Sandonato v. Horsey

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

JENIFER SANDONATO, )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. ) C.A. No.: K25C-05-023 NEP
)
TRUDENA HORSEY and )
KENT COUNTY LEVY COURT )
)
Defendants. )

Submitted: October 1, 2025
Decided: December 15, 2025

ORDER 1 0F

Upon Plaintiff’s Motions to Disqualify Counsel

DENIED

Plaintiff has filed three separate motions seeking to disqualify Defendants’
counsel, Scott Wilcox, Esq. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motions to
Disqualify Counsel are DENIED.
1. On June 2, June 3, and June 27, 2025, Plaintiff Jenifer Sandonato
(“Plaintiff”) filed motions seeking to disqualify counsel for Trudena Horsey and the
Kent County Levy Court (“Defendants”), Scott Wilcox, Esquire. 2 The Court treats
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these motions collectively as a single, consolidated request.
2. Plaintiff asserts, among other theories, that Mr. Wilcox is conflicted
due to his prior and current representation of Defendants, his involvement in another

1
Citations in the form of “D.I. ___” refer to docket items.
2
D.I. 20, 31, 46.
case involving the Kent County Levy Court, 3 and because Plaintiff has sued him
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separately in another civil proceeding.
3. Plaintiff invokes Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7
and 1.9 in an effort to show that such circumstances amount to a concurrent or
former-client conflict of interest and invokes Rule 3.7 to assert that Mr. Wilcox is a
“necessary witness.” 4 3F

4. “Although a court has ‘the inherent power to supervise the professional
conduct of attorneys appearing before it . . . disqualification motions are generally
disfavored.’” 5 To prevail on a motion to disqualify counsel, the movant must prove,
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by clear and convincing evidence, (1) the existence of a conflict; and (2) that the
conflict will prejudice the proceedings. 6 The Supreme Court retains exclusive
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authority over attorney discipline, 7 and absent conduct that prejudicially disrupts the
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proceeding, trial judges have no independent jurisdiction to enforce the Rules of
Professional Conduct. 8 A non-client litigant only has standing to enforce the rules
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3
Specifically, Plaintiff asserts in her June 3 motion that Mr. Wilcox’s representation of
Defendants in separate federal litigation pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Delaware contributes to the alleged conflict. See D.I. 31.
4
See D.I. 20, 31, 46. Rule 1.7 prohibits representation where a lawyer’s responsibilities to
another client are “directly adverse to another client” or where representation would be
“materially limited” by responsibilities to another person, subject to waiver by the client through
informed consent. Del. Lawyers’ Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.7. Rule 1.9 restricts representation
of a new client in a substantially related matter where the interests are materially adverse to those
of a former client. Del. Lawyers’ Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.9. Rule 3.7 limits an attorney
from serving as advocate at a trial where the attorney is “likely to be a necessary witness,” but
expressly permits such dual roles when testimony concerns uncontested matters, relates to the
nature and value of legal services rendered, or disqualification of the lawyer would work
substantial hardship on the client. Del. Lawyers’ Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.7.
5
Dunlap v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. Disqualification of Counsel, 950 A.2d 658, 2008 WL
2415043, at *1 (Del. May 6, 2008) (ORDER) (quoting Unanue v. Unanue, 2004 WL 602096, at
*2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 25, 2004)).
6
Appeal of Infotechnology, Inc., 582 A.2d 215, 221 (Del. 1990).
7
In re Favata, 119 A.3d 1283, 1291 (Del. 2015) (citing In re Green, 464 A.2d 881, 885 (Del.
1983)).
8
Crumplar v. Superior Ct. ex rel. New Castle Cnty., 56 A.3d 1000, 1009 (Del. 2012) (citing
Infotechnology, 582 A.2d at 221).
2
concerning conflicts of interest when she can demonstrate that opposing counsel’s
conflict “somehow prejudiced . . . her rights” and “calls into question the ‘fair or
efficient administration of justice.’” 9 To meet this high burden, the movant must
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present clear and convincing evidence of “extreme” departures from the rules. 10 9F

“Vague and unsupported allegations are not sufficient to meet this [disqualification]
standard.” 11
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5. Rule 1.7 exists to safeguard the attorney’s duty of loyalty to the client. 12
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That purpose generally does not permit an opposing party to assert a conflict that
belongs exclusively to another litigant. Plaintiff is not, nor has she ever been, Mr.
Wilcox’s client, and therefore cannot claim an ethical violation premised on
Defendants’ rights under Rule 1.7.
6. Rule 1.9 affords similar protection for former clients by prohibiting a
lawyer from representing a current client whose interests are materially adverse to
those of a former client in a substantially related matter. 13 As Plaintiff’s own
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allegations reflect, she has never been represented by Mr. Wilcox, and thus Rule 1.9
provides no basis for relief; there is no former-client relationship, no claim of
confidential information obtained through representation, and no material adversity
of interests within the meaning of Rule 1.9. 14 13F

7. Defendants have knowingly and expressly waived any alleged conflict
of interest pursuant to Rule 1.7(b), having affirmed in their submissions that they are
aware of Plaintiff’s separate lawsuit and desire continued representation by Mr.

