State v. Chandler

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) ID No. 2501009987
)
JEFFREY CHANDLER, )
)
Defendant. )

Submitted: November 20, 2025
Decided: January 9, 2026

OPINION AND ORDER

On Defendant’s Motion to Suppress

DENIED

William H. Leonard, Deputy Attorney General, Attorney General’s Office, 820 N.
French Street, 7th floor, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Plaintiff.

Matthew Keating, Assistant Public Defender, Office of Defense Services, 820 N.
French Street, 3rd floor, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Defendant

Jones, J.
Jeffrey Chandler challenges the warrant obtained to draw his blood following

a traffic accident that occurred on January 24, 2025, at approximately 6:45 p.m. in

the area of I-95 Southbound near Route 1. Defendant maintains that the affidavit of

probable cause failed to contain sufficient probable cause to justify the issuance of

the search warrant to draw the defendant’s blood.

Trooper Barry of the Delaware State Police was the investigating officer and

completed the affidavit of probable cause. The affidavit provided the following:

1. On 1/24/2025 at approximately 1845 hours, I was
dispatched to I-95 southbound in the area of SR-1 in reference to
a motor vehicle collision involving 2 vehicle collision involving
2 vehicles. Upon arrival, I made contact with the operator of non-
striking vehicle and obtained his statement. The operator stated
he was traveling southbound on I-95 when he was suddenly
struck by a sedan. The operator stated after being struck by the
sedan, same drifted off the roadway into a ditch.
2. I then responded to the ditch area to search for the sedan.
Upon searching for same, I observed a tan Toyota Camry with
front center damage in the ditch. The operator of the non-striking
vehicle confirmed this was the vehicle that struck him. Inside the
Toyota Camry was unconscious black male subject seated in the
driver seat.

3. I attempted to alert the operator in the vehicle by loudly
knocking on both the passenger and driver side window however
was unsuccessful in waking him up. I opened the driver side door
which ultimately awoke the operator. I questioned the operator
on what occurred however he was unable to provide me with a
clear statement due to him going in and out of consciousness.
4. The operator was instructed to step out of his vehicle and
speak with me. The operator stepped out and continued to advise
to me that he was struck by the non-striking vehicle. The operator
later provided me with his identification information where he
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was also identified through computer inquires as Jeffrey
Chandler. BMN – DOB-09/28/1966. While speaking Mr.
Chandler, his speech was very slurred and his eyes were
extremely bloodshot. I could also smell the odor of an alcoholic
beverage coming from his breath.
5. While observing Mr. Chandler, it appeared his shorts were
soiled right around his crotch area. I also observed Mr. Chandler
stumble when instruced (sic) to walk toward my patrol vehicle. I
was unable to perform any field sobriety tests on scene due to
Mr. Chandler complaining of a minor head injury suffered from
the collision. EMS later responded to the area and transported
Mr. Chandler to the Christiana Hospital.

6. Based on my training and the results of this investigation I
believe Mr. Chandler was operating the vehicle while under the
influence alcohol. I pray that a search warrant be approved on the
aforementioned probable cause to obtain a blood sample from Mr.
Chandler for the purpose of determining her intoxication.

“The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures

and provides that warrants cannot issue absent a showing of probable cause

supported by oath or affirmation.”1 Additionally, “the Delaware Constitution also

safeguards the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and requires

that warrants be based upon a sworn statement establishing probable cause.”2

“The Delaware General Assembly codified the requirements for a

constitutionally adequate showing of probable cause in [11 Del. C.] §§ 2306 and

2307” (hereinafter “Section 2306” or “Section 2307”). 3 Section 2306 outlines the

1
State v. Cannon, 2007 WL 1849022, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. June 27, 2007); see also U.S. Const. amend. IV.
2
Cannon, 2007 WL 1849022, at *3; see also Del. Const. art. I, § 6.
3
Cannon, 2007 WL 1849022, at *3.
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required content of the affidavit in support of the search warrant:

