Vincent v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

JOSEPH C. VINCENT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. ) C.A. No.: K24C-01-025 NEP
)
STATE FARM MUTUAL )
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE )
COMPANY, )
)
Defendant. )

Submitted: November 19, 2025
Decided: November 25, 2025

ORDER 1
0F

Upon Defendant’s Motion to File Out of Time and Motion for Reconsideration

DENIED

Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“Defendant”)
has filed a “Motion to File Out of Time and Motion for Reconsideration.” For the
following reasons, Defendant’s motions are DENIED.
1. On March 27, 2025, Plaintiff Joseph C. Vincent (“Plaintiff”) filed a
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of whether he is entitled to
personal-injury-protection coverage. 2 1F

2. On April 9, 2025, Defendant filed its response to Plaintiff’s motion and,
in the same filing, moved for partial summary judgment in its favor on the same

1
Citations in the form of “D.I. ___” refer to docket items.
2
Pl.’s Mot. Partial Summ. J. (D.I. 16).
issue, arguing that Plaintiff’s allegedly intentional act in making contact with the
subject vehicle precluded coverage. 3 2F

3. In a bench decision issued on July 18, 2025, the Court denied both
parties’ motions, concluding that a factual dispute remained regarding the nature of
Plaintiff’s contact with Ms. Auerbach’s vehicle. 4 3F

4. On November 19, 2025—more than four months after the Court’s
order—Defendant filed the instant motions, asking the Court to (a) permit Defendant
to file a Rule 59(e) motion out of time and (b) reconsider its prior denial of partial
summary judgment. 5 4F Defendant represents that Plaintiff does not oppose
Defendant’s request that the Court reconsider its previous decision and argues that
no material factual dispute exists because the parties agree that Plaintiff’s leg
contacted Ms. Auerbach’s vehicle, leaving only a legal question regarding whether
Plaintiff was an “occupant” under 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(2)(c). 6 5F

5. “Delaware law places a heavy burden on a party seeking relief pursuant
to Rule 59.” 7 The disposition of motions under Rule 59(e) is within the discretion
6F

of the Court. 8 7F

6. To obtain relief under Superior Court Civil Rule 59(e), the movant must
“demonstrate newly discovered evidence, a change in the law, or manifest
injustice.” 9 Motions for reargument should not be used to rehash arguments already
8F

3
Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. Partial Summ. J. (D.I. 18).
4
See D.I. 27, 28.
5
Def.’s Mot. for Reconsideration, at ¶¶ 4–14 (D.I. 52).
6
Id. at ¶¶ 4, 5, 8.
7
Newborn v. Christiana Psych. Serv., P.A., 2017 WL 394096, at *2 (Del. Super. Jan. 25, 2017)
(internal quotation omitted).
8
Indep. Mall, Inc. v. Wahl, 2013 WL 871309, at *1 (Del. Super. Jan. 17, 2013).
9
Brenner v. Vill. Green, Inc., 2000 WL 972649, at *1 (Del. Super. May 23, 2000), aff’d, 763
A.2d 90 (Del. 2000) (citing E.I. duPont de Nemours Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 711 A.2d 45, 55
(Del. Super. 1995)).
2
decided by the Court, or to present new arguments that were not previously raised. 10 9F

Using a motion for reargument for either of these improper purposes “frustrate[s]
the efficient use of judicial resources, place[s] the opposing party in an unfair
position, and stymie[s] ‘the orderly process for reaching closure on the issues.’” 11 10F

In order for such a motion to be granted, the movant must show that “the Court has
overlooked a controlling precedent or legal principles, or the Court has
misapprehended the law or facts such as would have changed the outcome of the
underlying decision.” 1211F

7. Pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rules 59(e) and 6(a), a motion for
reargument must be served “within 5 days after the filing of the Court’s opinion or
decision.” Because the Court issued its order denying the parties’ motions for partial
summary judgment on July 18, 2025, any motion for reargument was required to be
filed no later than July 25, 2025. The instant motion was filed on November 19,
2025, and is therefore untimely.
8. Moreover, the Court is barred by a separate provision—Civil Rule
6(b)—from extending the time for filing a Rule 59(e) motion. Pursuant to Rule 6(b),
the Court “may not extend the time for taking an action under Rule[ ] . . . 59 . . . (e)
. . . except to the extent and under the conditions stated [therein].” 13 Rule 59(e)
2F

makes no provision for extension of the applicable deadline.
9. Even if the Court could entertain Defendant’s untimely motion, it
would fail on the merits. Defendant does not identify any newly discovered
evidence, intervening change in controlling law, or manifest injustice that would

