EEOC Appeal 2026000547

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Sector
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
Desire M.,1
Complainant,
v.
Douglas A. Collins,
Secretary,
Department of Veterans Affairs,
Agency.
Appeal No. 2026000547
Hearing No. 430-2024-00243X
Agency No. 200I-0005-2023-151009
DECISION
On December 12, 2025, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment
Opportunity 	Commission 	(EEOC 	or 	Commission), 	pursuant 	to 	29 	C.F.R. 	§
1614.403(a), from the Agency’s November 14, 2025, final order concerning her
equal 	employment 	opportunity 	(EEO) 	complaint 	alleging 	employment
discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. For the following
reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final order.
1 	This 	case 	has 	been 	randomly 	assigned 	a 	pseudonym 	which 	will 	replace
Complainant’s 	name 	when 	the 	decision 	is 	published 	to 	non-parties 	and 	the
Commission’s website.

2026000547	2
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a GS-
2210-11 IT Specialist at the Agency’s Ralph Johnson VA Medical Center facility
in Charleston, South Carolina.
On June 6, 2023, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency
discriminated against her on the basis of disability (physical) when, since February
3, 2023, the Agency had failed to provide her a reasonable accommodation and/or
denied her reasonable accommodation requests.
In March 2020, Complainant was approved for 100% telework because she was at
high risk for complications related to Covid-19. Complainant contracted Covid-19
in June 2020, and she testified that, after her Covid-19 infection, she continued to
experience persistent gastrointestinal symptoms including loss of bowel control,
diarrhea, bloating, nausea, and excessive flatulence. Complainant testified that that
her gastrointestinal system “shut 	down” around August 	2021, which 	caused
extreme constipation and pain. Complainant was prescribed medication to relieve
constipation, but it was unpredictable when the medication would result in a bowel
movement, which caused her to have accidents.
On August 5, 2021, Complainant requested full-time telework as a reasonable
accommodation. Complainant was granted full-time telework on an interim basis
through November 3, 2021, which was extended through April 30, 2022, and again
through December 31, 2022. In December 2022, Complainant again requested full-
time telework as a reasonable accommodation. Complainant was permitted to
continue teleworking 	full-time while 	the 	Agency 	considered 	her 	request 	for
accommodation and her request for reconsideration.
The Agency denied Complainant’s request for full-time telework on February 3,
2023, and denied her request for reconsideration on March 3, 2023. The Agency
granted an alternative accommodation consisting of up to two days of ad hoc
telework per week, cubicle space with closer access to the restroom, flexible use of
leave, and additional breaks. Complainant declined the alternative accommodation
and began reporting to the office on March 27, 2023.
At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a
copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing

2026000547	3
before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a
hearing. The AJ held a hearing on July 30-31, 2025. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the AJ stated that Complainant had established that she was subjected to
discrimination 	and ordered 	the parties to 	brief Complainant’s 	entitlement 	to
attorney’s fees.
Complainant requested $295,460.50 in attorney’s fees and $4,053.34 in costs.
Complainant requested non-pecuniary compensatory damages in the amount of
$115,000. According to Complainant, the harm she suffered was similar to that of
the complainant in Elsa S. v. Nat’l Aero. & Space Admin., EEOC Appeal No.
0720180021 (Feb. 14, 2020), in which the Commission awarded $100,000 in non-
pecuniary compensatory damages. According to Complainant, the present-day
value of the award in Elsa S. was approximately $125,000.
Complainant requested the restoration of 665.75 hours of leave taken between
March 26, 2023, and April 25, 2025, consisting of 336 hours of annual leave, 207.5
hours of sick leave, and 112.25 hours of time off awards.2 Complainant averred
that she was required to use leave to manage disability symptoms that could have
been accommodated with telework. Complainant cited her testimony that, on days
when she soiled herself during her morning commute, she took sick or annual
leave to clean herself and avoid humiliation. According to Complainant, she did
not have an opportunity to testify about how many hours of leave she was forced to
take because of time constraints in presenting her case-in-chief.
AJ Decision and Final Order
On September 29, 2025, the AJ issued a decision finding that the Agency failed to
provide Complainant an effective accommodation. The AJ found that, while
Complainant’s position was incompatible with full-time telework, the AJ found
that the Agency’s alternative accommodation was not effective, as it required her
to work in the office at least three or more days per week with pervasive bowel
incontinence and potentially soil herself. The AJ determined that Complainant
presented evidence of two IT positions for which she was qualified that were
available in February and March 2023 that could have accommodated full-time
2 The AJ correctly noted that the sum of 336 hours, 207.5 hours, and 112.25 hours
is 655.75 hours, not 665.75 hours as claimed.