It shall designate the house, place, conveyance or person
to be searched and the owner or occupant thereof (if any),
and shall describe the things or persons sought as
particularly as may be, and shall substantially allege the
cause for which the search is made or the offense
committed by or in relation to the persons or things
searched for, and shall state that the complainant suspects
that such persons or things are concealed in the house,
place, conveyance or person designated and shall recite the
facts upon which such suspicion is founded. 4

Any judicial officer issuing a search warrant must adhere to both the procedural and

substantive requirements delineated in Section 2307:

If the judge, justice of the peace or other magistrate finds
that the facts recited in the complaint constitute probable
cause for the search, that person may direct a warrant to
any proper officer or to any other person by name for
service. The warrant shall designate the house, place,
conveyance or person to be searched, and shall describe
the things or persons sought as particularly as possible.5

“The specific statutory provisions of Sections 2306 and 2307 were enacted to

enhance and elucidate the Federal and State constitutional safeguards against

unreasonable searches and seizures.”6

“Delaware courts have interpreted Sections 2306 and 2307 as imposing a four

corners test for probable cause.” 7 In State v. Cannon, this court explained the four

4
11 Del. C. §2306.
5
11 Del. C. §2307(a).
6
Cannon, 2007 WL 1849022, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. June 27, 2007) (citing State v. Church, 2002 WL 31840887, at
*4 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2002)).
7
Id. See also, e.g., Pierson v. State, 338 A.2d 571, 573-74 (Del. 1975); State v. Ivins, 2004 WL 1172351, at *4
(Del. Super. Ct. May 21, 2004).
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corners evaluation in detail:

The facts alleged in the affidavit must suffice to allow the
issuing magistrate to independently evaluate the existence
of probable cause. The face of the affidavit must present
adequate facts to allow a reasonable person to conclude
that an offense has been committed and that seizable
property would be found in a particular place or on a
particular person. By requiring all facts relied upon by the
magistrate to be contained within the written affidavit, the
four corners test ensures that the reviewing court can
determine the warrant’s validity without “reliance upon
faded and often confused memories.”

The four corners test restricts the scope of a reviewing
court’s inquiry, but does not constrain the court from
adopting a flexible, nontechnical approach in evaluating a
warrant’s validity. The reviewing court’s task is to
determine whether the warrant application presented the
issuing magistrate with a “substantial basis” to conclude
that probable cause existed. In making this determination,
the reviewing court takes a deferential approach to the
magistrate’s decision and eschews “a hyper-technical
approach to the evaluation of the search warrant affidavit
in favor of a common-sense interpretation.” The affidavit
must be “considered as a whole and not on the basis of
separate allegations.”8

Blood tests that determine the presence of alcohol “may be performed ‘when

an officer has probable cause to believe [a] person was driving, operating or in

physical control of a vehicle in violation of §4177….’ Inter alia, while under the

influence of alcohol.”9

8
Cannon, 2007 WL 1849022, at *3 (citations omitted).
9
State v. Maxwell, 624 A.2d 926 (Del. 1993) (citing 21 Del.C. §2740(a)).
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Delaware Courts have acknowledged certain factors as supportive of probable

cause, including a defendant’s (1) traffic violation; 10 (2) bloodshot, glassy eyes;11

(3) odor of alcohol; 12 and (4) slurred speech.13

Defendant maintains that the affidavit is lacking because (1) the statements

were conclusory about whether Defendant was at fault for the accident, and (2) the

trooper failed to outline his investigative measure demonstrating probable cause that

the defendant was driving under the influence. Defendant cites to the decisions in

Esham v. Voshell,14 Valentine v. State, 15 and State v. White 16 in support of his

positions.

I find that the affidavit contains sufficient probable cause to justify the

drawing of Defendant’s blood. Trooper Barry was dispatched to I-95 southbound in

the area of SR-1 regarding a motor vehicle collision involving two vehicles. He

made contact with one of the drivers who reported he was suddenly struck by a sedan

while on I-95 and same drifted off the roadway into a ditch. The Trooper discovered

Defendant in the driver seat of his car in the I-95 median, unconscious and with front

end damage to his vehicle. The other driver confirmed that Defendant had struck his

car.

