Quintanar v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: June 24, 2025

S25A0360. QUINTANAR v. THE STATE.

ELLINGTON, Justice.

Abraham Quintanar appeals his convictions for felony murder

and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Marcus

Gilead and the attempted armed robbery of Ciavy Wiles. 1 Quintanar

1 The crimes occurred on February 10, 2020. On December 4, 2020, a

Gwinnett County grand jury indicted Quintanar, Miguel Angel Gonzalez, and
Sebastian Resendiz-Garcia for two counts of felony murder, two counts of
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, two counts of criminal attempt to
commit armed robbery, and one count of possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony. Quintanar alone was charged with possession of a
handgun by a person under the age of 18 years. Quintanar was tried separately
at a jury trial that ended on February 29, 2024, and he was found guilty on all
counts. On March 4, 2024, Quintanar was sentenced to serve life in prison with
the possibility of parole for felony murder predicated on the aggravated assault
of Gilead, a consecutive five-year prison term for possession of a firearm during
the commission of a felony, concurrent 20-year prison terms for the aggravated
assault and attempted armed robbery of Wiles, and a concurrent 12-month
prison term for possession of a handgun by a person under the age of 18 years.
The other felony murder count was vacated by operation of law, and the
remaining counts were merged into the felony murder for which Quintanar
was sentenced. We have identified a sentencing error that we correct in
Division 7. Quintanar filed a timely motion for new trial, which he amended
contends that the trial court erred by admitting his custodial

statement, admitting testimony about a video recording that was

not introduced into evidence, refusing to allow certain impeachment

of a witness, and failing to give requested jury charges related to

justification and mutual combat. Quintanar also contends that

certain portions of the State’s closing argument amounted to plain

error and that the cumulative effect of the enumerated errors

prejudiced him. Although we vacate Quintanar’s conviction and

sentence for aggravated assault because it should have merged with

his conviction for attempted armed robbery, we otherwise affirm

Quintanar’s convictions for the reasons explained below.

The evidence presented at trial showed that co-indictees

Quintanar, Sebastian Resendiz-Garcia, and Miguel Angel Gonzalez

attempted to rob Gilead and Wiles at gunpoint, that Quintanar and

Gilead fought and struggled for control of Quintanar’s gun, and that

through new counsel on March 14 and September 3, 2024. The trial court
denied Quintanar’s amended motion for new trial on September 16, 2024.
Quintanar filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed in this
Court to the term beginning in December 2024 and submitted for a decision on
the briefs.
2
Quintanar then shot and killed Gilead.

On February 10, 2020, Quintanar, Resendiz-Garcia, and

Gonzalez planned to rob Gilead where he lived with his mother and

brother. The co-indictees understood that Gilead was a drug dealer

and in possession of drugs and money because Gonzalez had

purchased marijuana from him earlier in the day. Gonzalez paid

about $600 for three to four ounces of marijuana, which Gilead

retrieved from a duffel bag in his vehicle.

The three co-indictees drove to Gilead’s house but parked some

distance away. Wiles and Gilead were “hang[ing] out” in Gilead’s

car, parked in his driveway, and Wiles was watching a game on his

phone while Gilead dozed off. Each of the co-indictees possessed a

gun and wore a mask during the attempted robbery. At

approximately 8:00 p.m., two of them approached the driver’s side

of Gilead’s vehicle while Gilead was asleep in the driver’s seat, and

one co-indictee approached the passenger’s side while Wiles was in

the front passenger seat. The three co-indictees pointed their

firearms at Gilead and Wiles and knocked on the windows of both

3
sides of the car. Gilead picked up a machete that was in the car, but

Wiles told Gilead not to get the machete. The co-indictees forced

Gilead and Wiles out of the vehicle and asked where the bag of

marijuana was. Resendiz-Garcia began searching the vehicle.

After Wiles showed the co-indictee on his side of the vehicle he

had nothing in his pockets, a gunshot from Gilead’s side of the

vehicle distracted that co-indictee and gave Wiles an opportunity to

run away from the scene. Resendiz-Garcia heard a shot and fired his

9mm Taurus pistol as he fled, and Quintanar and Gonzalez also

discharged their firearms. Gilead struggled with Quintanar and

tried to disarm him, but Quintanar regained control of his gun and

shot at Gilead multiple times. After Quintanar fled, he disposed of

his weapon by throwing it into a sewer.

Gilead’s mother, who was inside the house, heard three

gunshots and opened her front door. She saw Gilead bent over, and

he kept telling his mother he felt tired. As Gilead moved towards his

mother, she could see a young man, whom Gilead’s mother later

identified as Gonzalez, holding a gun to Gilead’s back. Gilead’s

4
mother then put herself between them and, not knowing that Gilead

had already been shot, begged the man not to shoot. Gilead collapsed

onto the floor with blood on his chest, and the other man fled. Gilead

later died from a single gunshot that entered the front of his chest

and exited through his back.

