N-A-G-C-

page
662
Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 662 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4200
Matter of N-A-G-C-, Respondent
Decided June 2, 2026
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
Neither a previous designation as an unaccompanied alien child (UAC) nor an approved
special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) petition gives an Immigration Judge authority to
redetermine the custody status of an alien who has not been admitted to the United States.
Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), followed.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Michelle J. Moodispaw, Esquire, Glen Burnie, Maryland
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Jeffery D. Lindsay, Assistant
Chief Counsel
BEFORE: Board Panel: HUNSUCKER and VOLKERT, Appellate Immigration Judges;
GILLIES, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge.
HUNSUCKER, Appellate Immigration Judge:
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) appeals an Immigration
Judge’s bond order dated October 14, 2025, granting the respondent’s
request for a change in custody status and releasing him from custody upon
payment of a $4,000 bond. 	The Immigration Judge issued a memorandum
explaining the bond decision on March 31, 2026. 	The respondent opposes
the appeal. 	We will sustain DHS’ appeal, vacate the Immigration Judge’s
bond decision, and order the respondent detained without bond.
The respondent, a native and citizen of El Salvador, arrived in the United
States 	on 	or 	about 	November 	30, 	2022, 	and 	was 	designated 	an
unaccompanied alien child (“UAC”) upon entry when he was 17 years old.
On or about December 18, 2022, the Office of Refugee Resettlement
(“ORR”) transferred the respondent to the care of his biological brother.
Thereafter, on January 21, 2025, a Maryland court awarded the respondent’s
custody to his mother, as she was residing in the United States.
On April 17, 2023, DHS served the respondent with a notice to appear
charging him with inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)
(2018), as an alien present in the United States without being admitted or

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 662 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4200
page
663
paroled. In September of 2025, the respondent was taken into DHS custody
and the Immigration Judge conducted a custody redetermination hearing.
The Immigration Judge concluded that she had authority to redetermine
the respondent’s custody under section 236(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
(2024). The Immigration Judge rejected DHS’ argument that the respondent
is an applicant for admission subject to mandatory detention under section
235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (2024). The Immigration
Judge concluded that the Board’s decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado,
29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), did not control because the respondent had
previously been designated a UAC upon entering the United States in 2022
at the age of 17, and has an approved Form I-360 petition as a Special
Immigrant Juvenile (“SIJ”). The Immigration Judge further determined that
the respondent did not present a danger to persons or property and that a
$4,000 bond was sufficient to ensure his appearance at future proceedings.
On appeal, DHS argues that the Immigration Judge lacked authority to
redetermine the respondent’s custody because the respondent is an applicant
for admission and is subject to the detention framework set forth in section
235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), pursuant to the Board’s
binding precedent in Matter of Yajure Hurtado. 	We agree that neither a
previous designation as a UAC nor an approved SIJ petition gives an
Immigration Judge authority to redetermine the custody status of an alien
who has not been admitted to the United States.
Upon de novo review, we conclude that Matter of Yajure Hurtado
controls the outcome of the present case.1 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2026).
Based on the text and structure of the INA, the Immigration Judge lacked
statutory authority to redetermine the respondent’s custody. 	The INA
provides that “[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been
admitted . . . shall be deemed . . . an applicant for admission.” INA
1 	We are aware that a federal district court in Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-01873-
SSS-BFM, 2026 WL 468284, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2026), vacated Matter of Yajure
Hurtado, and that the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit temporarily
stayed that order. See Bautista v. DHS, No. 26-1044, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 6750, at *2–3
(9th Cir. Mar. 6, 2026). This case arises in Florence, Arizona, and is not within the Central
District of California. We also note that federal courts of appeals have reached differing
conclusions regarding the scope of detention authority under INA §§ 235 and 236, 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1225, 1226. Compare Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), and
Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026), with Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, No. 25-
3141-pr, 2026 WL 1146044 (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 2026), Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, Nos. 25-
1965/1969/1978/1982, 2026 WL 1283891 (6th Cir. May 11, 2026), and Hernandez Alvarez
v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami, Nos. 25-14065/14075, 2026 WL 1243395 (11th Cir.
May 6, 2026).

