EEOC Appeal 2020001694

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
Dominic B.,1
Complainant,
v.
David Bernhardt,
Secretary,
Department of the Interior
(National Park Service),
Agency.
Appeal No. 2020001694
Hearing No. 570-2017-00082X
Agency No. DOI-NPS-15-0935
DECISION
On December 11, 2019, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s
October 25, 2019, final order concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint
alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS
the Agency’s final order.
ISSUES PRESENTED
The issues presented concern whether the Agency subjected Complainant to discrimination on the
basis of reprisal when: it did not give him opportunities to work overtime; moved him to another
location; delayed his training; subjected him to an administrative investigation; and checked up on
him during training.
1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name
when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website.

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BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a K-9 Police Officer,
SP-083-01, at the Agency’s New York Field Office (Liberty District, Ellis Island Receiving
Office) in Jersey City, New Jersey.
On January 27, 2016, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated
against him on the basis of reprisal for prior protected EEO activity under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 when between May 2015 and November 2015 the following occurred:
1. 	He was not provided with the opportunity to work overtime;
2. 	He was moved from the Battery Park work site to the Liberty Island work site;
3. 	He was denied dog handler training with his K-9 for two months;
4. 	An administrative complaint was filed against him; and
5. 	His supervisor checked up on him and requested reports while he participated in K-9
training with his new K-9 partner.
At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report
of investigation and notice of his right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ). 	Complainant timely requested a hearing.
The Agency subsequently filed a motion for a decision for a decision without a hearing on June 3,
2019, which Complainant timely opposed on June 21, 2019.
With regard to claim 1, Complainant maintained that the “terms and benefits of [his] employment
were negatively affected” when the Commander of the Liberty District ordered Sergeant-2 to not
give Complainant any more overtime. Complainant alleged that his immediate supervisor
(Sergeant-1) testified that the District Commander and the Security/K-9 Unit Commander “played
with the assignments to [e]nsure [Complainant] would not have the overtime.”
For claim 2, Complainant asserted that his reassignment from Battery Park to Liberty Island
“changed and curtailed” the terms and conditions of his employment. He contended that “[t]his
illegal 	order 	violated 	General 	Order 	Instruction.” 	Complainant 	asserted 	that 	the 	District
Commander “was subsequently ordered by the Deputy Chief – after [a] successful call from the
union officials – to move Complainant back to the Battery Park Station.”
As for claim 3, Complainant maintained that the Agency admitted to delaying his K-9 training for
a short period of time due to personnel needs. He asserted that this training is mandated by federal
law, and the state requires training every two weeks and certification every six months.
For claim 4, Complainant disputed the Agency’s contention that action against him was justified
because the concession and ferry operators “complained when their delivery was delayed to
Liberty Island.” Complainant asserted that a similarly situated comparator (C1) also made the
ferries late due to a delay in sweeping the vessels with his K-9 partner; however, no disciplinary
action was taken against C1.

