Steak N Shake, Inc. v. Wilfred Ramos, Jr.

Supreme Court of Florida
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No. SC2024-0099
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STEAK N SHAKE, INC.,
Petitioner,

vs.

WILFRED RAMOS, JR.,
Respondent.

July 10, 2025

SASSO, J.

The Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA) mandates that a claimant

file a complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations

containing “a short and plain statement of the facts describing the

violation and the relief sought” before bringing a civil action under

the FCRA. We must decide whether a claimant fulfills this

necessary step to exhaust administrative remedies when he

specifically references only federal law in a charge of discrimination

dual filed with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC) and the Florida Commission on Human
Relations. The Second and Fourth District Courts of Appeal

reached opposite conclusions on this issue, and the Second District

certified conflict. 1 As explained below, we answer that question in

the affirmative and hold a claimant need not specifically allege he is

seeking relief under the FCRA to exhaust administrative remedies.

I

A

The Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 is codified at sections

760.01-.11 and 509.092, Florida Statutes (2024). The FCRA serves

to “secure for all individuals within the state freedom from

discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy,

national origin, age, handicap, or marital status.” § 760.01(2), Fla.

Stat. The FCRA created the Florida Commission on Human

Relations (Commission), which is empowered “[t]o receive, initiate,

investigate, seek to conciliate, hold hearings on, and act upon

complaints alleging any discriminatory practice.” §§ 760.03(1),

.06(5), Fla. Stat. Pursuant to this authority, the Commission is

obligated both to attempt to eliminate or correct the alleged

1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

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discrimination by “informal methods of conference, conciliation,

and persuasion” and to investigate alleged discriminatory practices.

§ 760.11(3), (11), Fla. Stat.

To facilitate the Commission’s investigation, the FCRA

provides an administrative procedure for filing civil rights

complaints:

Any person aggrieved by a violation of ss. 760.01-760.10
may file a complaint with the commission within 365
days of the alleged violation, naming the employer,
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-
management committee, or, in the case of an alleged
violation of s. 760.10(5), the person responsible for the
violation and describing the violation.

§ 760.11(1), Fla. Stat. “The complaint shall contain a short and

plain statement of the facts describing the violation and the relief

sought.” Id. This Court has explained that the statutory

requirement of filing a complaint with the Commission is a

“prerequisite to bringing a civil action based upon an alleged

violation of the FCRA.” Woodham v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of

Fla., Inc., 829 So. 2d 891, 894 (Fla. 2002). In other words, failure to

exhaust the FCRA’s administrative requirements precludes a party

from bringing a civil action under the FCRA.

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Even so, the FCRA allows that “[i]n lieu of filing the complaint

with the commission, a complaint under this section may be filed

with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or

with any unit of government of the state which is a fair-

employment-practice agency under 29 C.F.R. ss. 1601.70-1601.80.”

§ 760.11(1), Fla. Stat. Accordingly, the Commission and the EEOC

have entered into worksharing agreements.

B

Steak N Shake hired Wilfred Ramos, Jr., as a grill operator.

During his employment, Ramos alleges he sustained a back injury

in an off-the-job car accident. After this injury, Steak N Shake

allegedly reduced Ramos’s work schedule, ultimately terminating

Ramos from his job. Ramos claims Steak N Shake took these

actions in retaliation for his disability and requests for

accommodations.

The specifics of Ramos’s termination are not at issue in this

appeal. What is at issue is whether Ramos satisfied the statutory

prerequisite to invoking the FCRA’s protections in a civil action

against Steak N Shake, thereby exhausting his administrative

remedies.

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Ramos did not file a complaint directly with the Commission.

Instead, Ramos filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. In

the “Discrimination Based On” section of the form, Ramos marked

“Retaliation” and “Disability.” In the “Particulars” section, Ramos

described the alleged retaliation and wrote: “I believe that I have

been discriminated on the basis of my disability and/or perceived

disability and by retaliation for my request for reasonable

accommodation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of

1991, as amended.” The form also included the following prepared

statement: “I want this charge filed with both the EEOC and the

State or local Agency, if any.” Ramos’s charge of discrimination did

not specifically reference the FCRA.

On April 10, 2018, the EEOC forwarded the charge to the

Commission with the following notation: “Pursuant to the

worksharing agreement, this charge is to be initially investigated by

the EEOC.” Following an investigation, the EEOC dismissed the

charge and sent Ramos a “Dismissal and Notice of Rights.”

Ramos then filed a two-count complaint in the trial court,

asserting discrimination and retaliation in violation of the FCRA. In

response, Steak N Shake filed a motion for final summary

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judgment, arguing that the undisputed evidence demonstrated

Ramos failed to allege any FCRA claims in his charge and therefore

did not exhaust his administrative remedies under the FCRA.

