State v. Saunders

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
v. )
) Crim I.D. No. 2109011647
LARRY SAUNDERS, )
)
Defendant. )

Date Submitted: March 19, 2025
Date Decided: June 19, 2025

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief – DENIED

On Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw as Counsel – GRANTED

Dominic Carrera, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Wilmington, Delaware, attorney for the State

Patrick Collins, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, counsel for Defendant

Larry Saunders, pro se

BRENNAN, J.
I. Factual and Procedural Background

Larry Saunders (“Saunders”) was Indicted on November 22, 2021, for various

drug, weapon and child endangering charges.1 Initially Saunders was represented

by appointed counsel who, early on, moved to withdraw citing multiple letters

Saunders wrote to the Court requesting permission to represent himself.2 The motion

was later withdrawn due to competency concerns.3 Competency was ultimately

determined not to be an issue and proceedings resumed.4 During the pendency of

the competency evaluation, original counsel (“Counsel”) retired, and new counsel

was assigned.

Once again, a Motion to Withdraw was filed, citing Saunders’ desire to

represent himself.5 This motion was heard on April 10, 2023, at which time the

Court engaged in a thorough colloquy with Saunders, determined he was making a

1
State v. Larry Saunders, Crim I.D. No. 2109011647, Docket Item (hereinafter
“D.I.”) 3.
2
D.I. 33, see also D.I. 9-24, 26-28, 30-31. In response to Saunders repetitive filings
to the Court, despite the issuance of counsel, prompted the Court on most occasions
to forward his pro se filings to counsel pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 47
and simply notate the docket. Some of Saunders’ filings, however, were not treated
in this manner. Saunders’ filings were so plentiful that they prompted a response
from Superior Court’s Staff Attorney advising him of the Court’s rules and
procedures for filings on multiple occasions. D.I. 25, 42, 48, 58.
3
D.I. 41.
4
Saunders was determined to be competent to stand trial after an evaluation by a
doctor at Delaware Psychiatric Center. D.I. 49. This evaluation was not contested.
D.I. 50.
5
D.I. 54.
knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel and permitted him to proceed

pro se. As such, the Motion to Withdraw was granted and then-counsel (hereinafter

“Standby Counsel”) was ordered to “stay on as standby counsel only.”6 Thereafter,

Saunders, acting pro se, filed a plethora of pretrial motions, including an attempt to

remove his criminal prosecution to the United States District Court.7 All of

Saunders’ pretrial motions were denied.8

Jury selection and trial was scheduled for May 15, 2023.9 In lieu of trial,

Saunders pled guilty to the charges of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited

(hereinafter “PFBPP”), Drug Dealing, and Possession of Ammunition by a Person

Prohibited (hereinafter “PABPP”). Before accepting his plea, the Court engaged in

a colloquy with Saunders and the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: … by entering a plea of guilt to these charges, you
are waiving your constitutional right to a trial.
[whereupon the Court read the enumerated rights to

6
D.I. 57, 80 (note: this Docket Item number is not in sequential order. On the
printout of the docket itself, this notation is in the place where D.I. 56 should be, but
reads “80” instead. There is no D.I. 56 on the record.)
7
D.I. 59 (Affidavit of Truth), 61 (Administrative and Judicial Notice By Special
Visitation With Affidavit In Support), 62 (Notice of Removal to the United Stated
District Court), 63 (Affidavit in Support of Notice of Default re: Affidavit
Challenging Jurisdiction); 65 (oral Motions to Suppress and to Dismiss Invoking
Speedy Trial were made at the Pre-Trial Conference). In Saunders’ multiple filings
throughout the pendency of his case, both while represented and unrepresented, he
made numerous jurisdictional challenges which track the filings of a Sovereign
Citizen.
8
D.I. 64, 65; 68.
9
D.I. 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70.
a trial on the Truth In Sentencing Guilty Plea Form.]
So do you understand [] those rights?

SAUNDERS: Yes.
…

THE COURT: Do you further understand that one I accept your
plea of guilt, it will be virtually impossible to get
out of it. The only thing that you would be able to
appeal is if I sentenced you illegally. So if I
sentenced you to more than 15 years on the first
charge, more than 8 years on the drug dealing, or
more than 8 years on the possession of ammunition
charge; do you understand that?

