In THE MATTER OF DOMINIQUE MARC HENRI LEMOINE (Two Cases)

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: August 12, 2025

S25Y0537, S25Y0538. IN THE MATTER OF DOMINIQUE MARC
HENRI LEMOINE.

PER CURIAM.

These disciplinary matters are before the Court on the

consolidated report and recommendation of the State Disciplinary

Review Board (“Review Board”), which reviewed the report and

recommendation of Special Master Charles David Jones involving

Dominique Marc Henri Lemoine (State Bar No. 446455), who has

been a member of the State Bar since 1998, pursuant to Bar Rules

4-214, 4-215, and 4-216. The Review Board adopted the Special

Master’s factual findings, conclusions of law, and recommendation

that Lemoine be disbarred from the practice of law for his violations

of Rules 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.15(I)(a), 1.15(I)(c), 1.15(II)(a),

1.15(II)(c)(1)(i), 1.15(III)(a), and 8.4(a)(4) of the Georgia Rules of
Professional Conduct (“GRPC” or “Rules”) found in Bar Rule 4-

102(d) in two separate matters. The maximum penalty for a

violation of Rules 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.15(I)(a), 1.15(I)(c), 1.15(II)(a),

1.15(III)(a), and 8.4(a)(4) is disbarment, while the maximum penalty

for a violation of Rules 1.4(a) and 1.15(II)(c)(1)(i) is a public

reprimand. Lemoine filed in this Court exceptions to the Review

Board’s report, in which he challenges many of the Special Master’s

factual findings; asserts that the Special Master ignored his mental

state and that, when taking this into account, no sanction higher

than a suspension should be imposed; and argues, in the alternative,

that the State Bar’s formal complaints be dismissed pursuant to In

the Matter of Brown, 319 Ga. 465 (2024), because, according to

Lemoine, his conduct from which the violations arose was not in

connection with the legal representation of a client. The State Bar

responded, stating that the overwhelming evidence shows that

Lemoine violated the Rules with which he was charged, that he was

acting in connection with the legal representation of a client in both

matters, and that Lemoine should be disbarred.

2
Upon careful consideration of the record, we conclude that

Lemoine’s exceptions to the Review Board’s report and

recommendation are without merit, and disbarment from the

practice of law is the appropriate sanction.

1. Procedural History

(a) S25Y0537

In June 2022, the State Bar filed a formal complaint alleging

that Lemoine failed to properly maintain funds that he held in a

fiduciary capacity while representing a client and improperly used

such funds to reimburse other clients and for personal use. As such,

the State Bar charged Lemoine with violations of Rules 1.15(I)(a)

(lawyer shall hold funds or other property of clients or third persons

that are in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation

separate from the lawyer’s own funds); 1.15(II)(a) (requiring lawyer

to maintain a trust account and all funds held for a client or in any

other fiduciary capacity be deposited in a trust account);

1.15(II)(c)(1)(i) (requiring client funds to be placed in an interest-

bearing account with the interest being paid to the Georgia Bar

3
foundation or client and providing that no earnings from such an

interest-bearing account shall be made available to a lawyer or law

firm); 1.15(III)(a) (requiring lawyer to maintain a trust account

separate from any business or personal accounts); and Rule 8.4(a)(4)

(it is a violation of the Rules for a lawyer to engage in professional

conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).

Lemoine acknowledged service of the complaint and filed his

answer, in which he denied all Rule violations but admitted some of

the State Bar’s factual allegations. The State Bar then filed a motion

seeking summary judgment regarding the violations of Rules

1.15(I)(a), 1.15(II)(a), 1.15(II)(c)(1)(i), and 1.15(III)(a). Upon

reviewing Lemoine’s answers to the State Bar’s several

interrogatories and requests for admissions, Lemoine’s deposition

testimony, the several bank statements introduced into evidence,

and both parties’ arguments, the Special Master granted summary

judgment on the Rule 1.15(I)(a) violation—finding that the evidence

undisputedly showed that Lemoine failed to hold funds owed to a

third party separate from his own funds in connection to his legal

4
representation of a client—but denied summary judgment on the

other counts.

