In the Matter of Curtis Lee Allen

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: July 2, 2024

S24Y0865. IN THE MATTER OF CURTIS LEE ALLEN.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on a petition for

voluntary reciprocal discipline filed by Respondent Curtis Lee Allen

(State Bar No. 009905), pursuant to Rule 9.4 (b) of the Georgia Rules

of Professional Conduct (“GRPC”) and Bar Rule 4-227 (b). In his

petition, Allen, who has been a member of the State Bars of Georgia

and Florida since 1994, asks this Court to impose a ten-day

suspension, nunc pro tunc, as substantially similar discipline to a

ten-day suspension he received in Florida for his conduct in

representing an insurance company in two cases. In its response, the

State Bar urges the Court to accept Allen’s petition. We agree that

a ten-day suspension is appropriate as “substantially similar

discipline,” see GRPC 9.4 (b) (3), for the suspension Allen received
in Florida. Nevertheless, Allen’s petition contains several

deficiencies that preclude final resolution of this matter at this time.

Accordingly, we reject his petition for voluntary reciprocal

discipline.

To resolve two disciplinary actions pending against him in

Florida, Allen and the Florida Bar entered into a consent judgment,

pursuant to which the Florida Supreme Court entered an order on

December 28, 2023, suspending him from the practice of law for ten

days, effective January 29, 2024, placing him on probation for one

year, directing him to attend the Florida Bar’s Ethics School, and

entering judgment against him in the amount of $1,450.10 for the

cost of the Florida Bar’s action against him.1 Allen states that he

served his suspension from January 29 to February 7, 2024. The

State Bar of Georgia then initiated a reciprocal disciplinary action

against Allen pursuant to GRPC 9.4 (b), and in response, he filed

1 Although Allen states in his petition that the Florida Supreme Court’s

order and the consent judgment are “attached,” neither of those documents
appears in the record before this Court.

2
this petition for voluntary discipline. See GRPC 9.4 (b); Bar Rule 4-

227 (b).

In his petition, Allen explains that in the first disciplinary

matter, the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal observed in a

published opinion that, while representing an insurance company,

Allen “made argumentative and unprofessional remarks to both the

insureds and their counsel” while conducting examinations under

oath. In the second matter, while representing the same insurance

company in a dispute over attorney fees, he made comments about

the opposing party and counsel “which were not consistent with the

high standards of professionalism.” In both matters, he was found

to have violated Florida Rules 3-4.3 (Misconduct and Minor

Misconduct),2 4-4.4 (a) (Respect for Rights of Third Persons),3 and 4-

2 Florida Rule 3-4.3 provides in relevant part that “[t]he commission by

a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice may
constitute a cause for discipline whether the act is committed in the course of
the lawyer’s relations as a lawyer or otherwise, whether committed within
Florida or outside the state of Florida, and whether the act is a felony or a
misdemeanor.”
3 Florida Rule 4-4.4 (a) provides that “[i]n representing a client, a lawyer

may not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass,

3
8.4 (d) (Misconduct).4 Allen observes that Florida Rule 4-4.4 (a) is

analogous to GRPC 4.4 (a), but Georgia does not have a disciplinary

rule equivalent to Florida Rules 3-4.3 or 4-8.4 (d). Allen states that

in the consent judgment with the Florida Bar, he stipulated to four

aggravating factors: prior disciplinary history, pattern of

misconduct, multiple offenses, and substantial experience in the

practice of law. See ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

(“ABA Standards”) 9.22 (a), (c), (d), and (i). He asserts that the

Florida Bar stipulated to four mitigating factors: absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive, personal or emotional problems arising

from or related to his stressful divorce at the time of his misconduct,

full and free disclosure to the bar or cooperative attitude toward the

delay, or burden a third person or knowingly use methods of obtaining evidence
that violate the legal rights of such a person.”
4 Florida Rule 4-8.4 (d) provides in relevant part that “A lawyer shall not

. . . engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice, including to knowingly, or through callous
indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against litigants, jurors,
witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers on any basis, including, but not
limited to, on account of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, national origin,
disability, marital status, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic status,
employment, or physical characteristic[.]”

