State v. Hall

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
v. )
) I.D. No. 2111008640
DANIEL SHAWN HALL, )
)
Defendant. )

ORDER 1

Submitted: September 3, 2025
Decided: November 12, 2025

Upon Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
DENIED

Defendant Daniel Shawn Hall (“Defendant”) moves pursuant to Superior
Court Criminal Rule 32(d) to withdraw the guilty plea he entered on October 26,
2022. 2 Defendant asserts that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made; that
his former counsel, Anthony J. Capone, rendered ineffective assistance of counsel;
and that Defendant possesses a basis to claim legal innocence. The State opposes
the motion, arguing that the record establishes a valid plea and that withdrawal at
this late stage would substantially prejudice the prosecution.
After reviewing the parties’ submissions, the Court finds no “fair and just
reason” under Rule 32(d) to permit withdrawal. For the reasons that follow,
Defendant’s motion is DENIED.

1
Citations in the form of “D.I. ___” refer to docket items.
2
Rule 32(d) states, in relevant part, “[i]f a motion for withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere is made before imposition or suspension of sentence or disposition without entry of a
judgment of conviction, the court may permit withdrawal of the plea upon a showing by the
defendant of any fair and just reason.”
1
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Initial Charges and Representation
1. On November 17, 2021, Defendant was arrested following a search
executed by the Delaware State Police Child Predator Task Force and was later
indicted under Case No. 2111008640 on thirty counts spanning eight distinct
offenses, including Dealing in Child Pornography and Sexual Exploitation of a
Child. 3 Defendant was represented by Anthony J. Capone, Esquire through plea
negotiations and the entry of a plea.4
2. The case involved extensive forensic evidence, multiple digital devices,
and victim-related materials requiring special handling.
Plea Agreement and Colloquy
3. On October 26, 2022, Defendant appeared before the Court and entered
a plea of guilty to two counts of Dealing in Child Pornography, one count of Sexual
Exploitation of a Child, and one count of Dangerous Crime Against a Child.5 During
the colloquy, Defendant confirmed under oath that he had reviewed the Truth-in-
Sentencing Guilty Plea Form with Mr. Capone; that he understood the nature of the
charges, the maximum penalties, and the rights he was waiving; and that he was
satisfied with counsel’s advice.6 The Court found the plea knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary, and accepted it. 7
Post-Plea Developments and Breakdown with Counsel
4. Following entry of the plea, sentencing was deferred pending a
presentence investigation. Defendant subsequently expressed dissatisfaction with
Mr. Capone’s representation, and Mr. Capone requested leave to withdraw due to

3
State’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Withdraw Guilty Plea 7 (D.I. 52).
4
Capone Initial Aff. ¶ 2 (D.I. 45).
5
Plea Agreement and Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form (D.I. 10).
6
Tr. of Plea Colloquy at 6:3–8, 12:14–20 (D.I. 15).
7
Id. at 13:17–20.
2
conflict of interest on July 7, 2023, which the Court granted.8 Alicia Porter, Esq.,
replaced Mr. Capone as counsel for Defendant on July 14, 2023.9
5. On November 15, 2023, Ms. Porter moved to withdraw as Defendant’s
counsel, citing a “breakdown in communication.” 10 At a December 1, 2023 hearing
on Ms. Porter’s motion to withdraw as counsel, Ms. Porter indicated that she was
unable to draft Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea because she felt that
it was meritless.11 Due to concerns raised at the December 1, 2023 hearing regarding
Defendant’s competency, Ms. Porter’s motion was reserved, and the Court ordered
a psychiatric evaluation to determine Defendant’s competency. 12 The subsequent
psychiatric evaluation determined that Defendant was indeed competent, 13 and at a
control hearing held on February 29, 2024, Ms. Porter was allowed to withdraw as
counsel and was appointed as Defendant’s standby counsel.14
6. On May 30, 2024, approximately nineteen months after Defendant
entered his plea, Defendant filed the instant motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The
motion set forth alleged deficiencies in counsel’s performance, 15 purported

