EEOC Appeal 2026000217

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Sector
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
Jaunita W.,1
Complainant,
v.
Pete Hegseth,
Secretary,
Department of War
(Defense Logistics Agency),
Agency.
Appeal No. 2026000217
Agency No. DLAN-23-003586
DECISION
Complainant filed an appeal to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s
October 14, 2025, final decision concerning her equal employment opportunity
(EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. For the
following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final decision.
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant was employed by
the Agency as a Supply Technician, GS-2005-06/Step 9 at the Agency’s Distribution
Susquehanna 	PA 	(DDSP) 	in 	New 	Cumberland, 	Pennsylvania. 	Report 	of
Investigation 	(ROI) 	at 	181. 	Complainant 	is 	a 	yellow-complexioned 	African-
American female. Her second level supervisor (Supervisor 2) was the Supervisory
Transportation Assistant. ROI at 311-15. A named individual, retired, was the
1 	This 	case 	has 	been 	randomly 	assigned 	a 	pseudonym 	which 	will 	replace
Complainant’s 	name 	when 	the 	decision 	is 	published 	to 	non-parties 	and 	the
Commission’s website.

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former Commander (Commander). A second named individual was the Division
Chief (Chief). ROI at 185-86. A third named individual was the Executive Officer
(Executive Officer). He submitted an affidavit on behalf of Commander, his former
supervisor. ROI at 208, 317-18, and 337. A fourth named individual was a Human
Resources Specialist (HR Specialist). ROI at 178-79. A Supervisory Human
Resources Specialist (SHR Specialist) was familiar with Complainant through the
processing and managing of her work-related injury claim. ROI at 199-201.
On 	December 	26, 	2023, 	Complainant 	filed 	an 	EEO 	complaint 	alleging
discrimination by the Agency on the bases of race (African-American), sex (female),
and color (yellow) when, on or about September 20, 2023, Agency officials failed
to reimburse or supplement her pay after a workplace injury resulting in her transfer
to a lower graded position (Transportation Specialist, GS-2102-05/Step 10), while
management officials reimbursed or supplemented the pay of individuals outside her
protected classes who were also injured on the job and had to take lower graded
positions.
The Agency previously dismissed the formal complaint in its entirety by letter dated
January 12, 2024. Complainant appealed the dismissal to the Commission on
January 25, 2024. On July 12, 2024, in EEOC Appeal No. 2024001950, the
Commission issued an order reversing the Agency’s January 12, 2024, dismissal for
a collateral attack because Complainant was not challenging a decision made during
the Office of Workers’ Compensation Program (OWCP) process but rather she was
alleging that the Agency failed to apply its usual policy and practice based on
discriminatory animus. The Commission remanded the complaint to the Agency for
a 	formal 	investigation. 	The 	Agency 	conducted 	a 	formal 	investigation 	and
supplemental investigation to ensure that the record was adequately developed.
The 	investigations 	revealed 	that 	Complainant’s 	annual 	salary 	in 	the 	Supply
Technician position was $57,727. After sustaining a workplace injury on September
11, 2019, she was placed on permanent light duty status and on April 10, 2022,
Complainant was reassigned (Change to a Lower Grade Level) to the position of
Transportation Assistant, GS-2102-05/Step 10 with an annual salary of $53,147.00.
Complainant filed a Workman’s Compensation claim on September 17, 2019, and
received a Department of Labor Decision (DOL Decision) dated November 22,
2022, 	reducing 	her 	monetary 	compensation 	to 	reflect 	her 	actual 	earnings.
Complainant appealed the DOL Decision, and a DOL OWCP hearing was held on