SAUNDERS: Yes.

THE COURT: … you have been charged by indictment in case
ending 1647 with Count 1 possession or control of
a firearm by a person prohibited in violation of Title
11, Section 1448 of the Delaware Code…[D]o you
understand that charge?

SAUNDERS: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: How do you plead to that charge?

SAUNDERS: Guilty.

THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty because you are, in fact,
guilty?

SAUNDERS: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: Now I am going to turn to Count 4 of the indictment
which charges you with drug dealing in violation of
Title 16, Section 4754, Subsection A of the
Delaware Code…[D]o you understand that charge?

SAUNDERS: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: How do you plead to that charge?

SAUNDERS: Guilty.

THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty because you are, in fact,
guilty?

SAUNDERS: Yes.

THE COURT: Now, you were also pleading guilty to Count 3 of
the indictment, possession of ammunition by a
person prohibited in violation of Title 11, Section
1448 of the Delaware code…[D]o you understand
that charge?

SAUNDERS: Yes.

THE COURT: How do you plead to that charge?

SAUNDERS: Guilty.

THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty because you are, in fact,
guilty?

SAUNDERS: Yes.
…

THE COURT: … Mr. Saunders, I do find that the plea that you’re
entering into is being made knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily…[Y]ou have been
nodding along and you seem to be pretty educated
on the questions as I am asking them. So even
everything about your demeanor today tells me that
you are understanding what you are doing and that
you are a willing participant in this.10

10
D.I. 78, Plea Trans. pp. 20-31.
Saunders was immediately sentenced in accordance with the terms reached in

the plea agreement,11 which included the joint sentencing recommendation from

both parties. Saunders’ sentence to fifteen (15) years at Level V, suspended after

twelve (12) years, six (6) months12 for two (2) years Level IV (DOC Discretion),

suspended after six (6) months for eighteen (18) months at supervision Level III for

PFBPP; eight (8) years at Level V suspended for eighteen (18) months concurrent

Level III probation for Drug Dealing; eight (8) years at Level V suspended for

eighteen (18) months concurrent Level III probation for Drug Dealing. Saunders

was eligible to have been sentenced as a habitual offender pursuant to 11 Del. C. §

4214, however the State did not seek sentencing pursuant to that statute per the terms

of the plea agreement.13

On July 28, 2023, Saunders moved to modify his sentence.14 The motion was

denied on August 3, 2023.15 An “Amended” Motion for Modification of Sentence

was filed on August 9, 2023.16 That motion was denied on August 23, 2023.17 Both

11
The only modification made at sentencing was that the LIV time was to be served
at DOC discretion as opposed to the designated Work Release on the plea
paperwork.
12
The first ten (10) years of the Level V time is minimum mandatory time pursuant
to 11 Del. C. § 1448.
13
D.I. 68.
14
D.I. 71.
15
D.I. 72
16
D.I. 73.
17
D.I. 74.
motions were denied given that Saunders’ voluntary acceptance of the plea

agreement requested the very sentence he was given.18

On September 18, 2023, Saunders moved for postconviction relief under

Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.19 The State responded in opposition on September

20, 2023.20 Saunders filed his reply on January 11, 2024.21 Affidavits from both

Standby Counsel (on April 17, 2024)22and now-retired original Counsel (on August

20, 2024)23 were filed in response to the ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

Upon consideration of the submissions of the parties, the Court considered Saunders’

Motion for Appointment of Counsel.24 Finding exceptional circumstances existed

to permit the appointment of counsel, the motion was granted and Postconviction

Counsel was thereafter appointed.25

A new briefing schedule was issued26 and in accordance with that schedule

Postconviction Counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw on January 13, 2025.27 Pursuant

to his duties under Rule 61(e)(7), postconviction counsel provided Saunders with a

18
D.I. 72, 74.
19
D.I. 75, 76.
20
D.I. 81.
21
D.I. 82.
22
D.I. 85.
23
D.I. 90.
24
D.I. 88.
25
D.I. 88, 93
26
D.I. 95.
27
D.I. 98.
copy of his Motion to Withdraw and informed him he had thirty (30) days to

respond.28 Postconviction counsel received Saunders’ response and forwarded it to

the Court and the State on February 10, 2025; Saunders separately filed his response

with the Court.29 The State filed its Response on March 19, 2025.30 Both Motions

are now ripe for decision.