4
disciplinary proceedings, and remorse. See ABA Standards 9.32 (b),

(c), (e), and (l). He assures the Court that he has taken steps to

ensure that his future conduct will be professional and will comply

with disciplinary rules. Accordingly, he requests, as substantially

similar discipline, that this Court suspend his license to practice law

in Georgia for ten days, nunc pro tunc and concurrent with his

Florida suspension, and that the Court allow his reinstatement upon

the entry of its opinion.

The State Bar responds by agreeing with Allen’s recitation of

the disciplinary matters against him and by stating that it does not

contest the facts that Allen expressed remorse for his actions and

cooperated fully with the Florida Bar. Therefore, the State Bar

recommends that the Court accept Allen’s voluntary petition and

impose the requested discipline.

This Court has generally interpreted the Bar Rules governing

reciprocal discipline to require the imposition of substantially

similar discipline as was imposed in the other jurisdiction, and here,

the ten-day suspension Allen requests is identical to the suspension

5
he served in Florida.5 See In the Matter of Van Dyke, 316 Ga. 168,

177 (886 SE2d 811) (2023) (noting “the nature of reciprocal

discipline matters[,] . . . wherein this Court must only impose

‘substantially similar’ discipline”). See also In the Matter of

Pettinato, 315 Ga. 831, 835-836 (884 SE2d 894) (2023) (accepting

attorney’s voluntary petition for reciprocal discipline and imposing

ten-day suspension, which is generally not a disciplinary sanction

available in Georgia, because the requested suspension was

“identical” to discipline imposed in Florida). However, we decline to

accept Allen’s petition at this stage for two reasons. First, although

Allen’s petition references various documents associated with the

Florida disciplinary proceeding, no such documents were attached

for our review. See In the Matter of Thompson, 310 Ga. 753, 754 (854

5 Allen is on disciplinary probation in Florida for one year, but the
Georgia Bar Rules do not provide for probation as a sanction. However, this
Court has previously approved reciprocal suspensions “without adding time for
the probationary period” imposed by other jurisdictions, so this would not
preclude our acceptance of his petition. See, e.g., In the Matter of Thompson,
315 Ga. 81, 85 (880 SE2d 214) (2022); In the Matter of Hanzelik, 294 Ga. 727,
728 (755 SE2d 758) (2014). Instead, as explained below, we reject his petition
because of his failure to make certain showings in connection with his request
for reciprocal discipline.

6
SE2d 522) (2021) (rejecting attorney’s voluntary petition for

reciprocal suspension for, inter alia, failing to provide documents

from his Florida disciplinary proceeding). Second, although Allen

requests that his suspension be imposed nunc pro tunc to the dates

he served his suspension in Florida, he has failed to show that he is

entitled to a retroactive suspension. This Court has held that “when

an attorney requests entry of a suspension or voluntary surrender

order nunc pro tunc, it is the lawyer’s responsibility to demonstrate

that they voluntarily stopped practicing law, the date on which their

law practice ended, and that they complied with all the ethical

obligations implicated in such a decision, such as assisting clients in

securing new counsel and facilitating the transfer of client files and

critical information about ongoing cases to new counsel.” In the

Matter of Onipede, 288 Ga. 156, 157 (702 SE2d 136) (2010). This

Court has imposed retroactive suspensions as reciprocal discipline

when the attorney made a showing that he or she stopped practicing

law in Georgia while suspended in another jurisdiction, which the

State Bar did not contest or dispute. See, e.g., In the Matter of Van

7
Dyke, 316 Ga. 168, 177 (3) (886 SE2d 811) (2023) (imposing

retroactive suspension as reciprocal discipline where attorney

provided evidence that he stopped practicing law in Georgia in

February 2019); In the Matter of Thompson, 315 Ga. 81, 85 (880

SE2d 214) (2022) (imposing retroactive suspension as reciprocal

discipline where attorney showed that he was not practicing law in

Georgia and the State Bar indicated that he was on inactive status).