(b) S25Y0538

In January 2023, the State Bar filed a second formal complaint

charging Lemoine with violations of Rules 1.2(a) (lawyer shall abide

by a client’s decisions concerning the scope and objectives of

representation and shall consult with the client as to the means by

which they are to be pursued); 1.3 (lawyer shall act with reasonable

diligence and promptness in representing a client); 1.4(a) (lawyer

shall keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the

matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for

information); 1.15(I)(a); 1.15(I)(c) (lawyer shall promptly deliver to

the client any funds that the client is entitled to receive); 1.15(II)(a);

1.15(II)(c)(1)(i); and 8.4(a)(4) in a separate client matter. The State

Bar alleged that Lemoine failed to properly maintain funds he held

for his clients by commingling the clients’ funds with his own,

improperly used client funds to reimburse other clients and for his

personal use, and failed to comply with the clients’ request for their
5
money back. Lemoine acknowledged service of the complaint and

filed his answer, in which he again denied all Rule violations but

admitted some of the State Bar’s factual allegations. The State Bar

then filed a motion seeking summary judgment regarding the

violations of 1.15(I)(a), 1.15(I)(c), 1.15(II)(a), and 1.15(II)(c)(1)(i).

Upon reviewing the evidence and arguments presented by both

parties, the Special Master granted summary judgment on the Rules

1.15(I)(a) and 1.15(I)(c) violations—finding that the evidence

undisputedly showed that Lemoine failed to hold funds owed to his

clients separate from his own and failed to promptly deliver funds

owed to his clients—but denied summary judgment on the other

counts. The Special Master then scheduled a consolidated

evidentiary hearing on the remaining counts for both matters and,

following the evidentiary hearing, issued his report and

recommendation.

2. Special Master’s Report and Recommendation

(a) Factual Findings

(i) S25Y0537

6
The Special Master recounted that in 2020, Lemoine became a

lawyer for a limited liability company engaged in facilitating and

securing transactions involving personal protective equipment (the

“LLC”). In August 2020, a consultant for the LLC worked with a

seller and a buyer to facilitate a large sale of surgical gloves. The

buyer was hesitant to send money directly to the seller, so the LLC’s

owner asked Lemoine if his IOLTA account could be used for the

transaction. The buyer agreed to Lemoine’s acting as the escrow

agent because Lemoine was an attorney and because the funds

would be transmitted through Lemoine’s “attorney escrow account.”

The LLC prepared the invoice for the sale of thousands of boxes of

surgical gloves, which listed Lemoine’s IOLTA account as the

account where the funds were to be sent. On September 1, 2020, the

buyer emailed Lemoine and requested that he not disburse any

funds until the goods were inspected; Lemoine acknowledged the

request and told the buyer that the funds would be released after

validation and transmission of the surgical gloves. On September 2,

the buyer wired approximately $222,400 into Lemoine’s account.

7
After the buyer wired the funds to the account, the LLC

instructed Lemoine to disburse 40% to the seller and, despite his

prior agreement with the buyer not to disburse any funds until the

goods were inspected, Lemoine wired $63,360 to the seller. At the

LLC’s direction, Lemoine also made three payments totaling

$17,200 from the wired funds to the LLC’s consultant for her work

on the transaction.

On September 28, 2020, the buyer received the goods,

determined that they were not what he ordered, sent an email to

Lemoine notifying him that the products were not compliant, and

asked him not to disburse the funds in his account. On that same

day, Lemoine responded to acknowledge that he had received this

email. In October 2020, the buyer emailed Lemoine several times

requesting his money back. Lemoine sent the seller a letter, stating

that he was the LLC’s attorney and demanding return of the

$63,360. Lemoine also responded to the buyer, informing the buyer

that he would return the funds by October 31, 2020. Lemoine failed

to return any portion of the buyer’s funds by this date.

8
In early November 2020, the buyer emailed Lemoine that he

had not received the funds. Lemoine responded that he had already

sent the funds back, and upon the buyer’s request, sent a copy of a

wire transfer purporting to show that he had wired the buyer

$132,483.40. However, Lemoine did not send that wire transfer.