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Complainant maintained the email confirmation “was a contract requirement of notification” and
never mentioned him. He emphasized that the Agency treated him a disparate manner than
similarly situated officers, such as C1.
Regarding claim 5, Complainant alleged that the terms and conditions of his employment were
negatively impacted when he was harassed and micromanaged, while at training with his new dog.
Over Complainant’s objections, the AJ assigned to the case granted the Agency’s June 3, 2019,
motion for a decision without a hearing and issued a decision without a hearing in favor of the
Agency on September 24, 2019. In finding no discrimination on all the claims, the AJ considered
Complainant’s contention that reprisal could be inferred in the Agency’s actions because his
problems began after he engaged in protected EEO activity. The AJ also considered Complainant’s
contention that the named management officials lied about being unaware about his prior EEO
activity. The AJ concluded, however, that these contentions were just “bare assertions” and that
Complainant had failed to provide “any evidence demonstrating otherwise.” Furthermore, the AJ
found that Complainant failed to identify any similarly situated individual who was treated more
favorably. As for Complainant’s retaliatory hostile work environment claim, the AJ concluded that
Complainant’s allegations were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute harassment, as
they related to routine work assignments, instructions and admonishments.
The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ’s finding that Complainant failed
to prove that the Agency subjected him to discrimination as alleged. This appeal followed.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
On appeal, Complainant largely reiterates his prior contentions, namely his assertion that the
responsible management officials were aware of his prior EEO activity and took the alleged actions
in reprisal for his prior EEO activity. He also asserts that the AJ misapplied the legal standard for
harassment and that the AJ made a “fatal conclusion in the decision” by finding that the charges
of misconduct were sustained. For these reasons, Complainant requests that the Commission
remand the case for a hearing or enter judgment in his favor.
The Agency, in response, argues that Complainant’s appeal is untimely and should be dismissed.
In this regard, the Agency notes that it issued the final order on October 25, 2019, but Complainant
did not file his appeal until December 11, 2019. The Agency emphasizes that the 30-day period
expired on November 24, 2019, and that even accounting for “receipt of [the] mail via the United
States Postal Service (USPS), Complainant was at least fifteen days overdue in filing his appeal.”
As for the merits of the complainant,2 the Agency requests that the Commission affirm the
Agency’s final order, which implemented the AJ’s finding of no discrimination.
2 We note that the Agency also argues on appeal that claims 1 and 2 preceded Complainant’s prior
protected EEO activity. However, for the purposes of our analysis, we will assume that the alleged
actions did not precede his protected EEO activity. For all claims, we will assume arguendo that
all of the responsible management officials were aware of Complainant’s prior EEO activity.

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ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
In rendering this appellate decision, we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal and factual conclusions, and
the Agency’s final order adopting them, de novo. 	See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a) (stating that a
“decision on an appeal from an Agency’s final action shall be based on a de novo review . . .”);
see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO
MD-110), at Chap. 9, § VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015) (providing that an administrative judge’s
determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed
de novo). This essentially means that we should look at this case with fresh eyes. In other words,
we are free to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ’s, and Agency’s, factual
conclusions 	and 	legal 	analysis 	– 	including 	on 	the 	ultimate 	fact 	of 	whether 	intentional
discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal employment discrimination
statute was violated. See id. at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review
“requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal
determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents,
statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties,
and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its
interpretation of the law”).
As an initial matter, we find that the Agency has not met its burden of proving that the appeal was
not timely filed. In this regard, our review of the record shows that the Agency issued a final order
on October 25, 2019, which implemented the AJ’s finding of no discrimination. The final order
advised Complainant that in accordance with 29 C.F.R § 1614.402(a), he had 30 calendar days
after receipt of the Agency’s final order to file an appeal with the Commission. The USPS tracking
number listed in the final order indicates that the final order was delivered to Complainant’s
attorney on November 12, 2019. 	Complainant filed his appeal on December 11, 2019,
approximately 29 days after receipt of the Agency’s final order. Because the record clearly shows
that Complainant filed his appeal well within the 30-day period for filing an appeal, we find his
appeal to be timely.
We determine whether the AJ appropriately issued the decision without a hearing. The
Commission’s regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing upon finding that there
is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). EEOC’s decision without a hearing
regulation follows the summary judgment procedure from federal court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The
U.S. Supreme Court held summary judgment is appropriate where a judge determines no genuine
issue of material fact exists under the legal and evidentiary standards. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the judge is to determine
whether there are genuine issues for trial, as opposed to weighing the evidence. Id. at 249. At the
summary judgment stage, the judge must believe the non-moving party’s evidence and must draw
justifiable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. Id. at 255. A “genuine issue of fact” is one
that a reasonable judge could find in favor for the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A “material”
fact has the potential to affect the outcome of a case.