II. Standard of Review

Before addressing the merits of a postconviction relief motion pursuant to

Rule 61, the Court must examine whether any of the Rule’s procedural bars apply.31

An applicable procedural bar precludes a reviewing court from addressing the merits

of a Rule 61 claim, to “protect the procedural integrity” of the Court Rules. 32 A

motion for postconviction relief can be procedurally barred as untimely, repetitive,

for failing to raise a claim in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction,

and for being formerly adjudicated.33

28
D.I. 97.
29
D.I. 100, 101.
30
D.I. 103. Recognizing that due to the filing of the Motion to Withdraw and the
mandated thirty (30) days provided to Saunders to respond, postconviction counsel
requested the State have an additional thirty (30) days to respond, as its deadline
otherwise would have been February 12, 2025. D.I. 100. This request was granted.
31
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
32
State v. Page, 2009 WL 1141738, at *13 (Del. Super. Apr. 28, 2009).
33
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1)-(4).
If timely and not otherwise barred, the Court will consider the motion’s merits.

To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant has the

burden to show that counsel’s representation at trial fell below “an objective standard

of reasonableness” and that there is a “reasonable probability” that, but for counsel’s

alleged errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.34 In the

context of a plea, a defendant must show that but for counsel’s deficiencies, he would

not have pled and insisted on proceeding with trial.35 A litigant who knowingly and

voluntarily waives his right to counsel at the proceedings below, cannot claim

ineffective assistance of counsel during the period of self-representation.36

III. Analysis

Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(1) precludes review of a motion for

postconviction relief filed more than one year after the judgment of conviction is

final.37 A defendant’s conviction is final thirty days after this Court imposes its

sentence, or if a direct appeal has been filed, when the Delaware Supreme Court

issues a mandate or order on that appeal.38 Saunders did not file a direct appeal of

his conviction and sentence, thus his conviction became final on June 15, 2023;

34
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
35
Jamison v. State, 2003 WL 21295908, at *2 (Del. June 3, 2003).
36
State v. Lewis, 2018 WL 2970762, *1-2 (Del. Super. Jun. 8, 2018).
37
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
38
Id. at (1)-(2).
thirty (30) days after his sentence was imposed.39 Therefore, this postconviction

motion, filed on September 18, 2023, is timely.40 As this is Saunders’ first

postconviction motion, it is likewise not barred as successive pursuant to Rule

61(i)(2).

Saunders raises two grounds for relief in his motion. His first ground for relief

challenges this Court’s jurisdiction. As part of his argument, Saunders alleges that

he:

made numerous challenges to the court’s jurisdiction, which should
have prompted thorough and meaningful review under Del. Super. Ct.
Crim. R. 61(a). The failure to examine these challenges not only
disregarded the Movant’s statutory rights but also his due process rights
under the U.S. Constitution, as well as the Delaware Constitution, Art.
I, §7.41

Saunders’ second ground for relief argues several challenges to the

effectiveness of both original Counsel and Standby Counsel. Within this second

claim, he claims an “autonomy interest violation” largely based on [Standby

Counsel’s] allegedly ineffective decision not to pursue a jurisdictional challenge. In

so arguing, he alleges “[t]he right [to autonomy] extends beyond the mere

appointment of counsel and encompasses the Movant’s ability to direct the course

of his defense…the refusal of counsel to file motions challenging jurisdiction

39
D.I. 68.
40
D.I. 75; Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m)(1).
41
D.I. 75 (emphasis in original).
constitutes ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S 688.”42

Saunders also repeatedly contends Standby Counsel failed to communicate with

him, which resulted in a “coerced” plea agreement, as well as other allegations of

ineffectiveness surrounding the pre-trial motions to withdraw as counsel that were

filed.43

The bars to relief set forth in Rule 61(i) are not applicable to a claim that the

court lacked jurisdiction, nor for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.44

Therefore, each of claim will be reviewed on the merits.