A total of five shell casings were recovered at the scene: four

9mm casings and one .40-caliber casing. One 9mm casing was in the

driveway on the driver’s side of the vehicle; two 9mm shell casings

were in the bushes near the front door; one 9mm shell casing was

between the vehicle and garage door; and one .40-caliber shell casing

was in a driveway across the street. The four 9mm shell casings were

fired from the same gun. When Resendiz-Garcia was arrested at his

home, officers recovered a loaded brown Taurus 9mm handgun.

Other evidence discovered at the scene included a bullet hole in the

garage door, 1.4 pounds of marijuana in the garage, a black “sock

hat” and black ski mask in the yard, marijuana and a machete in

the vehicle, a black folding knife on the ground, and Gilead’s wallet

in the house containing $2,328 in cash.

5
Law enforcement learned from Resendiz-Garcia of Quintanar’s

and Gonzalez’s involvement in Gilead’s murder and took out

warrants for their arrest. On February 13, 2020, Officer Johnathon

Bucknor stopped a vehicle carrying Quintanar and others, and

Quintanar fled the scene, leaving a firearm behind. Law

enforcement eventually located Quintanar the next day and took

him into custody. During a police interview, Quintanar, who was 15

years old at the time, stated that he and his two co-indictees ran up

on the victims to commit the armed robbery; Quintanar initially

pointed a 9mm Jimenez firearm at the passenger; after Gilead got

out of the car, he “tackled” Quintanar and “grabbed the gun from

[him]”; Quintanar “thought [Gilead] was going to shoot me”; Gilead

“pistol-whipped” Quintanar five times and pointed the gun at him;

Quintanar grabbed the gun back, “wrestled” on the ground with

Gilead over the gun, regained control of it, and shot Gilead; Gilead’s

mother came out and said “don’t kill me; don’t kill him”; and –

contrary to the identification of Gonzalez by Gilead’s mother – only

she and Quintanar were still there with Gilead because Wiles and

6
the two co-indictees had left.

1. Quintanar contends that the admission of his custodial

statement to law enforcement officers after his arrest when he was

a minor was a violation of due process under the United States

Constitution because the statement was not voluntarily made. In

support of this contention, Quintanar complains that, before being

advised of the charges against him, Detective Dennis Hennelly told

him that he was going prison for the rest of his life “because you

want to say you were not there,” in reference to Gilead’s shooting.

Quintanar argues that Detective Hennelly was not simply informing

Quintanar of his potential sentence, but instead made the life

sentence a consequence of his statement rather than his charges,

and implied that he would not spend the rest of his life in prison if

he changed his statement.2 Quintanar also complains of his mother’s

2 Quintanar does not make a separate statutory argument that his
confession was induced by a hope of benefit. Although Quintanar’s appellate
brief references case law related to such statutory claims, he does not cite the
relevant statute, OCGA § 24-8-824, which provides that, “[t]o make a
confession admissible, it shall have been made voluntarily, without being
induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.”

7
absence for four hours and the officers’ repeated misrepresentations

that both of his co-indictees and the victim’s mother had identified

him when Resendiz-Garcia was the only one who had implicated

Quintanar treats the hope-of-benefit principle as auxiliary to his constitutional
claim. This treatment is consistent with his failure to preserve the statutory
issue in the trial court for ordinary appellate review. An objection to evidence
on constitutional grounds does not preserve a related statutory ground for
review. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 294 Ga. 86, 87-88 (2) (750 SE2d 347) (2013)
(holding that objection to evidence on Confrontation Clause grounds does not
preserve for review a hearsay objection to the same evidence). Quintanar
preserved his contention that his custodial statement was involuntary in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. But he did not raise the statutory claim that his statement was
induced by a hope of benefit or fear of injury in his written motion, at the pre-
trial hearing on the motion, or when the statements were ultimately
introduced into evidence. See Turner v. State, 287 Ga. 793, 794 (2) (700 SE2d
386) (2010) (similarly explaining that the appellant waived his claim based on
the predecessor of OCGA § 24-8-824 even though he preserved his federal
constitutional voluntariness claim).
We have explained that statutory hope-of-benefit claims are
distinguished from constitutional voluntariness claims, though our own
decisions have sometimes conflated the two. See Matthews v. State, 311 Ga.
531, 542 (3) (b) (858 SE2d 718) (2021); State v. Chulpayev, 296 Ga. 764, 779 (3)
(b) (770 SE2d 808) (2015). Yet, again, Quintanar makes no separate statutory
argument. He does not make any argument that the portion of the statute
requiring the statement to be voluntary – apart from the specified “hope of
benefit” or “fear of injury” – means something more than the federal due-
process voluntariness requirement. Nor does he argue that his statement was
induced by hope of benefit or fear of injury as set forth in the statute. However,
Quintanar does specifically rely on the principle that a promise falling short of
a “hope of benefit,” “particularly if it is broken, could be one of the totality of
circumstances that renders a confession involuntary and inadmissible as a
violation of constitutional due process.” Brown v. State, 290 Ga. 865, 871 (2) (d)
(725 SE2d 320) (2012). Accordingly, we consider the circumstance of Detective
Hennelly’s statement as part of our due-process analysis below.
8
Quintanar. We conclude that the trial court did not err in

determining that the totality of the circumstances showed that

Quintanar’s custodial statement was voluntary.

