CourtListener 10680295

Testo completo

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: July 16, 2024

S24Y0534. IN THE MATTER OF CHRISTOPHER TYSON.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the petition for

voluntary discipline filed by Respondent Christopher Tyson (State Bar

No. 142208) before the issuance of a formal complaint. See Bar Rule

4-227 (b) (2). Tyson admits to conduct in violation of Rules 1.15 (I) (a),

1.15 (I) (b), 1.15 (I) (c), and 1.15 (II) (b) of the Georgia Rules of

Professional Conduct (“GRPC”) found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). The

maximum penalty for a violation of these rules is disbarment. Tyson

requests a six-month suspension, and the State Bar, through its

response, supports Tyson’s request. However, for the reasons

explained below, we decline to accept Tyson’s petition.

Tyson admits that he represented a client in a personal injury

matter arising out of a vehicle accident in December 2018 and that he

settled the client’s case in November 2020 for $6,300. Upon receiving
the settlement check, Tyson deposited the check into his IOLTA

account. Tyson notified the client of the receipt of funds, but he did not

notify a chiropractor from whom the client sought treatment and who

had an interest in any settlement funds resulting from the case. Tyson

paid an ERISA lien for medical benefits on behalf of the client but did

not promptly disburse the settlement funds owed to the client or the

chiropractor, did not maintain sufficient funds in his IOLTA account,

and used those funds for personal expenses. Tyson, who was admitted

to practice law in 1996, claims in an affidavit that he eventually

stopped practicing in June 2021, at which time he relocated to

Louisiana. Since July 2022, Tyson has been administratively

suspended from the State Bar of Georgia for failing to pay his license

fees.

In his representation of the client, Tyson admits to violating Rule

1.15 (I) (a) by failing to safeguard the settlement funds owed to the

client and the chiropractor in his IOLTA account; Rule 1.15 (I) (b) by

disregarding the chiropractor’s interest in the funds from the

settlement; Rule 1.15 (I) (c) by failing to promptly notify the

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chiropractor of the receipt of the settlement and failing to promptly

disburse the funds owed to the client and the chiropractor; and Rule

1.15 (II) (b) by withdrawing from the IOLTA account unearned funds

for personal use.

Tyson submits the following factors in mitigation of discipline: he

has made restitution to the client and the chiropractor; he has fully

and completely cooperated in this disciplinary matter; he has

expressed remorse by submitting this petition and agreeing to be held

responsible for his wrongdoing; and, though he has a disciplinary

history, his prior discipline is remote and for unrelated conduct. See

ABA Standard 9.22 (d), (e), (l), & (m).

In support of his purported restitution, Tyson includes with his

petition a copy of two $2,100 checks made out to the client and the

chiropractor. See Pet. Exh. A. The checks are dated June 22, 2023 —

almost three years from the date on which Tyson received the

settlement. Neither the petition nor response explains how a 2023

payment of $4,200 constitutes restitution for Tyson improperly

managing $6,300 in 2020, and there is nothing in the record indicating

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whether the client and the chiropractor agree that these checks

constitute full restitution and whether they feel that they have been

made whole.

Tyson requests a six-month suspension from the practice of law.

The State Bar does not dispute Tyson’s admissions of fact, admissions

of rules violations, or the mitigating factors set forth in his petition.

The State Bar supports Tyson’s six-month suspension with the

condition that he follow the procedures in Bar Rule 1-501 (b) to lift his

administrative suspension before returning to the practice of law.

While the State Bar acknowledges that the maximum penalty for

violations of the trust account rules is disbarment, it notes that when

the totality of the circumstances supports less severe discipline, this

Court has imposed suspensions or even reprimands. See, e.g., In the

Matter of Coggins, 314 Ga. 813 (2022) (accepting petition for voluntary

discipline requesting six-month suspension for lawyer who violated

Rules 1.15 (I) (a) and (b) and 1.15 (II) (a), (b), and (c) by disregarding

third-party’s interest in funds, commingling client and personal funds,

and using client funds to support his other business interests); In the

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Matter of Mathis, 312 Ga. 626 (2021) (accepting petition for voluntary

discipline requesting public reprimand for lawyer who mismanaged

trust account resulting in insufficient balance). Further, the State Bar

maintains that the Court has previously imposed a six-month

suspension for similar rule violations both where similar mitigating

and aggravating circumstances are present and even where there are

no mitigating circumstances. See, e.g., Coggins, supra; In the Matter

of Summers, 278 Ga. 57 (2004) (accepting petition for voluntary

discipline requesting six-month suspension for attorney who held

client funds in IOLTA account for over four years, during which time

the account at times contained insufficient funds to cover the

obligation).