And, although he told the buyer that he would send the funds,

Lemoine was aware that this would not be possible given the fact

that there was not enough money in the IOLTA account, as the

balance in the account was only $102,293.32 at this time. In late

November 2020, the buyer retained two lawyers to assist him with

getting his money back. Around this same time, Lemoine sent the

buyer a payment for $33,120.85—almost two months after the buyer

first requested that the funds be returned. Lemoine then made a

second payment of $20,000 to the buyer in December 2020. Shortly

thereafter, one of the buyer’s lawyers requested that Lemoine return

the rest of the funds and provide a complete accounting of the funds.

Lemoine failed to provide an accounting of the funds but told the

lawyer that he was fully committed to seeing all the funds returned

9
before the end of January. However, Lemoine did not return any

additional funds until May 2021, at which time he made a third wire

transfer for $79,362.55. Lemoine failed to make any further

payments.

Further, the Special Master found that the account Lemoine

used in the transaction was not properly constituted as an IOLTA

account because it did not contain the Tax ID number for the

Georgia Bar Foundation, nor was it an interest-bearing account with

the interest paid to a client. And, although Lemoine claimed that he

told the bank to designate the account as an IOLTA account, he

admitted during the evidentiary hearing that he did nothing to

ensure that the interest was going to the Georgia Bar Foundation

and he acknowledged that the Tax ID Number associated with the

account is the Tax ID Number for Lemoine’s law firm. The Special

Master also noted that the evidence showed that Lemoine moved

money back and forth from this account and his two operating

accounts, and he testified during the evidentiary hearing that he

used the buyer’s funds to pay other clients and third parties as well

10
as his own personal expenses. Moreover, the Special Master found

that, although Lemoine asserted that he did not represent anyone

in the transaction, the evidence—including his own actions and

testimony—demonstrated that he was acting as the LLC’s lawyer,

which was an intermediary in the transaction.

(ii) S25Y0538

As for the second matter, the Special Master recounted that in

April 2021, Lemoine was retained by two elderly French citizens

who do not reside in the United States—a husband and wife

(collectively, the “Clients”)—to represent them in a tax dispute with

the IRS. Lemoine informed the Clients that the IRS could seize

money they maintained in their accounts and advised them to

transfer funds to him to maintain in another one of his IOLTA

accounts.1 The Clients wired $175,000 into Lemoine’s IOLTA

account to be used, among other things, to pay any IRS penalties

and for Lemoine’s attorney fees. In May 2021, Lemoine transferred

1 The Special Master found that this account was a properly constituted

IOLTA account.

11
$115,000 of the $175,000 from the IOLTA account to his operating

account. On this same day, Lemoine transferred $80,000 of the

Clients’ money to the improperly constituted IOLTA account used

for the surgical glove transaction in an attempt to reimburse the

buyer. Throughout the month, Lemoine used the Clients’ funds to

reimburse other clients, as admitted by Lemoine in his deposition.

By the end of May, the balance in Lemoine’s IOLTA account was

$98.73, and the balance in Lemoine’s operating account to which he

transferred the Clients’ funds was -$62.75.

Regarding the IRS dispute, Lemoine requested a penalty

abatement, which the IRS denied in November 2021. Lemoine filed

an appeal but did not communicate with the Clients about the

matter. The Clients ended up resolving the IRS dispute themselves

in November 2023.

Additionally, in November 2021, while Lemoine was

representing the Clients in the IRS dispute, they requested that

Lemoine use a portion of the $175,000 they had wired to his account

12
to pay the property taxes on a home they owned in Florida.2 The

Clients sent Lemoine a copy of a tax bill they had received and

requested that he use their funds to pay the property tax bill as soon

as possible to avoid a late fee. Lemoine did not abide by the Clients’

directive to use the funds they had wired to him to pay the property

taxes and did not explain to them why he did not do so. Between

November 2021 and January 2022, the Clients asked Lemoine on

four occasions to wire them $30,000 from the funds they had sent

him so that they could pay for certain utilities and expenses

associated with the Florida property and continued to request that

he pay the property taxes. In mid-January 2020, after the Clients’

fourth request, Lemoine transferred $5,000 from his operating

account to the IOLTA account, and then sent the Clients $5,000 from

the IOLTA account, without explaining why he did not send them

the entire $30,000 that they had requested. The Clients sent

2 During his deposition, Lemoine testified that the Clients had
specifically hired him to represent them in the IRS dispute and that their
request that Lemoine use the money they had wired to him in relation to the
IRS dispute to pay the property taxes on their Florida home “wasn’t discussed
at the time” he was retained.