“In determining whether a defendant’s statement was

voluntary as a matter of constitutional due process, a trial court

must consider the totality of the circumstances,” with the State

bearing the “burden of demonstrating the voluntariness of [the]

statement by a preponderance of the evidence.” Matthews v. State,

311 Ga. 531, 540 (3) (a) (858 SE2d 718) (2021) (citation and

punctuation omitted). See also Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423, 429 (3)

n.9 (883 SE2d 317) (2023) (noting that we have applied the “totality-

of-the-circumstances test in evaluating whether a juvenile’s

statement to law enforcement officials was voluntarily made as a

matter of due process”). “[P]roper application of a totality-of-the-

circumstances test mandates . . . inquiry into all the circumstances

surrounding the interrogation.” Clark, 315 Ga. at 434 (3) (b) (citation

and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original) (citing cases

discussing the test in a variety of contexts). Thus, lists of specific

9
factors that we have previously considered “are neither required nor

exhaustive.” State v. Franklin, 318 Ga. 39, 42 (3) n.6 (897 SE2d 432)

(2024) (involving factors we have considered in determining whether

the statement made by an adult defendant while intoxicated or

under the influence of drugs was voluntary as a matter of

constitutional due process). See also Clark, 315 Ga. at 429 (3), 434-

435 (3) (b) & n.16 (stating that “any prescriptive or fixed list of

factors by its very nature risks undermining a totality-of-the-

circumstances test” and disapproving any language in prior cases

indicating that a specific nine-factor framework to determine

whether a juvenile knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda

rights is required or exclusive, as well as cases involving the issue of

whether a statement was voluntarily made as a matter of due

process).

As we recently clarified, however, “the totality-of-the-

circumstances standard we use to evaluate voluntariness claims

includes” the necessary predicate of coercive police activity.

Franklin, 318 Ga. at 42-43 (3) (relying on Colorado v. Connelly, 479

10
U. S. 157, 164-167 (107 SCt 515, 93LE2d 473) (1986)). “Coercive

police activity—such as excessively lengthy interrogation, physical

deprivation, and brutality—is a necessary predicate to the finding

that a confession is not voluntary within the meaning of the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Dozier v. State, 306

Ga. 29, 36 (4) (c) (829 SE2d 131) (2019) (citations and punctuation

omitted). And “[i]t is well established that artifice and deception do

not render a statement involuntary so long as they are not

calculated to procure an untrue statement.” Drake v. State, 296 Ga.

286, 290 (3) (766 SE2d 447) (2014).

Generally, when reviewing the voluntariness of a defendant’s

statement, which is “a mixed question of fact and law, we accept the

trial court’s finding on disputed facts and credibility of witnesses

unless clearly erroneous but independently apply the law to the

facts.” Matthews, 311 Ga. at 540 (3) (a) (citation and punctuation

omitted).

We have previously explained that when reviewing a trial
court’s ruling on a suppression issue, an appellate court
must construe the evidentiary record in the light most

11
favorable to the factual findings and judgment of the trial
court. In cases where some or all of the material facts are
undisputed, we properly may take notice of the
undisputed facts — even if the trial court did not —
without interfering with the prerogative of the trial court
to resolve disputes of material fact.

State v. Tripp, 320 Ga. 536, 547-548 (2) (910 SE2d 587) (2024)

(citation and punctuation omitted). “Such undisputed facts include,

among other things, those which definitively can be ascertained

exclusively by reference to evidence that is uncontradicted and

presents no questions of credibility. Audio or video evidence may

match that description.” Franklin, 318 Ga. at 39 (1) n.1 (citation and

punctuation omitted). See also State v. Leverette, 320 Ga. 806, 809-

810 (2) (912 SE2d 533) (2025). Thus, the video recording of

Quintanar’s interview – which was admitted at the hearing on

Quintanar’s motion to suppress and at trial and was played for the

jury – may be considered to the extent that there is no dispute about

what happened or what words were said during the interview, while

any findings the trial court made in resolving disputes of material

fact must be reviewed for clear error. “Finally, we review de novo the

12
application of the facts to the law — that is, the trial court’s ultimate

conclusion whether, under all the circumstances, the defendant’s

statement was voluntary.” Tripp, 320 Ga. at 548 (2) (citation and

punctuation omitted).

