The Florida Bar v. Charlie Easa Farah, Jr.

Supreme Court of Florida
____________

No. SC2022-0472
____________

THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant,

vs.

CHARLIE EASA FARAH, JR.,
Respondent.

February 27, 2025

PER CURIAM.

The Florida Bar seeks review of a referee’s report

recommending that Respondent, Charlie Easa Farah, Jr., be found

not guilty of violating the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar for his

involvement in the filing of thousands of meritless Engle-progeny1

claims in state and federal court. 2 The Bar argues that the record

before us clearly supports a finding that Farah is guilty of each of

the charged rule violations, as well as of violating rules 4-1.5(f)(2)

1. See Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006).

2. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.
and 4-1.5(f)(4)(D)(iii), and it urges us to impose a 30-day suspension

in this matter.

We agree with the Bar in part and disapprove the referee’s not

guilty recommendation as to rules 4-1.3, 4-1.4(a), and 4-1.16(a)(1).

We instead find Farah guilty of violating each of those rules. We

also find Farah guilty of violating rule 4-1.5(f)(2). However, instead

of sanctioning Farah at this time as requested by the Bar, we refer

this case back to the referee to hold a hearing and provide a

recommendation as to the appropriate sanction.

I.

Back in 2006, the Court approved the decertification of the

Engle class action group. See Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1277. Former

members of the class, which consisted of smokers and their

survivors, were given one year from this Court’s mandate—until

January 11, 2008 3—to file individualized claims in which certain

findings would receive res judicata effect. Id.

Farah became involved in tobacco litigation around the same

time the Engle class was decertified. He initially represented 163

3. The mandate in Engle issued January 11, 2007.

-2-
Engle plaintiffs. He later associated with Norwood Sherman Wilner,

a Jacksonville-based lawyer with experience in tobacco litigation,

and the two agreed to share the labor and expense required to

prosecute additional Engle-progeny cases. Specifically, the two

agreed that Wilner would file cases and conduct trials and

discovery, while Farah would provide personnel support and

financial backing.

Before the January 11, 2008, deadline expired, Wilner filed

more than 3,000 Engle cases in state and federal court. The

lawsuits alleged various claims related to cigarette smoking, such

as personal injury and wrongful death, and were filed on behalf of

4,432 plaintiffs, including the 163 plaintiffs originated by Farah’s

firm. Farah’s name was listed in the signature block of each

complaint filed by Wilner.

The federal claims were filed in the United States District

Court for the Middle District of Florida. The Middle District stayed

the cases until October 2010, at which point Wilner voluntarily

dismissed 499 cases (a little more than 10% of the cases filed). The

Middle District then ordered plaintiffs’ counsel to review the

remaining cases to determine whether any other cases were non-

-3-
viable and should therefore be dismissed. In March 2011, Wilner

certified that each pending case had been reviewed and

recommended the dismissal of 254 additional cases, meaning more

than 2,900 cases were still pending. Despite Wilner’s certification,

the Middle District went on to dismiss hundreds more Engle cases

throughout 2012 and 2013.

The Engle cases were eventually whittled down nearly 90% to

just 415 plaintiffs, all with whom the tobacco companies settled in

2015. Given the large number of cases that were ultimately

dismissed as non-viable, that same year, the Middle District

appointed a special master to investigate whether Wilner and

Farah’s conduct warranted sanctions. The special master

submitted a report finding that Wilner and Farah violated Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 4 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 5 the Middle District’s

4. Rule 11(b) prohibits the signing and filing of frivolous or
factually unsupported pleadings. A violation of 11(b) is
sanctionable under 11(c).

5. Section 1927 provides that “[a]ny attorney . . . who so
multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the
excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred
because of such conduct.”

-4-
local rules, and the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct. In 2017,

after holding a sanctions hearing, the Middle District entered a

detailed order finding Wilner and Farah violated their professional

obligations by failing to inform themselves of the facts of their

clients’ cases. The Middle District reprimanded both lawyers and

required them to pay $9,164,404.12 as a sanction. 6 In re Engle

Cases, 283 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1259 (M.D. Fla. 2017). That amount

was later reduced to $4,329,668.43, and Wilner and Farah each

paid half.