9
Matter of Estate of Waters, 647 A.2d 1091, 1096 (Del. 1994) (quoting Infotechnology, 582 A.2d
at 221).
10
Dunlap, 2008 WL 2415043, at *1 (citing Waters, 647 A.2d at 1095–96; Infotechnology, 582
A.2d at 1221).
11
Id. (quoting Unanue, 2004 WL 602096, at *2 (alteration in original)).
12
See Infotechnology, 582 A.2d at 220.
13
Del. Lawyers’ Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.9.
14
See id.
3
Wilcox. 15 Plaintiff cannot contradict or veto Defendants’ waiver of a conflict
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personal to them.
8. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate factually or legally that Mr. Wilcox’s
representation has prejudiced her rights in this litigation in any manner. Plaintiff’s
argument consists largely of vague, conclusory, and speculative accusations of
conflict, rather than competent evidence demonstrating an actual impairment of
counsel’s representation.
9. To the extent Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Wilcox’s continued
representation will personally prejudice her by enabling coordination of testimony
or influencing witnesses for the Defendants, such concerns do not, without more,
constitute evidence of bias or procedural unfairness. Counsel for any party naturally
takes strategic steps to prepare witnesses and frame testimony within lawful
bounds—this is part of advocacy, not misconduct. Moreover, Plaintiff’s suggestion
that counsel’s representation would taint the finality of any verdict or create a risk
of reversal on appeal reflects a misunderstanding of general legal principles: any
genuine, unwaived conflict of interest would give rise primarily to a malpractice or
fiduciary-duty claim by Defendants against their counsel, not to any appellate
remedy benefitting Plaintiff or invalidating a verdict in her favor. Thus, even under
Plaintiff’s hypothetical framing, any adverse consequence would fall upon
Defendants and their attorney personally, and therefore does not constitute prejudice
to Plaintiff’s rights or impairment of the fairness of the proceedings.
10. Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Wilcox will be a necessary witness at trial and
must therefore be removed under Rule 3.7. 16 However, Rule 3.7 applies only to
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acting as “advocate at a trial,” and this matter remains in pre-trial posture. Whether
this case will proceed to trial is presently unknown, and as such the issue of whether

15
See D.I. 68 at ¶ 4, D.I. 69 at ¶ 4, D.I. 70 at ¶ 2.
16
D.I. 46 at 3–4.
4
Mr. Wilcox must be removed on grounds of his being a necessary witness is not an
issue the court need decide at this time.
11. Furthermore, Rule 3.7 requires disqualification only where counsel is
shown to be a necessary witness at trial, and the Rule permits continued
representation even where the attorney is a necessary trial witness under certain
conditions. 17 Here, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that any testimony Mr. Wilcox
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might offer is both material and unavailable from other sources, nor has she shown
that Mr. Wilcox’s potential testimony falls outside the exceptions contemplated by
Rule 3.7(a). 18 At this stage, Plaintiff’s assertions are speculative, and the Court
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cannot conclude that Mr. Wilcox will be a necessary witness. Accordingly, Plaintiff
has not established a Rule 3.7 conflict requiring disqualification.
12. Plaintiff also argues that her separate lawsuit and collateral ethics
complaints against Mr. Wilcox require his withdrawal. 19 18F This position is
unsupported. Plaintiff’s separate lawsuit against Mr. Wilcox, which asserted
retaliation and related claims against him arising from his role as outside counsel for
Kent County, was dismissed by this Court on October 7, 2025. 20 Moreover, the 19F

Court will not permit a litigant to manufacture a conflict by suing opposing
counsel. 21
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13. The Court further observes that Plaintiff’s requests for disqualification
were presented in three separate iterations over the course of less than a month,
recycling nearly identical arguments. Plaintiff is instructed to avoid similarly
repetitive filings in the future.

17
See supra n. 4.
18
See id.
19
See D.I. 46 at 5.
20
See Sandonato v. Wilcox, C.A. No. K25C-05-022 NEP, D.I. 93.
21
See Hester v. State, 27 A.3d 551 (TABLE), 2011 WL 3717051, at *2 (Del. 2011) (holding that
the filing of a complaint against one’s own lawyer “did not create a conflict of interest per se”
requiring removal of counsel).
5
14. Having considered all arguments and submissions, the Court finds that
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a viable basis for disqualification.
15. The Court will next consider Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint, which was filed on July 10, 2025. 22 Plaintiff is directed to file a written
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response to that motion twenty days after the date of this order, and the Court will
thereafter consider whether to schedule oral argument. The parties are instructed to
make no additional filings pending the Court’s decision on the motion to dismiss.
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s consolidated Motions
to Disqualify Counsel are hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

NEP/tls
oc: Prothonotary
cc: Jenifer Sandonato, Pro Se
Scott G. Wilcox, Esq.

22
D.I. 60.
6