Recommended Order — 26-003227

STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
RONNIE MURCHINSON-RIVERA,
Petitioner,
vs.
SUMTER COUNTY SHERIFF'S
OFFICE,
Respondent.
/
Case No. 26-3227
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to notice, a formal administrative hearing was conducted via
Zoom on September 2, 2026, before Administrative Law Judge Garnett W.
Chisenhall of the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”).
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: 	Ronnie Murchinson-Rivera, pro se
31835 Sybill Avenue
Sorrento, Florida 32776
For Respondent: 	Matthew D. Stefany, Esquire
Allen Norton, & Blue, P.A.
324 South Hyde Park Avenue, Suite 225
Tampa, Florida 33606
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether Respondent, the Sumter County Sheriff’s Office (“SCSO”),
committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner
(“Mr. Murchinson-Rivera”).

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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On November 18, 2025, Mr. Murchinson-Rivera filed an “Employment
Complaint” with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (“the
Commission”) alleging the following:
I was targeted and treated more harshly because I
am a Black deputy. From the minute I filed workers
comp, the tone changed. HR and the insurance
partners treated me like I was lying, even though
every 	doctor 	supported 	my 	treatment.
They questioned 	my 	honesty, 	monitored 	my
movements, 	and 	talked 	about 	me 	like 	I 	was 	a
problem. No white deputies with injuries were ever
treated this way. The level of suspicion toward me
was based on race. As a dark skinned Black man,
I was treated with automatic suspicion. HR labeled
me as untruthful without evidence, and they pushed
an aggressive investigation into my medical care.
The way they talked about me, tracked me, and
assumed 	I 	was 	lying 	was 	rooted 	in 	bias.
Their behavior showed they did not see me the same
as lighter employees. They treated me like someone
they needed to catch doing something wrong.
After I was injured on duty and filed for workers
compensation, 	everything 	changed. 	Instead 	of
supporting my medical recovery, my employer and
their insurance partners (CorVel and the Florida
Sheriffs Risk Management Fund) began working
together behind the scenes to interfere with my
treatment. 	They 	contacted 	my 	doctors 	without
telling 	me, 	tried 	to 	force 	me 	into 	new 	medical
providers who were not familiar with my case, and
pressured me to attend therapy only at locations
that benefited the agency, not my health.
HR 	Staff, 	including 	Donald 	Smith, 	also 	began
scrutinizing me in a way that had nothing to do with
my job performance. They questioned my honesty,
searched 	my 	social 	media, 	and 	tried 	to 	gather
information to discredit me. This was all done after
I exercised my legal right to medical treatment.
Their actions made the work environment hostile

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and created so much pressure that I felt forced to
resign just to protect my health and continue seeing
the doctor who was actually treating me.
My employer did not treat my injury or my medical
restrictions with respect. Even though I had clear
light-duty restrictions and a treating physician who
ordered specific therapy at a specific location, the
Sheriff’s 	Office 	and 	their 	insurance 	partners
interfered with every part of my care. They tried to
override my doctor, pressured me to attend therapy
at a location closer to them, and made decisions
based on their convenience and workload, not my
medical needs.
They treated my disability like a burden. Instead of
trusting my doctor, they questioned every medical
note, tried to stop my approved therapy, and pushed
for changes that would disrupt my continuity of care.
They coordinated with the adjuster and nurse case
manager to make my treatment harder, not easier.
This made my symptoms worse and prevented me
from safely recovering while working.
Their actions showed discrimination based on my
medical condition and a refusal to accommodate my
injury in good faith . . .
The Commission issued a Notice on May 15, 2026, stating “there is no
reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful practice occurred.”
Mr. Murchinson-Rivera filed a Petition for Relief with the Commission on
June 10, 2026, and the Commission referred this matter to DOAH on
June 26, 2026.
The final hearing was convened as scheduled on September 2, 2026.
In addition to testifying on his own behalf, Mr. Murchinson-Rivera called
Rachel Turner, the SCSO’s Human Resources Director, and Jenna Moore, the
SCSO’s Human Resources Benefit Specialist, as witnesses. Petitioner’s
Exhibits 1 through 24 were accepted into evidence. The SCSO called

