Puddicombe v. City of Milford

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

JAMES PUDDICOMBE, )
) C.A. No. K25C-02-021 RLG
Plaintiff, )
)
CITY OF MILFORD, F. TODD )
CULOTTA, MARK WHITFIELD, )
WILLIS SHAFER, and JAMESHA )
WILLIAMS, )
)
Defendants. )

Submitted: August 21, 2025
Decided: August 29, 2025

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Upon Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
GRANTED in part, DENIED in Part.

Pro Se Plaintiff.

Scott G. Wilcox, Esquire, Giordano & Gagne, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for
Defendants City of Milford, F. Todd Culotta, Mark Whitfield, Willis Shafer, and
Jamesha Williams.

GREEN-STREETT, J.
I. Introduction

A former city engineer for the city of Milford alleges the city, through several

of its employees, retaliated against him for refusing to perform work he deemed

unethical. The city and its employees filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing the plaintiff

lacked a legal basis to proceed with his claims. The plaintiff has sufficiently pled

allegations that, if true, would entitle him to recover against the defendants – with

some exception. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff James Puddicombe worked as a city engineer for Milford, Delaware

until February 2025.1 That employment did not end amicably. Consequently, Mr.

Puddicombe filed the instant Complaint asserting claims of Wrongful Discharge;

Tortious Interference with a Contract; Civil Conspiracy; Intentional Infliction of

Emotional Distress; Trespass to Personal Property; and Family Leave and Medical

Act (“FMLA”)2 retaliation.3 Mr. Puddicombe asserts his termination stemmed from

his refusal to perform work he determined had not been approved properly.4 His

1
Compl. at 1.
2
29 U.S.C. § 2601.
3
See id.
4
Id. at 3.

2
various claims allege that the city of Milford; the mayor of Milford, F. Todd Culotta;

the city manager of Milford, Mark Whitfield; the public works director of Milford,

Willis Shafer; and the human resources director for the city of Milford, Jamesha

Williams (the “Defendants”) worked in tandem to retaliate against him for his failure

to proceed with that work.5 Mr. Puddicombe filed the Complaint on February 20,

2025.6

Counsel for Defendants entered his appearance on March 18, 2025.7 On

March 19th, Mr. Puddicombe filed a Motion for Default Judgment against

Defendants for failing to respond to the Complaint.8 Defendants filed a Motion for

Extension of Time, citing defense counsel’s recent entry onto the litigation and his

efforts to ask Mr. Puddicombe for an extension.9 The Court granted that extension

over Mr. Puddicombe’s objection.10

On April 4, 2025, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss under Superior Court

Civil Rule 12(b)(6), stating “[a]ll claims must fail because Plaintiff was an at will-

5
Id.
6
D.I. 1 (Feb. 20, 2025).
7
D.I. 9 (Mar. 18, 2025).
8
D.I. 10 (Mar. 19, 2025).
9
D.I. 11 (Mar. 20, 2025).
10
D.I. 13 (Mar. 25, 2025) (Mr. Puddicombe’s objection to an extension of time); D.I. 14 (Mar. 26,
2025) (the Court’s Order granting the extension of time).

3
employee.”11 Mr. Puddicombe filed his Response on April 21.12 The Court held oral

argument for both the Motion for Default Judgment and the Motion to Dismiss on

May 23, 2025. At that time, the Court orally denied the Motion for Default

Judgment.

III. Standard of Review

Under Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint survives a motion to

dismiss if the “plaintiff may recover under any reasonably conceivable set of

circumstances susceptible of proof under the complaint.”13 All well-pled allegations

are accepted as true, and all reasonable inferences are viewed in a light most

favorable to the non-moving party.14 The “universe of facts considered in a motion

to dismiss are those [pled] within the confines of the complaint.”15

11
Mot. to Dismiss at 1, D.I. 17. (Apr. 4, 2025).
12
D.I. 19 (Apr. 21, 2025).

13
Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967, 968 (Del. 1978).
14
Id.

15
Doe 30’s Mother v. Bradley, 58 A.3d 429, 443 (Del. Super. 2012).

4
IV. Analysis

A. Mr. Puddicombe’s claim for Wrongful Discharge survives the
Motion to Dismiss as to his employer, but not as to the individual
defendants

Mr. Puddicombe’s first claim – stylized as “Wrongful Discharge in Violation

of Due Process” – alleges that Defendants terminated his employment “in retaliation

for engaging in protected activities.”16 Defendants contend that Mr. Puddicombe’s

status as an at-will employee bars any claim for wrongful discharge.17 Further,

Defendants argue Mr. Puddicombe waived any hearing he may have been entitled to

regarding his termination via email.18 In response, Mr. Puddicombe asserts that

Delaware courts permit wrongful discharge claims to proceed – even in the case of

an at-will employee – if the discharge violates public policy.19

Generally, an at-will employment agreement may be discharged “without

demonstrating to anyone else’s satisfaction that the reasons for doing so are valid,

reasonable[,] or appropriate.”20 Defendants’ supposition that an at-will employee

16
Compl. at 3.
17
Mot. to Dismiss at 2.
18
Id. at 3.
19
Resp. at 1-2.

20
Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Grp., Inc., 652 A.2d 578, 585 (Del. Ch. 1994).