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or about September 20, 2023, in which Complainant was informed that the DOL
Decision would be upheld. After the DOL OWCP hearing, Complainant contacted
the servicing EEO Office to file a complaint of discrimination. ROI at 153, 155, 157,
169, and 181; Agency’s Appeal Brief at 54-6.
In the position to which Complainant was reassigned, Supervisor 2 became her first
level supervisor. He was not involved in Complainant’s reassignment or salary
determination decision. ROI at 311-14. Complainant alleged that the actions of
Commander and Chief caused her significant financial hardship resulting in the loss
of her apartment and vehicle. She also alleged that similarly situated employees in
DDSP who were not in her same protected classes were treated more favorably than
her because they did not lose money after being reassigned to a different position
due to a Workman’s Compensation claim, as she had. Complainant would like to be
compensated by the Agency paying her the wages they allegedly promised when she
accepted the reassignment to the Transportation Specialist position. Complainant
believed management was justified in reassigning her. According to Complainant,
the Agency misled her into believing that she would not have a reduction in pay
when she agreed to a reassignment due to her work-related injury. She stated,
specifically, that HR Specialist assured her by Microsoft Instant Messenger (IM) and
email on March 22, and October 1, 2022, that the reassignment would not result in
a loss of pay. ROI at 169-72.
According to Chief, he had no role in Complainant’s reassignment. He stated he was
advised that his organization would receive Complainant on a lateral transfer per
Workman’s 	Compensation 	Program 	for 	a 	medical 	condition, 	but 	no 	other
information was provided. He also stated his belief that Complainant was transferred
at the same GS pay grade from a GS-6 to a GS-6 position, and he was not aware
there would be a decrease in Complainant’s salary. Chief also added his belief that
management was justified in reassigning Complainant and stated that her medical
condition prevented her from remaining in the Supply Technician position in which
she was responsible for counting materiel within warehouses. ROI at 185-89.
HR Specialist asserted that it was management’s decision to place Complainant into
a lower graded position based on her permanent Light Duty restrictions due to her
work-related injury which precluded her from performing the duties of her former
position. HR Specialist also stated that there was a decrease in Complainant’s salary
because the reassignment was a change to a lower grade; and that Complainant was
aware there would be a decrease in her salary. HR Specialist added that she assured

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Complainant that she would not lose money when she was reassigned because, at
the time, that was her understanding. She stated that at the time of the permanent
Light Duty reassignment, she understood Complainant would have to file a CA-7
claim to claim wage-loss compensation for the difference in her original pay (Supply
Technician) and the pay of the downgraded position (Transportation Assistant). HR
Specialist asserted that the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (FECA) provides
that an employee who is unable to return to their Date of Injury (DOI) position
because of a disability due to a work-related injury or disease may instead return to
alternative employment. She added that the DOL makes formal determinations
regarding an employee’s Loss of Wage-Earning Capacity (LWEC) and entitlement
to wage-loss compensation.
HR Specialist explained that 5 U.S.C. Section 8106 of the FECA provides for a
reduction in compensation to reflect a LWEC when the disability for work is partial.
She also explained that the method for computing compensation for wage loss due
to partial disability is set forth in Section 8106(a), which states that if the disability
is partial, the United States shall pay the employee during the disability monthly
monetary compensation equal to 66 2/3 (or 75 percent) of the difference between
their monthly pay and their monthly WEC after the beginning of the partial
disability, which is known as their basic compensation for partial disability.
According to HR Specialist, Complainant was informed of the requirement to file
for CA-7, Claim for Compensation, to request compensation from DOL for her
partial wage loss, and her office assisted Complainant with the filing process. HR
Specialist stated that she consulted with SHR Specialist during the process, and that
SHR 	Specialist’s 	guidance 	was 	consistent 	with 	FECA 	requirements 	and
entitlements. ROI at 177-82.
Executive Officer provided supporting statements, asserting that the decrease in
Complainant’s salary was based on different duties in the Transportation Specialist
position as it was a lower graded position than her Date of Injury (DOI) position
(Supply Technician). He also stated that typically in Workman’s Compensation
cases, employees are reassigned to available positions as close as possible in pay to
the before injury duties, that are suitable given any physical restrictions or
limitations. He stated his belief that the options for reassignment would have been
limited to vacant positions at the time of reassignment. ROI at 317-21.
At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a
copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before