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Petitioner and Ms. Turner as witnesses. Respondent’s Exhibits 1 through 41
were accepted into evidence. Because Petitioner’s Exhibit 20 was a one-page
excerpt from Respondent’s position statement, the undersigned granted leave
for the SCSO to file its entire position statement as Respondent’s Exhibit 41.
Respondent’s Exhibit 41 is accepted into evidence.
Both parties filed timely Proposed Recommended Orders that were
considered in the preparation of this Recommended Order.
Unless stated otherwise, all statutory references shall be to the 2024
version of the Florida Statutes. See McClosky v. Dep’t of Fin. Serv., 115 So. 3d
441 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (noting that a proceeding is governed by the law in
effect at the time of the commission of the acts alleged to constitute a
violation of law).
FINDINGS OF FACT
Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing,
the entire record of this proceeding, reasonable inferences drawn from that
record, and matters subject to official recognition, the following findings of
fact are made:
1. Mr. Murchinson-Rivera is a former SCSO deputy and identifies as
African American.
2. The SCSO contracts with the Florida Sheriff’s Risk Management Fund
(“FSRMF”) to handle workers’ compensation claims. The FSRMF assigns the
adjustor and manages the overall care for the injured worker in conjunction
with the nurse case manager, including the assignment of authorized
treatment providers. Neither the FSRMF adjuster nor the nurse case
manager are SCSO employees.

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3. The SCSO does not interact with an injured worker’s medical providers
and relies on the doctor’s stated restrictions for the injured worker in making
decisions regarding accommodations and return to work opportunities.
4. On February 17, 2025, Mr. Murchinson-Rivera was injured while
operating a motorcycle for the SCSO’s specialized traffic unit.
Mr. Murchinson-Rivera suffered injuries to his left knee, right foot/ankle,
neck/back, and head injuries. Mr. Murchinson-Rivera was transported to a
local hospital where he received treatment before he was discharged a few
hours later.
5. Mr. Murchinson-Rivera describes his injuries as “a meniscus tear” in
his left knee that required surgery, “some strains and sprains in [his] right
foot,” swelling in the bones of his neck and back, and a “concussion.”
Mr. Murchinson-Rivera identifies those injuries as his disability.
6. Following the accident, Mr. Murchinson-Rivera was placed on out-of-
work status by a physician with Concentra, an occupational health services
entity, and Mr. Murchinson-Rivera’s authorized treatment provider through
the workers’ compensation process. The SCSO correspondingly placed
Mr. Murchinson-Rivera on leave.
7. On March 17, 2025, Mr. Murchinson-Rivera was cleared for work with
the following restrictions: “sitting work only, to use crutches and [left] knee
support for ambulation.” However, the doctor’s notes reflect that he was “not
able to tolerate” going to work and was returned to out-of-work status. As a
result, the SCSO permitted Mr. Murchinson-Rivera to remain on leave.
8. As Mr. Murchinson-Rivera’s treatment progressed, Concentra referred
him to various specialists which initially included: (1) Dr. Joseph Tutorino
(left knee); and (2) Dr. Sebastian Rivera (back/neck)
9. On March 23, 2025, Dr. Tutorino cleared Mr. Murchinson-Rivera for
“sedentary work only.”
10. On April 1, 2025, Dr. Rivera cleared Mr. Murchinson-Rivera for work
with the following restrictions: “alternate between sitting and standing as