10
Tilghman v. Del. State Univ., 2012 WL 5551233, at *1 (Del. Super. Oct. 16, 2012).
11
Id. (citing Plummer v. Sherman, 2004 WL 63414, at *2 (Del. Super. Jan. 14, 2004)).
12
Kennedy v. Invacare, Inc., 2006 WL 488590, at *1 (Del. Super. Jan. 31, 2006) (quoting Bd. Of
Managers of the Del. Crim. Just. Info. Sys. v. Gannett Co., 2003 WL 1579170, at *1 (Del. Super.
Jan. 17, 2003)).
13
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 6(b).
3
warrant reconsideration of the Court’s July 18 order. Instead, Defendant simply
argues that “[a]ll that remains is a question of law” as to whether Plaintiff’s contact
with Ms. Auerbach’s vehicle rendered him an “occupant.” 14 1 F

10. The Court’s July 18 order did not turn on a question of law. Rather, the
Court denied summary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact remained
as to the character of the contact between Plaintiff and Ms. Auerbach’s vehicle—
i.e., whether the contact between Plaintiff’s leg and the vehicle was intentional on
Plaintiff’s part or merely reflexive. That factual dispute bears directly on an issue
that must be resolved in determining whether Plaintiff is entitled to PIP benefits—
i.e., “whether there was an act of independent significance that broke the causal link
between the use of the vehicle and the injuries inflicted.” 15 14F

11. Defendant’s reliance on the fact that the parties filed cross-motions for
partial summary judgment is misplaced. Although cross-motions may permit the
Court to treat an issue as submitted for decision on the record where “neither party
argues the existence of a genuine issue of material fact,” 16 they do not eliminate
15F

factual disputes where, as here, the record supports, and the parties have maintained,
competing inferences regarding a crucial question of fact. The parties’ arguments
on July 18 reflect fundamental disagreement over the pivotal factual issue in this
case noted supra. Defendant offers no new evidence resolving that dispute and
points to no controlling authority that the Court overlooked in concluding that the
nature of the vehicle’s movement and Plaintiff’s contact with the vehicle are
questions for the jury, not issues to be decided on summary judgment. Furthermore,

14
Def.’s Mot. for Reconsideration, at ¶ 8 (D.I. 52).
15
Buckley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 139 A.3d 845, 851 (Del. Super. 2015), aff’d, 140
A.3d 431 (Del. 2016) (quoting Friel v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 2014 WL 1813293, at *2 (Del.
Super. May 6, 2014)).
16
See Sycamore Partners Management, L.P. v. Endurance American Insurance Co., 2021 WL
4130631, at *9 (Del. Super. Sept. 10, 2021) (Citing Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(h)).
4
as the Court noted in its July 18 decision, intent is normally a question for the jury
at trial, not for the Court on summary judgment. 17 16F

12. Defendant contends that submitting this case to the jury “will likely
result in injustice to both parties” because of the expense of litigation and “the
complexity of the legal question” and that the parties have been “unable to reach a
settlement agreement” because the “occupant” issue remains unresolved. 18 As the 17F

Court explained in its July 18 bench decision, the crucial issue before the Court—
which is distinct from the “occupancy” issue 19—is whether there was an act of
8F

independent significance breaking the causal link between the use of the vehicle and
the injuries inflicted, and determination of that issue must await resolution of the
factual dispute noted supra. The Court fails to see why submission of this issue to
the jury poses an “injustice” to the parties: juries are frequently called upon to
resolve disputed factual issues that bear upon legal questions, and Defendant has
therefore demonstrated no “manifest injustice” that would result from submission of
this factual dispute to the jury. In addition, the Court is unaware of any legal rule
that would preclude submission of a genuine issue of material fact to a jury because
the parties are unable to reach a settlement absent the jury’s determination of that
issue.
13. As previously stated, not only has Defendant failed to demonstrate
newly discovered evidence, an intervening change in the law, or manifest injustice,
but it has failed to show that the Court overlooked or misapprehended any fact or
legal principle that would have altered its July 18 decision. Defendant therefore has
not met its “heavy burden” under Rule 59(e). 20 19F

17
Images Hair Sols. Med. Ctr. v. Fox Stations, Inc., 2016 WL 425158, at *5 (Del. Super. Jan. 29,
2016).
18
Def.’s Mot. for Reconsideration, at ¶ 12.
19
Buckley, 139 A.3d at 848 (citing Friel, 2014 WL 1813293, at *5).
20
See Newborn, 2017 WL 394096, at *2.
5
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motions are hereby
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

NEP/tls
oc: Prothonotary
cc: Counsel of Record

6