The trial court here made no findings at the hearing on

Quintanar’s motion to suppress and subsequently issued a written

order finding, in relevant part, only that, “under the totality of

circumstances, [Quintanar’s] statement was voluntarily and freely

made[.]” The parties have not raised any dispute about the words

or the conduct occurring in the recorded interview or about any other

evidence related to the interview. Indeed, Quintanar states that the

evidence presented at the hearing “was not disputed” and that “the

controlling facts can be determined exclusively by reference to

evidence that is uncontradicted and presents no questions of

credibility.”

The video recording of Quintanar’s interview shows that police

officers slowly reviewed the waiver-of-rights forms for a juvenile,

Quintanar indicated he understood the forms, and he signed them.

13
Quintanar declined to continue without a parent, confirmed that he

would talk with officers if his mother was present, and gave them

her contact information. The interview was then suspended. About

two hours later, officers told Quintanar that they were still trying

to contact his mother. Quintanar asked what would happen if his

mother was not able to come to the police station that day. Officers

explained that, because he was being held on “adult charges,” they

would first “have to take you over to the jail, and you’re going to get

booked in, and then you’ll see a judge and then from there you’ll go

to our YDC [Youth Detention Center].” Quintanar asked whether

the interview would happen if his mother did not come, officers

explained it was his choice, and he said he would “go ahead with the

interview . . . I don’t really care.”

The officers left the interview room but later returned and

confirmed that Quintanar wanted to speak with them without his

mother present and understood all of the rights that had been

explained to him. Quintanar denied his presence and involvement

in a shooting with his friends. The officers told Quintanar that

14
Resendiz-Garcia and Gonzalez had told them everything they and

Quintanar did and that the victim’s mother gave a very good

description of Quintanar, but Quintanar continued to deny his

presence. Detective Hennelly later told Quintanar the story that

Resendiz-Garcia provided. Detective Hennelly stated he did not

believe Quintanar’s explanation that he was not at the crime scene.

Detective Hennelly stated that Quintanar was being charged as an

adult, his friends would testify against him, and “you are going to go

to jail for the rest of your f**king life for some bulls**t because you

want to say you weren’t there.”

Quintanar did not react or change his statement at that time.

Instead, he reviewed a document with his charges on it and had a

long discussion with Investigator Yayoi Huggins unrelated to the

shooting. Quintanar later said he was aware of the shooting because

he heard about it on the news, but he continued to insist he was not

there, and he told Investigator Huggins that they had the wrong

person. Investigator Huggins told Quintanar “everything you’re

saying now isn’t going to look good” because there were “three people

15
saying that it was you,” as well as other evidence, but Quintanar

remained silent and requested water, and Investigator Huggins left

the room.

When Investigator Huggins returned, she and Quintanar

discussed the visitation process at YDC, and Quintanar became

emotional when talking about his sisters. He asked when he would

be taken to jail, and Investigator Huggins said whenever he was

ready. Quintanar confirmed that he did not “have anything else to

say.” Investigator Huggins got up to leave, about four hours after

the interview had begun. As she grabbed the door handle, Quintanar

stopped her and said he was there when the shooting happened, “it

wasn’t supposed to go down like that but it did,” and “there, y’all got

me, I don’t give a f**k no more.” When Investigator Huggins asked

who came up with the idea, Quintanar said it was Resendiz-Garcia.

Quintanar then explained that, after Gilead and Wiles exited the

vehicle, Quintanar struggled with Gilead over his firearm, regained

control of it, and shot Gilead. At the hearing on Quintanar’s motion

to suppress those statements, both officers who interviewed

16
Quintanar gave testimony consistent with the video recording and

also testified that neither of them threatened him, coerced him, or

promised him anything for his cooperation.

Contrary to Quintanar’s specific arguments set forth above, the

trial court did not err by concluding that his statement was

voluntary. The officers did not talk to him without his mother

present until he agreed to speak with them after asking about what

would happen if she did not come. See Lester v. State, 310 Ga. 81, 88

(2) (849 SE2d 425) (2020) (The absence of a parent, especially when

the juvenile has acquiesced in nevertheless being interviewed, is

“merely one factor a trial court should consider in its totality-of-the-

circumstances evaluation of the voluntariness of a juvenile’s

statement.”), disapproved on other grounds in Clark, 315 Ga. at 435

(3) (b) n.16. And there is no evidence of the “hallmarks of coercive

police activity,” i.e., “excessively lengthy interrogation, physical

deprivation, [or] brutality.” See Drake, 296 Ga. at 291 (3) (citation

and punctuation omitted). To the extent that Detective Hennelly’s

statement about Quintanar going to prison for the rest of his life

17
“because you want to say you were not there” was artifice or

deception, it was not “calculated to procure an untrue statement.”