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needed; no lifting, carrying, pulling, pushing greater than 10 lbs.; no
repetitive bending.”
11. After the SCSO received Mr. Murchinson-Rivera’s updated medical
documentation clearing him for work with the above-referenced restrictions,
the SCSO contacted Mr. Murchinson-Rivera to return to work in a light duty
capacity.
12. In response, Mr. Murchinson-Rivera claimed that he could not work.
13. After the SCSO informed Mr. Murchinson-Rivera that he was expected
to report for light duty on April 4, 2025, Mr. Murchinson-Rivera returned to
work, on a light duty assignment, in SCSO’s Records Department.
14. On April 9, 2025, Mr. Murchinson-Rivera contacted his supervisor
within the records department and advised he was not coming to work
because he had been placed back on out-of-work status through Concentra.
15. Within 24 hours, however, Concentra modified Mr. Murchinson-
Rivera’s restrictions and permitted him to return to “seated duty” with
certain restrictions such as: (a) wearing a brace; (b) no driving of SCSO
vehicles due to his inability to get into a cab; (c) using crutches; (d) ground
level work only; and (e) no walking on uneven terrain. Concentra also
specified that Mr. Murchinson-Rivera should be able to sit or stand “for
comfort.”
16. The SCSO did not receive Mr. Murchinson-Rivera’s updated
restrictions until April 16, 2025. At that time, the SCSO notified
Mr. Murchinson-Rivera that he was expected to return to work pursuant to
his modified duty assignment.
17. In response, Mr. Murchinson-Rivera initiated a three-way phone call
with Concentra during which Concentra confirmed that Mr. Murchinson-
Rivera could return to work with the restrictions described above.
Mr. Murchinson-Rivera returned to work on April 17, 2025.
18. During this time period, Mr. Murchinson-Rivera was seeing a physical
therapist for his back. His physical therapy location was a substantial

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distance away from the Sheriff’s Office, and Mr. Murchinson-Rivera needed
an hour’s worth of travel time to reach physical therapy appointments when
he was working light duty. While Mr. Murchinson-Rivera’s light-duty
assignment was a fulltime position, Mr. Murchinson-Rivera was admittedly
only able to work half days on the days he attended physical therapy— an
occurrence which happened three times a week.
19. Although the SCSO requested that Mr. Murchinson-Rivera switch to a
physical therapy location closer to the Sheriff’s Office that would enable him
to return to work after physical therapy, Mr. Murchinson-Rivera refused.
The SCSO accommodated Mr. Murchinson-Rivera by permitting him to leave
work early and work only half days when he had physical therapy
appointments.
20. By April 22, 2025, Mr. Murchinson-Rivera was returned to out-of-work
status after he left a physical therapy appointment feeling light-headed and
faint.
21. Over the course of the next several weeks, Mr. Murchinson-Rivera
remained on out-of-work status. During this time, Mr. Murchinson-Rivera
had left knee surgery and saw a specialist for his head. That specialist placed
him on out-of-work status pending the results of an MRI.
22. By June 11, 2025, Mr. Murchinson-Rivera’s treating physicians
cleared him for work, and Mr. Murchinson-Rivera returned to light duty on
June 12, 2025.
23. Approximately one week later, on June 20, 2025, Mr. Murchinson-
Rivera contacted Jenna Moore, a Human Resources Benefit Specialist, and
asked to be taken off work because side effects from his pain medication
made it difficult to work. Because Mr. Murchinson-Rivera’s medical
documentation did not support a need for him to take pain medication at
work, Ms. Moore encouraged him to contact his doctor.
24. Mr. Murchinson-Rivera subsequently contacted Concentra and asked
to be returned to out-of-work status. Concentra refused that request and