5
“can be terminated for any reason, at any time, with or without cause,”21 however,

ignores several identified exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine recognized

by Delaware courts. One such exception triggers if the discharged employee can

“assert a public interest recognized by some legislative, administrative[,] or judicial

authority, and … [occupies] a position with responsibility for that particular

interest.”22

In the Complaint, Mr. Puddicombe alleges that his termination came as

retaliation for refusing to perform work that he felt violated “ethics and possibly

statutes in addition to financial rules within the City Charter, Article 6.”23 Accepting

that allegation as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Mr.

Puddicombe, his discharge conceivably falls within the public policy exception to

the at-will doctrine. Accordingly, this claim survives dismissal as to Mr.

Puddicombe’s employer – the city of Milford. As to the other Defendants, they were

not Mr. Puddicombe’s employer, and, thus, could not have discharged him –

wrongfully or otherwise. Mr. Puddicombe’s wrongful discharge claims against the

individuals named in the Complaint are dismissed.

21
Mot. to Dismiss at 2.

22
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 441 (Del. 1996) (quoting Shearin,
652 A.2d at 585).
23
Compl. at 3.

6
Concerning the due process argument advanced by Mr. Puddicombe,

Defendants argue the review process referenced in the City of Milford Code “does

not provide a clearly defined process.”24 Defendants also contend Mr. Puddicombe

waived any right to challenge his termination in an email he sent to Defendants.25

Mr. Puddicombe retorts that his email was taken out of context. As the email falls

outside the documents provided to the Court in the Complaint, it does not lie within

“the universe of facts” this Court considers in a motion to dismiss. At this juncture,

the Court declines to convert Defendants’ motion to one for summary judgment, and

will not consider any documentation outside the pleadings.

B. Mr. Puddicombe’s tortious interference claim is dismissed in part
as to his employer, but survives dismissal as to the individual
defendants

Mr. Puddicombe advances two separate claims of tortious interference – one

relating to his employment contract and one relating to a contract with a third party,

the American Public Works Association.26 In the first claim, Mr. Puddicombe argues

the Defendants made false allegations and misrepresented facts to undermine his

employment contract.27 In the second claim, Mr. Puddicombe asserts Defendants

24
Mot. to Dismiss at 2.
25
Id.
26
Compl. at 4-5.
27
Id. at 4.

7
rescinded permission for Mr. Puddicombe to attend “previously scheduled travel,

which was a requirement to complete contract with APWA [sic].”28

Defendants posit two separate reasons Mr. Puddicombe’s tortious interference

claims must be dismissed. First, Defendants cite WaveDivision Holdings, LLC v.

Highland Capital Management, L.P.29 for the premise that a tortious interference

claim can only be proper if “the Defendant’s sole motive was to interfere with the

contract.”30 Defendants contend Mr. Puddicombe does not argue that “Defendants’

sole motive was to interfere with the contract.”31 This argument misapprehends the

decisional law upon which it relies, and, accordingly, fails.

In Cousins v. Goodier,32 the Delaware Supreme Court considered the exact

contention that WaveDivision held any claim of tortious interference required “the

plaintiff to allege that the tortfeasor’s sole motive was to interfere with the plaintiff’s

contract.”33 The Cousins court expressly rejected that premise, explicitly

differentiating, “WaveDivision did not hold that a tortious interference claim

28
Id. at 5.
29
49 A.3d 1168 (Del. 2012).
30
Mot. to Dismiss at 4.
31
Id.
32
283 A.3d 1140 (Del. 2022).
33
Id. at 1165.

8
requires the plaintiff to allege that the tortfeasor’s sole motive was to interfere with

the plaintiff’s contract.”34 As the Delaware Supreme Court has already considered

Defendants’ argument – and rejected it as inapposite to the holding of WaveDivision

upon which Defendants rely – this Court must also reject Defendants’ argument.

Defendants’ second argument against tortious interference posits, “it is a

rudimentary notion that parties to a contract cannot be liable for both breaching that

contract and inducing the breach.”35 Defendants contend this notion bars Mr.

