimately convicted Defendant, the lesser-
included offense of assault in the second degree, permitted a guilty finding if Defendant acted
either intentionally or recklessly and caused Handte serious physical injury. However, as
Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s case, before any request
for a lesser-included instruction was made, the question before the Court at that time was whether
there was sufficient evidence to convict Defendant as charged in the indictment. The indictment
charged Defendant with acting intentionally.
23
Defendant’s Motion ¶ 2.a. Defendant’s motion used the phrasing “to disable Defendant
permanently.” The Court has corrected this obvious typographical error for clarity.
9
11 Del. C. § 306(c)(1) permits the jury to draw an inference 24 that “a person .
. . intend[s] the natural and probable consequences of the person’s act.” The
Delaware Supreme Court “has repeatedly upheld the application of § 306(c)(1) in
the context of intentional assaults.”25 Thus, if any reasonable juror could have found
that serious and permanent disfigurement or the permanent disability of Handte’s
jaw was the natural and probable consequence of striking Handte as Defendant did,
his motion must fail.
A reasonable juror could conclude that permanent disfigurement or disability
was the natural and probable consequence of striking Handte in the manner and with
the force that Defendant did. As this Court has observed, “[n]o doubt, ‘serious
physical injury’ has been the resultant harm from ‘fights,’ ‘altercations,’ and bodily
assaults with or without weapons.”26 Here, of course, serious physical injury was
not enough. Such injury gives rise to liability for assault in the second degree, the
lesser included offense of which Defendant was actually convicted. This distinction
is, however, somewhat deceptive, because “serious physical injury” includes
“physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious
and prolonged disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health or prolonged loss of
the function of any bodily organ.” 27 As charged in this case, therefore, a principal
distinction between the requisite injuries for assault in the first degree and assault in
the second degree is the duration of the injuries.

24
Although the statute uses the phrase “rebuttable presumption,” the Delaware Supreme Court has
recognized that “[t]he federal Constitution . . . would prohibit a statute which . . . shifts the burden
of persuasion to the defendant” and has interpreted the statute to avoid such a violation. Plass v.
State, 457 A.2d 362, 366 (Del. 1983).
25
Carlo v. State, 152 A.3d 123, 2016 WL 7011354 (Del. Nov. 30, 2016) (ORDER) (citing Harris
v. State, 965 A.2d 691, 693 (Del. 2009); Guinn v. State, 894 A.2d 406, 2006 WL 506433, at *2
(Del. Feb. 28, 2006) (ORDER)).
26
State v. Clark, 2018 WL 7197607, at *5 (Del. Super. Oct. 1, 2018) (collecting cases), aff’d on
other grounds, 224 A.3d 997 (Del. 2020).
27
11 Del. C. § 222(32) (emphasis supplied).
10
Here, a jury could conclude that Defendant intended to seriously and
permanently disfigure Handte or disable his jaw, rather than merely impair it for a
“prolonged” period of time. Defendant is over six feet tall and of heavy build.
Witnesses and Defendant’s driver’s license both put his weight at 300 pounds. It is
obvious from the serious physical injuries Handte suffered 28 that Defendant was
capable of striking with great force, and that he in fact did so. If the jury reasonably
concluded that Handte’s disfigurement and/or disability from his injuries was
permanent, rather than merely prolonged, it could infer that Defendant intended to
inflict such injuries.29 Even if Defendant merely intended to inflict some injury, but

