State v. Lewis

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
v. ) I.D. No. 2402003067
)
MASHAWN LEWIS, )
)
Defendant. )

Submitted: May 22, 2025
Decided: May 29, 2025

Upon the State of Delaware’s Motion to Revoke Bail
GRANTED.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Stephen McCloskey, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, 820 North French Street, Wilmington, DE 19801, Attorney for the State
of Delaware.

John S. Edinger, Esquire, Assistant Public Defender, OFFICE OF DEFENSE
SERVICES, PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, 820 North French Street,
Wilmington, DE 19801, Attorney for Defendant Mashawn Lewis.

WHARTON, J.
1. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Mashawn Lewis (“Lewis”) was found guilty by a jury of a single

count of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”). The limited

issue before the Court is whether his bail should be revoked pursuant to 11 Del. C.

§ 2104(f)(1)(b).1 That section requires that bail be revoked for a defendant convicted

of a crime for which a minimum mandatory sentence must be imposed. 2 For Lewis,

his prior conviction of Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon - Firearm (“CCDW”)

would seemingly meet that requirement. 3 But, citing Erlinger v. United States,4

Lewis contends that prior conviction enhancement is a fact that must be proven to a

jury’s satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt. Here the parties stipulated to Lewis’

status as a prohibited person. But for the fact that the Supreme Court left standing a

single exception to the rule that any fact that enhances a defendant’s minimum

sentence must be submitted to a jury, Lewis would be correct. However, that

exception, found in Almendarez-Torres v. United States,5 allows the Court to find

the fact of a prior conviction. Based on Lewis’ Indictment, Plea Agreement, in

which he pled guilty to CCDW- Firearm , the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form,

1
Lewis has been, and remains, in default of bail, giving the issue a bit of an academic
flavor.
2
11 Del. C. § 2104(f)(1)(b).
3
See, 11 Del. C. §§ 1448(e)(1)(a) and (b)
4
602 U.S. 821 (2024).
5
523 U.S. 224 (1998).
2
and a certified copy of the Court’s Corrected Sentence Order, the Court finds that

Lewis has been convicted of that charge. Since that charge is a violent felony, he is

subject to a minimum mandatory sentence and his bail must be revoked pursuant to

11 Del. C. § 2104(f)(1)(b). The State’s Motion to Revoke Bail is GRANTED.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Lewis was indicted on three counts – PFBPP, Possession of Ammunition by

a Person Prohibited (“PABPP”) and Receiving a Stolen Firearm. At the pre-trial

conference on April 24, 2025, the Court was advised by the State that it would be

entering a nolle prosequi on the Receiving a Stolen Firearm charge. The Court was

advised that the parties anticipated entering into a stipulation regarding Lewis’ status

as a prohibited person. At trial, the parties did stipulate that Lewis was prohibited

by law from possessing a firearm and ammunition. At the end of the trial, the jury

found Lewis guilty of the PFBPP charge but not guilty of the PABPP charge. The

Court ordered a pre-sentence investigation.

After the verdicts were returned, the Court asked if there were any

applications. Neither party made any. Later, the State called chambers asking about

a bail revocation. The Court scheduled a teleconference for May 5th. At the

teleconference, the State asked that Lewis’ bail be revoked. Lewis opposed that

request. The Court ordered the parties to submit letter memoranda, the last of which

was filed on May 22nd.

III. THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

3
At the pre-trial conference, when the Court asked if there were any Erlinger

issues, the State, relying on Jackson v. State,6 said there were none. Apparently

realizing that Jackson has no relevance, the State sought a firmer foundation for its

bail revocation motion. In its opening memorandum, the State distinguishes

Erlinger from Lewis’ situation.7 Erlinger involved the application of the federal

Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). ACCA provides:

In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this
title and has tree previous convictions by any court
referred to in section 922(g)(1) of this title for a violent
felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on
occasions different from one another, such person shall be
fined under this title and imprisoned not less than 15 years,
and notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court
shall not suspend the sentence of, or grant a probationary
sentence to such person with respect to the conviction
under section 922(g).8

In Erlinger, the parties disputed whether Erlinger’s prior crimes had occurred “on

occasions different from one another.”9 Erlinger contended whether his prior crimes

occurred on distinct occasions or in a single criminal episode was a factual

determination to be made by a jury.10 The Supreme Court agreed, holding that

determination is a ‘“fact laden task”’ which must be undertaken by a jury.11

6
2025 WL 227682 (Del. Jan. 16, 2025).
7
State’s Op. Mem. at 2-3, D.I. 56.
8
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
9
State’s Op. Mem. at 2, D.I. 56.
10
Id.
11
Id. (quoting Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 834.)
4
Lewis’ case is different in the State’s view. The operative statute, 11 Del. C.

