2026002946•EEOC Appeal 2026002946
Testo completo
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Sector P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Stephine S.,1 Complainant, v. David Steiner, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southern Area), Agency. Appeal No. 2026002946 Hearing No. 460-2025-00158X Agency No. 4G-770-0278-24 DECISION Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s May 8, 2026, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final order. 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website.
2026002946 2 BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a City Carrier at the Agency’s Greens North Post Office in Houston, Texas. On September 17, 2024, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the bases of sex (female) and disability (physical), and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity, when: 1. on May 5, 2024, Complainant’s work schedule was changed and her workstation moved. Complainant alleged discrimination based on her race (African American), color (Brown), sex, and disability when: 2. on or about October 21, 2024,2 management misused Complainant’s annual leave. Complainant also alleged discrimination based on her race, national origin (“Black”), sex, and disability when: 3. on December 14, 2024, management charged Complainant with leave and did not pay her for eight (8) hours of work; and 4. on January 4, 2025, management removed Complainant’s time and charged her with absence without leave (AWOL). At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation (ROI) and notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. Over Complainant’s objections, the AJ granted the Agency’s motion and issued a decision without a hearing on April 28, 2026. The AJ determined that Complainant failed to dispute the Agency’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts with citations to the record, and there were no genuine issues of material fact. The AJ concluded by entering judgment in the Agency’s favor. 2 Complainant later amended the date at issue as November 21, 2024. Complainant Deposition at 36.
2026002946 3 The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ’s finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged. The instant appeal followed, but Complainant did not submit any arguments in support of her appeal. The Agency opposes the appeal. STANDARD OF REVIEW As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, the Agency’s decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9, § VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”); see also EEO MD-110, at Chap. 9, § VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015) (providing that an administrative judge’s determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed de novo). ANALYSIS Decision Without a Hearing The Commission’s regulations allow an AJ to grant summary judgment when they find that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). An issue of fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-49 (1986). A fact is “material” if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. Id. When considering summary judgment, facts and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009).
2026002946 4 To successfully oppose a decision by summary judgment, a complainant must identify, with specificity, facts in dispute either within the record or by producing further supporting evidence and must further establish that such facts are material under applicable law. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g)(2); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24; see also EEO MD-110, at Chap. 7, § III.E. Such a dispute would indicate that a hearing is necessary to produce evidence to support a finding that the Agency was motivated by discriminatory animus. Here, however, Complainant did not provide arguments on appeal, and she has not established a genuine dispute. A review of the record does not reveal any genuine disputes of material facts. Therefore, the AJ’s issuance of a decision without a hearing was appropriate. Disparate Treatment To prevail in a disparate treatment claim, a complainant must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). A complainant must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he/she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 441 U.S. at 802 n.13. The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, a complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency’s explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993). As an initial matter, we find that Complainant did not establish a prima facie case of reprisal because she did not engage in protected EEO activity. The Commission defines protected activity as (1) opposing a practice made unlawful by one of the employment discrimination statutes; or (2) filing a charge, testifying, assisting, or participating in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under the applicable statute. EEOC Compliance Manual on Retaliation, No. 915.004 at II.A. (Aug. 25, 2016). Complainant admitted that she does not have prior EEO activity, and she claimed reprisal after the Station Manager was issued discipline. ROI at 75, 78.
2026002946 5 We also find that Complainant did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination for claim 3. She clarified that this claim was based on disability, and not her race, national origin, or sex. ROI at 101. While Complainant alleged that this action occurred because she has a disability and her comparators did not, she did not name any similarly situated non-disabled employee who was treated more favorably. ROI at 102. Among other things, to be considered “similarly situated,” the comparator must be similar in substantially all aspects, so that it would be expected that they would be treated in the same manner. See Grappone v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC No. 01A10667 (Sept. 7, 2001), reconsideration denied, EEOC Request No. 05A20020 (Jan. 28, 2002). Complainant did not submit any other evidence to raise an inference of disability discrimination. Accordingly, we find that Complainant did not establish discrimination for claim 3. Assuming, arguendo, a prima facie case of discrimination for claims 1, 2, and 4, the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the actions. For claim 1, the Station Manager responded that Complainant was not delivering her route at the time, and her schedule was adjusted because they needed her assistance. The Station Manager added that Complainant’s workstation was always located at the Caller Door desk, but she kept going to a supervisor’s office despite never being authorized. He noted that employee files were stored in that office, and they conducted investigative interviews there. ROI at 119, 121. Two (2) supervisors explained that Complainant does not work full days on Saturdays (claim 2), and she left early without authorization or notification to management. Complainant did not request leave and gave supervisors “1260” forms to put a false time for the end of her tour. ROI at 152, 166. Complainant disclosed that on Saturdays, the phones are shut off and the door closed at noon, and she normally leaves once she completes her work but believes she should be paid for eight (8) hours. Complainant Deposition at 41. The Station Manager instructed the supervisors to ensure that the hours Complainant claimed were accurate and to correct her early departures and submission of falsified times. ROI at 124. In response to claim 4, the Station Manager stated that Complainant did not swipe her timecard to begin or end her tours, or for her breaks, and she did not make any clock rings with her badge. A supervisor informed Complainant that she was AWOL but made an adjustment.
2026002946 6 ROI at 135-6. Complainant’s Leave Year 2024 Absence Analysis confirms that she was not charged AWOL for January 4, 2025. ROI at 203. Complainant did not show that the proffered reasons are not worthy of belief, and her bare assertions that management officials discriminated against her are insufficient to prove pretext or that their actions were discriminatory. In addition, the Commission has long held that an Agency has broad discretion to set policies and carry out personnel decisions, and it should not be second-guessed by the reviewing authority, absent evidence of unlawful motivation. See Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981); Vanek v. Dep’t of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05940906 (Jan. 16, 1997). In this case, there is no evidence of unlawful motivation for the Agency’s actions. Accordingly, we find that Complainant did not establish discrimination or retaliation for her claims. CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency’s final order adopting the AJ’s decision without a hearing. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M1125) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or evidence that tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Sector (OFS) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. If the party requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the request, that statement or brief must be filed together with the request for reconsideration.
2026002946 7 A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). Complainant should submit their request for reconsideration, and any statement or brief in support of their request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx. Alternatively, Complainant can submit their request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Sector, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFS receives it by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Either party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include proof of service on the other party, unless Complainant files their request via the EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required. Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted together with the request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(f). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0124) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by their full name and official title.
2026002946 8 Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: T. Gimbrere Gul Chaudhry’s signature T. Gimbrere, Acting Director Office of Federal Sector September 21, 2026 Date
Ti chiedi come si applica questo testo alla tua situazione?
Consulenza gratuita, senza impegno
Descrivi la tua situazione. Il nostro team ti ricontatterà via e-mail per la tua consulenza.
Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude
Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.