A. Ground One

Saunders first argues this Court lacked jurisdiction over his case and

prosecution was thus improper. This is not a novel argument for Saunders, nor

should he be surprised that this claim lacks merit. In denying an appeal of one of

Saunders’ previous convictions, the Supreme Court of Delaware ruled:

[t]he Department of Justice and the Attorney General of the State of
Delaware are vested with legal authority to pursue charges in criminal
proceedings occurring within the boundaries of the State. Moreover,
the Superior Court has personal and subject matter jurisdiction over all
adults indicted on felony charges in the State of Delaware.45

42
Id., D.I. 84.
43
D.I. 76. His motion is not always clear as to which counsel he refers when alleging
ineffectiveness.
44
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5); See also Cooke v. State, 2025 WL 16395, *23 (Del.
Jan. 2, 2025) (“…as a general matter, the procedural bar of Rule 61(i)(3) does not
apply to ineffective assistance of counsel claims.”).
45
Saunders v. State, 35 A.3d 419 (TABLE), 2011 WL 6740403 (Del. Dec. 21,
In its 2011 decision, the Supreme Court ruled “[t]here is no merit to Saunders’

contention that either the State or the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to convict

him.”46 Nonetheless, Saunders repeatedly challenged this Court’s jurisdiction

throughout the prosecution of this case, including his failed attempt to remove the

case to District Court.47 The law remains the same as it did in 2011. These claims

remain meritless.48 Further, given that Saunders pled guilty to crimes he committed

in the State of Delaware, he submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court.49

Saunders’ guilty plea also waived his right to challenge any alleged pre-trial

deficiencies.50 Saunders acknowledged this very fact in his colloquy, and even

though the Court specifically asked him if his words were truthful during the plea

colloquy, his statements are nevertheless presumed to be truthful.51 Therefore,

Saunders has waived any jurisdictional challenges and may not raise them now.

2011). Saunders similarly argued on appeal, unsuccessfully, that this Court lacked
jurisdiction over his 2011 conviction.
46
Id. at *1.
47
D.I. 62, 64.
48
Thomas v. May, 2021 WL 3140379, at *1 (Del. Super. July 26, 2021), citing
Matter of Petition of Stroman-Bey, 2016 WL 4491746, at *1 (Del. Aug. 25, 2016)
and Rodriguez v. State, 2014 WL 1513282, at *1 (Del. Apr. 16, 2014).
49
Smith v. State, 2004 WL 120530, at *1 (Del. Supr. Jan. 15, 2004).
50
Scarborough v. State, 119 A.3d 43 (TABLE), 2015 WL 4606519, at *3 (Del.
Supr. July 30, 2013).
51
Sommerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997); See also D.I. 68, Plea
Trans. p. 14-15
The same is true regarding Saunders’ claims regarding the failure to remove

this prosecution to federal court – they are meritless but also waived. Again, absent

clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, his statements at the plea colloquy

acknowledging his guilt and waiver of constitutional rights to trial, are binding on

him now.52 Thus, Saunders is bound by the implications of his guilty plea, including

submission to this Court’s jurisdiction as opposed to federal court.

B. Ground Two

Saunders’ second ground for relief raises several ineffective assistance of

counsel claims wrapped in one. Saunders claims that his “autonomy interest was

violated by ineffective assistance of counsel, forcing him into an unconscionable

plea agreement.”53 Saunders’ claims are intertwined and not clearly delineated,

therefore, they will be addressed in the most sensical way conceivable to the Court.

Failure to File Jurisdictional Challenges

Saunders’ claims that both his original Counsel and Standby Counsel were

ineffective for failing to file motions challenging this Court’s jurisdiction. Saunders

argues that counsel should have filed motions to pursue his challenges to the Court’s

jurisdiction to hear his case and their failure to do so – both original Counsel and

52
Somerville v. State, at 631-32.
53
D.I. 76.
Standby Counsel – fell below the standard of reasonableness under Strickland v.