2026000547	4
telework. The AJ found that there was no evidence that the Agency considered
reassignment as an accommodation of last resort or to rebut the suitability of the
identified IT positions for reassignment. The AJ found that Complainant was
entitled to compensatory damages.
The AJ ordered the Agency to provide following relief pursuant to the finding of
discrimination: (1) to pay non-pecuniary compensatory damages in the amount of
$85,000; (2) to pay attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $158,464.81 in
attorney’s fees and costs; (3) to restore restoration of 24 hours of sick leave; (4) to
reassign Complainant to a GS-11 position for which she was qualified that would
allow her to telework full-time; (5) to post a notice; and (6) to provide training to
the responsible management officials.
Complainant testified that she stopped taking her medication when the Agency
removed her full-time telework because it was unpredictable when she would need
the restroom and that, as a result, she experienced worsening constipation, nausea,
and abdominal pain. Complainant also testified that she experienced depression
and loss of intimacy with her husband, began wearing Depends on a daily basis,
went on fewer family outings, became less active in church, and was apprehensive
around people. The AJ found that the worsening of Complainant’s condition and
the impact on her social and family life could not be attributed to the Agency. The
AJ cited Complainant’s medical records from February 7, 2023, which showed that
she had stopped her bowel regimen based on the side effects while she was still
being accommodated with full-time telework. The AJ found that Complainant’s
medical records, which reflected that her chronic constipation had persisted since
August 2021 with no improvement, cast doubt on whether any worsening of her
condition was attributable to the Agency denying her request for accommodation.
The AJ also found that the evidence did not establish that Complainant’s need to
wear Depends, decreased social activity, and decreased marital intimacy were
caused by the Agency’s conduct rather than Complainant’s medical condition.
The AJ found that Complainant credibly testified that she experienced bowel
incontinence and had approximately six accidents either on the way to work or on
the way home to work. If Complainant had an accident on the way to work, she
would use leave to return home to clean herself up. If she had an accident on the
way home, she would sit in her waste until she got home. Complainant did not
have an accident at work, but she testified that she feared having an accident at
work, and her husband and son testified that she was unsettled, horrified, anxious,