§ 1448(e)(1), Delaware’s analog to § 924(e)(1), requires only a single violent felony

conviction to enhance Lewis’ minimum mandatory sentence to at least three years

of Level V incarceration. 12 Almendarez-Torres permits a sentencing judge to find

the fact of a prior conviction. 13 Because Almendarez-Torres was not overruled by

Erlinger, and because § 1448(e)(1) does not require an “occasions” determination,

this Court may find Lewis was convicted of the violent felony of CCDW - Firearm

subjecting him to a minimum mandatory sentence. 14 Accordingly, his bail must be

revoked pursuant to § 2104(f)(1)(b). 15

In his memorandum, Lewis maintains that Erlinger requires that a jury make

the factual finding that Lewis had a prior conviction that triggered the enhanced

sentencing provision of § 1448(e)(1)(b).16 He acknowledges that a sentencing court

may make a determination of what crime, with what elements the defendant was

convicted of.17 But, he contends that is the limit of what a sentencing court can do.

Were the Court to go beyond finding the fact of conviction to finding that it occurred

within 10 years so as to impose a five year minimum mandatory sentence required

by § 1448(e)(1)b, such finding would contravene Erlinger.18

12
Id. at 3.
13
Id. at 4.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Def.’s Mem. at 3, D.I. 58.
17
Id. at 5.
18
Id. at 5-6.
5
The State replied on May 22, 2025 by letter dated May 21st.19 It points out

that for bail revocation purposes, the fact that Lewis had previously been convicted

of CCDW - Firearm, a violent felony, is sufficient to require enhanced punishment

of at least a three-year minimum mandatory sentence at Level V under §

1448(e)(1)a.20 Therefore bail must be revoked without regard to Lewis’ arguments

based on § 1448(e)(1)b which requires that the violent felony conviction be within

the previous 10 years. 21

IV. DISCUSSION

Typically, when a defendant is charged with PFBPP and/or PABPP and other

crimes, there is a severance. The other crimes are tried as the “A” case and the

PFBPP and/or PABPP charge is the “B” case. In this way, a defendant will not be

prejudiced in the “A” case by the jury’s knowledge that he had been convicted of

another crime that caused him to be prohibited from possessing a firearm or

ammunition. Frequently, after the jury returns a verdict in the “A” case, a defendant

elects to waive a jury trial and allow the trial judge to decide the “B” case. Here, in

effect, the “B” case became the “A” case when the State decided not to pursue the

Receiving a Stolen Firearm charge, leaving only the PFBPP and PABPP charges.

The parties stipulated before the jury that Lewis was prohibited by law from

possessing a firearm and ammunition. Whether the State needed to enter into the

19
State’s Reply, D.I. 59.
20
Id. at 3.
21
Id. at 3-4.
6
stipulation when there was no “B” case is not before the Court. 22 Regardless, the

State never proposed how the issue of the date of Lewis’ CCDW - Firearm

conviction was to be resolved.

The parties do not appear to be in disagreement about the law, at least insofar

as to whether the Court can determine the fact of Lewis’ prior conviction. That fact

can be found consistently with Erlinger and Erlinger’s determination to leave

Almendarez-Torres in place, at least for the time being. 23 Therefore, the Court finds

that Lewis was previously convicted of CCDW – Firearm based on Lewis’

Indictment in Case No. 2202001461, his Plea Agreement and Truth-in Sentencing

Guilty Plea Form, and the certified copy of his Corrected Sentence Order all in that

case.24 The Court also finds that CCDW – Firearm is a violent felony as a matter of

law pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4201(c)(1). Accordingly, the requirements of §

1448(e)(1) have been met because Lewis will be subject to a minimum mandatory

sentence. Lewis’ bail is revoked pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 2104(f)(1)(b).

That determination does not answer the question of how long that minimum

mandatory sentence must be. That question is not before the Court now. If the State

intends to seek sentencing under § 1448(e)(1)b because Lewis’ CCDW – Firearm

conviction occurred within 10 years of this conviction, it must notify the Court of

22
See, Monceaux v. State, 51 A.3d 474, 478-79 (Del. 2012).
23
Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 837-38.
24
State’s Reply at Exs. A, B, and C, respectively, D.I. 59.
7
that intention no later than 20 days after the date of this Memorandum Opinion and

Order.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the State’s Motion to Revoke Bail is

GRANTED. Defendant Mashawn Lewis’ bail is REVOKED immediately.

If the State intends to seek to have Defendnant Mashawn Lewis sentenced

pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 1448(e)(1)b it shall notify the Court of such intention no

later than 20 days after the date of this Memorandum Opinion and Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Ferris W. Wharton
Ferris W. Wharton, J.

8