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advised Mr. Murchinson-Rivera to take his medication in a reasonable
manner. Nevertheless, on June 23, 2025, Mr. Murchinson-Rivera emailed
Ms. Moore and unilaterally took himself out of work, claiming “I cannot
properly function at work while under the impairment of my narcotic
medication and other medications that may cause me to sleep while at work,
or worst [sic], injure myself more.”
25. No physician authorized Mr. Murchinson-Rivera to place himself on
out-of-work status. Nevertheless, the SCSO allowed Mr. Murchinson-Rivera
to go back on leave rather than continue in his light duty assignment.
26. On July 21, 2025, Dr. Tutorino cleared Mr. Murchinson-Rivera to
return to work without restrictions. At this time, Dr. Rivera was the only
doctor who had yet to clear Mr. Murchinson-Rivera for full duty.
27. Mr. Murchinson-Rivera returned to modified duty on August 12, 2025.
28. On September 16, 2025, Dr. Rivera cleared Mr. Murchinson-Rivera to
return to work without restrictions. Up until this time, the SCSO had
continued to accommodate Mr. Murchinson-Rivera by placing him in a
modified duty assignment and allowing him to miss half days for physical
therapy appointments.
29. After Dr. Rivera cleared Mr. Murchinson-Rivera to return to work
without restrictions, Mr. Murchinson-Rivera exercised his right for a one-
time change in physician through the workers’ compensation process.
30. On October 7, 2025, Mr. Murchinson-Rivera’s new physician,
Dr. Michael Broom, placed Mr. Murchinson-Rivera back on modified duty
status for a “muscle strain” and referred Mr. Murchinson-Rivera for
three weeks of physical therapy.
31. In response, the SCSO placed Mr. Murchinson-Rivera back on his
previous modified duty assignment.
32. This time, however, the SCSO requested, and its workers’
compensation carrier approved, for Mr. Murchinson-Rivera to attend physical
therapy at a location closer to the Sheriff’s Office. Attending physical therapy

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at a closer location would allow Mr. Murchinson-Rivera to attend his
appointments and return to work later that day. It would also drastically
reduce the time he was travelling to and from physical therapy, and thus
reduce the SCSO’s potential liability.
33. On October 9, 2025, SCSO Human Resources Director Rachel Turner
met with Mr. Murchinson-Rivera to ensure he understood his status and
expectations moving forward. During this meeting, Ms. Turner clarified with
that Mr. Murchinson-Rivera had two options: (a) attend physical therapy at
the approved, closer location and remain on his light duty assignment or
(b) attend physical therapy at his preferred location and be placed on leave
during the duration of his physical therapy period. Ms. Turner further
informed Mr. Murchinson-Rivera that if he insisted on going to physical
therapy at an unauthorized location, then he would have to use his personal
leave to account for missed hours from work.
34. Mr. Murchinson-Rivera responded by resigning, effective October 10,
2025, from the SCSO.
Findings Regarding Disparate Treatment, Hostile Work Environment, and
Retaliation
35. Mr. Murchinson-Rivera’s claim of race discrimination is based solely
on his testimony that an unidentified Caucasian deputy, who was also
injured, stated to Mr. Murchinson-Rivera that the SCSO allowed him to: (a)
go home because of pain; (b) leave early; and (c) and leave his duty station in
order to walk around.1
1 Mr. Murchinson-Rivera testified that “[s]o during the course of this, I was assigned to light
duty, in the records area, and this is my recollection of it, and while assigned there, there
was another gentleman, and I don’t remember his name. I know he was a white deputy, and
he also was injured, and there were things that I would ask for, that I wouldn’t be able to get,
like I need to go home because, you know, I’m in pain, I need to, you know, walk around, and
I need to do this, and I couldn’t do it, but when he [ ] asked, he was allowed to do these
things. And I – I specifically know this, because when I would go to HR and complain about
certain things, he’s sitting in the same area as me, I will tell him the outcome of what they
told me, and then when he go complain about the same thing, he will come back and tell me,
well, I was allowed to do this. And I’m like, wow, that’s crazy, you know, we’re both injured,

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36. Mr. Murchinson-Rivera has no personal knowledge of this unidentified
person’s medical status, medications, or restrictions. Mr. Murchinson-Rivera
never saw this person’s medical records, attended any doctor’s appointments,
or otherwise spoke with this person’s physicians. Mr. Murchinson-Rivera
never attended any meetings regarding the individual’s medical status, light
duty status, or return to work.
37. Mr. Murchinson-Rivera disagreed with how the SCSO treated him
after his initial return to work. However, no actions by the SCSO were
sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the terms and conditions of his
employment. On the contrary, the greater weight of the evidence
demonstrated that the SCSO treated Mr. Murchinson-Rivera fairly following
his work-related injury. The SCSO appropriately placed Mr. Murchinson-
Rivera on leave and light duty status in light of his treating physicians’
assessments and his physical limitations. In addition, the SCSO had
legitimate reasons, such as limiting potential liability and maximizing
Mr. Murchinson-Rivera’s time at work, for requiring him to receive physical
therapy at a location closer to his work station.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
38. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter of this proceeding pursuant to sections
120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule
60Y-4.016(1).
39. The State of Florida, under the legislative scheme contained in
sections 760.01–760.11 and 509.092, Florida Statutes, known as the Florida
Civil Rights Act of 1992 (“the FCRA”), incorporates and adopts the legal
principles and precedents established in the federal anti-discrimination laws
we’ve both got pain, and you’re allowed to do it, but I can’t [be] allow[ed] to like, you know, go
home . . .”