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 662 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4200
page
664
§ 235(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) (2024). 	The respondent entered the
United States without admission or parole and has not identified any lawful
admission. 	Thus, under the statute’s express terms, the respondent is an
applicant for admission. 	See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. at
220–28; Matter of Lemus, 25 I&N Dec. 734, 743 & n.6 (BIA 2012).
Detention authority for applicants for admission is governed by section
235(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), which does not authorize Immigration
Judges to consider bond for such aliens. Section 236(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a), governs a different statutory category and does not apply where
Congress has prescribed detention rules for applicants for admission under
section 235. 	See generally Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 406–14 (2019)
(analyzing the statutory provisions of section 236 of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226).
The statutory framework applicable to applicants for admission remains
under INA § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225, and does not change even after such aliens
have resided in the interior of the United States for an extended period of
time. 	Unlawful entry into the United States does not constitute admission,
and remaining in the United States for an extended time following unlawful
entry does not transform an illegal entry into a lawful admission. See Matter
of Lemus, 25 I&N Dec. at 743 & n.6 (observing that “many people who are
not actually requesting permission to enter the United States in the ordinary
sense [including aliens present in the United States who have not been
admitted] are nevertheless deemed to be ‘seeking admission’ under the
immigration laws”).
Rather, Congress made admission the relevant statutory classification.
Section 235(a)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1), applies to any alien
“present in the United States who has not been admitted,” without temporal
limitation. 	Courts may not insert a timing or interior-arrest restriction that
Congress did not include. 	Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 300–01
(2018); see also Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 506 (5th Cir.
2026) (noting that “the government’s past practice has little to do with the
statute’s text. The text says what it says, regardless of the decisions of prior
Administrations. 	Years 	of 	consistent 	practice 	cannot 	vindicate 	an
interpretation that is inconsistent with a statute’s plain text.”) (citing Pereira
v. Sessions, 585 U.S. 198, 204 (2018)).
The 	Immigration 	Judge 	also 	reasoned 	that 	the 	respondent’s 	prior
designation as an unaccompanied child, his approved SIJ petition, and the
protections 	contained 	in 	the 	William 	Wilberforce 	Trafficking 	Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 662 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4200
page
665
(“TVPRA”), remove him from the detention framework applicable to
applicants for admission. We conclude that the Immigration Judge erred.
The respondent was previously designated as a UAC, but he had attained
the age of 18 in July 2023, more than 2 years before he was detained by DHS
and requested custody redetermination before the Immigration Judge; thus,
he no longer qualified as a UAC. See 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2); see also Matter
of M-A-C-O-, 27 I&N Dec. 477, 479–80 (BIA 2018) (holding that a prior
UAC determination does not necessarily govern subsequent proceedings
after an alien turns 18 where the governing statute defines a UAC as a person
who “has not attained 18 years of age”). 	This case does not concern the
initial placement of a juvenile in ORR custody or the transfer of a person
upon turning 18 from ORR custody to DHS custody pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1232(c)(2)(B) 	(2026). 	Likewise, 	issues 	regarding 	DHS 	placement
determinations or obligations arising under the TVPRA are not before us in
this custody appeal. 	The only issue before us is whether the Immigration
Judge had authority to redetermine custody under INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a).
The respondent’s circumstances do not constitute an admission to the
United States, they do not alter the statutory definition of an applicant for
admission in section 235(a)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1), and they
do not confer authority on the Immigration Judge to redetermine custody
under section 236(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), where the respondent
remains subject to the detention framework set forth in section 235(b)(2)(A)
of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Congress has not provided that a prior
UAC designation confers bond jurisdiction on an Immigration Judge, and a
court 	may 	not 	create 	such 	authority 	by 	implication. 	See 	Louisville
& Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467, 479 (1911) (“The court cannot
add an exception based on equitable grounds when Congress forbore to make
such an exception.”).
We are not persuaded by the respondent’s reliance on district court
decisions concluding that SIJ status removes an alien from detention under
section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). 	See, e.g.,
Rodriguez v. Perry, 747 F. Supp. 3d 911 (E.D. Va. 2024). 	Federal district
court decisions are not binding on the Board. Matter of K-S-, 20 I&N Dec.
715, 718 (BIA 1993). Moreover, an approved SIJ petition does not alter the
statutory 	framework 	governing 	custody 	redetermination 	before 	an
Immigration Judge. For example, section 245(h)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255(h)(2)(A) (2024), provides that specified grounds of inadmissibility,
including section 212(a)(6)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A), will not apply in
determining the admissibility of certain special immigrants for purposes of

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 662 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4200
page
666
adjustment of status. 	However, that limited adjustment provision does not
constitute an admission or actual parole under section 212(d)(5) of the INA,
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (2024), or otherwise alter an alien’s classification as
an applicant for admission under section 235(a)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(a)(1). Nor does it create an exception to the detention provisions of
section 235(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). 	While the respondent’s
approved SIJ petition may bear on potential eligibility for adjustment of
status, it does not confer authority on an Immigration Judge to redetermine
custody under section 236(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
We find no validity in the Immigration Judge’s reasoning that the
respondent’s prior UAC designation renders him “exempt from a variety of
grounds for removal,” or by the Immigration Judge’s reliance on Loper
Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), to provide a basis for
custody-redetermination authority in these circumstances. Bond proceedings
are “separate and apart from the removal hearing” and address only whether
the respondent should remain detained during the pendency of removal
proceedings. Matter of Shentu, 29 I&N Dec. 595, 599 (BIA 2026) (quoting
Matter of Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. 37, 40 n.2 (BIA 2006)); see also Matter of
R-A-V-P-, 	27 	I&N 	Dec. 	803, 	804 	(BIA 	2020) 	(distinguishing 	bond
proceedings from removal proceedings). Immigration proceedings are civil
in nature. 	Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Detention during
removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible aspect of that process.
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). Like other civil bond obligations,
immigration custody determinations are governed by the statutory terms that
authorize them and must be strictly construed. 	See generally United States
v. Western Surety Co., 118 F.2d 703, 704 (9th Cir. 1941) (stringently
construing statutory provision for immigration bond conditions). 	The
Immigration Judge possesses only the authority conferred by statute and
regulation. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d) (2026).
As the respondent remains an applicant for admission under INA
§ 235(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1), the respondent remains subject to the
detention 	framework 	set 	forth 	in 	INA 	§ 	235(b)(2)(A), 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), and the Immigration Judge therefore lacked authority to
redetermine 	custody 	under 	INA 	§ 	236(a), 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1226(a),
notwithstanding the respondent’s prior UAC designation and approved SIJ
petition. 	See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. at 220–28.2 	Where
2 	As the Immigration Judge did not have authority to grant bond, we need not address the
Immigration Judge’s findings related to danger or flight risk. Matter of Yajure Hurtado,
29 I&N Dec. at 229 n.8 (citing INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per curiam)).

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 662 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4200
page
667
Congress has mandated detention and omitted bond authority, we may not
supply jurisdiction by implication.
Accordingly, the following orders will be entered.
ORDER: DHS’ appeal is sustained.
FURTHER ORDERED: 	The Immigration Judge’s bond decision is
vacated, and the respondent is ordered detained without bond.