10
Bease v. State, 884 A.2d 495, 499-500 (Del. 2005).
11
Lefebvre v. State, 19 A.3d 287, 293 (Del. 2011).
12
Id.
13
Maulo v. State, 2011 WL 3849498, at *3 (August 30, 2011).
14
Esham v. Voshell, 1987 WL 8277 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 2, 1987).
15
Valentine v. State, 207 A.3d 566 (Del. 2019).
16
State v. White, 2010 WL 369354 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 2, 2010).
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Trooper Barry had difficulty rousing Defendant from unconsciousness by

loudly knocking on the windows of both sides of the vehicle. Once awakened,

Defendant could not give a coherent statement as he was going in and out of

consciousness repeatedly. While interacting with the defendant after he regained

consciousness, Trooper Barry observed that Defendant: had very slurred speech; had

extremely bloodshot eyes; an odor of alcoholic beverage was coming from his

breath, the defendant’s shorts were soiled right around his crotch area; and the

defendant was stumbling when he walked about to the Trooper’s patrol car. I reject

the argument that a finding of fault for the accident on Defendant’s part is necessary

for a finding of probable cause.

The totality of these facts and circumstances was sufficient for the magistrate

to conclude that there was reasonable belief a crime had been committed, and that

evidence of said crime could be obtained in a search. Namely, that the defendant was

under the influence of alcohol and evidence of same would be found within the

Defendant’s blood.

Defendant’s reliance on Esham v. Voshell is misplaced. In Esham, the

evidence of impairment was speeding and the order of alcohol.17 In the instant case,

there is not only evidence of a traffic violation and the odor of alcohol, but there

were also bloodshot eyes, soiling around Defendant’s crotch area and the defendant

17
Esham, 1987 WL 8277, at *2.
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was observed stumbling as he walked to the Trooper’s car. The decisions in

Valentine v. State and State v. White are equally unavailing. Valentine involved

conclusory statements regarding a confidential informant. 18 The instant situation

does not involve a confidential informant. Further, the trooper’s statements in his

affidavit are not merely conclusory but involve factual findings based on his own

observations as the scene. State v. White does not compel a different result because

White concerned an affidavit that left more questions than answers 19 as opposed to

the present affidavit which clearly lays out the basis for the Trooper’s conclusions

of impairment.

This case is more akin to the decision in State v. Oseguera-Avila 20 than the

cases relied upon by the defendant.

In State v. Oseguera-Avila, this court held probable cause to arrest for a DUI

existed after the Defendant drove erratically, committed multiple traffic infractions, had

dazed, glassy, and watery eyes, slurred his speech, had a strong odor of alcohol, had a

flushed face, provided evasive answers to the officers, was unsteady on his feet, and

acknowledged he had been drinking earlier in the day. Many of these same facts are

present in the instant case, in addition to other DUI indicators.21 Here, Defendant 1)

likely committed a traffic violation (was involved in a car accident and the other driver

18
Valentine, 207 A.3d at 572.
19
White, 2010 WL 369354, at *3 (“The affidavit is most striking for all the information it does not contain.”).
20
State v. Oseguera-Avila, 197 A.3d 1050 (Del. Super. Ct. 2018).
21
Oseguera-Avila, 197 A.3d at 1059.
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told the officer Defendant hit him); 2) exhibited slurred speech; 3) smelled of alcohol;

4) had issues with balance; 5) had trouble answering questions; 6) had bloodshot eyes;

7) had soiled himself around his crotch area; and 8) had passed out behind the wheel of

the car and needed the officer to awake him.

For the stated reasons Defendant’s Motion to Suppress is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Francis J. Jones, Jr.
Francis J. Jones, Jr., Judge

cc: Original to Prothonotary

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