See id. at 290 (3). Moreover, although the officers lied about the

evidence against Quintanar, they “did nothing to suggest that a

confession would not be used against [him].” Matthews, 311 Ga. at

541 (3) (a). Absent evidence of coercive police conduct, and

considering all of the circumstances here, including the officers’

testimony and our de novo review of the entire video recording, we

conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that

Quintanar’s statement was voluntary as a matter of constitutional

due process. See Griffin v. State, 309 Ga. 860, 869 (4) (849 SE2d 191)

(2020) (“Considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding

[the appellant’s] custodial statement, including the detectives’

testimony concerning [his] demeanor, conduct, and responses to

their questions during the interview, as well as our de novo review

of the video recording of the interview, we conclude that the trial

court did not err in finding that [the appellant’s] statement was

voluntarily made.”).

18
2. Quintanar contends that the trial court violated the best-

evidence rule3 when it admitted Officer Bucknor’s testimony about

a body-camera video recording of his attempted traffic stop of

Quintanar’s vehicle even though the recording was not introduced

into evidence. Because it is highly probable that the alleged violation

of the best-evidence rule did not contribute to the verdict, there is no

reversible error.

An erroneous evidentiary ruling, without more, does not

require reversal if it was harmless. See OCGA § 24-1-103 (a) (“Error

shall not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes

evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected[.]”). “In

determining whether the error was harmless, we review the record

de novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable

jurors to have done so. The test for determining nonconstitutional

3 The best-evidence rule provides that, “[t]o prove the contents of a
writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or
photograph shall be required.” OCGA § 24-10-1002. Thus, proving the contents
of a video recording “generally requires a party to admit the original
recording.” Render v. State, 320 Ga. 890, 899 (3) (912 SE2d 679) (2025).
However, the original will not be required in certain specified circumstances.
See OCGA §§ 24-10-1004, 24-10-1007.
19
harmless error is whether it is highly probable that the error did not

contribute to the verdict.” Clarke v. State, 308 Ga. 630, 634 (2) (842

SE2d 863) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted).

In this case, Officer Bucknor testified on direct examination

that he received information that Quintanar was in a certain vehicle

in a particular location and was a “skinny male with almost bright

orange hair, light auburn-type color hair, short.” Bucknor

subsequently stopped the described vehicle after dark in a well-lit

parking lot. Four people were in the vehicle, and Bucknor identified

Quintanar as the person who exited the rear passenger-side door

and ran away. A loaded firearm was found under the front passenger

seat, accessible from the rear seat on that side. Quintanar was

wearing a hoodie, and Bucknor did not see his face, but the hoodie

came off, and Bucknor identified Quintanar based on observation of

his “clearly dyed” orange hair. During cross-examination, Officer

Bucknor testified that there was video from a body-worn camera

that showed what happened. When defense counsel asked to see it,

the prosecutor said, “we hadn’t planned to play it, but we can.” After

20
admitting the firearm and bullets over defense counsel’s objection,

the trial court ruled that either party could play the body-camera

video, and defense counsel said, “It’s their prerogative. I’d be

delighted to see it if they wish to show it to us.”

During redirect examination, Bucknor testified he watched the

body-camera video in preparation for court, the prosecutor asked if

he was “able to see Mr. Quintanar’s orange hair in the body camera,”

and Bucknor responded affirmatively. Quintanar objected that the

“body camera will speak for itself.” The prosecutor responded that

she was “asking about his foundation for his testimony in terms of

being able to recognize” Quintanar’s picture on another exhibit. The

trial court overruled the objection, and the prosecutor said it would

take 10 or 15 minutes to pull up the body-camera video. Neither the

State nor Quintanar ever introduced the video despite its

availability. 4

4 The District Attorney claims that Quintanar waived this issue because

he never attempted to play the video recording and instead suggested that the
prosecution play it and argued to the jury that neither the recording nor the
testimony of any of the other three persons in the vehicle was ever presented.

21
Assuming without deciding that the trial court abused its

discretion when it admitted Officer Bucknor’s testimony on redirect

examination over Quintanar’s objection, the error was harmless.

Bucknor’s testimony on redirect examination about what he saw on

the video recording was cumulative of his prior eyewitness

identification testimony based on his personal observation of the

traffic stop, to which Quintanar did not object. The evidence against

Quintanar, including his confession, was strong. And the challenged

testimony was relevant only to show that Quintanar fled from a

traffic stop just three days after the murder. Moreover, Quintanar

was able to argue to the jury that the identification of him at the

traffic stop was unreliable because neither the recording nor the

testimony of any of the other three persons in the vehicle was ever

presented. Under these circumstances, we conclude that it is highly

probable that any error in the admission of Officer Bucknor’s

testimony about what he saw on the video recording did not

However, we need not definitively decide whether Quintanar waived this issue.
Instead, we assume, only for purposes of this appeal, that Quintanar did not
waive this issue but preserved it for ordinary review.
22
contribute to the verdict. See Madera v. State, 318 Ga. 593, 596 (2)