13
Lemoine an email acknowledging receipt of the $5,000, requesting

that he send the remainder of the $30,000, and renewing their

request for Lemoine to use the funds they had wired in relation to

the IRS dispute to pay the property taxes. Lemoine responded,

sending them a copy of a check dated January 14, 2022, for $5,615.63

made payable to the county tax collector, which led the Clients to

believe that Lemoine had paid the property taxes. And, although

Lemoine contended that he sent the check, he also acknowledged

that he only had $60.57 in the account at this time, that the check

was never debited from the account, and that he provided no

evidence that he sent the check. In his response, Lemoine also

informed the Clients that they should receive another transfer,

which led the Clients to believe that he had sent them the remainder

of the requested funds. However, he never did so and, as a result,

the Clients had to sell personal property and borrow money from

friends to pay the maintenance expenses on their Florida home.

In late January 2022, the wife emailed Lemoine, informing him

that her husband was hospitalized and requesting that he

14
immediately send her the balance of the funds in his possession after

deducting his attorney fees. Lemoine did not respond. On that same

day, a Florida attorney emailed Lemoine, informing Lemoine that

he had been contacted by the Clients and requesting the return of

the funds and an accounting of the funds. In February 2022,

Lemoine emailed the attorney an accounting ledger and invoice, and

told the attorney that once the Clients approved the invoice, he

would transfer the balance of their funds. Around the same time

that the Clients received this invoice, they became aware that

Lemoine had still not paid the property taxes, and their Florida

attorney requested a conference call. During this call, Lemoine

failed to explain why he had not paid the property taxes, but he

“committed to sending a new check to the [county tax collector], to

sending a final invoice to the [Clients,] and to return the balance of

the funds.” On March 11, 2022, Lemoine wrote a check for the

property tax bill, which was marked as paid on March 16, 2022—

almost four months after the Clients had first requested him to do

15
so. And, because Lemoine failed to timely pay the property taxes,

the Clients incurred late payment penalties.

In December 2023, shortly before the evidentiary hearings,

Lemoine contacted the Florida attorney regarding making payments

that he owed the Clients and sent two wire transfers for $1,000.

However, despite telling the Clients and the Florida attorney that

he would return the remainder of the funds owed, he did not do so

and has still not returned the funds.

(b) Rule Violations

(i) S25Y0537

Based on the factual findings, the Special Master concluded

that, in addition to violating Rule 1.15(I)(a) (as the Special Master

had already granted the State Bar summary judgment as to this

count), Lemoine violated Rules 1.15(II)(a) by depositing client and

fiduciary funds into an improperly constituted trust account;

1.15(II)(c)(1)(i) by maintaining an IOLTA account with the interest

not disbursed to a client or the Georgia Bar Foundation, noting that

Lemoine set up the account such that the interest went to his law
16
firm; 1.15(III)(a) by failing to maintain a trust account separate from

his business and personal accounts and using his IOLTA account for

multiple purposes including for his personal expenses; and 8.4(a)(4)

by misrepresenting to the buyer that he had wired funds when he

did not do so, fraudulently converting the buyer’s funds to pay other

clients and for his personal expenses, and allowing the buyer to be

misled into believing that his funds were being wired into a properly

constituted IOLTA account.

(ii) S25Y0538

Based on the factual findings, the Special Master concluded

that, in addition to violating Rule 1.15(I)(a) and 1.15(I)(c) (as the

Special Master had already granted the State Bar summary

judgment as to these counts), Lemoine violated Rules 1.2(a) by

failing to consult with the Clients about the developments in their

IRS case and failing to abide by the Clients’ decisions on how to

disburse their funds; 1.3 by failing to timely use the funds they had

wired to Lemoine in relation to the IRS matter to pay the tax

collector as they had requested; 1.4(a) by failing to respond to the

17
Clients’ requests regarding how to disburse their funds and failing

to provide honest, reasonable, and necessary communication

regarding the Clients’ funds; 1.15(II)(a) by depositing client funds

into an improperly constituted trust account, as he transferred the

Clients’ funds into the improperly constituted IOLTA account he

used for the glove transaction; 1.15(II)(c)(1)(i) by maintaining an

IOLTA account with the interest not disbursed to a client or the

Georgia Bar Foundation; and 8.4(a)(4) by misrepresenting to the

Clients that he had sent the payment to the county tax collector

when he never sent the check and knew that he had insufficient

funds to provide the payment.