Ultimately, the trial court granted summary judgment for Steak N

Shake. In doing so, it concluded that (1) “[t]he undisputed facts in

the record demonstrate that Plaintiff failed to allege claims under

the Florida Civil Rights Act in his Charge of Discrimination and

therefore has not properly exhausted his administrative remedies”

and (2) “Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies

cannot be cured at this juncture, as the time for filing or amending

his administrative claims has expired.”

On appeal, the Second District reversed and held that “Ramos

was not required to specifically allege in his charge of

discrimination that his claims were under the FCRA.” Ramos v.

Steak N Shake, Inc., 376 So. 3d 100, 104 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023). The

Second District observed that “[u]nder Florida’s workshare

agreement, the EEOC and the Commission each designate the other

as an agent for the purposes of receiving and drafting charges, thus

allowing an aggrieved party to elect to dual file a charge of

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discrimination with both agencies.” Id. at 103. The Second District

then concluded that:

[I]n finding that Ramos failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies by failing to specifically allege in
his charge of discrimination that his claims were under
the FCRA, the trial court added a requirement that is not
found anywhere within the statute and contravenes the
legislature’s clear intent that the statute be interpreted
liberally.

Id. at 104. In so doing, the Second District certified conflict with

the Fourth District’s decision in Belony v. North Broward Hospital

District, 374 So. 3d 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). Belony held that:

Merely asserting a violation of federal law in a charge of
discrimination and dually filing the charge with the
[Commission] is insufficient to satisfy the statute’s
requirements because “a cause of action founded on a
federal statute is not the same cause of action as one
founded on a state statute, even where both statutes
apply to the same transaction or occurrence.”

Id. at 7 (quoting Andujar v. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Underwriters, 659 So.

2d 1214, 1216 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)).

II

Steak N Shake argues that Ramos failed to exhaust

administrative remedies as required by the FCRA. Specifically,

Steak N Shake asserts that when a claimant alleges a violation of

federal law in a complaint that is dual filed with the EEOC and the

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Commission, he must also specifically allege a violation of the

FCRA. Because Ramos failed to do so, Steak N Shake argues that

he is precluded from pursuing a civil action under the FCRA.

Steak N Shake’s argument presents an issue of statutory

interpretation which we review de novo. Ripple v. CBS Corp., 385

So. 3d 1021, 1027 (Fla. 2024) (citing Levy v. Levy, 326 So. 3d 678,

681 (Fla. 2021)). So, as always, we begin with the text. But this is

where our analysis departs from Steak N Shake’s because we

discern no statutory requirement that a party specifically identify

the FCRA, even if he only alleges a violation of federal law and dual

files that complaint with both the EEOC and the Commission.

Steak N Shake stakes its claim on section 760.11(1)’s

requirement that the complaint contain a “short and plain

statement of the facts describing the violation and the relief

sought.” § 760.11(1), Fla. Stat. Steak N Shake posits that “the

relief sought” means a complaint must specifically identify the

FCRA.

For several reasons, we cannot agree with Steak N Shake that

section 760.11(1)’s reference to the “relief sought” carries with it a

requirement that a plaintiff explicitly state the law violated. First,

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Steak N Shake’s preferred definition of relief is not consistent with

the ordinary meaning of the term. In the legal context, as the term

is used here, “relief” is defined as the “[r]edress awarded by a

court.” American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1524

(3d ed. 1992); see also Relief, Oxford English Dictionary vol. XIII 565

(2d ed. 1989) (“Deliverance (esp. in Law) from some hardship,

burden, or grievance; remedy, redress.”); Relief, Webster’s Ninth

New Collegiate Dictionary 995 (1990) (“legal remedy or redress”);

Relief, Black’s Law Dictionary 1292 (6th ed. 1990) (“Deliverance

from oppression, wrong, or injustice. In this sense it is used as a

general designation of the assistance, redress, or benefit which a

complainant seeks at the hands of a court, particularly in equity.”).

Second, the ordinary meaning of relief, one that describes the

remedy sought for a violation of the FCRA, allows the rest of section

760.11 to logically flow. The word “relief” is used seven more times

in section 760.11, each time carrying with it the connotation of a

remedy rather than the specific law violated. See, e.g.,

§ 760.11(13), Fla. Stat. (“the court shall remand the matter to the

commission for appropriate relief”); § 760.11(7), Fla. Stat. (“accept

the affirmative relief offered by the commission”); § 760.11(6), Fla.

