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Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 736 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4214
Matter of Juan Andres VIZCAINO AYBAR, Respondent
Decided July 1, 2026
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(c)(1), the proper venue for a respondent’s request for bond
redetermination is the Immigration Court having jurisdiction over the respondent’s place
of detention.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Robert D. Watt, Jr., Esquire, Providence, Rhode Island
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: 	Alexandra M. Wolff,
Assistant Chief Counsel
BEFORE: 	Board Panel: 	HUNSUCKER, GEMOETS, and CHABAN, Appellate
Immigration Judges.
HUNSUCKER, Appellate Immigration Judge:
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) appeals an Immigration
Judge’s bond decision dated March 20, 2025, ordering the respondent
released from detention upon the posting of an $8,000 bond. 	See section
236(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
(2024). The Immigration Judge issued a bond memorandum explaining the
bond decision on September 12, 2025. 	We will sustain DHS’ appeal and
vacate the Immigration Judge’s bond decision.
On March 20, 2025, the Immigration Judge determined that she had
authority to set bond and granted a change in custody status after determining
DHS did not carry its burden of establishing that the respondent poses a
danger to persons or property or is a flight risk. See INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a); Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir. 2021)
(describing DHS’s burden in opposing a request for bond under section
236(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)).1 	On appeal, DHS argues that the
1 	We note that the respondent submitted a letter of support from a state senator; however,
the letter states, “I have known Juan for the past [insert how long you’ve known him] and
have witnessed firsthand his dedication, responsibility, and commitment to his family and
community.” 	While the inclusion of the parenthetical “[insert how long you’ve known
him],” may be a scrivener’s error, we note the issue because the Immigration Judge
explicitly relied on such letter in the danger analysis, and the parenthetical may affect the
weight afforded to such evidence in future proceedings.

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Immigration Judge erred in conducting a bond hearing on the respondent’s
second request for custody redetermination because the respondent had
already been transferred to a detention facility in Texas. We agree with DHS.
The relevant procedural facts are as follows. 	DHS initiated removal
proceedings 	on 	February 	25, 	2025, 	charging 	the 	respondent 	with
removability 	under 	section 	237(a)(1)(B) 	of 	the 	INA, 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(B) (2024). On the same date, DHS issued a Form I-286, Notice
of 	Custody 	Determination, 	and 	the 	respondent 	requested 	custody
redetermination. At that time, the respondent was detained in the area served
by the Chelmsford Immigration Court.
On March 2, 2025, DHS transferred the respondent to the South Texas
ICE Processing Center. 	On March 3, 2025, DHS filed a motion to change
venue. On March 6, 2025, the respondent withdrew his initial bond request
on the record and filed an opposition to DHS’ motion to change venue. On
March 6, 2025, the respondent also filed a second request for custody
redetermination, which is the subject of this appeal.
On March 13, 2025, the Immigration Judge denied DHS’ motion to
change venue and stated that DHS could renew the motion at the conclusion
of the custody hearing. The Immigration Judge then conducted the custody
redetermination hearing on March 20, 2025. At that hearing, DHS renewed
its venue objection; however, the Immigration Judge proceeded with the
bond hearing, granted the respondent release on bond, and only afterward
granted DHS’ renewed motion to change venue.
When a respondent is detained, an application “for the exercise of
authority to review bond determinations shall be made . . . to the Immigration
Court 	having 	jurisdiction 	over 	the 	place 	of 	detention.” 	8 	C.F.R.
§ 1003.19(c)(1) (2026). In Matter of Cerda Reyes, 26 I&N Dec. 528 (BIA
2015), we explained that “[j]urisdiction refers to the court’s authority to
adjudicate a case,” and that “[v]enue is the place where such authority is to
be exercised.” 	26 I&N Dec. at 530 n.6. 	Thus, based on the language of
8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(c) – which applies to applications “for the exercise of
authority” – such regulation governs the venue where a detained respondent
must seek custody redetermination. Id. at 530.
The Immigration Judge’s decision conflates the respondent’s removal
proceedings with the separate bond proceeding. 	See generally Matter of
Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. 37, 40 n.2 (BIA 2006) (“Bond proceedings are separate
and apart from the removal hearing.”). 	In the bond memorandum, the
Immigration 	Judge 	concluded 	that 	the 	Chelmsford 	Immigration 	Court

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remained the proper venue for the bond matter because the respondent’s
“case was under the Chelmsford Immigration Court’s administrative control
when the Form I-286 was submitted,” and DHS’ motion to change venue had
not yet been granted. 	However, the relevant question under 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.19(c)(1) is not where the removal case is pending. 	Rather, the
controlling issue is the respondent’s place of detention. 	See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.19(c)(1) (specifying “the Immigration Court having jurisdiction over
the place of detention”); accord Matter of Cerda Reyes, 26 I&N Dec. at 530.
The Chelmsford Immigration Court was, therefore, not the proper venue
for these bond proceedings. 	By March 6, 2025, when the respondent had
withdrawn 	his 	initial 	bond 	request 	and 	filed 	the 	second 	custody
redetermination request that led to the March 20, 2025, bond hearing, he had
already been transferred to the South Texas ICE Processing Center. 	Cf.
Matter of Cerda Reyes, 26 I&N Dec. at 529 (where alien filed bond request
prior to being transferred to another jurisdiction). Under the plain terms of
8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(c)(1), the proper venue for the respondent’s request for
bond redetermination dated March 6, 2025, was the Immigration Court
having jurisdiction over the respondent’s place of detention on that date,
which was in Texas. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(c)(1); Matter of Cerda Reyes,
26 I&N Dec. at 530. Therefore, the Chelmsford Immigration Court was not
the proper venue for bond proceedings, and the Immigration Judge erred in
adjudicating 	the 	respondent’s 	March 	6, 	2025, 	request 	for 	custody
redetermination. 	In light of this conclusion, we need not reach the parties’
remaining arguments regarding dangerousness, flight risk, or bond amount.
Accordingly, we will sustain DHS’ appeal and vacate the Immigration
Judge’s bond decision.
ORDER: DHS’ appeal is sustained, and the Immigration Judge’s bond
decision dated March 20, 2025, is vacated.