28
Defendant does not now contend that the jury lacked an evidentiary basis to find that Handte
suffered serious physical injuries, and such argument would be frivolous given the evidence. See
Snow v. State, 542 A.2d 1215, 1988 WL 61577, at *1 (Del. June 2, 1988) (ORDER) (victim
suffered serious physical injury when he suffered a broken jaw, his jaw was wired shut for five
weeks as a result, and he had a “permanent and visible indention under his left eye”); Cronin v.
State, 454 A.2d 735, 736–37 (Del. 1982) (victim who was “unable to chew certain foods” for four
months due to tooth damage suffered serious physical injury). Indeed, defense counsel conceded
in her closing argument that Handte’s injuries met the statutory requirements for serious physical
injury.
29
The jury could have reasonably found that Handte suffered permanent serious disfigurement or
disability. The State presented evidence that Handte has a likely-permanent divot on his face,
which the jury could reasonably have concluded rose to the level of a serious permanent
disfigurement. The Supreme Court has held that a bite scar on an officer’s arm could reasonably
be interpreted as a “serious . . . disfigurement.” Bradley v. State, 193 A.3d 734, 739 (Del. 2018).
The divot in Handte’s face is smaller than the marks left by a bite. However, in the analogous
context of workers’ compensation claims for serious and permanent disfigurements, Delaware
courts recognize that scarring to the face is more serious than similarly-sized scars to other parts
of the body. Hodgson v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 2012 WL 1435006, at *2 (Del. Super. Apr. 25, 2012)
(citing Martinez v. Gen. Metalcraft, Inc., 919 A.2d 561, 2007 WL 521906, at *3 (Del. Feb. 21,
2007) (ORDER)). While Defendant’s permanent injury is not a scar, it is, like a scar, a
“disfigurement,” and the principles just cited are therefore applicable. Far more significant to this
case, however, is the evidence of permanent disability. As noted supra, Handte has metal hardware
permanently installed in his body and can no longer engage in his customary level of physical
activity because it causes him pain. Handte’s jaw has a tendency to “lock up” in the mornings if
not regularly stretched. His doctors tell him that his jaw will never return to normal. As the Court
noted in its bench ruling on Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, although these issues
do not amount to a total disability of Handte’s jaw, total disability is not a requirement of the
statute, and the jury was entitled to find that they collectively rose to the level of permanent
disability.
11
Handte in fact was permanently disfigured or disabled, such injuries could hardly be
considered so remote or accidental that Defendant should be absolved of
responsibility for them. 30
The Supreme Court has sustained findings of intentionality inferred from far
less direct harm than Handte suffered. In Bradley v. State, for example, the Court
held that a jury could infer that the natural and probable consequences of a
defendant’s biting of a law enforcement officer included the travails of prophylactic
HIV treatment, which “caused painful, physically debilitating side effects such as
nausea and diarrhea[.]” 31 Such side effects were, of course, several steps removed
from the assault itself. In this case, the relationship between cause and effect is
scarcely so attenuated. In light of Bradley, a jury could reasonably conclude that the
natural and probable consequence of striking Handte in the jaw with great force was
that his jaw would be broken, causing permanent serious disfigurement and
disability, and that Defendant therefore intended that consequence. 32
The circumstances surrounding the crime also supported a finding that
Defendant intended to permanently disable and/or seriously disfigure Handte.

30
See 11 Del. C. § 262 (“The element of intentional or knowing causation is not established if the
actual result is outside the intention or the contemplation of the defendant unless: . . . the actual
result involves the same kind of injury or harm as the probable result and is not too remote or
accidental in its occurrence to have a bearing on the actor’s liability or on the gravity of the
offense.”).
31
193 A.3d at 739–40 & n.27. The Court has also sustained such findings where the harm resulted
from the predictable reaction of third parties. See, e.g., Harris, 965 A.2d at 693 (“When Harris
ran out of the courthouse, the natural and probable consequence of his conduct was that law-
enforcement officers would chase him in an effort to return him to custody. But for Harris’s
conduct, Wheeler would not have chased after him, or broken his leg. Thus, Harris is criminally
responsible for causing that injury.” (citation omitted)).
32
The jury could also reasonably infer that Defendant, by striking at Handte’s head, sought to
maximize the damage he would inflict. Cf. Carter v. State, 933 A.2d 774, 779 (Del. 2007) (plastic
lacrosse stick, under the circumstances it was used, was not readily capable of causing death or
serious physical injury, because defendant “acted intentionally, but his intent was to strike [victim]
on the hand, not on the head or some other more vulnerable part of his body[.]” (emphasis in
original)).
12
“Delaware . . . allows a jury to infer intent to commit a crime from the surrounding
circumstances.”33 Indeed, Delaware courts draw no distinction between direct and
circumstantial evidence. 34 Shortly before he was struck by Defendant, Handte was
embroiled in an argument with a group of men with whom Defendant associated,
and with whom he was apparently friends.35 The catalyst for this argument was a
racial slur Moffett directed at Handte’s friend, Nutter. Defendant was later filmed
viciously beating Nutter. A juror could reasonably conclude that Defendant held
animus toward Handte and that he intended to inflict extreme physical punishment
on him for that reason.
As a subsidiary point, Defendant further objects to this Court’s bench
decision, in which it was observed that Handte’s assailant “would have had to use
such force that . . . they should have known that the natural consequences—or could
have known, and the jury could conclude . . . that they would have known that using
that force could disable permanently a member of that individual’s body[.]”
Defendant contends that the Court erred in conflating a “knowingly” mens rea with
“intentionally.”36 Undoubtedly, the latter is a higher state of mind than the former.37
Even if the Court erred in its bench decision rationale, however, it was harmless
error because, for the reasons stated previously, the jury had sufficient grounds to
infer Defendant’s intent.