(899 SE2d 132) (2024) (“It is well settled . . . that the erroneous

admission of evidence that is merely cumulative of other properly

admitted evidence is generally harmless, particularly where the

evidence of the defendant’s guilt is strong.”). Cf. Render v. State, 320

Ga. 890, 901 (4) (912 SE2d 679) (2025) (assuming without deciding

on plain-error review that certain accomplice testimony was a clear

and obvious error under the best-evidence rule, and concluding that

the appellant did not show prejudice because the challenged

testimony was relevant only to show that he had been with an

accomplice inside the vehicle used in the crime on the day after the

shooting and the testimony was cumulative of the accomplice’s

separate testimony from personal experience.).

3. Quintanar contends that the trial court wrongfully

prevented him from fully cross-examining Resendiz-Garcia about

the reduced sentence Resendiz-Garcia received in exchange for his

testimony. Quintanar asserts that this ruling violated his right to

confront witnesses against him under the federal and state

23
constitutions and his right to a thorough and sifting cross-

examination. We see no reversible error.

Criminal defendants are entitled to confront witnesses against

them and to a thorough and sifting cross-examination. See U.S.

Const. Amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against

him[.]”); Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XIV (“Every person

charged with an offense against the laws of this state . . . shall be

confronted with the witnesses testifying against such person.”);

OCGA § 24-6-611 (b) (“The right of a thorough and sifting cross-

examination shall belong to every party as to the witnesses called

against the party.”). That can include the right to ask a testifying

co-defendant about any benefit he received in exchange for his

testimony, including a change in when the witness could become

eligible for parole. See Jones v. State, 305 Ga. 750, 754 (2) (d) (827

SE2d 879) (2019); Manley v. State, 287 Ga. 338, 341-343 (2) (698

SE2d 301) (2010). But the right to cross-examination is not

unlimited, and the trial court has discretion to limit it. See Manley,

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287 Ga. at 340 (2).

In this case, Resendiz-Garcia testified that he was originally

charged with murder, which he knew carried a life sentence, but

that he later pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of manslaughter in

return for his testimony and was sentenced to 40 years, with 20

years to be served in prison. He also conceded that he would not have

received the plea deal if he had admitted that he was the shooter.

On cross-examination, defense counsel tried to establish whether

Resendiz-Garcia knew that, had he received a life sentence, he

would have to serve 30 years before being eligible for parole. The

State objected, and the trial court sustained the objection.

Quintanar now argues that his cross-examination was unfairly

limited because he was not allowed to fully explore exactly what

Resendiz-Garcia understood about the different possibilities for

parole under his original charges versus under his plea deal. But

even assuming that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting

cross-examination in that way, the error was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt. See Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 605, 616 (4) (878 SE2d

25
505) (2022) (“A constitutional error is harmless when the State

proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute

to the verdict, such as when the evidence at issue is cumulative of

other properly-admitted evidence or when the evidence against the

defendant is overwhelming.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

The jury heard about Resendiz-Garcia’s original charges and

his reduced charges. The jury heard that he got the plea deal in

exchange for his testimony. The possibility that the jury would have

reached a different verdict if it heard a little more about exactly

what Resendiz-Garcia understood about the details of the parole

system is small. That is especially so given the strong evidence of

Quintanar’s guilt. For these reasons, any error was harmless beyond

a reasonable doubt. See Jones, 305 Ga. at 754 (2) (d) (holding that

any error in limiting the appellant’s cross-examination on the issue

of parole eligibility was harmless, in light of the strength of the

evidence against him and substantial testimony from his accomplice

“concerning the favorable plea deal resulting in a major reduction in

the sentences [she] faced, thereby establishing [her] potential bias

26
toward the State”); Manley, 287 Ga. at 343 (2) (holding that trial

court erred in excluding evidence of changes in eligibility of a State’s

witness for parole resulting from her plea and sentencing deal, but

that the error was harmless because the appellants “were allowed to

extensively cross-examine [the witness] about her potential bias

flowing from her plea deal with the State which reduced her possible

sentence of life imprisonment to only a six-year sentence”).

4. Quintanar contends that the trial court erred by failing to

give his requests to charge the jury on the exercise of self-defense

while in the commission of a felony and on mutual combat. Although

Quintanar did request both charges and made timely objections to

their omission, the evidence in this case did not authorize either of

his requested jury instructions.