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an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge, or a final
decision from the agency. 	After Complainant requested a decision, the Agency
issued a final decision (FAD) pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b). The Agency
concluded that Complainant did not prove that the Agency subjected her to
discrimination as alleged. Complainant then filed the instant appeal.
On appeal, Complainant, among other things, argues that the Agency erroneously
framed her complaint as a collateral attack on a Department of Labor (DOL) Office
of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP) determination that resulted in loss of
pay. Complainant also argues that the Agency should have made up any financial
difference in pay based on DOL’s adjudication of the claim to ensure that she had
no loss in pay, asserting that when “similarly situated co-workers that do not look
like [Complainant]” were given lower-graded positions after a job-related injury, the
Agency had a practice of “mak[ing] up the pay difference.” Complainant’s Appeal
Brief at 2. Complainant also challenges the timeliness of the FAD, arguing that she
has been further “discriminated against by the Agency’s severely late [FAD].”
Complainant seeks default judgment as an appropriate sanction against the Agency,
asserting that she was substantially prejudiced by the significant delay in conducting
its investigation and issuing the FAD. Complainant’s Appeal Brief at 3. We will
address Complainant’s arguments below.
The Agency, in pertinent part, argued that its final decision should be affirmed.
As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.110(b), 	the 	Agency's 	decision 	is 	subject 	to 	de 	novo 	review 	by 	the
Commission. 	29 	C.F.R. 	§ 1614.405(a). 	See 	Equal 	Employment 	Opportunity
Management Directive for 	29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-16 (Aug. 5,
2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission
examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the
previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and
testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties,
and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record
and its interpretation of the law”).
To prevail in a disparate treatment claim, a complainant must satisfy the three-part
evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). A complainant must initially establish a prima facie
case by demonstrating that he/she was subjected to an adverse employment action

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under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination. 	Furnco
Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will
vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 441 U.S. at
802 n.13. 	The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, a complainant must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the agency’s explanation is a pretext for
discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143
(2000); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).
Delayed FAD Issuance
We note that our regulations require agency action in a timely manner at many points
in the EEO process. 	Tammy S. v. Dep’t of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 0120084008
(June 	6, 	2014). 	Compliance 	with 	these 	timeframes 	is 	not 	optional; 	as 	the
Commission stated in Royal v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No.
0520080052 (Sept. 25, 2009), “the Commission has the inherent power to protect its
administrative process from abuse by either party and must insure that agencies, as
well as complainants, abide by its regulations.” Because of the length of time it can
take to process a federal sector EEO complaint, any delays in complying with the
time frames in the regulations can impact the outcome of the complainant’s claims.
Id.
In this case, we assume that Complainant requested a FAD on December 17, 2024,
when she withdrew her original hearing request. The FAD was made available to
Complainant on October 14, 2025, about 11 months and three days after it was
requested. Complainant did not show how the delay in issuance of the FAD
prejudiced her or otherwise resulted in an unconscionable delay in justice.
The Agency also concedes that the FAD was issued more than 60 days after
Complainant’s request; however, that delay was caused by the need to reopen the
investigation to determine if there was any additional evidence that was missing that
would have had an impact on the outcome of the complaint. Therefore, we concur
with the Agency’s position that sanctions would be inappropriate here as extending
the timeline only served to benefit Complainant by ensuring that the record was
thoroughly developed so that the Agency could arrive at a more informed decision,
particularly in light of the Commission’s July 18, 2024, Order.