33
Guinn, 2006 WL 506433, at *2 n.4.
34
Ford, 293 A.3d at 377 n.9 (citing Poon v. State, 880 A.2d 236, 238 (Del. 2005)).
35
In addition to being present for the argument, Defendant was located in the camping trailer when
Handte entered it. The property on which the bonfire was constructed, and the trailer located, was
owned by Moffett’s parents. Moffett’s mother testified that Defendant had known her son since
childhood. Further, Defendant was pictured at a prior party (presumably also on the Moffetts’
land) in a social media post advertising the March 8, 2024, bonfire. State’s Ex. 1.
36
Defendant’s Motion ¶¶ 5–7.
37
Phillips v. State, 154 A.3d 1146, 1160–61 (Del. 2017); Jewell, 2025 WL 957377, at *19 n.137
(“Proving that a defendant acted intentionally, of course, will also support a conviction for a crime
under which the required mental state is ‘knowingly.’” (citing 11 Del. C. § 253)).
13
Taken together, the jury had ample evidence from which it could conclude,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant intended to permanently disable Handte’s
jaw and/or seriously disfigure him. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for judgment
of acquittal was properly denied as to count one of the indictment.
3. The State Provided Insufficient Evidence Of Causation To
Support The Nutter Conviction
In order to return the Nutter Conviction, the jury was required to find that
Defendant caused serious physical injury to Nutter.38 Under the Delaware Criminal
Code, the State must show “a ‘but-for’ relationship between an action and a result
to establish causation.” 39 In the Code’s formal language, “[c]onduct is the cause of
a result when it is an antecedent but for which the result in question would not have
occurred.”40
Assuming that the physical injuries Nutter suffered on March 8, 2024, were
“serious,” the jury could not reasonably conclude that Defendant’s actions were the
“but-for” cause of those injuries. The difficulty in assigning causation arises from
the fact that Nutter was attacked multiple times on the night in question, by multiple
assailants—Defendant, Moffett, and an unidentified third man. The State has never
contended that Defendant is criminally liable (e.g., as an accomplice) for the acts of
either of the other two assailants, and the only signs of injury Nutter identified as
occurring prior to the other assaults—disorientation and vomiting—were not
independently serious enough to support the conviction. 41

38
11 Del. C. § 612(a)(1).
39
Bullock v. State, 775 A.2d 1043, 1049 (Del. 2001).
40
11 Del. C. § 261.
41
Delaware courts have recognized that certain de minimus injuries do not rise to the level of
“physical injury,” much less “serious physical injury.” Compare Harris, 965 A.2d at 694 (elbow
to head, leaving red mark but not causing pain, was not physical injury), with Mummitt v. State,
981 A.2d 1173, 2009 WL 3191709, at *3 (Del. Oct. 6, 2009) (ORDER) (beating with belt, causing
soreness, allowed jury to conclude victim suffered physical injury), and Div. of Fam. Servs. v. J.C.,
2012 WL 4861601, at *4–5 (Del. Fam. May 23, 2021) (bump on child’s head, which hurt “a little
14
Although a victim’s testimony is, standing alone, sufficient evidence of his
injuries to support a jury verdict,42 no evidence was presented from which the jury
could find that Nutter’s ultimate injuries were caused by Defendant’s actions as
opposed to those of the other assailants. Nutter testified that he suffered headaches
for the four days following the night in question, memory loss about the events, and
vomiting. Defendant repeatedly punched Nutter in the head; Moffett repeatedly
struck Nutter in the face, placed him into a headlock, and likely kicked him in the
torso; and a third man also repeatedly struck Nutter in the head. The State presented
no evidence that would have helped the jury disaggregate the effects of the various
assaults. Given the complexities of the human body (particularly the brain), the jury
could not draw a causal link between the blows struck by Nutter’s various assailants
and his physical symptoms without making an impermissible speculative leap.43 On
a Rule 29 motion, the Court is “not free to substitute [its] own judgment for the jury’s
assessment[]” of the weight of the evidence, 44 but it must nonetheless grant acquittal
if the evidence is insufficient in light of the State’s burden to prove guilt beyond a

