C-I-R-H- & H-S-V-R-

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Matter of C-I-R-H- & H-S-V-R-, Respondents
Decided by Board May 23, 20251
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
While explicit statements from the persecutors regarding the protected ground are not
required to establish nexus, there must be some showing of a connection between the
persecutors’ actions and the protected ground beyond speculation such that the alleged
harm is not solely stemming from statistical likelihoods or unfortunate coincidence.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Luis A. Gonzalez, Falls Church, Virginia
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Matthew E. Sweet, Assistant
Chief Counsel
BEFORE: Board Panel: MALPHRUS, Chief Appellate Immigration Judge, MULLANE
and CREPPY, Appellate Immigration Judges.
MALPHRUS, Chief Appellate Immigration Judge:
On December 30, 2021, we remanded the record to the Immigration
Judge for additional fact finding and analysis. The Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”) now appeals from the March 24, 2022, decision of the
Immigration Judge granting the respondent’s application for asylum under
section 208(b)(1)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”),
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2018).2 The respondents, natives and citizens of
Honduras, oppose the appeal. The appeal will be sustained, and the record
will be remanded.
The respondent testified that, among other things, multiple male relatives
on her mother’s side of the family were killed between 2011 and 2018. The
Immigration Judge found the respondent had not established past persecution
but had shown a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of her
1 	Pursuant to Order No. 6306-2025, dated June 25, 2025, the Attorney General designated
the Board’s decision in Matter of C-I-R-H- & H-S-V-R- (BIA May 23, 2025), as precedent
in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(3) (2025).
Editorial changes have been made consistent with the designation of the case as a
precedent.
2 	The respondents are a mother and her minor daughter. The minor child has not filed a
Form I-589 and only seeks asylum as a derivative beneficiary on her mother’s application.
All references to “the respondent” refer to the adult respondent.

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115
membership in a particular social group characterized as “family relationship
with her mother” and that Honduran authorities were unable or unwilling to
control the persecutors. 	The Immigration Judge granted the respondent’s
application for asylum.
On appeal, DHS argues the Immigration Judge erred as a matter of fact
and law in his findings and analyses regarding the objective reasonableness
of the respondent’s fear of future persecution, her ability to relocate
internally within Honduras, the existence of a nexus between the harm feared
and a cognizable protected ground, and the Honduran government’s inability
or unwillingness to control the perpetrators. 	We review the Immigration
Judge’s factual findings for clear error, but his legal determinations de novo.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i), (ii) (2025).
We will sustain the appeal and vacate the March 24, 2022, decision on
the basis that it includes factual findings that are not supported by record
evidence and errors of law with respect to nexus. 	A respondent seeking
asylum must establish that the harm suffered or feared is persecution “on
account 	of” 	a 	protected 	ground. 	INA 	§ 	101(a)(42)(A), 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A) (2018); accord Alvarez Lagos v. Barr, 927 F.3d 236, 245
(4th Cir. 2019). To satisfy the nexus requirement, the respondent must show
that the applicable protected ground was or would be “at least one central
reason” for the persecution. 	Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117,
127 	(4th 	Cir. 	2011) 	(quoting 	INA 	§ 	208(b)(1)(B)(i), 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)).
Here, the Immigration Judge acknowledged the respondent’s testimony
that no one knew who killed her family members or why but cited to cases
from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in whose
jurisdiction this case arises, to conclude a showing of motive is not required
to satisfy the element of nexus. 	However, these cases do not support the
Immigration Judge’s conclusion. In Hernandez-Cartagena v. Barr, 977 F.3d
316, 321–23 (4th Cir. 2020), the Fourth Circuit faulted the Immigration
Judge and this Board for not addressing statements made by the perpetrators
in which they repeatedly referenced the petitioner’s parents then ultimately
determined that the petitioner had shown a nexus between her family and the
harm alleged. Similarly, in Perez Vasquez v. Garland, 4 F.4th 213, 226–27
(4th Cir. 2021), the Fourth Circuit noted that the respondent did not know
why she was targeted but also found nexus was established given that the
“unrebutted evidence demonstrate[d] that the gang leveraged Petitioner’s
familial relationship to her husband, as well as their familial relationships to
their daughter, to incentivize payment.” 	In both cases, the Fourth Circuit
referred to unrebutted record evidence showing a connection between the

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family-based particular social group and the perpetrators’ persecution, such
as statements from the persecutors.
While we agree that explicit statements from the persecutors regarding
the protected ground are not required, there must be some showing of a
connection beyond speculation such that the alleged harm is not solely
stemming from statistical likelihoods or unfortunate coincidence. See Matter
of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 40, 45 (BIA 2017) (explaining “nexus is not
established simply because a particular social group of family members
exists and the family members experience harm”). Such a showing comports
with the definition of nexus as contemplated in the INA. 	As the Supreme
Court of the United States has explained, we do not require direct proof of
the 	persecutors’ 	motives 	to 	satisfy 	the 	nexus 	requirement. 	INS 	v.
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992). 	“But since the statute makes
motive critical, [a respondent] must provide some evidence of it, direct or
circumstantial.” Id. Thus, the Immigration Judge erred in concluding that a
showing of nexus does not require indicia of persecutory motive.
While it is regrettable that so many of the respondent’s relatives have
been killed, the respondent acknowledged that she and her family do not
know whether it was the same perpetrators who killed the many deceased
relatives. 	She did not testify about any direct threats to her or her family;
instead, she testified that in 2013, a neighbor commented that there was a
rumor going around the village that the family was going to be killed. Here,
there is an absence of any showing of a connection between the various
killings and an apparent motive for any of the killings. 	In addition, the
perpetrators are unknown parties who have never directly or indirectly
communicated with the respondent or anyone else in the family or referred
to the family in relation to the murders. Thus, the facts are too speculative
and too tenuously connected to constitute even circumstantial evidence that
could underpin a determination that nexus has been established.3 The record
does not demonstrate that persecutory motive exists in this case, as the facts
do not indicate—without speculation—that the harm was perpetrated on
account of a protected ground. 	Based on the foregoing, we reverse the
Immigration Judge’s finding that nexus has been established in this case.
We decline to address the other issues raised on appeal. 	See INS v.
Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (“As a general rule courts
3 	Also, as the Immigration Judge found, and DHS notes on appeal, only male members
of the family have been killed. 	Even if persecutory motive were shown, the record
evidence is insufficient to show nexus to anyone beyond a male subset of the proposed
group.

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and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of
which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”). 	The respondent has not
established eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal. Mirisawo v.
Holder, 599 F.3d 391, 396 (4th Cir. 2010) (explaining applicants who cannot
satisfy asylum burden cannot satisfy higher standard for withholding of
removal). We thus reverse the grant of asylum.
We will remand the record for the Immigration Judge to consider the
respondent’s application for protection under the regulations implementing
the Convention Against Torture4 in the first instance. The parties may update
the record. In remanding this record, we express no opinion as to the ultimate
outcome of these proceedings. See Matter of L-O-G-, 21 I&N Dec. 413, 422
(BIA 1996). Accordingly, the following orders will be entered.
ORDER: DHS’ appeal is sustained, and the decision of the Immigration
Judge dated March 24, 2022, granting the respondents asylum is vacated.
FURTHER ORDER: 	The record is remanded to the Immigration
Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing order and for the
entry of a new decision.
4 	The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into
force for United States on Nov. 20, 1994).