8
D.I. 18.
9
D.I. 19.
10
See D.I. 24–25.
11
Tr. Of Criminal Mot., Dec. 1, 2023, 10:5–11:7 (D.I. 35).
12
At the December 1, 2023, hearing, upon being asked whether, in her consultations with Mr.
Hall, Ms. Porter had any concerns regarding Defendant’s competency, Ms. Porter answered in
the affirmative. See id. at 13:12–14:9, 14:22–15:19. The Court noted that the concerns over
competency discussed in the December 1, 2023 hearing applied only to the “current time,” and
there did not appear to be competency concerns related to when Defendant entered his plea. Id. at
19:12–22.
13
D.I. 29.
14
D.I. 30, 31.
15
Defendant alleges that his former counsel, Mr. Capone, coerced Defendant into accepting the
plea, advised Defendant to plead guilty under threat of receiving a “fifty-year minimum”
sentence if Defendant proceeded to trial, discouraged Defendant from filing civil claims against
others involved in the investigation, failed to raise potential defenses (e.g., diminished capacity),
and never reviewed discovery materials with Defendant. Def.’s Mot. To Withdraw Guilty Plea ¶
24 (D.I. 39).
3
irregularities in the warrant process, 16 and a claim that the plea documents had been
altered. 17
Affidavit of Former Counsel
7. On July 8, 2024, Mr. Capone filed an affidavit in response to
Defendant’s motion. 18 In his sworn response, Mr. Capone attested that he fully
advised Defendant of the charges, penalties, and plea terms, and denied any coercion
or misrepresentation.19 Mr. Capone also explained that Dr. Laura Cooney-Koss
conducted a psychological evaluation of Defendant at Mr. Capone’s request. 20 The
evaluation was sought to assess Defendant’s mental health for purposes of potential
mitigation and was later disclosed to the State during plea negotiations. Dr. Cooney-
Koss found no competency-related concerns, noting that Defendant’s Autism
Spectrum Disorder diagnosis was “without accompanying intellectual and language
impairment,” and as such Mr. Capone felt Defendant was competent to make
decisions in his case. 21
State’s Response and Further Proceedings
8. The State filed its response on August 1, 2024, arguing that Defendant’s
plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered, as confirmed by
Defendant’s signed Truth-in-Sentencing form and sworn plea colloquy, both of
which showed that Defendant understood the charges, penalties, and rights he was
waiving.22 The State contended that Defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim failed

16
Defendant alleges that law enforcement lacked valid search or electronic investigative
warrants for his residence and devices, that officers misrepresented facts in their reports, and that
Defendant’s arrest followed an improper “civil arrest” related to an unpaid traffic fine. Id. at ¶
25.
17
Id. at ¶ 17.
18
D.I. 45.
19
See Capone Initial Aff. ¶¶ 7–9, 12, 15 (D.I. 45).
20
Capone Initial Aff. ¶¶ 12–13 (D.I. 45).
21
Second Capone Aff. ¶ 9 (D.I. 65).
22
See State’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Withdraw Guilty Plea 1, 9–10 (D.I. 52).
4
because it was contradicted by the record and by Mr. Capone’s affidavit, which
established that counsel had reviewed discovery with Defendant and accurately
explained the plea terms. 23 Additionally, the State argued that Defendant presented
no credible evidence of legal innocence, given the strength of the forensic and
testimonial evidence linking Defendant to the crimes. 24 Lastly, the State explained
that allowing withdrawal would substantially prejudice both the prosecution and the
victim by requiring re-subpoenaing of witnesses, renewed trial preparation, and
forcing the child victim to relive the abuse, thereby defeating the finality achieved
through the plea. 25
9. Defendant replied on December 2, 2024, reiterating his earlier
assertions and disputing Mr. Capone’s credibility.26 The Court later entered an order
finding that Defendant had waived attorney-client privilege by placing
communications with counsel at issue, and directing Mr. Capone to address those
allegations left unaddressed in his initial affidavit based upon that privilege. 27 Mr.
Capone filed a second affidavit on March 11, 2025, addressing the communications
with Defendant that had not previously been addressed as well as supplementing
information provided in the first affidavit. 28 Defendant then filed a reply to Mr.
Capone’s second affidavit on August 26, 2025, maintaining his prior allegations,
challenging the accuracy of Mr. Capone’s notes, and asserting that counsel’s
recollection of events was fabricated and inconsistent with the record. 29 In a court
filing on September 3, 2025, the State declined to submit any further response to