bit” and may have prompted headache was not physical injury, even if causation were established).
Even if the jury could infer that Nutter’s vomiting and wooziness were prompted by a physical
injury Defendant caused, there was no evidence from which the jury could conclude that the injury
was sufficiently serious to support an assault second conviction. See, e.g., Carter, 933 A.2d at 778
(hand that remained swollen for one month after attack was not serious physical injury). As noted
supra, under the indictment, such injury would need to “create[] a substantial risk of death, or . . .
cause[] serious and prolonged disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health or prolonged loss of
the function of any bodily organ[.]” 11 Del. C. § 222(32).
42
Williamson v. State, 113 A.3d 155, 159 (Del. 2015) (quoting McKnight v. State, 753 A.2d 436,
438 (Del. 2000)).
43
Cf. Manerchia v. Kirkwood Fitness and Racquetball Clubs, Inc., 992 A.2d 1237, 2010 WL
1114927, at *3 (Del. Mar. 25, 2010) (holding that, because proof of causation “require[d] an
understanding and analysis of issues beyond the ken of the typical jury, [plaintiff] had to present
expert testimony to establish” it.) (citations omitted); Mazda Motor Corp. v. Lindahl, 706 A.2d
526, 533 & n.30 (Del. 1998) (granting directed verdict in products liability case because plaintiff
produced no expert testimony on which of decedent’s injuries would have been avoided had the
product not been defective, which left the jury to speculate).
44
Thomas, 2019 WL 669934, at *5 (citing Poon, 880 A.2d at 238; State v. Biter, 119 A.2d 894,
898 (Del. Super. 1955)).
15
reasonable doubt. A conviction founded on speculation cannot stand.
The Supreme Court’s 1987 decision in Oxendine v. State is instructive.45 In
Oxendine, the defendant was convicted of the manslaughter of his six-year-old child
but was acquitted on appeal because the evidence of causation was insufficient.46
Key to the Supreme Court’s holding was the lack of definitive medical expert
testimony.
Although the facts of Oxendine do not completely mirror those of this case,
there are significant parallels: on one morning, the defendant’s girlfriend pushed the
child into a bathtub, “causing microscopic tears in his intestines that led to
peritonitis.”47 The following morning, the defendant, by his own admission, beat
the child.48 The child’s abdomen swelled, and he died in the hospital that
afternoon.49 At trial, the State called two medical examiners, who both testified that
the child’s death was “caused by intra-abdominal hemorrhage and acute peritonitis,
occurring as a result of blunt force trauma to the front of the abdomen,” and
“identified two distinct injuries, one caused more than twenty-four hours before
death, and one inflicted less than twenty-four hours before death.” 50 One of the
experts “could not separate the effects of the two injuries,” while the other testified
that “the second hemorrhage[] ‘was an aggravating and probably some factors [sic]
contributing,’ but it was the earlier injury that was the plain underlying cause of
death.’” 51 To the question of whether the second injury accelerated the death, as
required to convict the defendant under the State’s theory, the latter expert stated
that he “[did] not know,” or in other words, could not attest, to a reasonable degree

45
528 A.2d 870 (Del. 1987).
46
See generally id.
47
Id. at 871.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 872.
16
of medical probability, that it did so.52 The Supreme Court therefore reversed the
defendant’s conviction, reasoning, in part, that “[a] finding of medical causation may
not be based on speculation or conjecture.” 53
In contrast to Oxendine, the jury in the instant case was presented with no
evidence concerning which actor’s blows caused Nutter’s injuries. They were
therefore left to speculate as to whether Defendant’s punches caused Nutter to suffer
headaches, memory loss, and vomiting, or whether some or all of those symptoms
were instead caused by Moffett’s and the third man’s actions. Neither a juror’s nor
an expert’s opinion that it is possible that a defendant caused an injury is sufficient
to sustain a conviction.54 The evidence in this case may suggest such a possibility,
but it will stretch no further. In short, the State failed to present sufficient evidence
that Defendant’s actions caused the injuries that Nutter ultimately suffered—or,
more precisely, a subset thereof sufficiently grave to sustain the charge against
Defendant. Therefore, Defendant’s renewed motion for judgment of acquittal must
be granted as to the Nutter Conviction, and the Court need not address Defendant’s
alternative argument that Nutter did not suffer the requisite serious physical injury.
B. Defendant Is Not Entitled To A New Trial Because Exhibit 4 Was
Properly Authenticated Before Admission And Defendant Does
Not Raise A Genuine Question As To Its Authenticity.
1. Standard of Review
“Under Rule 33 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, ‘[t]he
court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to that defendant if required in
the interest of justice.’” 55 Pursuant to Rule 33, “[a] new trial is warranted ‘only if
the error complained of resulted in actual prejudice, or so infringed upon the