Washington.

Saunders has not met his burden in showing trial counsel’s representations

were objective unreasonable, nor does he show a “reasonable probability” that, had

counsel challenged this Court’s jurisdiction, Saunders would not have entered the

plea agreement.54 “A reasonable probability means a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome....”55 “The likelihood of a different result must

be substantial[,] not just conceivable.”56 Saunders “must make concrete allegations

of actual prejudice and substantiate them[.]”57 The record simply does not support

his argument.

As previously discussed, while self-represented Saunders challenged the

Court’s jurisdiction and attempted to remove his case to District Court. 58 Those

attempts were unsuccessful.59 The record is devoid evidence showing how

challenging jurisdiction through counsel, rather than while self-represented, would

have been successful. Even if he could somehow make out such a showing,

Saunders fails to articulate how counseled motions would have changed the outcome

54
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Jamison 2003 WL 21295908, at *2.
55
Green v. State, 238 A.2d 160, 174 (Del. 2020).
56
Swan v. State, 248 A.3d 839, 859 (Del. 2021).
57
Dawson v. State, 673 A.3d 1186, 1196 (Del. 1996).
58
D.I. 62.
59
D.I. 65.
of Saunders’ decision to enter his guilty plea. A jurisdictional challenge is without

merit and would not have been successful, even had such a motion been filed by

either of Saunders’ counsel. Therefore, this claim fails.

Motion to Withdraw During the Pendency of the Prosecution

Saunders asserts both Counsel and Standby Counsel were ineffective for their

respective motions seeking withdrawal from representation.60 Specifically,

Saunders alleges:

the actions, or more accurately the inactions, of Movant’s public
defenders fall starkly short of the legal profession’s expected standard
of conduct…The persistent attempts to withdraw from Movant’s case
and the failure to meaningfully represent him represent a stark
departure from the legal standards set forth in Strickland and its
progeny.61

Standby Counsel’s Affidavit in response makes clear that:

Mr. Saunders sent a number of letters to the Court requesting to
represent himself. [Standby Counsel] spoke with Mr. Saunders on May
27, 2022 and confirmed that he wanted to move forward Pro Se.
[Standby Counsel] spoke with Mr. Saunders in-depth about his ability
to represent himself, what the case would require of him, that [Standby
Counsel] had a number of years of experience handling these cases, and
was willing to take his case all the way to trial if he wished. Mr.
Saunders was able to ask and answer questions appropriately and
expressed that he did not want [Standby Counsel’s] services. Mr.
Saunders advised that he was able to handle his own case and wanted
to do so.62

60
D.I. 28 and 90.
61
D.I. 76.
62
D.I. 85 (transposed directly from the original).
Original Counsel, likewise, denies this claim. Counsel provided

specifics as to when Saunders requested withdrawal and that he represent

himself. Further, Counsel detailed the inquiry made upon Saunders’

request.63 It was Saunders’ own desire to proceed pro se which drove the

initial Motion to Withdraw. The record supports that the motion was filed at

Saunders’ bequest. Saunders’ bare allegation alone falls short of the concrete

evidence required in postconviction motions.64 Saunders has not shown a

reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different had

counsel not withdrawn. And again, Saunders not only made a knowing and

voluntary waiver of his right to counsel, but made a knowing, intelligent and

voluntary guilty plea. Given that, he cannot show that had counsel not

withdrawn, he would not have pled guilty. This claim is therefore, without

merit and fails.