Based on this conduct, the Bar charged Farah with violating

rules 4-1.3 (Diligence), 4-1.4(a) (Communication), and 4-1.16

(Declining or Terminating Representation). The Bar’s complaint

was referred to a referee, who held a hearing and filed a report

recommending that Farah be found not guilty of the charged rule

6. We suspended Wilner in March 2022 for 91 days for filing
thousands of Engle-progeny claims without investigating or
informing himself as to the facts of each case, and for knowingly
misrepresenting the viability of the claims to the Middle District.
Fla. Bar v. Wilner, No. SC2021-0373 (Fla. Mar. 3, 2022) (approving
uncontested referee’s report). Wilner was later denied
reinstatement to the Bar when he failed to fully comply with rule
3-6.1 during his suspension. Fla. Bar v. Wilner, 382 So. 3d 621,
625 (Fla. 2024).

-5-
violations. The referee found that the Bar improperly based its case

on the special master’s report and investigatory materials and did

not conduct its own investigation into Farah’s conduct.

The Bar filed a notice of intent to seek review of the referee’s

report. It challenges the referee’s recommendation that Farah be

found not guilty of the charged rule violations. It also argues that

Farah should be found guilty of two additional rule violations and

that he should be suspended from the practice of law for 30 days.

II.

Our review of a referee’s findings of fact is limited, and if the

findings of fact are supported by competent, substantial evidence in

the record, we will not reweigh the evidence and substitute our

judgment for that of the referee. Fla. Bar v. Alters, 260 So. 3d 72,

79 (Fla. 2018) (citing Fla. Bar v. Frederick, 756 So. 2d 79, 86 (Fla.

2000)). As for a referee’s recommendations as to guilt, “the referee’s

factual findings must be sufficient under the applicable rules to

support the recommendations.” Fla. Bar v. Patterson, 257 So. 3d

56, 61 (Fla. 2018) (citing Fla. Bar v. Shoureas, 913 So. 2d 554, 557-

58 (Fla. 2005)). Ultimately, the burden is on the party challenging

the referee’s findings of fact and recommendations as to guilt to

-6-
demonstrate “that there is no evidence in the record to support

those findings or that the record evidence clearly contradicts the

conclusions.” Fla. Bar v. Germain, 957 So. 2d 613, 620 (Fla. 2007)

(citing Fla. Bar v. Carlon, 820 So. 2d 891, 898 (Fla. 2002)).

We begin our review of the referee’s report by first addressing

the referee’s finding that the Bar failed to conduct its own

investigation into Farah’s conduct and instead improperly based its

case on the federal court’s sanction order and the special master’s

report. The report and sanction order are the product of an

extensive seven-month investigation. The report is nearly 300

pages in length and includes numerous exhibits. The federal

court’s sanction order is equally comprehensive. It details at great

length how Wilner and Farah recklessly initiated thousands of

meritless Engle-progeny cases, and how their actions greatly

burdened the federal court.

Nothing in our rules or case law requires that the Bar

essentially duplicate the work of the special master and federal

court by conducting its own extensive investigation into Farah’s

conduct during the Engle litigation. Furthermore, the federal

court’s order and the special master’s report were both admissible

-7-
in the proceedings before the referee as evidence of Farah’s conduct.

See Fla. Bar v. Rood, 620 So. 2d 1252, 1255 (Fla. 1993) (explaining

that Bar discipline proceedings are not bound by the technical rules

of evidence and that a referee may consider any evidence deemed

relevant in resolving the factual question).

Based on our thorough review of the record, particularly the

Middle District’s sanction order and the special master’s report, we

find that the record in this case contradicts the referee’s not guilty

recommendation. As detailed below, we find Farah guilty of

multiple rule violations.

Rules 4-1.3 and 4-1.4

Under rule 4-1.3, a lawyer must “act with reasonable diligence

and promptness in representing a client.” And under rule 4-1.4(a),

a lawyer must: “promptly inform the client” of matters requiring

“informed consent”; “consult with the client about the means by

which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished”; and “keep the

client reasonably informed about the status of the matter.” See R.

Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.4(a)(1)-(3).

-8-
Farah’s Original 163 Clients

The special master found that Farah began interviewing

potential Engle plaintiffs in late 2006, and ultimately identified 163

clients that were included among the more than 3,000 Engle cases

Wilner filed. Farah claimed he was in communication with most of

the 163 clients up to the January 11, 2008, filing deadline. Yet, 8

of the 163 clients died before January 11, 2008, and personal

injury claims were still filed on their behalf. Additionally, Farah

filed a time-barred wrongful death claim on behalf of another client

who died before the class period.

From these facts, it is clear Farah did not adequately

communicate with all 163 plaintiffs his firm originated, nor did he

exercise reasonable diligence by conducting a pre-suit investigation

into their claims. Had Farah diligently conducted a pre-suit

investigation in each case and maintained client communication, he

surely would have learned of the time-barred claim and the 8

deceased clients before filing their personal injury claims.