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Although the Agency failed to timely issue a final decision as required by our
regulations, it did not act in a manner to warrant the sanction of a default judgment
against it. See, e.g. Josefina L. v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 0120142023 (July 19, 2016),
req. for recon. denied, EEOC Request No. 0520170108 (Feb. 9, 2017) (finding that
the Agency’s 571-day delay in issuing the decision did not warrant sanctions, as
complainant did not show she was prejudiced by the delay); Abe K. v. Dep’t of
Agric., EEOC Appeal No. 0120141252 (Nov. 4, 2016) (declining to sanction an
agency that issued a decision after approximately 326 days when complainant failed
to show that he was prejudiced by the delay); Jocelyn R. v. Dep’t of Def., EEOC
Appeal No. 0120152852 (Mar. 11, 2016) (citing Vunder v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC
Appeal No. 01A55147 (May 12, 2006) (declining to sanction an agency that issued
a decision after approximately 371 days)); Anthony M. v. Dep’t of the Air Force,
EEOC Appeal No. 2019003380 (Sept. 22, 2020). The Commission finds that there
is no evidence that the Agency’s delay in this case is attributable to contumacious
conduct or bad faith. As such, under the specific circumstances present, we decline
to sanction the Agency for its delay in issuing the final decision.
While we will not impose a sanction in the present case, we do find the Agency’s
failure to abide by the regulations reflects negatively on the Agency’s support for
the integrity of the EEO process. Beatrice B. v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, EEOC
Appeal No. 2019001641 (Sept. 17, 2020) (The Commission declined to issue a
sanction where following a supplemental investigation, the Agency delayed in
issuing a final decision for over eight months).
The merits of Complainant’s claim
We find that the Agency met its burden to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for its actions. However, Complainant failed to demonstrate that the
articulated reason was pretextual. Nor did she prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the challenged action was motivated by discriminatory animus due to
her protected classes. Contrary to Complainant’s appeal argument, we also find that
the Agency’s reframing of Complainant’s claim for clarity was not erroneous.
HR Specialist explained that, consistent with FECA requirements, Complainant was
advised that she needed to file a form CA-7 to receive the difference in pay between
her former position and the position to which she was transferred. We also note
statements provided by the Director for Injury Compensation that his office issued
to Complainant a separate letter dated April 15, 2022, explaining how to file form

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CA-7, Claim for Compensation to request OWCP compensate her for her loss of
wage-earning capacity. See Agency’s Appeal Brief at 40-2.
Complainant did not dispute these statements; and the record is devoid of any
evidence that she took any steps to follow the advice she received in order to address
the pay decrease resulting from her reassignment. Nor did Complainant provide any
evidence to show that she was unaware that she would lose pay by accepting the
reassignment to a lower graded position.
Complainant also failed to identify the coworkers who she alleged received more
favorable treatment, only stating that those individuals whose pay the Agency
allegedly supplemented despite their reassignment to a lower-graded position “are
in the same protected class as [her], BUT do NOT look like [her].” ROI at 170-73.
However, the record reflects comparative data from the Agency showing that three
other similarly situated employees were reassigned to lower-graded positions
following an on-the-job injury between 2014 and 2022. All three individuals were
outside of at least one of Complainant’s protected classes; and all received lower pay
after their reassignment. ROI at 160.
Moreover, HR Specialist’s admission that she mistakenly misinformed Complainant
regarding pay after the reassignment does not evidence discrimination. In that
regard, we have held that a mistake without more does not establish discriminatory
animus. See Velda F. v. Zinke, EEOC No. 0120122684 (Jul. 10, 2018). Rather, the
focus of pretext inquiry 	is whether an agency’s 	actions were motivated 	by
discriminatory animus.” Jeffrey G. v. Austin, EEOC No. 2022003098 (Oct. 24,
2022). That is not the situation here.
Therefore, based on our review of the record and the contentions on appeal,
including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency’s final
decision finding no discrimination.

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STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M1125)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if
Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or
evidence that tend to establish that:
1. 	The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of
material fact or law; or
2. 	The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Sector
(OFS) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. 	If the party
requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the request,
that 	statement 	or 	brief 	must 	be 	filed 	together 	with 	the 	request 	for
reconsideration. 	A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of
another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or
statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity
Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B
(Aug. 5, 2015).
Complainant should submit their request for reconsideration, and any statement or
brief in support of their request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at
https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx. 	Alternatively, Complainant can
submit their request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Sector, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box
77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street, NE,
Washington, DC 20507. 	In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFS receives it by mail within
five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604.
An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the
EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Either
party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include proof of
service on the other party, unless Complainant files their request via the EEOC
Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required.

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Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented
the timely filing of the request. 	Any supporting documentation must be
submitted together with the request for reconsideration. 	The Commission will
consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(f).
COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0124)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court
within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. 	If
you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person
who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by their
full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case
in court. 	“Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the
local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to
reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the
administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so,
you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without
paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent
you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You
must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an
attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole
discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the

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time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s
Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:
T. Gimbrere
___________________________ 	Acting Director's signature
T. Gimbrere, Acting Director
Office of Federal Sector
September 28, 2026
Date