2026000547	5
and self-conscious about experiencing incontinence at work. The AJ also found
that Complainant credibly testified that it was humiliating to have gas and urgent
bowel movements at work, including two instances when her condition caused her
to clog the toilet. The AJ found that none of the accidents, embarrassment, or
anxiety would have occurred if the Agency had granted Complainant an effective
accommodation.
The AJ cited Elsa S., EEOC Appeal No. 0720180021, in which the complainant
requested telework for irritable bowel syndrome but was offered flexible leave
instead, which the Commission found was ineffective because it forced her to take
leave when another accommodation would have allowed her to continue working.
As a result of being denied telework, the complainant had accidents at work, and
she testified about the embarrassment of sitting in her own feces or cleaning her
underwear in the restroom at work, as well as depression, loss of confidence,
feelings of social isolation, strain on her marriage, and psychological stress. The
AJ noted that, while Complainant experienced accidents on her way to and from
work, she did not experience any accidents at work, which would have been more
embarrassing. Based on Complainant’s testimony and the facts in Elsa S., the AJ
determined 	that 	Complainant 	was 	entitled 	to 	a 	non-pecuniary 	compensatory
damages award of $85,000.
Regarding leave restoration, the AJ found that it was appropriate to restore leave
for dates after March 27, 2023, when Complainant’s medical condition forced her
to miss work. The AJ noted their finding that Complainant did not establish that
her symptoms or any alleged worsening of her symptoms was attributable to the
Agency’s actions. Complainant testified that, on approximately six occasions, she
experienced bowel incontinence on the way to or from work and that, when it
happened on the way to work, she would use leave to return home to clean herself
up. While Complainant did not testify regarding the dates of these incidents or
whether she used sick or annual leave when she had to return home, the AJ granted
Complainant four hours of sick leave per episode, for a total of 24 hours.
The AJ granted Complainant $4,053.34 in costs as requested. The AJ found that
the request for nearly $300,000 in attorney’s fees was unreasonable considering
Complainant’s total recovery and the complexity of the case. The AJ deducted
$5,000 in fees for clerical work and $939 for a potential retaliation claim that was
never raised. The AJ applied a 20% reduction to the remaining fees based on a
determination that Complainant’s attorneys appeared to request more than their

2026000547	6
stated hourly rates. The AJ applied another one third reduction for duplicative
billing. The AJ awarded $154,411.47 in attorney’s fees, for a total of $158,464.81
in attorney’s fees and costs.
On November 14, 2025, the Agency issued a final order3 stating that it would fully
implement the AJ’s decision finding discrimination and the order of relief.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
On appeal, Complainant argues that she is entitled to $175,000 in non-pecuniary
compensatory damages because the harm began before the Agency revoked her
telework and because the denial of a reasonable accommodation caused her
preexisting condition to get worse. Complainant contends that she established that
she is entitled to the restoration of 655.75 hours of leave taken between March 26,
2023, and April 25, 2025. According to Complainant, the AJ also erred in applying
large across-the-board reductions to the attorney’s fees requested.
The Agency argues, in pertinent part, that its final order should be affirmed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by an AJ will
be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence
is defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding regarding
whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-
Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ’s conclusions of law are
subject to a de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held.
An AJ’s credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or on the
tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or other objective
3 EEOC regulation 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(a) states that an agency shall issue a final
order within 40 calendar days of receipt of an AJ’s decision. However, pursuant to
29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(f), the Commission tolled all complaint processing timelines
that were affected by the lapse in appropriations from October 1, 2025, to
November 12, 2025.

2026000547	7
evidence so contradicts the testimony, or the testimony so lacks in credibility that a
reasonable fact finder would not credit it. See Equal Employment Opportunity
Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), Chapter 9, at
§ VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015).
ANALYSIS
Non-Pecuniary Compensatory Damages
Here, it is undisputed that Complainant is entitled to compensatory damages. The
AJ awarded Complainant $85,000 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages. On
appeal, Complainant argues that she is entitled to $175,000 in non-pecuniary
compensatory damages.
In West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212 (1999), the Supreme Court held that Congress
afforded the Commission the authority to award compensatory damages in the
administrative process. For an employer with more than 500 employees, such as
the agency, the limit of liability for future pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages is
$300,000. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). Non-pecuniary losses are losses that are not
subject to precise quantification, i.e., emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience,
mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, injury to professional standing, injury to
character 	and 	reputation, 	injury 	to 	credit 	standing, 	and 	loss 	of 	health. 	See
Enforcement Guidance: Compensatory and Punitive Damages Available under §
102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 at 10 (July 14,
1992). There is no precise formula for determining the amount of damages for non-
pecuniary losses except that the award should reflect the nature and severity of the
harm and the duration or expected duration of the harm. See Loving v. Dep’t of the
Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 01955789 (Aug. 29, 1997). The Commission notes
that non-pecuniary compensatory damages are designed to remedy the harm
caused 	by 	the 	discriminatory 	event 	rather 	than 	punish 	the 	Agency 	for 	the
discriminatory 	action. 	Furthermore, 	compensatory 	damages 	should 	not 	be
motivated by passion or prejudice or be “monstrously excessive” standing alone,
but should be consistent with the amounts awarded in similar cases. See Ward-
Jenkins v. Dep’t of the Interior, EEOC Appeal No. 01961483 (Mar. 4, 1999).
Objective evidence of compensatory damages can include statements from the
complainant concerning his or her emotional pain or suffering, inconvenience,
mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, injury to professional standing, injury to