(a) Quintanar’s argument regarding his request for a self-

defense instruction is difficult to follow. The jury was charged on the

lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter, but, as Quintanar

conceded, the evidence did not warrant a jury instruction addressing

whether he acted in self-defense. Instead, the undisputed evidence

27
showed that Quintanar was one of the initial aggressors and was

committing a felony against Gilead. See OCGA § 16-3-21 (b) (“A

person is not justified in using force . . . if he . . . [i]nitially provokes

the use of force against himself with the intent to use such force as

an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant;” if he “[i]s

attempting to commit [or] committing . . . a felony; or” if he “[w]as

the aggressor or was engaged in a combat by agreement unless he

withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to such

other person his intent to do so and the other, notwithstanding,

continues or threatens to continue the use of unlawful force.”).

Kinlaw v. State, 317 Ga. 414, 423 (5) (893 SE2d 712) (2023) (“Indeed,

it would turn the law on its head to allow an armed aggressor, who

confronts an unarmed nonthreatening victim, to claim self-defense

when the victim is shot during the victim’s struggle to disarm the

aggressor.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

Quintanar argues, however, that – because Gilead was

committing the drug-related felonies of possession with intent to

distribute marijuana and possession of more than one ounce of

28
marijuana and therefore, under OCGA § 16-3-21 (b) (2), would not

have been entitled to self-defense if he had killed one of the robbers

– the jury should have been charged that “a person is not justified

in using force if that person is attempting to commit, committing, or

fleeing after the commission or attempted commission of a felony,”

especially when the prosecutor argued in closing that Gilead was

“defending himself” and was entitled to use “deadly force.”

Quintanar also argues that the omission of his requested self-

defense charge prevented the jury from finding the provocation

required to find him guilty of voluntary manslaughter.

Whether Gilead acted in self-defense is not relevant to

Quintanar’s culpability. Consistent with Kinlaw, and as Quintanar

concedes, he could not claim self-defense, regardless of whether

Gilead acted in self-defense. Similarly, Quintanar has not shown

how his level of culpability in any way depends on Gilead’s

hypothetical non-entitlement to self-defense. The jury was fully and

fairly instructed on voluntary manslaughter. Quintanar has failed

to explain how his request for an isolated instruction – on one aspect

29
of the victim’s non-entitlement to self-defense – was relevant to

whether Quintanar acted in response to a serious provocation. See

OCGA § 16-5-2 (a) (“A person commits the offense of voluntary

manslaughter when he causes the death of another human being

under circumstances which would otherwise be murder and if he

acts solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion

resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion

in a reasonable person[.]”); Shaw v. State, 301 Ga. 14, 20 (3) (799

SE2d 186) (2017) (“The provocation necessary to support a charge of

voluntary manslaughter is markedly different from that which will

support a self-defense claim.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

Whether or not Gilead would have been legally entitled to claim self-

defense if he were the defendant has no bearing on whether his

actions to defend himself as the victim counted as a sudden and

severe provocation that could reduce Quintanar’s offense from

murder to voluntary manslaughter. See OCGA § 16-5-2 (a). Nothing

in the definition of voluntary manslaughter requires that the

provocation be illegal or unjustified. Id.

30
Because there was not even slight evidence to support the

theory of Quintanar’s requested jury charge related to self-defense,

the trial court did not err in rejecting that requested charge. See

Bowman v. State, 317 Ga. 457, 461 (2) (a) (893 SE2d 735) (2023) (A

jury “instruction is authorized as long as slight evidence supports

the theory of the charge.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Munn

v. State, 313 Ga. 716, 722 (3) (873 SE2d 166) (2022) (“To authorize a

jury charge [on justification], there must be slight evidence

supporting the charge.”).

(b) As for the other request to charge, the evidence did not

warrant a jury instruction on mutual combat. “Mutual combat

occurs when there is combat between two persons as a result of a

sudden quarrel or such circumstances as indicate a purpose,

willingness, and intent on the part of both to engage mutually in a

fight.” Jones v. State, 319 Ga. 140, 147 (4) (902 SE2d 599) (2024)

(citation and punctuation omitted). Fighting to repel an unprovoked

attack “should not be confused with mutual combat.” Tidwell v.

State, 312 Ga. 459, 463 (1) (863 SE2d 127) (2021) (citation and

31
punctuation omitted). Quintanar argues that a mutual combat

instruction was supported by the evidence that Gilead picked up a

machete at first, tackled Quintanar, grabbed the gun, pistol-

whipped Quintanar, and wrestled with him. However, such evidence

of a violent struggle – involving Gilead’s fighting to repel an

unprovoked attack that began while he slept – did not constitute

even slight evidence to support a jury charge on mutual combat, as

that evidence did not show circumstances indicating an agreement,

willingness, or readiness on the part of both to engage mutually in

a fight. See Jones, 319 Ga. at 147 (4) (holding that trial court did not

err in failing to instruct the jury on mutual conduct where there was

evidence of a struggle but the appellant did not point to any evidence

of combat between him and the victim resulting from circumstances

indicating a “purpose, willingness, and intent on the part of both to

engage mutually in a fight” (citation and punctuation omitted));

Tidwell, 312 at 463 (1) (holding that trial court did not err in failing

to instruct the jury on mutual combat where “there [was] no

evidence of an agreement, willingness, or readiness to fight between

32
[the victim] and any of his attackers” and the evidence instead

showed that the victim “was ambushed” by the appellant and others

“while he slept” and that the victim later charged at them and tried

to hit them).