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set forth under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.
40. Section 760.10 prohibits discrimination “against any individual with
respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age,
handicap, or marital status.” § 760.10(1)(a), Fla. Stat.
41. The allegations in Mr. Murchinson-Rivera’s Employment Complaint
amount to claims of disparate treatment, retaliation, and hostile work
environment. Mr. Murchinson-Rivera must prove his claims by a
preponderance of the evidence. See EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d
1265, 1273 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that a claimant bears the ultimate burden
of persuading the trier of fact that the employer intentionally discriminated
against the employee); § 120.57(1)(j), Fla. Stat.
42. Each of Mr. Murchinson-Rivera’s claims will be addressed below.
Any additional allegations and/or claims raised in his Petition for Relief
cannot be considered. See Adhim Hollis Hosein v. Miami-Dade Public
Schools, Case No. 07-1972 (Fla. DOAH Sept. 28, 2007; Fla. FCHR Dec. 17,
2007)(stating “‘[o]nly those claims that are fairly encompassed within a
[timely-filed complaint] can be the subject of [an administrative hearing
conducted pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes]’ and
any subsequent FCHR award of relief to the complainant.”) citing Chambers
v. American Trans. Air, Inc., 17 F.3d 998, 1003 (7th Cir. 1994); Gwendolyn
Salter v. International Paper, Case No. 06-0339 (Fla. DOAH Nov. 3, 2006;
Fla. FCHR June 29, 2007) (stating DOAH “is without jurisdiction of any
claim not raised in the initial charge of discrimination before the
Commission. New or different types of discrimination cannot be alleged in the
Petition for Relief or at the formal proceeding instituted under Sections
120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, unless they were originally alleged
in the Charge of Discrimination and investigated by the Commission.”);
Obrigkeit v. Bill Leeper, in His Official Capacity as Sheriff of Nassau Cnty.,

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Case No. 24-2731 (Fla. DOAH; Order Establishing Scope of Hearing;
Sept. 30, 2024) (ruling “allegations of drug use shall not form the basis for
Respondent’s alleged discriminatory action as it exceeds the scope of the
Complaint, and is not properly raised in this proceeding.”).
Analysis of Mr. Murchinson-Rivera’s Disparate Treatment Claim
43. Mr. Murchison-Rivera alleges that he was the victim of disparate
treatment. The United States Supreme Court has noted that “[d]isparate
treatment . . . is the most easily understood type of discrimination.
The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of
their race, color, religion, sex, or [other protected characteristic].” Teamsters
v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
44. A party may prove unlawful race discrimination by direct or
circumstantial evidence. Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga., 918 F.3d 1213, 1220
& n.6 (11th Cir. 2019). When a petitioner alleges disparate treatment under
the FCRA, the petitioner must prove that his or her race “actually motivated
the employer’s decision. That is, the [petitioner’s race] must have
‘actually played a role [in the employer’s decision-making] process and had a
determinative influence on the outcome.’” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000) (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,
507 U.S. at 610 (1993)) (alteration in original).
45. Direct evidence is evidence that, “if believed, proves [the] existence of
[a] fact in issue without inference or presumption.” Burrell v. Bd. of Trs. of
Ga. Mil. Coll., 125 F.3d 1390, 1393 (11th Cir. 1997). Direct evidence consists
of “only the most blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than
to discriminate” on the basis of an impermissible factor. Carter v. City of
Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 582 (11th Cir. 1989).
46. To prove unlawful discrimination by circumstantial evidence, a party
must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the
evidence. If successful, this creates a presumption of discrimination.
The burden then shifts to the employer to offer a legitimate, non-