2026000547	8
character or reputation, injury to credit standing, loss of health, and any other non-
pecuniary losses that are incurred as a result of discriminatory conduct. Statements
from others, including family members, friends, health care providers, other
counselors (including clergy) could address the outward manifestations or physical
consequences 	of 	emotional 	distress, 	including 	sleeplessness, 	anxiety, 	stress,
depression, marital strain, humiliation, emotional distress, loss of self-esteem,
excessive fatigue, or a nervous breakdown. See Lawrence v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
EEOC Appeal No. 01952288 (Apr. 18, 1996), citing Carle v. Dep’t of the Navy,
EEOC Appeal No. 01922369 (Jan. 5, 1993).
Evidence 	from 	a 	health 	care 	provider 	or 	other 	expert 	is 	not 	a 	mandatory
prerequisite 	for 	recovery 	of 	compensatory 	damages 	for 	emotional 	harm. 	A
complainant’s own testimony, along with the circumstances of a particular case,
can suffice to sustain his or her burden in this regard. The more inherently
degrading or humiliating the defendant’s action is, the more reasonable it is to infer
that a person would suffer humiliation or distress from that action. The absence of
supporting evidence, however, may affect the amount of damages appropriate in
specific cases. Lawrence, EEOC Appeal No. 01952288.
As Complainant notes on appeal, the Commission applies the principle that “a
tortfeasor takes its victims as it finds them.” Wallis v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC
Appeal No. 01950510 (Nov. 13, 1995) (quoting Williamson v. Handy Button
Machine Co., 817 F.2d 1290, 1295 (7th Cir. 1987)). The Commission also applies
two exceptions to this general rule. First, when a complainant has a preexisting
condition, the agency is liable only for the additional harm or aggravation caused
by the discrimination. Second, if the complainant’s preexisting condition inevitably
would have worsened, the agency is entitled to a reduction in damages reflecting
the 	extent 	to 	which 	the 	condition 	would 	have 	worsened 	even 	absent 	the
discrimination; the burden of proof being on the agency to establish the extent of
this entitlement. Wallis, EEOC Appeal No. 01950510 (citing Maurer v. United
States, 668 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1981)); Finlay v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No.
01942985 (Apr. 29, 1997). The Commission notes, however, that complainant is
entitled to recover damages only for injury, or additional injury, caused by the
discrimination. Terrell v. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., EEOC Appeal No.
01961030 (Oct. 25, 1996); EEOC Notice No. 915.002 at 12.
Here, substantial evidence in the record supports the AJ’s determination that
Complainant 	did 	not 	establish 	that 	the 	Agency’s 	denial 	of 	a 	reasonable

