PINZON ROZO

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Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 507 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4171
Matter of Julian Santiago PINZON ROZO, Respondent
Decided March 11, 2026
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
The Immigration Judge erred in granting the respondent, who has an approved petition
for special immigrant juvenile classification, a continuance to await the availability of a
visa, where the respondent’s priority date will not be current for an uncertain and lengthy
period of time.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: 	Johanna T. Sanchez-Albarracin, Esquire, Wainscott,
New York
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: 	Edward P. Lombardo,
Assistant Chief Counsel
BEFORE: Board Panel: MALPHRUS, Chief Appellate Immigration Judge; CHABAN,
Appellate Immigration Judge; MCCLOSKEY, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge.
MALPHRUS, Chief Appellate Immigration Judge:
The 	Department 	of 	Homeland 	Security 	(“DHS”) 	has 	filed 	an
interlocutory appeal from the Immigration Judge’s December 8, 2025,
decision granting the respondent’s motion for a continuance of his removal
proceedings. 	Although the Board does not usually entertain interlocutory
appeals, we deem it appropriate to do so here “to correct recurring problems
in the handling of” continuance requests by Immigration Judges. Matter of
M-D-, 24 I&N Dec. 138, 139 (BIA 2007). The appeal will be sustained, and
the record will be remanded.
The respondent, a native and citizen of Colombia, was last admitted to
the United States on December 3, 2018, as a nonimmigrant visitor for a
period not to exceed 6 months. He overstayed his visa. On May 23, 2025,
shortly after he turned 20 years old, he filed a visa petition for special
immigrant 	juvenile 	classification 	under 	section 	101(a)(27)(J) 	of 	the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2024),
with 	United 	States 	Citizenship 	and 	Immigration 	Services 	(“USCIS”).
Several months later, DHS placed him in removal proceedings and charged
him with removability under section 237(a)(1)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(B) (2024), for remaining in the United States for a time longer
than permitted. The respondent conceded his removability and stated that he
would not be filing any applications for relief from removal. 	Instead, he

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stated that he would be moving for the Immigration Judge to administratively
close or terminate removal proceedings based on the then-pending visa
petition. 	USCIS approved the respondent’s visa petition on November 4,
2025. The respondent then filed a motion with the Immigration Judge asking
to administratively close or continue his removal proceedings pending the
availability of a visa. 	The Immigration Judge denied the administrative
closure request 	but 	agreed to 	continue 	the removal proceedings until
February 12, 2027. The present appeal followed.
An Immigration Judge “may grant a motion for continuance for good
cause shown.” 	8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (2020); see also Matter of L-A-B-R-,
27 I&N Dec. 405, 415 (A.G. 2018) (“A respondent bears the burden of
establishing good cause for a continuance.”). 	Whether the Immigration
Judge erred in granting a continuance is a legal question we review de novo.
See Matter of J-A-F-S-, 29 I&N Dec. 195, 198 (BIA 2025); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2026).
In determining whether good cause exists for a continuance based on the
pendency 	of 	a 	collateral 	matter, 	an 	Immigration 	Judge 	“must 	focus
principally on two factors: (1) the likelihood that the alien will receive the
collateral relief, and (2) whether the relief will materially affect the outcome
of the removal proceedings.” Matter of L-A-B-R- 27 I&N Dec.at 413. The
Immigration 	Judge 	should 	also 	consider 	secondary 	factors, 	including
“whether the alien has exercised reasonable diligence in pursuing that relief,
DHS’s position on the motion, the length of the requested continuance, and
the procedural history of the case.” 	Id. 	The two primary factors are not
dispositive when “there are relevant secondary factors that weigh against
continuing the proceedings.” 	Matter of L-N-Y-, 27 I&N Dec. 755, 758
(BIA 2020).
An alien whose petition for special immigrant juvenile classification has
been approved by USCIS may apply for adjustment of status to lawful
permanent 	residence 	“only 	when 	an 	immigrant 	visa 	is 	immediately
available.” 	Matter of Cahuec Tzalam, 29 I&N Dec. 300, 304 (BIA 2025);
see also INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2024) (discussing the general
requirements for adjustment of status); 8 C.F.R. §§ 245.1(a), 1245.1(a)
(2026) (same). 	The availability of visas, including special immigrant
juvenile visas, is determined by the applicant’s priority date, that is, the date
the applicant filed the petition. See 22 C.F.R. § 42.51(b) (2026) (providing
that visa numbers are made available “based on the chronological order of
the priority dates of visa applicants”).