However, while we do have precedents accepting a petition for

voluntary discipline requesting a six-month suspension for

intentionally violating Rules 1.15 (I) and 1.15 (II), a six-month

suspension is generally not sufficient when the conduct involves

improperly converting client funds for personal use — even where the

attorney has provided restitution. A longer suspension would be more

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appropriate in those circumstances. See, e.g., In the Matter of Veach,

310 Ga. 470 (2020) (accepting petition for voluntary discipline

requesting 18-month suspension where attorney failed to properly

disburse funds and removed estate funds from his IOLTA account for

personal use); In the Matter of Morgan, 303 Ga. 678 (2018) (accepting

petition for voluntary discipline requesting two-year suspension with

conditions where attorney withdrew funds from client’s estate and

deposited it for personal use); In the Matter of Saunders, 304 Ga. 824

(2018) (accepting petition for voluntary discipline requesting 12-

month suspension where attorney converted client funds for her own

personal use). And in In the Matter of Hine, 314 Ga. 70 (2022), the

Court rejected a petition for voluntary discipline requesting a six-

month suspension where the attorney failed to properly communicate

with his client and converted estate funds for his personal use, even

where the attorney repaid his clients and had no prior disciplinary

history. See 314 Ga. at 76.1

1 However, in Hine, the attorney converted an amount substantially larger

than the settlement here and neglected to address in the petition the fact that he
significantly overcharged the estate’s beneficiaries. See 314 Ga. at 75-76.
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Accordingly, for Tyson, we conclude that a six-month suspension

is insufficient — even if he made full restitution. But he has not even

shown that he has done that. Rather, Tyson has provided little detail

on restitution. There has been no affirmative showing of restitution

having been completely paid. Tyson merely attaches two checks from

2023 equaling an amount less than the $6,300 at issue, and neither he

nor the State Bar provides any detail or response from the client or

the chiropractor on whether these checks constitute full restitution for

Tyson’s 2020 conduct.

Further, the petition does not fully consider Tyson’s disciplinary

history. According to the State Bar, in 2013, Tyson received an

Investigative Panel Reprimand for his violations of Rules 1.1 (lawyer

shall provide competent representation to a client) and 1.16 (d) (upon

termination of representation, lawyer shall take steps to the extent

reasonably practicable to protect client’s interests). The State Bar

contends that the 2013 sanction was “remote” and “for unrelated

conduct,” but our precedents approving six-month suspensions

typically do not involve attorneys with such disciplinary history. See

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Coggins, supra (noting lawyer’s lack of disciplinary history when

accepting request for a six-month suspension).

We believe a longer suspension is more appropriate based on the

facts before us. Even if Tyson made full restitution, six months is

insufficient considering the nature of his conduct and his disciplinary

history. However, we are unable to determine the more appropriate

discipline here without further information on Tyson’s purported

restitution. And regardless, “it has been the Court’s practice to reject

a petition in such circumstances rather than to impose a more

stringent discipline than that requested by the petitioner.” Veach, 310

Ga. at 472. We therefore reject Tyson’s petition for voluntary

discipline.

Petition for voluntary discipline rejected. All the Justices concur.

319 Ga. 527
FINAL COPY

S24Y0534. IN THE MATTER OF CHRISTOPHER TYSON.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the petition for

voluntary discipline filed by Respondent Christopher Tyson (State Bar

No. 142208) before the issuance of a formal complaint. See Bar Rule

4-227 (b) (2). Tyson admits to conduct in violation of Rules 1.15 (I) (a),

1.15 (I) (b), 1.15 (I) (c), and 1.15 (II) (b) of the Georgia Rules of

Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). The maximum

penalty for a violation of these rules is disbarment. Tyson requests a

six-month suspension, and the State Bar, through its response,

supports Tyson’s request. However, for the reasons explained below,

we decline to accept Tyson’s petition.

Tyson admits that he represented a client in a personal injury

matter arising out of a vehicle accident in December 2018 and that he

settled the client’s case in November 2020 for $6,300. Upon receiving

the settlement check, Tyson deposited the check into his IOLTA
account. Tyson notified the client of the receipt of funds, but he did not