2026000547	9
accommodation 	exacerbated 	her 	gastrointestinal 	condition. 	Medical 	records
indicate that Complainant discontinued her bowel regimen and continued to
experience severe constipation and pain while she was still teleworking full-time.
Similarly, we find that substantial evidence of record supports the AJ’s finding that
Complainant’s increased use of Depends, decreased social activity, and decreased
marital intimacy were attributable to her gastrointestinal condition rather than the
Agency’s denial of continued full-time telework as a reasonable accommodation.
The AJ found that Complainant credibly testified that she experienced bowel
incontinence while commuting to and from work approximately six times and had
to either return home to clean herself up or sit in her own waste for the remainder
of her commute. Although Complainant did not have an accident at work, she was
extremely anxious and horrified about the possibility. Complainant was humiliated
and self-conscious about passing gas and having urgent bowel movements at work,
including two times when she clogged the toilet. To the extent that Complainant
argues on appeal that she suffered harm prior to being required to return to the
office, 	substantial 	evidence 	in 	the 	record 	supports 	the 	AJ’s 	finding 	that
Complainant established that she was subjected to harm as a result of not being
accommodated beginning on March 27, 2023.
The AJ determined that the Agency’s failure to accommodate and Complainant’s
damages were similar to the facts described in Elsa S., EEOC Appeal No.
0720180021. The complainant in Elsa S. requested telework as a reasonable
accommodation for irritable bowel syndrome, which was denied. The complainant
experienced accidents at work and was forced to sit in her own waste or try to
clean her underwear in the restroom, causing stress and anxiety. The AJ in Elsa S.
found that the agency’s failure to accommodate exacerbated the complainant’s
symptoms. The complainant and her husband also stated that she experienced
depression, loss of confidence, feelings of social isolation at work, strain on their
marriage, and psychological stress. The AJ noted that, unlike the complainant in
Elsa S., Complainant never had an accident at work, which would have been
inherently more embarrassing than having an accident on the way to or from work.
Using the $100,000 award of non-pecuniary damages in Elsa S. as a guide, the AJ
found that Complainant was entitled to $85,000 in non-pecuniary compensatory
damages.
On appeal, Complainant contends that she suffered more significant medical harm
than the complainant in Elsa S., including potentially permanent damage to her

2026000547	10
pelvic floor and internal organs as a result of not taking her medication. However,
as stated above, we find that substantial evidence supports the AJ’s determination
that Complainant did not show that the denial of accommodation worsened her
gastrointestinal condition. This precludes a finding that damage to her pelvic floor
and internal organs related to her gastrointestinal condition was attributable to the
Agency’s failure to accommodate Complainant.
Upon 	review, 	we 	find 	that 	the 	AJ’s 	award 	of 	$85,000 	in 	non-pecuniary
compensatory 	damages 	is 	supported 	by 	substantial 	evidence, 	is 	neither
monstrously excessive nor the product of passion or prejudice and is consistent
with Commission precedent. See Randolph T. v. Dep’t of the Army, EEOC Appeal
No. 2020004200 (Dec. 13, 2021) ($70,000 in non-pecuniary damages ($83,838.21
present-day value)4 where 16-month delay in providing accommodation resulted in
complainant experiencing depression, stress, alcohol dependency, and aggravation
of physical medical conditions); Augustine V. v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal
No. 2020001847 (Aug. 16, 2021) ($70,000 in non-pecuniary damages ($85,442.54
present-day 	value) 	where 	continued 	and 	indefinite 	delay 	in 	providing
accommodation caused complainant to experience depression, anxiety, anger, and
sleeplessness, among other conditions); Mardell B. v. Soc. Sec. Admin., EEOC
Appeal No. 0120172035 (Oct. 31, 2017) ($70,000 in non-pecuniary damages
($94,761.92 present-day value) where two-year delay in providing accommodation
caused 	complainant 	to 	suffer 	emotionally, 	become 	depressed, 	and 	change
physically, as well as exacerbating her medical condition).
Leave Restoration
When discrimination is found, the Agency must provide the complainant with a
remedy that constitutes full, make-whole relief to restore her as nearly as possible
to the position he would have occupied absent the discrimination. See, e.g., Franks
v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
4 The Commission has held that, when determining an award of nonpecuniary
compensatory damages, the Commission may consider the present-day value of
comparable awards. Lara G. v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 0520130618
(June 9, 2017). The Commission has used the Consumer Price Index (CPI)
Inflation Calculator to calculate the present-day value of past compensatory
damages 	awards. 	See 	Bureau 	of 	Labor 	Statistics, 	CPI 	Inflation 	Calculator,
https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm.