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In reviewing the AJ’s decision to grant the Agency’s motion for a decision without a hearing, we
must draw all justifiable inferences in Complainant’s favor. For the following reasons, we find that
the AJ correctly determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact or credibility that
merited a hearing.
Disparate Treatment
Our analysis begins with claims 1, 2, and 3. For Complainant to prevail, he must satisfy the three-
part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that
he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an
inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a
prima facie case will vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 411
U.S. at 804 n. 14.
To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment on the basis of reprisal, Complainant must
show that: (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) the Agency was aware of the protected
activity; (3) subsequently, he was subjected to adverse treatment by the Agency; and (4) a nexus
exists between the protected activity and the adverse treatment. See Complainant v. U.S. Postal
Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120132503 (Aug. 28, 2014), citing Whitmire v. Dep't of the Air Force,
EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340 (Sept. 25, 2000).
The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
actions. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Aff. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Complainant must
ultimately prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency’s explanation is pretext for
discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
Assuming arguendo that Complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination based on
reprisal, we find that the Agency has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its
actions.
For claim 1, which concerns the alleged denial of overtime, Sergeant-1 stated that he did not know
what Complainant meant. Report of Investigation (ROI) at 86. He maintained that overtime was
based on seniority, and that he would go down the list to fill overtime positions. Id. Sergeant-1
stated that the District Commander made the decision to rotate all K-9 teams throughout various
posts to reduce the risk of complacency. See Agency’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 462.
Sergeant-1 further maintained that the issue of overtime began when Complainant was rotated to
Battery Park, which had a 7:00 a.m. start time. Id. at 441. This meant that overtime began at 06:00
a.m. However, Complainant did not want to change his shift to start at 6:00 a.m.
With regard to claim 2, concerning Complainant’s reassignment from Battery Park to Liberty
Island, the District Commander stated that both Battery Park and Liberty Island are part of Liberty
District. ROI at 76.

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He emphasized that there are no permanently assigned beats, and that all K-9 teams work together
to rotate throughout various assignments in the District. Id. The District Commander added that
the changes were also related to the hiring of contract officers to patrol Battery Park. Id.
As for claim 3, Sergeant-1 emphasized that he did not delay Complainant’s training by two months.
See Agency’s Opposition File 469-470. He clarified that he pulled Complainant out training on
one occasion for coverage reasons, as Complainant’s dog was going to be retired shortly, and
Complainant was scheduled to receive 400 hours of training with his new dog. Id. As such,
Sergeant-1 reasoned that Complainant would be less affected by leaving training than his
colleagues. ROI at 86. Sergeant-1 also added that Complainant left training a second time on his
own volition to attend a union conference in Pennsylvania. See Agency’s Opposition File 469-
470.
As the Agency has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, Complainant
now bears the burden of establishing that the Agency’s stated reasons were merely a pretext for
discrimination. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Soc. Sec. Admin., EEOC Request No. 05960403 (Dec. 6,
1996). Indicators of pretext include, but are not limited to, discriminatory statements or past
personal treatment attributable to those responsible for the personnel action that led to the filing of
the complaint, comparative or statistical data revealing differences in treatment across various
protected-group lines, unequal application of Agency policy, deviations from standard procedures
without explanation or justification, or inadequately explained inconsistencies in the evidentiary
record. Mellissa F. v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120141697 (Nov. 12, 2015).
With regard to claims 1 and 2, Complainant stated that his regular tour of duty at Battery Park
began at 7:00 a.m. However, in May 2015, management asked him to come in at 6:00 a.m. for one
hour of overtime to conduct bomb sweeps. Complainant maintained that a few weeks after he
agreed to testify for his colleague, management told him that he would be going to Liberty Island,
where he would not be getting overtime. He alleged that the District Commander told Sergeant-2
to transfer him from Battery Park.3 Complainant alleged that when he contacted the Operations
Commander, the Operations Commander told him that the changes were made to reduce overtime
costs. Complainant stated that he then contacted the Union President to complain, and after three
weeks of being on Liberty Island, the District Commander called him to apologize and transfer
him back to Battery Park.
For claim 3, Complainant maintained that as a K-9 handler, he was required to train every two
weeks and recertify every six months. Complainant stated that he was scheduled to train the
Wednesday following his transfer to Liberty Park. However, when he checked the “the daily detail
the night before it had him on Liberty Island and it continued like that for, approximately, three
weeks.” Complainant stated that when he asked management the reason for the delay, management
told him that it was because he would be getting a new dog.
3 Complainant cited to Ex. L, p.25:2-7 in support of this contention. This document contains the
deposition transcript of Sergeant-1. See hearing document labelled, “Opp. Exhibits L-M” at 8; see
also Complainant’s appellate brief at 8.