52
Id.
53
Id. at 873 (citations omitted).
54
Id. (citation omitted).
55
Waters v. State, 242 A.3d 778, 783 (Del. 2020) (alteration in original).
17
defendant’s fundamental right to a fair trial as to raise a presumption of prejudice.’”56
Applying that standard to the instant case, a new trial is not warranted.
Defendant raises two principal arguments to justify his motion for a new trial.
Both relate to Exhibit 4, a video depicting defendant repeatedly punching a helpless
Nutter in the head. Defendant’s first contention is that Exhibit 4 was not properly
authenticated under Delaware Rule of Evidence 901 because Nutter, on the witness
stand, could not recall all details of the assault.57 Defendant’s second contention is
that the video itself is unreliable, because it “had a high chance of being altered as it
was uploaded into Triller . . . an artificial intelligence application . . . which allows .
. . videos to be altered”; because it bears some evidence of such alteration (added
music and text); and because “[t]he video was grainy . . . [and] did not clearly show
the face of any individual[.]”58
After thorough consideration, the Court finds that both of Defendant’s
contentions are without merit. Exhibit 4 was properly authenticated under Rule 901,
and Defendant’s argument that the video may have been altered, or may not depict
what it appears to, is best understood to raise a question of its evidentiary weight,
not its admissibility. “In general, the decision whether evidence has been
sufficiently authenticated in accordance with D.R.E 901(a) is a matter relegated to
the sound discretion of the trial judge.”59 The Court did not abuse that discretion,
much less in any manner that compromised the fairness of Defendant’s trial. Rule
33 does not, therefore, afford Defendant the relief he seeks.

56
Ford, 293 A.3d at 380 (citing Waters, 242 A.3d 778; State v. Milner, 2023 WL 19080 (Del.
Super. Jan. 3, 2023); State v. Ryle, 2015 WL 5004903, at *1 (Del. Super. Aug. 14, 2015)).
57
Defendant’s Motion ¶¶ 19–22.
58
Id. at ¶ 23. Defendant also asserts that the Court should grant a new trial given the weight of
the evidence presented, but makes no argument to support this position separate from those
addressed in Section II.A. of this opinion, supra. Therefore, the Court need not and will not
address this assertion.
59
Demby v. State, 695 A.2d 1127, 1133 (Del. 1997) (citations omitted).
18
2. The challenged video exhibit was appropriately authenticated
and admitted over objection
State’s Exhibit 4 was properly authenticated and admitted over Defendant’s
objection. As the Delaware Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, “[t]he
‘authentication requirement is fundamental,’ but ‘it imposes only a lenient burden
that is easily met.’”60 The party offering a piece of evidence “need not conclusively
prove the evidence’s authenticity, but merely provide a ‘rational basis’ from which
a reasonable finder of fact could draw that conclusion.” 61 “[T]here are no hard-and-
fast rules about how that may be done. The proponent can point to ‘witness
testimony, corroborative circumstances, distinctive characteristics,’ or other
evidence probative of authenticity.’”62 Of particular note, “[t]here is no requirement
under Delaware law . . . that the individual who recorded [a] video must testify in
order to authenticate the . . . recording.”63 The standard for authentication is not
heightened simply because the video was posted to, and retrieved from, social
media. 64
Here, the distinctive characteristics of Exhibit 4, appearing to show Defendant
and Nutter in the circumstances of the assault, combined with Nutter’s testimony
describing those circumstances and identifying both himself and Defendant in the
video, were sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that the video was what the
state purported it to be, i.e., a recording of Defendant physically attacking Nutter on