2026000547	11
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-19 (1975); Adesanya v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC
Appeal No. 01933395 (July 21, 1994). As part of make-whole relief, the AJ
determined that Complainant was entitled to restoration of leave taken as a result
of the Agency denying her effective reasonable accommodation. The AJ ordered
the Agency to restore 24 hours of sick leave, and Complainant requests the
restoration of 655.75 hours of paid leave.
Complainant argues that she used 655.75 hours of paid leave to manage symptoms
related 	to 	her disability 	that 	could 	have 	been 	accommodated 	with 	full-time
telework. 	Upon 	review, 	we 	accept 	the AJ’s 	determination 	that 	Complainant
credibly testified that she had approximately six accidents on her way to or from
work. We find that substantial evidence of record supports the AJ’s determination
that Complainant did not establish that her need to take leave was attributable to
the denial of her request for telework as a reasonable accommodation, with the
exception of those occasions when she soiled herself on her commute to work and
needed to use leave to clean herself up. Accordingly, we find that Complainant is
entitled to restoration of 24 hours of sick leave.
Attorney’s Fees and Costs
The Rehabilitation Act authorizes the award of reasonable attorney’s fees. 29
C.F.R. § 1614.501(e). To establish entitlement to attorney’s fees, Complainant
must first show that he or she is a prevailing party. Buckhannon Bd. and Care
Home Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
A prevailing party for this purpose is one who succeeds on any significant issue
and achieves some of the benefit sought in bringing the action. Davis v. Dep’t of
Transp., EEOC Request No. 05970101 (Feb. 4, 1999) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 427, 433 (1983)).
The fee award is ordinarily determined by multiplying a reasonable number of
hours expended on the case by a reasonable hourly rate, also known as a
“lodestar.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)(2)(ii)(B); Bernard v. Dep’t of Veterans
Affs., EEOC Appeal No. 01966861 (July 17, 1998). In determining the number of
hours expended the Commission recognizes that the attorney “is not required to
record in great detail the manner in which each minute of his time was expended.”
Id. However, the attorney does have the burden of identifying the subject matters
on 	which 	he 	spent 	his 	time 	by 	submitting 	sufficiently 	detailed 	and

2026000547	12
contemporaneous time records to ensure that the time spent was 	accurately
recorded. Id.
Further, a reasonable fee award may be assessed in light of factors such as: (1) the
time required (versus time expended) to complete the legal work; (2) novelty or
difficulty of the issues; (3) the requisite skill to properly handle the case; (4) the
degree to which counsel is precluded from taking other cases; (5) the relief sought
and 	results 	obtained; 	and 	(6) 	the 	nature 	and 	length 	of 	the 	attorney-client
relationship. See Cerny v. Dep’t of the Army, EEOC Request No. 05930899 (Oct.
19, 1994). Complainant is only entitled to an award for time reasonably expended.
It does not always follow that the amount of time actually expended is the amount
of time reasonably expended. Elvin v. Dep’t of Labor, EEOC Request No.
01943425 (Aug. 31, 1995). Rather, “billing judgment” is an important component
in fee setting, and hours that would not be properly billed to a private client are
also not properly billed to an agency pursuant to a successful EEO claim. Id.
Counsel for the prevailing party should make a “good faith effort to exclude from a
fee request hours that are excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary.” See
Bernard, EEOC Appeal No. 01966861.
We 	find 	that 	substantial 	evidence 	supports 	the 	AJ’s 	determination 	that
Complainant is entitled to reimbursement of $4,053.34 in costs, as well as the AJ’s
deduction of $5,000 for clerical work and $939 for the retaliation claim that was
never raised. We have reviewed Complainant’s arguments on appeal regarding the
AJ’s 20 percent reduction to the requested rates and find them to be unpersuasive.
After careful review of Complainant’s fee petition, we agree with the AJ that there
appear to be excessive and duplicative billing entries, including a number of
instances of attorneys billing for conferring with each other. Regarding duplicative
billing, the Commission has held that it is reasonable to disallow the charges of one
attorney where both attorneys are charging for time conferring with each other. See
Estefana M. v. Dep’t of Transp., EEOC Appeal No. 2022005175 (Dec. 21, 2023);
Ricardo K. v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., EEOC Appeal No. 2020003751 (Nov. 16,
2021); Holmes v. Dep’t of Energy, EEOC Appeal No. 01976454 (Mar. 13, 2000).
Here, Complainant requests more than $17,000 in fees for two attorneys to present
the case at the hearing while also requesting nearly $12,000 in fees for a third,
more senior attorney who apparently attended the hearing in an advisory or