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Here, even if we draw all justifiable inferences in Complainant’s favor, we still conclude that the
undisputed facts fully support the AJ’s finding of no discrimination, as the record persuasively
shows that the Agency had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions for which
Complainant cannot establish pretext. With regard to claim 2, concerning Complainant’s rotation
out of Battery Park, our review of the record shows that the Agency hired contract officers to patrol
Battery Park because there were issues with staff coverage. Further, management wanted to rotate
officers to reduce the risk of complacency. Having reviewed the record, we find no persuasive
evidence that Complainant’s rotation out of Battery Park to Liberty Island was due to reprisal, as
the record clearly shows that all officers were affected by the change. As for the alleged denial of
overtime raised in claim 1, we note that Complainant stated that his overtime issues began when
he was rotated out of Battery Park. While we acknowledge Complainant’s contention that the
District Commander ordered Sergeant-2 to rotate Complainant out of Battery Park in order to deny
him overtime, we find that the exhibit cited in Complainant’s appellate brief does not support
Complainant’s proposition. In fact, nowhere in the cited exhibit does Sergeant-1 recall Sergeant-2
telling him that the District Commander did not want Complainant to have overtime. See Opp.
Exhibit L-M at 8, Exhibit L at 25:2-7. Our own independent review of the record fails to reveal
any persuasive evidence showing that Complainant was denied overtime due to reprisal. Moreover,
we find no evidence that Complainant was treated less favorably than similarly situated
individuals.
For claim 3, we find no evidence that Complainant’s training was delayed by two months. While
we acknowledge Complainant’s contention that federal and state laws require K-9 handlers and
their dogs to receive training every two weeks and recertify every six months, we note that
management 	needed 	to 	pull 	an 	officer 	from 	training 	due 	to 	coverage 	issues. 	Because
Complainant’s dog was set to retire, and he was scheduled to undergo 400 hours of training with
his new dog, management decided to pull Complainant from training to provide coverage. We note
that Complainant, in his deposition, admitted that he was specifically told that he could not attend
training because his dog was set to retire. See Agency’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 59,
Complainant’s Deposition at 35. We are simply not persuaded that such action was retaliatory.
Hostile Work Environment
As an initial matter, we find that a finding of harassment on claims 1, 2, and 3, is precluded by our
determination that Complainant failed to establish that the actions taken by the Agency were
motivated by discriminatory animus. See Oakley v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No.
01932923 (Sep. 21, 2000).
For Complainant to prevail on his allegations of harassment, he must show that: (1) he belongs to
a statutorily protected class; (2) he was subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal
or physical conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment complained of was based on
his statutorily protected class; (4) the harassment affected a term or condition of employment
and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the work environment and/or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) there is a basis for
imputing liability to the Agency. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).