(c) ABA Standards

After finding that Lemoine violated the provisions of the GRPC

with which he was charged in both disciplinary matters, the Special

Master applied the framework set out in the ABA Standards for

Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1992) (“ABA Standards”), which

provide that, when imposing a sanction, “a court should consider the

following factors: (a) the duty violated; (b) the lawyer’s mental state;
18
(c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct;

and (d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.” ABA

Standard 3.0. Regarding S25Y0537, the Special Master determined

that Lemoine had a duty to preserve the funds in a properly

constituted trust account and had not only failed to deposit the funds

in a proper account but failed to safeguard the funds. Regarding

S25Y0538, the Special Master determined that Lemoine had a duty

to communicate and consult with the Clients, diligently perform the

services that he had been hired to perform, and preserve his Clients’

funds, but had failed to meet these obligations. In assessing

Lemoine’s mental state, the Special Master determined that

Lemoine’s actions were knowing rather than inadvertent or

negligent. Specifically, the Special Master determined that Lemoine

was “acutely aware” that he was converting client and fiduciary

funds for his own use or to pay others, as he testified at the

evidentiary hearing that he used money that did not belong to him

to fill a “hole” that had been created by his own conduct in not

monitoring his bank account and used these funds to pay the client

19
“that screams the loudest.” Further, Lemoine knowingly

disregarded the Clients’ direction to return their money. In

assessing the injury caused, the Special Master determined that the

Clients, who were elderly and vulnerable, suffered significant harm

and had to sell other property to satisfy financial obligations due to

Lemoine stealing their money, and that Lemoine caused harm to the

legal system and profession by converting hundreds of thousands of

dollars that did not belong to him.

As for aggravating circumstances, the Special Master

determined that the following factors set forth in ABA Standard 9.22

applied: dishonest or selfish motive; a pattern of misconduct;

multiple offenses; vulnerability of the victim; and substantial

experience in the practice of law. See ABA Standard 9.22(b), (c), (d),

(h), and (i). Additionally, the Special Master concluded that, out of

the 13 mitigating factors set forth in ABA Standard 9.32, only one

applied, as before these two matters, Lemoine had no prior discipline

history. See ABA Standard 9.32(a).

(d) Recommended Discipline
20
The Special Master then concluded that given the Rules

violated and significant aggravating factors, disbarment is the

appropriate discipline for Lemoine’s conduct, noting that

“[Lemoine’s] conduct was dishonest, it was constant, and it was

harmful.” In making this recommendation, the Special Master relied

on several cases in which this Court has imposed disbarment for

similar rule violations. See In the Matter of Sicay-Perrow, 310 Ga.

855 (2021) (disbarment for lawyer who violated Rules 1.15(I)(a) and

(c), 1.15(II)(a) and (b), and 8.4(a)(4)); In the Matter of Turner, 311

Ga. 204 (2021) (disbarment for lawyer who violated Rules 1.3, 1.4(a),

1.15(I)(c), 1.15(II), 1.15(III), 8.4(a)(4), and 9.3 in two matters); In the

Matter of Cheatham, 304 Ga. 645 (2018) (disbarment for lawyer who

violated Rules 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.15(I)(a) and (c), 1.15(II)(a) and (b), 5.5(a),

and 8.4(a)(4)).

3. The Review Board’s Report and Recommendation

Lemoine filed exceptions to the Special Master’s report and

recommendation, as well as a motion to dismiss the State Bar’s

formal complaints. In addition to challenging many of the Special

21
Master’s factual findings, Lemoine argued that the State Bar’s

allegations were barred by Brown—which was issued after the

Special Master’s report and recommendation—in which this Court

held that Rules 1.15(I)(c) and 1.15(II)(b) “do not apply to lawyers

when they are acting as fiduciaries not in connection with the legal

representation of a client or otherwise in the practice of law.” 319

Ga. at 466. The Review Board rejected this argument, concluding

that Brown is distinguishable because Brown was acting solely as a

fiduciary and was not practicing law, whereas, in these matters, the

Special Master specifically found that Lemoine was retained as the

LLC’s attorney, which was an intermediary in the transaction, and

by the Clients. The Review Board then adopted the Special Master’s

factual findings and conclusions of law and recommended that

Lemoine be disbarred for his violations of the GRPC provisions.