2026000547	13
supervisory capacity.5 Fee Petition Ex. 1 at 20. The Commission has recognized
that the presence of multiple counsel at a hearing or deposition may be considered
duplicative in certain situations, such as where one or more counsel had little or no
participation, absent a showing that the case was unusually difficult or complex.
See Hodge v. Dep’t of Transp., EEOC Request No. 05920057 (Apr. 23, 1992); see
also Belia B. v. Dep’t of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 2022003701 (Dec. 12,
2024); Complainant v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., EEOC Appeal No. 0720130035
(Oct. 20, 2015); Jimenez v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., EEOC Appeal No.
0120083765 (June 12, 2012); Nolan v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., EEOC Appeal No.
07A40119 (June 7, 2006). As the AJ found, the issues in this case were not
complex enough to require the presence of three attorneys at the hearing, especially
considering the third attorney’s lack of participation.
For the reasons stated, we find that, rather than conducting a line-by-line analysis,
the AJ appropriately reduced the number of hours requested by one-third across the
board. 	See 	Ricardo 	K., 	EEOC 	Appeal 	No. 	2020003751 	(finding 	that 	AJ
appropriately applied reduction of one-third for excessive and unnecessary hours);
Odis H. v. Dep’t of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 0120171383 (Mar. 28, 2019) (finding
that 	AJ’s 	50 	percent 	across-the-board 	reduction 	for 	excessive 	billing 	was
appropriate); Denese G. v. Dep’t of the Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 0120172618
(Mar. 5, 2019) (affirming 30 percent across-the-board reduction for excessive
hours); Mohar v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0720100019 (Aug. 29,
2011), req. for recon. denied, EEOC Request No. 0520120027 (Mar. 29, 2012)
(finding that a 15 percent across-the-board reduction of attorney’s fees was
warranted when complainant’s fee petition simply reflected too much time spent
by too many people).
Accordingly, we find that the AJ appropriately awarded $154,411.47 in attorney’s
fees, for a total of $158,464.81 in attorney’s fees and costs.
5 We note that Complainant also requests reimbursement for more than $3,500 in
fees for a paralegal who took notes during the hearing. Fee Petition Ex. 1 at 20.

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CONCLUSION
Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including
those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency’s final order fully
implementing the AJ’s decision finding discrimination based on disability and the
ordered relief.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M1125)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if
Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or
evidence that tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of
material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Sector
(OFS) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. If the party
requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the
request, that statement or brief must be filed together with the request for
reconsideration. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of
another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or
statement 	in 	opposition. 	See 	29 	C.F.R. 	§ 	1614.405; 	Equal 	Employment
Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at
Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015).
Complainant should submit their request for reconsideration, and any statement or
brief in support of their request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at
https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx. 	Alternatively, 	Complainant 	can
submit their request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Sector, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box
77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street,
NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFS receives it by mail within
five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. §
1614.604.

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An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the
EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Either
party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include proof of
service on the other party, unless Complainant files their request via the EEOC
Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required.
Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s
request 	for 	reconsideration 	as 	untimely, 	unless 	extenuating 	circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must
be submitted together with the request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very
limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(f).
COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0124)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District
Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this
decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint
the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that
person by their full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the
dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national
organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If
you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will
terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so,
you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without
paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent
you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you.
You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an
attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole
discretion to grant or deny these types of requests.

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Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the
paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time
limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:
T. Gimbrere
____________________________ 	Acting Director's signature
T. Gimbrere, Acting Director
Office of Federal Sector
September 28, 2026
Date