60
Bowers v. State, 307 A.3d 977, 2023 WL 6938238, at *2 (Del. Oct. 20, 2023) (ORDER) (quoting
Prince v. State, 284 A.3d 713, 2022 WL 4126669, at *3 (Del. Sept. 9, 2022) (ORDER)); see also
Pierce v. State, 270 A.3d 219, 231 (Del. 2022) (“The burden for authentication is relatively low.”
(citations omitted)).
61
Schaffer v. State, 184 A.3d 841, 2018 WL 1747793, at *5 (Del. Apr. 10, 2018) (ORDER) (citing
Cabrera v. State, 840 A.2d 1256, 1264–65 (Del. 2004)).
62
Id. (quoting Parker v. State, 85 A.3d 682, 687–88 (Del. 2014)).
63
State v. Lewis, 2021 WL 1118114, at *6 (Del. Super. Mar. 23, 2021) (citing State v. Hill, 2017
WL 1094369, at *2 (Del. Super. Mar. 22, 2017)).
64
Parker, 85 A.3d at 687 (“We conclude that social media evidence should be subject to the same
authentication requirements . . . as any other evidence.”).
19
March 8, 2024.
Thus, the State sufficiently authenticated Exhibit 4 to comply with D.R.E.
901. “To satisfy the authentication requirement, the State need only ‘establish a
rational basis from which the jury could conclude that the evidence is connected to
the defendant.’ The link between the defendant and the evidence ‘need not be
conclusive[.]’” 65 In State v. Hill, this Court denied the defendant’s motion in limine
seeking to bar admission of a video of an assault for reasons much like those
Defendant raised at trial.66 The state proffered that it would authenticate the video
through the testimony of two witnesses: the victim would “testify that the video
accurately depict[ed] the altercation by describing the clothes that she was wearing
. . . and the injuries she sustained,” and an officer would then “testify that [the victim]
appeared to be victim [sic] of a recent assault . . . [and would] describe the clothes
she was wearing the day of the incident, and the location of the alleged assault in
relation to the background of the video.” 67 The evidence of authenticity in this case
was strikingly similar to that in Hill. Here, Nutter identified himself and Defendant.
He did so, as in Hill, by confirming his clothing and features, and by attesting to his
own memory of being hit on the head while prostrate in the dirt. This, too, was
evident from the video.
Nutter’s testimony authenticating Exhibit 4 is supported by the distinctive
characteristics of the video. The Supreme Court has repeatedly approved the use of
evidence’s content and context for authentication. 68 The video clearly depicts a

65
White v. State, 258 A.3d 147, 154 (Del. 2021) (quoting Cabrera, 840 A.2d at 1265).
66
See generally 2017 WL 1094369.
67
Id. at *1.
68
See, e.g., Parker, 85 A.3d at 688 (“[T]he substance of the Facebook post referenced the
altercation that occurred between Parker and Brown. Although the post does not mention Brown
by name, it was created on the same day after the altercation and referenced a fight with another
woman.”); White, 258 A.3d at 155-56 (text messages on cellphone recovered from Defendant’s
bedroom, which included texts purportedly from his girlfriend using his name, were sufficiently
authenticated to be admissible); Harris v. State, 301 A.3d 1175, 1184, 2023 WL 4551720 (Del.
20
white man with Defendant’s build, clothing, and hair color assaulting Nutter in the
manner Nutter testified he was attacked. Even had Nutter never testified, the jury
could have easily compared Defendant’s appearance in the courtroom to that of the
assailant in the video. 69 In the background, a large fire, like that constructed for the
party at which Nutter was assaulted, is visible, as is a large crowd consistent with
the party. Further, the State was in possession of evidence that the video was posted
shortly after the events in question, and this temporal proximity in conjunction with
the contents of the video could certainly have allowed a reasonable juror to conclude
that it was connected with Defendant.70
3. Defendant has not raised a genuine question of Exhibit 4’s
authenticity
“[F]or a genuine question of authenticity to exist, a party would need to
present facts or testimony sufficient to bring the issue into contention.” 71 The mere
suggestion that a video may have been altered does not create such a genuine issue.72