23
Id. at 10–14.
24
Id. at 14–15.
25
Id. at 16–17.
26
See Def.’s Reply to State’s Resp. to Mot. to Withdraw Guilty Plea 1–2, 4–8 (D.I. 58).
27
State v. Hall, 2025 WL 26117 (Del. Super. Jan. 3, 2025) (ORDER) (finding waiver of
attorney-client privilege by putting attorney-client communications at issue) (D.I. 63).
28
See Second Capone Aff. ¶¶ 5–25 (D.I. 65).
29
See Def.’s Reply to Second Capone Aff. 1–24 (D.I. 78).
5
Defendant’s reply.30
10. Having reviewed the written submissions, the Court concludes that the
record is sufficient to resolve the motion without an evidentiary hearing.
LEGAL STANDARD
11. Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 32(d), a defendant may withdraw
a guilty plea before sentencing “upon a showing by the defendant of any fair and just
reason.” The motion is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court.31 In applying
Rule 32(d), the Court considers five factors:
(1) Whether there was a procedural defect in taking the plea;
(2) Whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered the plea;
(3) Whether the defendant has a basis to assert legal innocence;
(4) Whether the defendant had adequate legal counsel; and
(5) Whether granting the motion would prejudice the State or unduly
inconvenience the Court.32
The defendant bears the burden of showing a “fair and just reason,” and that burden
“is substantial.”33 These factors are not balanced; satisfaction of any one factor may
justify relief. 34 We now assess each of these factors in turn.
DISCUSSION
No Procedural Defect in Taking the Plea
12. The record demonstrates full compliance with Superior Court Criminal
Rule 11.35 The plea colloquy confirms that Defendant was placed under oath, that

30
D.I. 79.
31
Reed v. State, 258 A.3d 807, 830 (Del. 2021); State v. Barksdale, 2015 WL 5676895, at *3
(Del. Super. Sept. 21, 2015).
32
Morrison v. State, 274 A.3d 1006 (TABLE), 2022 WL 790507, at *4 (Del. Mar. 16, 2022);
Scarborough v. State, 938 A.2d 644, 649 (Del. 2007).
33
Reed, 258 A.3d at 823.
34
Patterson v. State, 684 A.2d 1234, 1239 (Del. 1996); Barksdale, 2015 WL 5676895, at *4.
35
Rule 11, in relevant part, provides that before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the
court must address the defendant personally in open court to ensure the defendant understands
6
the Court reviewed the charges and potential penalties, and that Defendant affirmed
his understanding of the proceedings. 36 Defendant further affirmed that no threats
or promises beyond the plea agreement had induced his plea and that he was satisfied
with counsel’s advice.37 The colloquy and signed Truth-in-Sentencing form
demonstrate that Defendant understood that he was waiving his constitutional rights
and that his plea would be final once accepted. Accordingly, no procedural defect
occurred in the taking of the plea.
Defendant Knowingly and Voluntarily Entered the Plea
13. Defendant’s principal claim—that he did not understand the meaning
of certain charges or the Tier III registration requirements—is squarely contradicted
by the plea form and Mr. Capone’s sworn affidavits. The Truth-in-Sentencing form
enumerates each offense, specifies its sentencing range, and identifies the collateral
consequences, including Tier III registration obligations. Mr. Capone attested that
he reviewed these provisions with Defendant in detail.38
14. A defendant’s “representations during the plea colloquy are presumed
truthful” absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.39 Here, Defendant
offers only his own inconsistent recollections, unsupported by any objective
evidence. The Court finds the contemporaneous record more credible and concludes
that the plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
Defendant Has Not Established a Basis to Assert Legal Innocence
15. A mere denial of guilt does not constitute a fair and just reason for