5. Quintanar contends that certain portions of the State’s

closing argument – telling the jury that the victim’s force was

justified 5 – amounted to plain error. But Quintanar made no

objection at trial to those portions of the State’s closing argument.

And it is well-settled that “we do not review unpreserved challenges

to closing arguments in non-death penalty cases, even for plain

error.” Troutman v. State, 320 Ga. 489, 494 (2) (b) (910 SE2d 173)

(2024) (citation and punctuation omitted). This claim therefore

presents nothing for review.

6. Quintanar finally contends that the cumulative effect of the

alleged errors prejudiced him and warrants a new trial. To establish

cumulative error, Quintanar “must establish that at least two errors

5 Quintanar specifically complains of the prosecutor’s statements that

Gilead was “defending himself,” “didn’t do anything wrong that night,” and was
entitled to use “some kind of deadly force.”
33
were committed in the course of the trial and considered together

along with the entire record, the multiple errors so infected the

jury’s deliberation that they denied him a fundamentally fair trial.”

Platt v. State, 319 Ga. 1, 12 (4) (901 SE2d 114) (2024) (citation and

punctuation omitted). Although we have assumed two errors by the

trial court in the course of our analysis, we conclude that they do not

warrant a new trial here.

In Divisions 2 and 3 above, we assumed, without deciding, that

the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Officer Bucknor’s

testimony about what he saw on the video recording of his traffic

stop and that the trial court also abused its discretion by precluding

Quintanar from further cross-examination of Resendiz-Garcia about

potential disparities in his parole eligibility with and without his

plea deal. These assumed “errors addressed entirely different issues

in the case,” Pender v. State, 311 Ga. 98, 120 (6) (856 SE2d 302)

(2021), and, as explained above, they each produced very little, if

any, harm. The admission of Bucknor’s testimony about the video

recording was harmless for several reasons, including the fact that

34
it was cumulative of his own properly admitted prior testimony

based on personal observation. And the limitation on cross-

examination of Resendiz-Garcia about parole was harmless beyond

a reasonable doubt for several reasons, including the admission of

substantial testimony from him about favorable aspects of his plea

deal.

Given the strength of the properly admitted evidence against

Quintanar, we are persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt6 that the

cumulative prejudice of the assumed errors did not deny him a fair

trial. See Platt, 319 Ga. at 12 (4) (holding that, because two assumed

“errors produced very little, if any, harm[,] . . . given the strength of

the evidence, even if these assumed errors could be considered

cumulatively, the cumulative prejudice did not deny [the appellant]

a fair trial”); Lofton v. State, 309 Ga. 349, 367 (7) (846 SE2d 57)

6 One assumed error in this case was partly constitutional in nature, and

the other one was not. As was true at the time of Pender, “[w]e have yet to
decide how multiple standards for assessing prejudice may interact under
cumulative review of different types of errors, and again we need not do so
here, because [the appellant]’s claims of cumulative prejudice fail under even
the higher standard implicated by these errors, which requires the State to
prove that violations of [the appellant]’s right to confront witnesses were
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 311 Ga. at 120 (6) (citation omitted).
35
(2020) (“[E]ven when considered as a whole under the most

demanding standard that applies to any of the alleged errors, the

cumulative prejudicial effect of the actual and assumed evidentiary

errors and counsel’s deficiencies is not sufficient to outweigh the

strength of the properly admitted evidence of the [a]ppellant’s guilt

. . . . Accordingly, we conclude that the combined prejudicial effect of

the actual and assumed evidentiary errors and deficiencies by

counsel did not deprive the [a]ppellant of his right to a

fundamentally fair trial.”).

7. Quintanar does not raise the issue on appeal, but we have

identified a merger error in his sentencing. See Dixon v. State, 302

Ga. 691, 696-697 (4) (808 SE2d 696) (2017) (“We have the discretion

to correct merger errors sua sponte . . . because a merger error

results in an illegal and void judgment of conviction and sentence.”).

The count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon against Wiles

should have been merged into the attempted armed robbery

conviction also involving Wiles. See Reeves v. State, 309 Ga. 645, 649

(4) (847 SE2d 551) (2020). See also Rice v. State, 311 Ga. 620, 625

36
(2) (857 SE2d 230) (2021). We therefore vacate Quintanar’s

conviction and sentence for aggravated assault.

Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. Peterson, CJ,
Warren, PJ, and Bethel, McMillian, LaGrua, Colvin, and Pinson,
JJ, concur.

37