2023) (“The authenticity of the [audio] recordings is further established through their content and
context. A male voice, using [defendant’s] SBI number was heard speaking with a woman
regarding efforts to convince a man to recant his identification of [defendant] . . . . The discussion
mentions a specific dollar amount being paid to the unnamed man [consistent with other
testimony]. Furthermore, these discussions heavily concerned the form of the affidavits and gave
background to the reason that three different affidavits in three different formats exist, a unique
circumstance. The evidence was sufficient to allow a juror to conclude that the recording was
authentic.”).
69
The identification of Defendant is further corroborated by his mother’s testimony that he
admitted to fighting Nutter on the night in question. Defendant’s mother’s testimony was
presented during the State’s case-in-chief.
70
See Bowers, 2023 WL 6938238, at *3 (video anonymously sent to officer three hours after
eyewitnesses promised to do so, which was consistent with his observations of the scene, was
sufficiently authenticated given its “content and context”). Although, when Exhibit 4 was
introduced, no witness had yet attested to the date and time the video was posted, Defendant was
not prejudiced by the video’s admission prior to that testimony—even if that testimony were a
prerequisite under the rules of evidence.
71
Hill, 2017 WL 1094369, at *2 (quoting Graves v. State, 2006 WL 496140, at *2 (Del. Super.
Feb. 2, 2006)).
72
State v. Stallings, 2018 WL 3655862, at *12 (Del. Super. July 31, 2018), aff’d, 212 A.3d 804,
2019 WL 2486754 (Del. June 13, 2019) (TABLE) (en banc); Barnes v. State, 858 A.2d 942, 944
(Del. 2004) (affirming trial judge’s decision to admit time-lapse video that had been edited to play
21
In State v. Stallings, the defendant argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to retain an expert to challenge the authenticity of a video depicting his
alleged crime. 73 In preparation for trial, defense counsel provided the video to an
expert, who indicated that the video had been mishandled, and that such mishandling
“resulted in manufactured frames, and could just as easily cause[] missing frames,”
though it could not be determined whether such mishandling was intentional or what
any missing frames may have contained. 74 The Superior Court concluded that
failure to pursue this line of inquiry could not form the basis of an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim because such “equivocal testimony” would not have
prevented the video from being authenticated or introduced. 75 An en banc Supreme
Court affirmed the Superior Court’s holding without issuing a written opinion.76
Defendant has done less to raise a genuine question of Exhibit 4’s authenticity
than could defense counsel in Stallings. Defendant’s sole witness on the video, and
specifically on the “Triller” application, provided evidence that was at best
equivocal. That witness, Mr. Workman, merely testified that the “TRILLER”
application had the ability to add music to and edit (i.e., splice or excerpt) video, and
that this latter capability included an artificial intelligence function to assist users.
He did not testify that the application employed generative artificial intelligence that
would allow it to, for example, remove Nutter’s actual assailant from the video and
replace him with a facsimile of Defendant. Indeed, he did not testify that the video
showed any signs of alteration that would be relevant to its authenticity, but merely
that it showed signs of editing (music and reordering of video clips). Defendant
raises the specter that advances in artificial intelligence may make falsification of

back in real time).
73
2018 WL 3655862, at *12.
74
Id. (alteration in original).
75
Id.
76
2019 WL 2486754.
22
inculpatory videos easier than in the past. However, Defendant presented no
evidence that this was the case here. Moreover, “the risk of forgery exists with any
evidence and the rules provide for the jury to ultimately resolve issues of fact.” 77 At
trial, Defendant raised the possibility that the video could have been altered in such
a way that it did not depict what actually occurred. The jury evidently rejected that
argument. The Court will not disturb that factual finding.
Defendant’s argument that “[t]he video was grainy . . . [and] did not clearly
show the face of any individual”78 also fails to create a genuine issue of authenticity.
Just as with the alleged manipulation of the video, the core of Defendant’s claim is
that there is reasonable doubt about what the video depicts. However, as noted
supra, “[t]he link between the defendant and the evidence ‘need not be conclusive’”
for the evidence to be admissible.79 To put a finer point on it, “[a]n inconclusive
link diminishes the weight of the evidence but does not render it inadmissible.”80
Assessing the evidence’s weight was the jury’s task.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal is
DENIED IN PART AND GRANTED IN PART. Pursuant to Superior Court
Criminal Rule 29(c), the verdict of guilty on count two of the indictment is hereby
set aside and a judgment of acquittal is hereby entered on that charge. Defendant’s
motion for a new trial is DENIED.

77
Parker, 85 A.3d at 685.
78
Id. at ¶ 23.
79
White, 258 A.3d at 155 (quoting Cabrera, 840 A.2d at 1265).
80
Id. (quoting Cabrera, 840 A.2d at 1265).
23
IT IS SO ORDERED.

NEP/tls
oc: Prothonotary
cc: Counsel of Record

24