Farah argues that his conduct should be considered in the

context of the thousands of Engle-progeny claims at issue and the

time constraints imposed by our decision in Engle. But the

-9-
existence of these exigencies did not alter, let alone diminish,

Farah’s professional obligations under rules 4-1.3 and 4-1.4(a). He

was required under both rules to handle all 163 cases with the

same standard of care that he would provide to a single case. As

the Middle District explained in its sanction order, “the volume of

claims does not render the fundamental precepts of lawyer-client

responsibilities . . . procedural niceties.” In re Engle Cases, 283 F.

Supp. 3d at 1221 (quoting In re Engle Cases, 767 F.3d 1082, 1114

(11th Cir. 2014)).

Accordingly, we find Farah guilty of violating rules 4-1.3 and

4-1.4(a) with respect to the 163 clients his firm originated.

The Thousands of Other Cases

Farah knowingly partnered with Wilner to prosecute the

thousands of other Engle-progeny cases. They agreed to divide the

labor and to evenly split any attorney’s fees recovered. Although he

predominantly played a behind-the-scenes role, mainly providing

personnel support and financial backing, Farah, nevertheless,

knowingly agreed to provide legal services for which he intended to

be paid at the end of the litigation on the thousands of other Engle

cases initiated by Wilner. Furthermore, Farah’s name was listed in

- 10 -
the signature block of each complaint filed by Wilner. We thus find

that Farah was co-counsel on the thousands of other Engle-progeny

cases Wilner initiated.

As co-counsel, Farah could not satisfy his professional

obligations under rules 4-1.3 and 4-1.4(a) by simply deferring to

Wilner’s expertise in tobacco litigation. As with the 163 clients his

firm originated, Farah also had a duty to adequately communicate

with and provide diligent representation to the thousands of other

Engle plaintiffs to whom he agreed to provide legal services. Had

Farah been in communication with these other Engle plaintiffs and

exercised reasonable diligence by conducting pre-suit investigations

into their claims, he would have discovered that most were not

viable.

Indeed, a questionnaire sent by the Middle District to the

named plaintiffs revealed that more than 500 died before a

complaint was filed on their behalf, and that 572 never authorized

Wilner and Farah to file or maintain a lawsuit on their behalf. The

reach of unauthorized cases included a sitting juror, who learned

for the first time in 2012 that she was named as an Engle plaintiff

in a suit filed by Wilner and Farah.

- 11 -
Accordingly, we find that Farah is also guilty of violating rules

4-1.3 and 4-1.4(a) with respect to his representation of the

thousands of other Engle plaintiffs.

Rule 4-1.16(a)(1)

Rule 4-1.16(a)(1) prohibits a lawyer from representing a client

if “the representation will result in [a] violation of the Rules of

Professional Conduct or law.”

Here, Farah took on far more Engle plaintiffs than he could

reasonably handle. He should have known well before the January

11, 2008, filing deadline that he could not provide legal services to

the thousands of Engle plaintiffs and still fully comply with his

professional obligations under rules 4-1.3 and 4-1.4(a). As the

federal court detailed in its sanction order:

Wilner and Farah violated their obligations by
failing to inform themselves about the facts of their
“clients’ ” cases. Had they done so, they would not have
advanced hundreds of complaints involving dead
plaintiffs, people who never smoked, people who never
lived in Florida, people who did not authorize a lawsuit,
and people whose claims had been previously
adjudicated. These complaints were without merit in law
or fact, and they contained material assertions that were
false. Overwhelming evidence would have contradicted
these allegations as well, but for the fact that Wilner and
Farah chose not to conduct any meaningful investigation
before recklessly filing thousands of complaints. And

- 12 -
there is evidence that Wilner and Farah actually knew
that some of the personal injury plaintiffs were dead, that
several plaintiffs or survivors did not want to pursue a
claim, and that some of the plaintiffs or decedents did
not smoke, did not live in Florida, or already had their
claims adjudicated.

In re Engle Cases, 283 F. Supp. 3d at 1243. Accordingly, we find

Farah guilty of violating rule 4-1.16(a)(1).

Rule 4-1.16(b)(1)

Rule 4-1.16(b)(1) provides that a lawyer may withdraw from

representing a client only if “withdrawal can be accomplished

without material adverse effect on the interests of the client.”

Here, between February and October 2007, Farah sent letters

to 146 clients who were potential Engle plaintiffs declining

representation. The clients were advised to consult with another

lawyer and were informed of the January 11, 2008, filing deadline.