4. Lemoine’s Exceptions

Lemoine filed exceptions to the Review Board’s report, arguing

that the Special Master failed to consider all the evidence which, if

fully examined, shows that the State Bar failed to establish by clear

22
and convincing evidence that Lemoine violated the Rules with which

he was charged. Lemoine also contends that the Special Master

erred by failing to consider his mental state which, when taken into

account, demonstrates that he should receive a sanction no higher

than a suspension. Additionally, Lemoine argues in the alternative

that the State Bar’s formal complaints should be dismissed under

Brown because, according to Lemoine, his conduct in both matters

was not connected to the representation of a client or the practice of

law. As explained in our analysis section below, we reject Lemoine’s

arguments.

5. Analysis

(a) First, Lemoine challenges the Special Master’s factual

findings in both disciplinary matters, arguing that the Special

Master ignored several facts which, if fully examined, show that the

State Bar failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that

Lemoine violated the Rules with which he was charged. Specifically,

as for S25Y0537, Lemoine argues that the Special Master failed to

consider that he directed the bank to designate the account to which

23
the buyer wired the funds as an IOLTA account; that he commingled

fiduciary funds with his own and used fiduciary funds to compensate

other clients because he was “targeted by scammers,” which left a

deficit in his account; that he never used fiduciary funds for personal

use; that there was no evidence that he allowed the LLC to use his

status as a lawyer to receive the fiduciary funds; and that he was

required by contract to wire 40% of the buyer’s funds to the seller.

As for S25Y0538, Lemoine argues that the Clients never stated that

they were unsatisfied with Lemoine’s communication regarding the

IRS matter or that they hired another lawyer due to Lemoine failing

to respond to their requests, and that he did not intentionally steal

the Clients’ money and had always intended to pay them back.3

However, this Court has explained that “the special master is

in the best position to determine the witnesses’ credibility,” and that

it “generally defers to the factual findings and credibility

determinations made by the special master unless those findings or

3 Lemoine also repeats his assertion that the Special Master failed to

consider the fraudulent activity regarding his IOLTA account.

24
determinations are clearly erroneous.” In the Matter of Tuggle, 317

Ga. 255, 258 (2023) (citations omitted). Here, the Special Master

considered the evidence, and, upon our review of the record, we

conclude that his subsequent findings and determinations are not

clearly erroneous. Regarding Lemoine’s assertion that the Special

Master failed to consider that he directed the bank to designate the

account to which the buyer wired the funds as an IOLTA account,

the Special Master explicitly considered this assertion in his report

and recommendation and explained that Lemoine admitted during

the evidentiary hearing that he did nothing to ensure that the

account was properly set up and that the Tax ID Number Lemoine

provided for the account was the Tax ID Number for Lemoine’s law

firm, rather than for the Georgia Bar Foundation. Further, we have

explained that even inadvertent violations of the Rules relating to

trust accounts are subject to discipline. See In the Matter of Howard,

292 Ga. 413, 414 (2013) (“a trust account is a high honor and

privilege afforded to a member of the Bar, so even a technical

25
violation should have public discipline so as to protect clients, courts,

and the public”).

Additionally, the record shows that the Special Master

considered Lemoine’s claim that he commingled client and fiduciary

funds with his own and used fiduciary funds to compensate other

clients because he was “targeted by scammers,” and found that any

fraudulent issues with Lemoine’s account was created by his own

conduct in failing to monitor the account. Lemoine testified that he

received and deposited into his IOLTA account a “fake check”

received from a client in the amount of $140,092 and then disbursed

funds from his account before realizing he had been given “a bad

check,” such that “a hole of $140,000 in [his] IOLTA account” was

created. However, during the evidentiary hearing, in response to

counsel for the State Bar asking Lemoine how long it took for him to

notice the deficit in his account, Lemoine replied “five or six

months.” Further, Lemoine admitted that he was “[n]ot always”

looking at his IOLTA account on a monthly basis, and that, upon his

contacting the client who delivered the fake check after several

26
months, the client had “disappeared.” See Tuggle, 317 Ga. at 258

(noting this Court’s authority to rely on undisputed material facts,

even when not contained in the Special Master’s report).