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The harasser’s conduct should be evaluated from the objective viewpoint of a reasonable person
in the victim's circumstances. Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., EEOC
Notice No. 915.002 at 6 (Mar. 8, 1994). Further, the incidents must have been “sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the conditions of complainant’s employment and create an abusive working
environment.” Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); see also Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 23 U.S. 75 (1998).
To ultimately prevail on a claim of retaliatory harassment, Complainant must show that he was
subjected to conduct sufficient to dissuade a “reasonable person” from making or supporting a
charge of discrimination. See Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57
(2006); EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues, EEOC Notice No.
015.004, § II(B)(3) & n. 137 (Aug. 25, 2016). Only if both elements are present, retaliatory
motivation and a chilling effect on protected EEO activity, will the question of Agency liability
for reprisal-based harassment present itself. See also Janeen S. v. Dep’t of Commerce, EEOC
Appeal No. 0120160024 (Dec. 20, 2017).
With regard to Complainant’s allegation that he was subjected to harassment, we will assume
arguendo that the events occurred as Complainant described and were unwanted. However, we
agree with the AJ that Complainant has not shown that the alleged conduct occurred because of
his protected classes. In this regard, we note that the Agency, in claim 4, initiated an administrative
investigation into Complainant after a security guard raised concerns about Complainant.
Ultimately, the investigation revealed that Complainant had reported late to work approximately
18 times. See District Commander’s Deposition at 66, contained in Agency’s Motion for Summary
Judgment at 346. The Commission has long held that “[p]articipation in the EEO process does not
shield employees from uniformly applied standards of conduct and performance; nor are the
statutory anti-retaliatory provisions a license for employees to engage in misconduct.” Berkner v.
Dep’t of Commerce, EEOC Petition No. 0320110022 (June 23, 2011). While we acknowledge
Complainant’s contention that the Agency did not discipline C1 for making the ferries late, there
is no evidence that C1 was late to work 18 times. As such, we do not find C1 to be similarly
situated to Complainant. For these reasons, we conclude that Complainant cannot prevail on claim
4.
In reaching this conclusion, we considered Complainant’s contention that the AJ made a “fatal
conclusion” in finding that the charges of misconduct for coming to work late were sustained.
However, we note that Complainant filed a grievance challenging both the charges and the decision
to impose a two-week long suspension. By Complainant’s own admission, the charges were indeed
sustained; however, the discipline was reduced to a letter of reprimand. See Complainant’s
Deposition at 45, contained in Agency’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 69. Because the record
clearly shows that the AJ did not err in this regard, we find no “fatal conclusion” in the decision.
As for claim 5, wherein Complainant alleges that Sergeant-1 checked up on him and requested
reports while he participated in K9 training with his new K9 partner, we are simply unpersuaded
that the alleged incidents of surveillance amounted to retaliatory harassment.

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In this regard, while we acknowledge Complainant’s contention that Sergeant-1 would check up
on him during training, we note that Sergeant-1 explained that management was conducting the
administrative investigation while Complainant was at training and needed to get in touch with
Complainant. ROI at 87. Sergeant-1 further explained that since the training lasted three months,
upper management also wanted him to drop by the training school to see how Complainant and
the other trainees were doing. Id. Given the facts in this case,4 we conclude that the Agency did
not engage in retaliatory harassment against Complainant, as we find no persuasive evidence that
the Agency acted with retaliatory animus.
Finally, we find that the AJ did not err in requiring Complainant to establish retaliatory animus.
As noted above, a claim of retaliatory harassment must demonstrate both retaliatory motivation
and a chilling effect on protected EEO activity. We find that Complainant has failed to do so here.
CONCLUSION
Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not
specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency’s final order affirming the AJ’s finding of
no discrimination.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0620)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if the complainant or the
agency submits a written request that contains arguments or evidence that tend to establish that:
1. 	The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or
law; or
2. 	The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or
operations of the agency.
Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations (OFO)
within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. If the party requesting reconsideration
elects to file a statement or brief in support of the request, that statement or brief must be filed
together with the request for reconsideration. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days
from receipt of another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or
statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management
Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015).
4 We note that during deposition, Complainant alleged that Sergeant-1 took photographs and/or
videos of him at training, as he saw Sergeant-1 aiming his cellular phone at him. 	See
Complainant’s Deposition at 51-52, contained in Agency’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 75-
76. 	Complainant 	did 	not, 	however, 	provide 	any 	evidence 	that 	Sergeant-1 	was 	actually
photographing/recording him.

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Complainant should submit his or her request for reconsideration, and any statement or brief in
support of his or her request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at
https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx.
Alternatively, complainant can submit his or her request and arguments to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to
P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street, NE,
Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, complainant’s request to reconsider
shall be deemed timely filed if OFO receives it by mail within five days of the expiration of the
applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604.
An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s
Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Either party’s request and/or
statement or brief in opposition must also include proof of service on the other party, unless
complainant files his or her request via the EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof of service
is required.
Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s request for
reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the
request. 	Any supporting documentation must be submitted together with the request for
reconsideration. 	The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the
deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety
(90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must
name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department
head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result
in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider
and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of
your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request
permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs.
Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the
court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or
appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole
discretion to grant or deny these types of requests.

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Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled
Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________ 	Carlton M. Hadden’s signature
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
October 26, 2020
Date