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According to the United States Department of State’s visa bulletin, visas
for aliens classified as special immigrant juveniles are currently only
available to aliens who filed their visa petition before July 15, 2021. 	See
Bureau of Consular Affs., U.S. Dep’t of State, Visa Bulletin, Vol. XI, No. 12
(Mar. 	2026), 	https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/visa-law0
/visa-bulletin/2026/visa-bulletin-for-march-2026.html; see also Matter of
Cahuec Tzalam, 29 I&N Dec. at 304 (noting that special immigrant juveniles
fall within the fourth preference employment-based visa category). The rate
at which the currently eligible priority date moves forward often fluctuates
and is subject to being pushed back in a process known as “retrogression,”
when 	actual 	demand 	for 	a 	visa 	category 	exceeds 	the 	available 	visas
established in the INA and projected for issuance in each visa category by
the 	State 	Department. 	Cheejati 	v. 	Blinken, 	106 	F.4th 	388, 	391–92
(5th Cir. 2024) (explaining the visa allocation and retrogression process).
Thus, while the eligible priority date can change based on demand at a given
time, there is presently a nearly 4-year gap between the currently eligible visa
priority date and the respondent’s priority date of May 23, 2025. The amount
of time the respondent would have to wait for a visa number is highly
uncertain and potentially lengthy.
The respondent has not met his burden to establish good cause for a
continuance. 	See Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. at 415. 	Although the
respondent would be eligible for adjustment of status if a visa were available
and eligibility for adjustment would materially affect the outcome of his
removal proceedings, the relevant secondary factors in this case strongly
weigh against a continuance. 	The significant gap between the currently
eligible visa priority date and the respondent’s priority date militates against
a continuance for an “unknown and potentially lengthy period of time” to
await the availability of a visa. 	Matter of L-N-Y-, 27 I&N Dec. at 759;
see also 	Hernandez 	v. Garland, No. 21-6340, 2024 WL 	443374, *1
(2d Cir. Feb. 6, 2024) (unpublished) (holding that the Board “did not err in
affirming the IJ’s denial of a continuance” when “no [special immigrant
juvenile] visa was immediately available to [the respondent] and there was
still a year-long gap between the then-current visa availability date and [the
respondent’s] visa priority date”); Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. at 418
(holding that “good cause does not exist if the alien’s visa priority date is too
remote to raise the prospect of adjustment of status above the speculative
level”). Indeed, we have long held that “the fact that [a] respondent has an
approved visa petition does not entitle him to delay the completion of
[removal] proceedings pending availability of a visa number.” 	Matter of
Quintero, 18 I&N Dec. 348, 350 (BIA 1982).

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Moreover, in seeking a continuance, the respondent bears the burden to
show he “demonstrated reasonable diligence in pursuing the collateral
adjudication.” Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. at 412. The respondent has
not offered any explanation for why, despite last entering the United States
in 2018, he waited to file his visa petition until 2025 at the age of 20. 	See
Pereida v. Wilkinson, 592 U.S. 224, 240 (2021) (explaining that “evidentiary
gaps work against” the party bearing the burden of proof). 	His failure to
demonstrate diligence weighs against the grant of a continuance.
Finally, DHS’ opposition based on its interest in the prompt resolution of
these proceedings is also an important consideration in determining whether
there is good cause for a continuance. See Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec.
at 416; see also Matter of B-N-K-, 29 I&N Dec. 96, 99 (BIA 2025) (noting
the significant public interest in bringing immigration proceedings “to a close
as promptly as is consistent with the interest in giving the adversaries a fair
opportunity to develop and present their respective cases” (quoting INS v.
Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 107 (1988)). 	The respondent has conceded his
removability and is not seeking any form of relief from removal before the
Immigration Judge. 	See Matter of B-N-K-, 29 I&N Dec. at 99 (explaining
that “the role of Immigration Judges and the Board is to adjudicate whether
an alien is removable and eligible for relief from removal in cases brought
by DHS”). 	Continuing to prolong these removal proceedings indefinitely
over DHS’ opposition when there is no dispute regarding the respondent’s
removability or eligibility for relief would significantly undermine “the
public 	interest 	in 	expeditious 	enforcement 	of 	the 	immigration 	laws.”
Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. at 406.
In this case, the uncertain and potentially lengthy period of time until a
visa would become available to the respondent, along with DHS’ opposition
to the respondent’s 	motion for a continuance, strongly weigh against
continuing 	removal 	proceedings 	to 	await 	the 	respondent’s 	potential
eligibility for adjustment of status. 	Balancing the relevant primary and
secondary factors for assessing good cause, the Immigration Judge erred in
granting the respondent, who has an approved petition for special immigrant
juvenile classification, a continuance to await the availability of a visa, where
the respondent’s priority date will not be current for an uncertain and lengthy
period of time. We will therefore sustain DHS’ appeal and remand the record
for further proceedings.
ORDER: The appeal is sustained.
FURTHER ORDER: The record is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new decision.