Additionally, the record supports the Special Master’s finding

that Lemoine used fiduciary funds for his personal use, as during

his deposition testimony, when Lemoine was asked about several

transfers he made from his IOLTA account containing the buyer’s

funds to his operating account, he stated that he did not remember

what those transfers were for or why he had made them, but that

the transfers had been authorized and he had not used client or

fiduciary funds for his own personal use. Yet, later during his

deposition, Lemoine testified that only “some” of the transfers from

the IOLTA account were authorized and that he was “defrauded by

a crook” and “in the meantime, [he] still ha[s] to eat.” Thus, based

on this testimony, the Special Master was authorized to infer that

Lemoine used the funds for his own personal expenses and

livelihood.

27
Regarding Lemoine’s assertion that there is no evidence that

he allowed the LLC to use his status as a lawyer to receive the

fiduciary funds, a review of the transcript from the evidentiary

hearing reveals that the buyer testified that he agreed to the

transaction with the LLC only because Lemoine was a lawyer; that

“[he] never would have done the deal” otherwise; and that, when he

sent the money to what he believed to be an attorney escrow account,

he thought it was guaranteed that his funds would be released only

upon giving Lemoine confirmation to do so.

Regarding Lemoine’s assertion that the Special Master failed

to consider that he was required by contract to wire 40% of the

buyer’s funds to the seller, we note that the Special Master was

entitled to discredit Lemoine’s claim, as the buyer testified at the

evidentiary hearing that, although this was customary practice

when conducting an international transaction with a factory, the

seller in this case was a company with which he was not familiar

such that he would not have agreed to this initial 40% payment.

Moreover, regardless of whether Lemoine was required to wire 40%

28
of the buyer’s funds, we note that the Special Master found that by

November 2020, the balance in the IOLTA account in which

Lemoine was holding the buyer’s initially wired $222,400 was only

$102,293.32, and that Lemoine had testified during the evidentiary

hearing that he improperly used the buyer’s funds to pay other

clients and third parties. Further, the Special Master’s

determination that Lemoine’s conduct in this disciplinary matter

violated Rules 1.15(I)(a), 1.15(II)(a), 1.15(II)(c)(1)(i), 1.15(III)(a), and

Rule 8.4(a)(4) did not hinge on this 40% transfer.

As for S25Y0538, the Special Master was authorized to find

that Lemoine did not adequately communicate with the Clients

regarding the IRS matter and that they hired another lawyer due to

Lemoine’s failure to respond to their requests. The wife testified at

the evidentiary hearing that Lemoine would send them copies of

documents that he sent to the IRS but they did “not have a lot of

communications” about what those documents meant; that she

began receiving correspondence from the IRS through her

accountant because Lemoine “never sent [the Clients] the answers

29
… that the IRS would give him” regarding their case; and that she

realized she “could no longer have trust in [Lemoine]” based on his

failure to communicate with the Clients.

Regarding Lemoine’s assertion that the Special Master

disregarded Lemoine’s testimony that he did not intentionally steal

the Clients’ money and had always intended to pay them back,

again, we determine that the Special Master’s finding is supported

by the record. The wife testified at the evidentiary hearing that the

Clients have still not received all the funds they originally

transferred to Lemoine and that, from the original $175,000 they

transferred, he still owed them $146,217.63. Moreover, during cross-

examination, Lemoine admitted that he owed the Clients “$146,000

and something” and, when asked if he believed that his failure to

refund the Clients’ money is inconsistent with his obligations as a

lawyer, he responded “Yes, it is, of course.” Accordingly, this

enumeration of error fails.

(b) Additionally, Lemoine asserts that the Special Master

failed to consider his mental state and, when taking this into

30
account, he should receive a sanction no higher than a suspension.