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discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. If the employer
meets that burden, then the presumption disappears, and the employee must
prove that the legitimate reasons were a pretext. Valenzuela v. GlobeGround
N. Am., LLC, 18 So. 3d 17, 25 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). Facts that are sufficient to
establish a prima facie case must be adequate to permit an inference of
discrimination. Id.
47. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, one can establish a prima
facie case of discrimination by demonstrating that: (a) he or she is a member
of a protected class; (b) he or she was qualified for the position held; (c) he or
she was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (d) other similarly-
situated employees, who are not members of the protected group, were
treated more favorably. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802 (1973). “When comparing similarly situated individuals to raise an
inference of discriminatory motivation, these individuals must be similarly
situated in all relevant respects.” Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d
1250, 1273
48. With regard to the instant case, Mr. Murchinson-Rivera’s race
discrimination claim is entirely based on hearsay testimony that an
unidentified, Caucasian deputy received more favorable treatment because
that deputy was allegedly allowed to: (a) leave work because of pain; (b) leave
work early; and (c) leave his duty station in order to walk around.
49. As noted above in Paragraph 38, DOAH had jurisdiction over this
matter pursuant to section 120.57. That statute governs formal
administrative hearings such as the one conducted in the instant case, and
section 120.57(1)(e), mandates that hearsay evidence “shall not be sufficient
in itself to support a finding unless it would be admissible over objection in
civil actions.” Because the hearsay statement used by Mr. Murchinson-Rivera
to support his disparate treatment claim would not be admissible over
objection in a civil action, Mr. Murchinson-Rivera failed to prove his
disparate treatment claim. See Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., 137

14
F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 1998)(noting that “[i]f Plaintiff fails to identify
similarly situated, nonminority employees who were treated more favorably,
her case must fail because the burden is on her to establish her prima facie
case.”).2
Analysis of Mr. Murchinson-Rivera’s Hostile Work Environment Claim
50. “Title VII is violated when the workplace is permeated with
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an
abusive working environment.” Coles v. Post Master Gen. United States
Postal Serv., 711 F. App’x. 890, 897 (11th Cir. 2017).
51. In order to substantiate such a claim, a plaintiff must satisfy the
following criteria: (a) he or she belongs to a protected group; (b) he or she has
been subjected to unwelcome harassment; (c) the harassment was based on a
protected characteristic of the employee; (d) the harassment was sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment; and
(e) the employer was responsible for the harassment under a theory of
vicarious or direct liability. See Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d
1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002).
52. Mr. Murchinson-Rivera did not prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the SCSO subjected him to a hostile work environment.
While Mr. Murchinson-Rivera objects to how the SCSO treated him after his
initial return to work, the greater weight of the evidence established that no
actions by the SCSO were sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the
terms and conditions of his employment. On the contrary, the greater weight
of the evidence demonstrated that the SCSO treated Mr. Murchinson-Rivera
fairly following his work-related injury. Therefore, Mr. Murchinson-Rivera
failed to substantiate his hostile work environment claim. See § 120.57(1)(j),
2 Even if that hearsay testimony were admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule, the
undersigned finds that aspect of Mr. Murchinson-Rivera’s testimony to be insufficient, by
itself, to support a disparate treatment claim.