the nature of the charge, the maximum possible penalty, and the constitutional rights being
waived, and must determine that the plea is voluntary and not the result of force, threats, or
promises apart from the plea agreement.
36
Tr. of Plea Colloquy at 5:1–23, 4:9–23 (D.I. 15).
37
Id. at 9:6–8, 12:14–20.
38
See id. at 4:9–23, 5:1–8; see also Capone Initial Aff. ¶¶ 7–9, 12, 15 (D.I. 45); Capone Second
Aff. ¶¶ 20–21 (D.I. 65).
39
Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997); Reed, 258 A.3d at 821.
7
withdrawal.40 Defendant’s allegations of irregularities regarding search warrants,
alleged document alteration, and multiplicity of counts raise legal, not factual,
questions. More importantly, these questions do not constitute evidence of
innocence. Defendant has not identified any new evidence exculpating him from
the charged conduct. By contrast, the record reflects overwhelming proof of guilt:
forensic examination of Defendant’s laptop and cellphone revealed ninety-four (94)
and two-hundred-forty-two (242) files of child-sexual-abuse material, respectively,
including videos personally produced by Defendant involving a minor victim.41
Defendant’s sworn admission of guilt at the plea colloquy further forecloses any
credible claim of innocence. This factor therefore weighs strongly against
withdrawal.
Defendant Received Adequate Legal Counsel
16. To the extent Defendant frames his claim as one of ineffective
assistance, Reed instructs that the Strickland v. Washington standard governs:
Defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness and that, but for the deficiency, he would have insisted on
proceeding to trial.42 In other words, Defendant must show a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s errors, he would have insisted on going to trial.43
17. Here, Defendant fails to make that showing. Mr. Capone’s affidavits
detail repeated meetings, review of discovery, and explanation of plea terms, and the
Court credits those sworn statements. The Court finds the claim that counsel
“forged” Defendant’s signature unsupported and unpersuasive, and finds Mr.

40
Russell v. State, 734 A.2d 160 (TABLE), 1999 WL 507303, at *2 (Del. June 2, 1999).
41
State’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Withdraw Guilty Plea 6 (D.I. 52).
42
Reed, 258 A.3d at 824–25; accord State v. Schofield, 2011 WL 882838, at *5 (Del. Super.
March 14, 2011).
43
Reed, 258 A.3d at 824; Schofield, 2011 WL 882838, at *5.
8
Capone’s account of this allegation more credible. 44 Moreover, advising a client to
accept a favorable plea in the face of strong evidence and significant sentencing
exposure is not deficient performance. As such, Defendant’s allegations do not meet
Strickland’s high threshold.
Prejudice to the State and Inconvenience to the Court
18. More than three years have elapsed since Defendant’s plea. The record
indicates that key witnesses, including digital-forensic analysts and investigators,
would have to be re-subpoenaed and that the minor victim has been assured of
closure.45 Reassembling the case for trial at this juncture would impose substantial
prejudice upon the State and undue burden on the Court. The cumulative effect of
delay, lost evidence, and logistical difficulties weighs heavily against withdrawal.46
In any event, the State need not demonstrate prejudice where the defendant has failed
to establish any of the other factors supporting withdrawal under Rule 32(d). 47
CONCLUSION
19. After full consideration of the record and governing law, the Court
concludes that there was no procedural defect in the taking of Defendant’s plea. The
record demonstrates that Defendant entered his plea knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily, and with a full understanding of its consequences. Defendant has failed
to advance any credible basis upon which to assert legal innocence, and the Court
finds that he was represented by competent counsel who provided adequate legal
assistance throughout the proceedings. Moreover, permitting withdrawal of the plea
at this stage would cause substantial prejudice to the State and impose undue burden

44
See Capone Initial Aff. ¶ 7 (D.I. 45).
45
State’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Withdraw Guilty Plea 16 (D.I. 52).
46
See Barksdale, 2015 WL 5676895, at *6–7.
47
Id. at *6 (citing United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v.
Cannistraro, 734 F. Supp. 1110, 1123 (D.N.J. 1990)).
9
upon the Court.
20. For these reasons, the Court finds that Defendant has not established
any fair and just reason under Superior Court Rule 32(d) to warrant withdrawal of
his guilty plea. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea is
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

NEP/tls
Via Email and State Mail
oc: Prothonotary
cc: Kristina G. Bensley, Esquire, DAG
Daniel S. Hall, Defendant Pro Se
Anthony J.W. Capone, Esquire
Alicia A. Porter, Esquire

10