However, this is not an accurate statement, as the record shows that

the Special Master considered the evidence in its entirety and found

that Lemoine acted knowingly in intentionally converting the

fiduciary funds for an improper use, as he admitted to using these

funds to pay back other clients and his own living expenses, and

intentionally misleading the buyer and his Clients that he would

return their funds when he was aware that he did not have enough

money in his accounts to do so, as he had already converted these

funds for other uses. Further, although Lemoine contends that he

should receive a sanction no higher than a suspension, he does not

cite any authority to support such a sanction. And the cases cited by

the Special Master—Turner, Sicay-Perrow, and Cheatham—support

the recommendation of disbarment. Accordingly, this enumeration

of error fails.

(c) Alternatively, Lemoine argues that he cannot be found to

have violated the Rules with which he was charged in either matter

pursuant to Brown, in which we held that Rules 1.15(I)(c) and

31
1.15(II)(b) (providing that no personal funds shall ever be deposited

in a lawyer’s trust account) do not apply to lawyers when they are

acting as fiduciaries not in connection with the legal representation

of a client or otherwise in the practice of law. See 319 Ga. at 466.

According to Lemoine, he was not acting in connection with the legal

representation of a client because he did not represent the LLC

during the surgical glove transaction and the funds that the Clients

wired to him were unrelated to the IRS matter for which he was

hired.

However, although the Special Master’s report was issued

prior to Brown, the Special Master specifically found that the LLC

served as an intermediary in the transaction and that Lemoine acted

as the LLC’s attorney during this time, as he held himself out as the

LLC’s attorney to the buyer and seller and both the LLC’s owner and

consultant testified to such. And the fact that Lemoine did not

represent the buyer does not mean that his actions were not in

connection with the legal representation of a client. See In the

Matter of McDonald, 319 Ga. 197, 206–08 (2024) (attorney violated

32
Rules with which she was charged where attorney was “acting in her

capacity as a lawyer in connection with [a] transaction,” received

money from a third party “into her escrow account in a ‘fiduciary

capacity,’” and commingled the funds that she received and failed to

keep and maintain records of the trust account used for the

transaction). Cf. Brown, 319 Ga. at 466 (attorney could not be found

to have violated Rules 1.15(I)(c) and 1.15(II)(b) where attorney “was

contacted and asked if she would consider acting as successor

trustee for the Trusts, and she agreed to do so for a fee in her

‘individual capacity,’ rather than as a lawyer”). The Special Master

also specifically found that Lemoine was hired by the Clients to

represent them in the IRS matter; that he advised the Clients to

wire him money from their accounts so that the funds could not be

seized by the IRS; that based on Lemoine’s advice, the Clients wired

him $175,000; and that the Clients later made requests regarding

how Lemoine disburse these funds, including paying their property

taxes and wiring them money so that they could pay for certain

utilities and expenses associated with their home. Thus, while

33
Lemoine was initially retained to represent the Clients in their

dispute with the IRS, his conduct in failing to disburse the Clients’

funds as directed is clearly connected with the legal representation

of a client. Accordingly, this enumeration of error fails.

Therefore, after considering the record, we agree with the

Special Master that disbarment is the appropriate sanction in this

matter and that this sanction is consistent with prior cases

disbarring lawyers for similar conduct. See In the Matter of Raines,

319 Ga. 820 (2024) (disbarring attorney for violations of Rules

1.15(I)(a), 1.15(I)(b), 1.15(I)(c), and 1.15(II)(b) where attorney failed

to safeguard client funds, disregarded the interests of third parties

in the settlement funds, failed to promptly deliver the funds owed to

the clients and third parties, and converted the funds for personal

use); In the Matter of Doeve, 303 Ga. 672 (2018) (disbarring attorney

for violations of Rules 1.15(I), 1.15(II), 1.15(III)(b)(2), and 8.4(a)(4)

where attorney agreed to act as an escrow agent, received funds from

an investor in connection with his client’s transaction, disbursed the

investor’s funds without approval, failed to communicate with the

34
investor about the status of the funds, repeatedly issued

insufficient-funds checks to those involved in the transaction, and

misled those involved in the transaction about when they could

expect to be paid). Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the name of

Dominique Marc Henri Lemoine be removed from the rolls of

persons authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia. Lemoine

is reminded of his duties under Bar Rule 4-219(b).

Disbarred. All the Justices concur, except Land, J., not
participating.

35