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Fla. Stat. (providing that “[f]indings of fact shall be based upon a
preponderance of the evidence, except in penal or licensure disciplinary
proceedings or except as otherwise provided by statute, and shall be based
exclusively on the evidence of record and on matters officially recognized.”).
Analysis of Mr. Murchinson-Rivera’s Retaliation Claim
53. As for Mr. Murchinson-Rivera’s retaliation claim, the burden of proof
in Title VII retaliation cases is also governed by the framework established in
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792. A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case
by demonstrating the following: (a) that he or she engaged in a statutorily
protected activity; (b) he or she experienced an adverse employment action;
and (c) a causal link between the protected expression and the adverse action.
Coles v. Post Master Gen. U.S. Postal Serv., 711 F. App’x. at 896. The burden
then shifts to the defendant to negate the inference of retaliation by
presenting legitimate reasons for the adverse employment action. If the
defendant is successful, then the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that
the reasons offered by the defendant are pretextual. Id.
54. If an employer articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory and non-
retaliatory reason for the adverse action, then a petitioner must establish
that the non-retaliatory reason was merely a pretext by demonstrating that
the stated reason was not the true reason for the employment decision.
Jackson v. State of Ala. State Tenure Comm’n, 405 F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir.
2005). “A reason is not pretext for discrimination unless it is shown both that
the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.” Brooks v.
Cnty. Comm’n of Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006).
A plaintiff “can meet her burden either directly by persuading the court that
a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by
showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.”
Dexter v. Amedisys Home Health, Inc. of Ala., 965 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1296
(N.D. Ala. 2013); see also Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1541 (11th Cir.
1989)(noting that when assessing whether an employer’s proffered reason

16
was pretextual, it is the decision-maker’s motive that is at issue); Murphree v.
Comm’r, 644 F. App’x. 962, 968 (11th Cir. 2016)(noting that “[i]n evaluating
pretext, we ask whether the plaintiff has cast sufficient doubt on the
defendant’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons to permit a reasonable
factfinder to conclude that the employee’s proffered legitimate reasons were
not what actually motivated its conduct.”).
55. If the stated, non-retaliatory reason is one that might motivate a
reasonable employer, “an employee must meet that reason head on and rebut
it, and the employee cannot succeed by simply quarreling with the wisdom of
that reason.” Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir.
2000)(en banc). Pretext must be established with “concrete evidence in the
form of specific facts” showing that the proffered reason was pretext; “mere
conclusory allegations and assertions” are insufficient. Bryant v. Jones, 575
F.3d 1281, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009). A reason cannot be pretext for
discrimination “unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that
discrimination was the real reason.” Fla. Stat. Univ. v. Sondel, 685 So. 2d
923, 927 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
56. The SCSO argues that Mr. Murchinson-Rivera’s filing of a workers’
compensation claim is not a protected activity under the FCRA. See Jimenez
v. Postmaster General, 211 F. App’x. 289, 290 (5th Cir. 2006) (ruling that “a
workers’ compensation claim is not a protected activity under Title VII. Only
those activities listed under Title VII are protected from retaliation, and
filing for worker’s compensation is not one.”).
57. Even if a workers’ compensation claim is a protected activity under the
FCRA, all of the allegedly adverse actions taken by the SCSO, described
above in the Findings of Fact, were supported by legitimate, non-
discriminatory, and non-retaliatory reasons. The SCSO appropriately placed
Mr. Murchinson-Rivera on leave when a treating physician deemed him
unable to work. In addition, the light duty assignments were appropriate
given his physical limitations. As for requiring Mr. Murchinson-Rivera to

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Case No. 26-3227
receive physical therapy from a provider in closer proximity to his work
station, the SCSO had legitimate reasons, such as limiting potential liability
and maximizing Mr. Murchinson-Rivera’s time at work, for doing so.
Accordingly, Mr. Murchinson-Rivera failed to prove his retaliation claim by a
preponderance of the evidence.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a
final order dismissing Ronnie Murchinson-Rivera’s Employment Complaint.
DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of October, 2026, in Tallahassee,
Leon County, Florida.
S
G. W. CHISENHALL
Administrative Law Judge
DOAH Tallahassee Office
Division of Administrative Hearings
2001 Drayton Drive
Tallahassee, Florida 32311
(850) 488-9675
www.doah.state.fl.us
Filed with the Clerk of the
Division of Administrative Hearings
this 14th day of October, 2026.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Elizabeth A. Miller, Chief Legal Counsel
(eServed)
Casey C. Snipes, Agency Clerk
(eServed)
Cindy T. Harper, Attorney Supervisor
(eServed)
Matthew David Stefany, Partner
(eServed)

18
Ronnie Murchinson-Rivera
(eServed)
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within 15 days from
the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended
Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this
case.