LOPEZ-DAVILA

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Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 763 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4219
Matter of Jeobany Alexander LOPEZ-DAVILA, Respondent
Decided July 16, 2026
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
(1) The decision of a parent to leave his or her United States citizen child in the United
States without parental care does not, on its own, create exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship as required for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1)(D)
of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). Matter of Ige, 20 I&N Dec. 880 (BIA 1994),
followed.
(2) Parental care is not the only care sufficient for a qualifying relative child who is
remaining in the United States.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Cynthia Ceballos, Esquire, Metairie, Louisiana
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Samuel T. French, Assistant
Chief Counsel
BEFORE: Board Panel: HUNSUCKER and GOODWIN, Appellate Immigration Judges;
TERRIEN, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge.
GOODWIN, Appellate Immigration Judge:
On October 10, 2025, the Immigration Judge granted the respondent’s
application for cancellation of removal for certain nonpermanent residents
under section 240A(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”),
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2024). 	The Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) has appealed from that decision, arguing that the respondent has not
demonstrated that his qualifying relative child would suffer exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship if he is removed. The respondent, a native and
citizen of Guatemala, opposes the appeal. The appeal will be sustained, and
the record will be remanded to the Immigration Court.
The respondent’s qualifying relative for purposes of cancellation of
removal is his 6-year-old United States citizen daughter. 	The child would
remain in the United States if the respondent is removed. The respondent is
the sole caregiver for his family. The respondent’s partner, who is the child’s
mother, is not capable of caring for their daughter due to a stroke which led
to severe physical and cognitive disabilities rendering her unable to care for
herself or others. The respondent’s partner has been diagnosed with suicidal
ideation and experienced multiple hospitalizations, including, at the time of

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the hearing, hospitalization in Mexico. 	The respondent’s partner’s adult
daughter (the qualifying relative’s half-sister) has been caring for the child
since the respondent was detained during his removal proceedings. The half-
sister testified that she is unable to care for the child long term and that, if the
respondent were removed, the child would experience severe hardship and
be at heightened risk of being placed into foster care. 	The record does not
reflect that the child has any medical conditions or special educational needs.
The respondent bears the burden of proving he is statutorily eligible for
cancellation 	of 	removal. 	INA 	§ 	240(c)(4)(A)(i), 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(4)(A)(i) (2024); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) (2026). 	The respondent
must show, among other things, that his removal would result in exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative, namely a United
States citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse, parent, or child. 	INA
§ 	240A(b)(1)(D), 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1229b(b)(1)(D). 	The 	exceptional 	and
extremely unusual hardship standard for cancellation of removal requires an
assessment of the cumulative hardship factors for the qualifying relative.
Matter of J-J-G-, 27 I&N Dec. 808, 811 (BIA 2020). 	The hardship to a
qualifying relative “must be ‘substantially’ beyond the ordinary hardship that
would be expected when a close family member leaves this country.” Matter
of Monreal, 23 I&N Dec. 56, 62 (BIA 2001).
We review for clear error findings concerning what would occur to the
respondent’s qualifying relative if the respondent is removed. 	Trejo v.
Garland, 3 F.4th 760, 772 (5th Cir. 2021) (explaining that the question of
what would happen if a respondent were removed is a question of fact); see
also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2026). 	We review de novo whether such
facts rise to the level of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2026).
The Immigration Judge found that the respondent’s daughter would likely
be placed into foster care because there is no other parent to care for her and
her half-sister’s care “is not a long term solution for this child.” 	Based on
this finding, the Immigration Judge concluded that the respondent’s daughter
“would then become in operation an orphan.” 	The Immigration Judge’s
finding that the child may be subject to foster care is not clearly erroneous.
The respondent and the half-sister testified that the half-sister is unable to
care for the child long term. The child’s mother is currently in Mexico and
unable to care for herself, let alone her daughter.
However, the Immigration Judge’s factual findings do not support the
legal conclusion that the respondent’s removal would result in exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship to the child. We conclude on de novo review

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that the Immigration Judge legally erred in determining that the respondent
could meet his burden of proof by creating hardship through choosing to
abandon his daughter to foster care or no care rather than have her
accompany him upon removal. 	See Matter of Ige, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 886
(BIA 1994) (holding that, “absent proof of extreme hardship to a child if he
returns to his parents’ native country with them, we will generally consider
the decision to leave the child in the United States to be a matter of personal
choice”). 	If a qualifying relative child would not suffer exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship by accompanying the parent, “then the fact that
the child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result
of parental choice, not the parent’s deportation.” Id. at 885. We reaffirm the
reasoning and conclusion in Matter of Ige, a suspension of deportation case
involving a lower hardship standard, and extend its holding as applicable to
cancellation of removal cases.
We also clarify that parental care is not the only care sufficient for a
qualifying relative child who is remaining in the United States. 	The
Immigration Judge concluded that it would be “unconscionable” to remove
the qualifying relative’s only competent parent. 	The Immigration Judge
decided that care for a minor qualifying relative child must necessarily be
provided by a parent, reasoning that the “statute’s purpose” was not “as long
as there is someone to care for [the qualifying relative] it did not matter who
or what the relationship is or how tentative it is.” 	The Immigration Judge
found that, even if the half-sister were able to care for the child, that is “not
what the statute was intended to do.”
The Immigration Judge erred in concluding that the removal of an only-
parent creates the requisite hardship for cancellation of removal. 	Parental
caretaking, as opposed to caretaking by another responsible adult party, is
not a statutory or other requirement the lack of which necessarily gives rise
to exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. We have never held that only
care by a parent is appropriate or sufficient for minor qualifying relatives
separated from one or both parents.
In Matter of Recinas, 23 I&N Dec. 467, 470–72 (BIA 2002), the Board
granted cancellation of removal to a single mother, but it was not solely her
status as a single mother which gave rise to our determination of hardship.
Rather, there were numerous factors present which collectively established
the requisite hardship in that case. A child may be competently cared for by
an adult other than a parent, and thus the decision of a parent to leave his or
her United States citizen child in the United States without parental care does
not, on its own, create exceptional and extremely unusual hardship as

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required for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1)(D) of the INA,
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).
Finally, we observe that the respondent did not provide an affidavit
confirming his intent to leave the child in the United States or proof of
arrangements for her long-term care. 	An applicant for cancellation of
removal who intends to leave a qualifying relative child in the United States
is generally required to provide an affidavit and proof of the arrangements
made for the care of the child. Matter of Ige, 20 I&N Dec. at 885; cf. Matter
of Calderon-Hernandez, 25 I&N Dec. 885, 886–87 (BIA 2012) (clarifying
that the evidence required in Matter of Ige need not be provided where it may
be assumed that a custodial parent remaining in the United States would care
for the couple’s children).
For these reasons, we conclude that the Immigration Judge legally erred
in determining that the respondent demonstrated his removal would result in
exceptional 	and 	extremely 	unusual 	hardship 	to 	his 	qualifying 	relative
daughter. See generally Matter of Monreal, 23 I&N Dec. at 62–64 (defining
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship and describing relevant factors
to consider). 	Accordingly, we will sustain DHS’ appeal and remand the
record 	for 	further 	fact 	finding 	on 	all 	relevant 	hardship 	factors 	and
reassessment of the issue of hardship without reliance on the legally
erroneous analysis outlined above.
ORDER: 	DHS’ appeal is sustained, and the Immigration Judge’s
October 10, 2025, order granting relief is vacated.
FURTHER ORDER: 	The record is remanded to the Immigration
Court for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for
the entry of a new decision.