Puddicombe’s claim against all of the Defendants.36 As Mr. Puddicombe’s employer,

the city of Milford qualifies as a party to his employment contract. Therefore, the

city of Milford cannot be liable for both a breach of Mr. Puddicombe’s employment

contract and tortious interference with that contract. Mr. Puddicombe’s claim for

tortious interference by the city of Milford relating to his employment contract is

dismissed.

Mr. Culotta, Mr. Whitfield, Mr. Shafer, and Ms. Williams (collectively, the

“Individual Defendants”) were not Mr. Puddicombe’s employer, and thus

presumably were not parties to his employment contract. “Employees or directors

… cannot be held personally liable for inducing a breach of contract by their

34
Id. (emphasis added).
35
Mot. to Dismiss at 4.
36
Mot. to Dismiss at 4-5.

9
[employer] when they act within their role.”37 That immunity is not absolute, and

dissolves if the employee acts outside of her role.38 The Complaint alleges that the

Defendants acted outside of their role by lying about Mr. Puddicombe, and, at least

implicitly, threatening him to compel compliance with their requests. Taking those

allegations as true, the Complaint establishes a conceivable path for Mr. Puddicombe

to succeed on a tortious interference claim against the Individual Defendants relating

to his employment contract.

Mr. Puddicombe’s second tortious interference claim concerns his contract

with the American Public Works Association.39 Defendants have not suggested they

were a party to that contract. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss makes no argument

regarding this claim. The Complaint alleges that Defendants interfered with this

contract by cancelling previously approved travel in retaliation for Mr. Puddicombe

exercising his right to take FMLA leave.40 Taken as true, those allegations provide

a conceivable path to recovery under this claim. This claim survives dismissal as to

all Defendants.

37
Schatzman v. Mod. Controls, Inc., 2024 WL 4249939, at *12 (Del. Super. Sept. 20, 2024)
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Shearin, 652 A.2d at 590).
38
Id.
39
Compl. at 5.
40
Id.
10
C. Mr. Puddicombe’s claim for civil conspiracy survives dismissal

Mr. Puddicombe next asserts a claim for civil conspiracy, alleging Defendants

participated in a concerted effort to disparage him and cause his termination.41 “Civil

conspiracy is not an independent cause of action in Delaware – it must arise from

some underlying wrong.”42 Here, Mr. Puddicombe has sufficiently pled an

underlying wrong: at a minimum, his claim for Tortious Interference.

Defendants argue Mr. Puddicombe has failed to plead an underlying wrong,

as explained by their effort to have all of Mr. Puddicombe’s preceding claims

dismissed. For the reasons already stated, the Court disagrees with Defendants’

characterization of Mr. Puddicombe’s claims. Mr. Puddicombe alleges the

Defendants “spent time and effort orchestrating [his] dismissal.”43 At the motion to

dismiss stage, coupled with the other allegations contained in the Complaint

previously addressed, Mr. Puddicombe has established a conceivable claim for civil

conspiracy against all Defendants.

41
Id. at 6-7.

42
Ramunno v. Cawley, 705 A.2d 1029, 1039 (Del. 1998) (cleaned up).
43
Compl. at 6.

11
D. The Defendants failed to address Mr. Puddicombe’s remaining
claims in their Motion to Dismiss

Mr. Puddicombe’s final three claims are for Intentional Infliction of Emotional

Distress; Trespass to Personal Property; and FMLA Retaliation.44 Defendants make

no mention of the Trespass to Personal Property or FMLA Retaliation claims in their

Motion to Dismiss. As for the claim of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress,

Defendants mention it only in passing as part of a recitation of Mr. Puddicombe’s

claims.

During oral argument, Defendants conceded the Trespass to Personal Property

and FMLA Retaliation claims should proceed forward. For the first time, however,

Defendants raised a defense under 10 Del. C. § 4011 only as to the Intentional

Infliction of Emotional Distress claim.45 § 4011 immunizes government entities and

their employees from tort claims, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute.” §

4011(c) provides one such statutory exception for government employees, allowing

them to be held “personally liable for acts or omissions causing property damage …

in which the governmental entity is immune under this section, but only for those

44
Id. at 7-10.
45
During oral argument, counsel for Defendants cited 10 Del. C. § 4012 for the proposition that a
government body and its employees are immune from liability for any tort claim. § 4012
enumerates the exceptions to that proposition. Accordingly, the Court understands Defendants as
making an argument under § 4011, which provides a general immunity to “all governmental
entities and their employers” for all tort claims.

12
acts which were not within the scope of employment, or which were performed with

wanton negligence or willful and malicious intent.” Viewing the allegations

contained within the Complaint in a light most favorable to Mr. Puddicombe, it can

be inferred that the Individual Defendants may have performed acts with “willful

and malicious intent.” At this stage, that determination remains within the province

of the fact finder and survives a motion to dismiss.