The Bar argues that Farah violated rule 4-1.16(b)(1) by sending

some of the letters close to the January 11, 2008, deadline, thereby

leaving the clients insufficient time to obtain new counsel. But it is

not entirely clear from our review of the record when Farah took on

the clients, why he later declined to represent them, or when the

- 13 -
clients received Farah’s letter. Accordingly, we approve the referee’s

not guilty recommendation as to rule 4-1.16(b)(1).

Rule 4-1.5(f)

The Bar asks that we find Farah guilty of two other violations,

neither of which Farah was charged with in the Bar’s complaint:

rule 4-1.5(f)(2) and rule 4-1.5(f)(4)(D)(iii). Rule 4-1.5(f)(2) requires

that an agreement to compensate a lawyer on a contingency fee

basis be in writing and signed by the client and the lawyer and that

each lawyer or law firm participating in a contingency fee sign the

fee agreement with the client and agree to assume joint legal

responsibility to the client. Rule 4-1.5(f)(4)(D)(iii) addresses the

division of fees among lawyers in different firms.

However, we may only consider whether Farah violated rule

4-1.5(f)(2) because the conduct associated with a violation of rule

4-1.5(f)(4)(D)(iii) is not within the scope of the Bar’s complaint. See

Fla. Bar v. Fredericks, 731 So. 2d 1249, 1253 (Fla. 1999) (“[S]pecific

findings of uncharged conduct and violations of rules not charged

in the complaint are permitted where the conduct is either

specifically referred to in the complaint or is within the scope of the

specific allegations in the complaint.”). The conduct associated with

- 14 -
a violation of rule 4-1.5(f)(2) and the lack of written fee agreements,

on the other hand, is within the scope of the Bar’s complaint.7

Here, the special master found that Farah did not have written

fee agreements with many of the Engle plaintiffs his firm originated,

as required by rule 4-1.5(f)(2). He found that among the 163 Engle

plaintiffs Farah’s firm originated, Farah only produced 122 fee

agreements. Farah had no fee agreement at all for 27 clients. And

for the remaining 14 clients, they only signed written fee

agreements sometime after the January 11, 2008, filing deadline.

Further, of these 14 clients, only 5 signed fee agreements in 2008,

while the rest signed fee agreements sometime between 2009 and

2015. The special master also found that Farah never obtained any

of the clients’ written consent to Wilner participating in the eventual

contingency fee. Accordingly, we find Farah guilty of violating rule

4-1.5(f)(2).

III.

Having found Farah guilty of violating rules 4-1.3, 4-1.4(a),

4-1.16(a)(1), and 4-1.5(f)(2), we now consider the appropriate

7. See Bar Compl. ¶¶ 19, 38.

- 15 -
disciplinary sanction for his misconduct. The Bar urges us to

suspend Farah from the practice of law for 30 days. However, the

referee did not conduct a sanction hearing in this matter, and “due

process requires that [an] attorney be permitted to ‘explain the

circumstances of the alleged offense and to offer testimony in

mitigation of any penalty to be imposed.’ ” Fla. Bar v. Carricarte,

733 So. 2d 975, 979 (Fla. 1999) (quoting Fla. Bar v. Cruz, 490 So.

2d 48, 49 (Fla. 1986)). We, therefore, find the record insufficient to

determine the appropriate sanction and refer this case back to the

referee to conduct a sanctions hearing. See Fla. Bar v. Marrero, 157

So. 3d 1020, 1026 (Fla. 2015) (rejecting not guilty recommendation

and referring case back to referee for sanctions hearing).

IV.

Accordingly, Charlie Easa Farah, Jr., is hereby found guilty of

violating rules 4-1.3, 4-1.4(a), 4-1.16(a)(1), and 4-1.5(f)(2). This

case is referred back to the referee to hold a hearing and consider

the appropriate sanction. The referee must file an amended report

recommending a disciplinary sanction within 90 days of the date of

this opinion.

It is so ordered.

- 16 -
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS,
FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar

Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, Patricia Ann Toro Savitz, Staff
Counsel, Mark Lugo Mason, Bar Counsel, and Shaneé L. Hinson,
Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Complainant

Henry M. Coxe III and Brian T. Coughlin of Bedell, Dittmar,
DeVault, Pillans & Coxe, P.A., Jacksonville, Florida, and Michael J.
Korn of Korn & Zehmer, P.A., Jacksonville, Florida,

for Respondent

- 17 -