Failure to Consult

Finally, Saunders argues Standby Counsel was ineffective for failing to

consult and collaborate with him about his case. Saunders submits Standby

Counsel’s insufficient communication violates Delaware Rules of Professional

63
D.I. 90.
64
Purnell v. State, 106 A.2d 337, 342 (Del. 2014); See Zebroski v. State, 822 A.2d
1038, 1043 (Del. 2003) (explaining entirely conclusory allegations are legally
insufficient to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, and movant must assert and
substantiate concrete allegations of actual prejudice).
Conduct 1.4(a)(2) and 1.4(b), which he submits “obliges attorneys to consult with

their clients about the means to achieve their objectives.”65 While Saunders quoted

the Rules, he fails to acknowledge that attorneys do not owe duties to individuals

other than their clients. Standby Counsel was just that: an attorney who was

appointed to assist, and not represent, Saunders should he need a reference during

the proceedings. Saunders elected to proceed pro se, and therefore waived his right

to have counsel represent him.66

The fact that Standby Counsel was not his counsel, and that he was acting as

his counsel was specifically addressed at his pre-trial conference and again when he

accepted his plea. Saunders acknowledged and represented that he understood this

fact.67 Standby Counsel owed no duty to Saunders, therefore, the cited Rules do not

apply. As a result, he cannot sustain his burden to show that Counsel’s

representation fell below a standard of reasonableness, as Standby Counsel did not

represent him. This claim of ineffectiveness is without merit and thus fails. To the

extent Saunders is raising this claim for actions during the pendency of their

65
D.I. 76.
66
Briscoe v. State, 606 A.2d 103, 107 (Del. 1992); D.I. 90.
67
D.I. 66, 68. See also Plea Trans. P. 13: THE COURT: So you do have [Standby
Counsel] sitting here and who has been assisting you and she has been appointed as
standby counsel. But she is not your counsel as we have previously discussed. But
I’m going to ask you anyway, have you had the opportunity to discuss any aspects
of this plea with [Standby Counsel]? [SAUNDERS]: Yes
respective representation, he has put forth no evidence in support and has failed to

meet his burden.

Voluntariness of Plea

Saunders challenges the voluntariness of his plea, alleging he “was forced into

an unconscionable plea agreement due to his counsel’s actions and the court’s

disregard for his objections.”68 Saunders plea was entered into during a period of

self-representation. Saunders cannot make out a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel when he has represented himself.69 Per the State’s response, as well as the

representations made at the time of the plea, the record supports that it was Saunders

himself who approached the State for a plea on the day of trial.70

Once again, Saunders is bound by his own words to the Court when entering

his plea, which are “presumed to be truthful,” and create “a formidable barrier” now

to his arguments to the contrary.71 Saunders received all required protections during

his colloquy.72 He was specifically asked if anyone had threatened or forced him to

enter his plea, to which Saunders responded “[n]o.”73 He was then asked if anyone

“promised or guaranteed you to what your sentence will be?” He again replied

68
D.I. 76.
69
State v. Lewis, 2018 WL 2970762 at *1, 3.
70
D.I. 103.
71
Sommerville, 703 A.2d at 631-32 (quoting Blackledge v. Allison 431 U.S. 63, 74
(1977)).
72
See Superior Court Crim. R. 11.
73
D.I. 17.
“[n]o.”74 Saunders’ own words evidence the voluntariness of his guilty plea. The

record does not support his bare allegation that he was “forced into an

unconscionable plea agreement.” Saunders plea was voluntary and his second

ground for relief is denied as meritless.

As noted above, much of Saunders’ claims were intertwined and there was

insufficient delineation as to whether he complained of ineffectiveness while

represented or while he acted pro se, as with this coercion argument. To the extent

Saunders sets forth any other claims of ineffectiveness while he was acting pro se,

these claims fail as meritless, as it was his knowing and voluntary choice to waive

counsel.

Motion to Withdraw

Appointed Postconviction Counsel moved to withdraw pursuant to Superior

Court Criminal Rule 61(e)(7) after having carefully reviewing the entirety of the

record and determining that there are no claims of merit which can be raised. The

Court has considered Postconviction Counsel’s thorough submissions and agrees

with the assessment therein, which is consistent with the rulings of the Court.

Therefore, the pending Motion to Withdraw is GRANTED. The only obligations

that befall postconviction counsel now are pursuant to Rule 61(e)(7)(ii).

74
D.I. 78, p. 15-16.
IV. Conclusion

For the above stated reasons, finding no merit to the claims raised, Saunders’

Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED. Naturally, postconviction counsel’s

Motion to Withdraw is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

__________________________
Danielle J. Brennan, Judge

Original to Prothonotary