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Stat. (“providing affirmative relief from the effects of the practice,

including back pay”). So, this textual clue cuts against Steak N

Shake’s argument too.

Third, there is nothing about the structure or operation of

section 760.11 that suggests an alternative definition applies.

Steak N Shake argues that because section 760.11 also refers to a

complaint “under this section,” that language suggests a plaintiff

must specifically identify the FCRA. But the argument demands a

level of specificity that the statute does not. Section 760.11(1) lists

what must be in a complaint. The first requirement is “a short and

plain statement of the facts describing the violation and the relief

sought.” § 760.11(1), Fla. Stat. Next, the legislature gives the

Commission room to impose additional requirements. Id. (“The

commission may require additional information to be in the

complaint.”). And for those additional requirements we turn to the

Florida Administrative Code. But that only further undercuts Steak

N Shake’s argument.

When Ramos filed his charge of discrimination in 2017, the

Florida Administrative Code provided the following guidance for

complaints filed with the Commission:

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(a) The complaint should contain the following
information:

1. The name, address and telephone number of the
person filing the complaint;

2. The name, address and telephone number of the
respondent;

3. A clear and concise statement of the facts, including
pertinent dates, constituting the unlawful employment
practice;

4. If known, the approximate number of employees of a
respondent employer;

5. If known, a statement disclosing whether proceedings
involving the alleged unlawful employment practice have
been commenced before a Federal, State or local agency
charged with the enforcement of fair employment practice
laws and, if so, the date of such commencement and the
name of the agency.

(b) Notwithstanding the provision of paragraph (a) of this
subsection, a complaint is sufficient if it is in writing,
signed by the Complainant, verified, and is sufficiently
precise to identify the parties and to describe generally
the action or practice complained of.

Fla. Admin. Code R. 60Y-5.001(6). In addition, this subtitle of the

Florida Administrative Code provided that “complaint” “means a

written statement which alleges the occurrence of an unlawful

employment practice, and includes an amended complaint.”

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Id. R. 60Y-3.001(4). 2 Again, nowhere was there a requirement that

a complainant list the specific law violated.

We reject Steak N Shake’s arguments to the contrary. Steak N

Shake argues that applying the ordinary meaning of relief to the

statute here would render the term redundant with “violation,”

which precedes the term relief in section 760.11(1). But there is

nothing redundant about a statute that both requires “a short and

plain statement of the facts describing the violation,” in other words

the facts explaining the allegedly discriminatory practice, and the

claimed redress for that practice. Likewise, we reject Steak N

Shake’s argument that applying the ordinary meaning of relief to

section 760.11 eradicates the distinction between federal and state

employment discrimination claims. Nothing about this

interpretation means that the disposition of a state claim would

dispose of a federal claim and vice versa, nor does this

2. This definition was amended in 2022. Currently, this
subtitle defines “complaint” as “a written statement which alleges
the occurrence of an unlawful employment practice, which is signed
and verified by the complainant and includes an amended
complaint.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 60Y-3.001(4). Rule 60Y-5.001(6)
remained unchanged.

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interpretation undermine any procedural distinctions at the state

and federal levels.

All in all, while we are careful to give full effect to all statutory

provisions, we cannot go beyond the plain meaning and inject extra

statutory requirements that the legislature did not enact. And here,

there is simply no requirement that a complaint specifically

reference the FCRA when it is dual filed, even if it only references

federal law. We agree with the Second District that finding to the

contrary would be “add[ing] a requirement that is not found

anywhere within the statute.” Ramos, 376 So. 3d at 104. 3

III

Because section 760.11(1) does not contain the requirement

Steak N Shake advances, we approve the decision of the Second

District in Ramos to the extent it holds that the aggrieved party is

3. We similarly reject Steak N Shake’s argument that the
Second District’s decision was fundamentally flawed because it
referenced a worksharing agreement that was absent from the
record. Primarily, we reject this argument because the Second
District’s decision was a legal one based on statutory interpretation
and there is no indication that the presence of the worksharing
agreement affected that analysis. Even if it did, there was record
evidence of a worksharing agreement in effect between the two
agencies.

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not required to identify the FCRA in a dual-filed complaint that

specifically references federal law to exhaust administrative

remedies. We disapprove the Fourth District’s decision in Belony to

the extent it holds to the contrary.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS,
and FRANCIS, JJ., concur.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal
Certified Direct Conflict of Decisions

Second District - Case No. 2D2022-3465

(Hillsborough County)

J. Robert McCormack and John C. Getty of Ogletree, Deakins,
Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Tampa, Florida,

for Petitioner

Ashley N. Richardson of Marie A. Mattox, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida,

for Respondent

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