Whether § 4011 should bar any claims against the City of Milford poses a

trickier question. As Defendants did not raise a defense under § 4011 until oral

argument, the Court instructed the parties to file supplemental briefing on three

issues: (1) the applicability of § 4011 to Mr. Puddicombe’s claims; (2) whether Mr.

Puddicombe brought any claims under federal statute or regulation; and (3) whether

any of Mr. Puddicombe’s claims that may have been brought under federal law were

thus exempt from the provisions of § 4011.46 Defendants’ letter addressing those

issues reiterated their position that § 4011 should bar Mr. Puddicombe’s claim for

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.47 Curiously, Defendants now contend

that Mr. Puddicombe did not raise any claims under federal statutes, irrespective of

Count VII of the Complaint which sets forth a claim under the FMLA. Defendants

46
D.I. 27 (July 30, 2025).
47
D.I. 29 at 1 (Aug. 21, 2025).

13
concede that any claims brought by Mr. Puddicombe asserted “under federal

statutory or regulatory authority” would not be prohibited by § 4011.48

Mr. Puddicombe’s supplemental filing sets forth several federal and state laws

that he posits permit his claims to proceed.49 After providing a list of statutes he

argues are applicable, Mr. Puddicombe restates each Count of the Complaint with

an annotation that the Fourteenth Amendment; FMLA; and the Delaware

Whistleblower Protection Act50 prevent the application of § 4011 from barring his

claims. Mr. Puddicombe did not assert a claim under the Delaware Whistleblower

Protection act in his Complaint.

At the Motion to Dismiss stage, Defendants bear the burden of showing

“under no reasonable interpretation of the facts alleged could the complaint state a

claim for which relief might be granted.”51 Defendants have taken the position that

“none of [Mr. Puddicombe’s] claims are based upon federal statutes or

regulations.”52 Not only did Mr. Puddicombe raise a claim under the FMLA – a

48
Id. at 3.
49
D.I. 30 at 1-3 (Aug. 21, 2025).
50
19 Del. C. § 1703.

51
Kelsall v. BayHealth, Inc., 2015 WL 9312477, at *1 (Del. Super. Dec. 18, 2015) (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting Thompson v. Medimmune, Inc., 2009 WL 1482237, at *4 (Del. Super.
May 19, 2009)).
52
D.I. 29 at 2-3.
14
federal statute – the other Counts of the Complaint are replete with references to the

FMLA.53 Defendants, when asked to consider whether Mr. Puddicombe’s claims

that are tied in any meaningful way to a federal statute would be immune from the

provisions of § 4011, conceded, “[i]f Plaintiff had asserted a claim under federal

statutory or regulatory authority, such claims would not be barred by the Tort Claims

Act, which governs only state law tort liability.”54 As Defendants have failed to

engage in any material way with Mr. Puddicombe’s claims related to federal law,

Defendants have not carried their burden to show a Motion to Dismiss should be

granted on the basis of § 4011’s provisions.55

V. Conclusion

Accepting Mr. Puddicombe’s well-pled allegations as true, he has

demonstrated a conceivable path to recovery on Counts III, IV, V, VI, and VII.

53
See e.g. Compl. at 4 (stating some of the events leading to Count II occurred “while Plaintiff
was on FMLA leave.”); id. at 5 (“Plaintiff responded to email informing Defendants … that the
request constituted both FMLA harassment and would be breaking an existing contract.”); id. at
5-6 (reiterating that “Defendants’ request was both breaking a contract and a violation of FMLA
law.”); id. at 8 (detailing alleged violations of the FMLA); id. at 11 (containing a subheading that
reads: “Count VII – FMLA Retaliation.”)
54
D.I. 29 at 3.
55
During oral argument, Defendants summarized their argument as, “So I think at the end of the
day what we heard today was a lot more than what’s in the complaint. If those were the elements
of what happened in this case, they should have been put in the Complaint. They weren’t, we’re
stuck with what what’s in the Complaint. When you look at the Complaint, it’s deficient on all
four of the claims or five of the claims that we’ve asserted today as a reason to dismiss them from
this matter. The Court can proceed forward with the two remaining claims, which were the
FMLA claim and the trespass claim.” Audio Recording of Oral Argument at 12:30:37 (May 23,
2025) (emphasis added) (accessed through For The Record – Delaware State Courts).
15
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to those counts. Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss Count I is DENIED as to the City of Milford and GRANTED as to the

Individual Defendants. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count II is DENIED as to

the Individual Defendants and GRANTED as to the City of Milford.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

16