Here, in contrast, Allen failed to provide any evidence that he

stopped practicing law in Georgia during his suspension in Florida.

Accordingly, he has not made the necessary showing to have his

suspension imposed nunc pro tunc to the dates of his Florida

suspension. When this Court finds a voluntary petition for discipline

deficient, our practice is to reject the petition. See In the Matter of

Thompson, 310 Ga. 753, 654 (854 SE2d 522) (2021) (rejecting

petition for voluntary reciprocal discipline, even though the State

Bar recommended the Court accept the petition, due to several

deficiencies in the petition, including that the attorney referenced,

but failed to attach, documents associated with his Florida

8
disciplinary proceeding). Accordingly, we reject Allen’s petition for

voluntary reciprocal discipline.

Petition for voluntary discipline rejected. All the Justices
concur.

9

319 Ga. 505
FINAL COPY

S24Y0865. IN THE MATTER OF CURTIS LEE ALLEN.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on a petition for

voluntary reciprocal discipline filed by Respondent Curtis Lee Allen

(State Bar No. 009905), pursuant to Rule 9.4 (b) of the Georgia Rules

of Professional Conduct (“GRPC”) and Bar Rule 4-227 (b). In his

petition, Allen, who has been a member of the State Bars of Georgia

and Florida since 1994, asks this Court to impose a ten-day

suspension, nunc pro tunc, as substantially similar discipline to a

ten-day suspension he received in Florida for his conduct in

representing an insurance company in two cases. In its response, the

State Bar urges the Court to accept Allen’s petition. We agree that

a ten-day suspension is appropriate as “substantially similar

discipline,” see GRPC 9.4 (b) (3), for the suspension Allen received

in Florida. Nevertheless, Allen’s petition contains several

deficiencies that preclude final resolution of this matter at this time.
Accordingly, we reject his petition for voluntary reciprocal

discipline.

To resolve two disciplinary actions pending against him in

Florida, Allen and the Florida Bar entered into a consent judgment,

pursuant to which the Florida Supreme Court entered an order on

December 28, 2023, suspending him from the practice of law for ten

days, effective January 29, 2024, placing him on probation for one

year, directing him to attend the Florida Bar’s Ethics School, and

entering judgment against him in the amount of $1,450.10 for the

cost of the Florida Bar’s action against him.1 Allen states that he

served his suspension from January 29 to February 7, 2024. The

State Bar of Georgia then initiated a reciprocal disciplinary action

against Allen pursuant to GRPC 9.4 (b), and in response, he filed

this petition for voluntary discipline. See GRPC 9.4 (b); Bar Rule 4-

227 (b).

1 Although Allen states in his petition that the Florida Supreme Court’s

order and the consent judgment are “attached,” neither of those documents
appears in the record before this Court.
In his petition, Allen explains that in the first disciplinary

matter, the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal observed in a

published opinion that, while representing an insurance company,

Allen “made argumentative and unprofessional remarks to both the

insureds and their counsel” while conducting examinations under

oath. In the second matter, while representing the same insurance

company in a dispute over attorney fees, he made comments about

the opposing party and counsel “which were not consistent with the

high standards of professionalism.” In both matters, he was found

to have violated Florida Rules 3-4.3 (Misconduct and Minor

Misconduct),2 4-4.4 (a) (Respect for Rights of Third Persons),3 and 4-

2 Florida Rule 3-4.3 provides in relevant part that “[t]he commission by

a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice may
constitute a cause for discipline whether the act is committed in the course of
the lawyer’s relations as a lawyer or otherwise, whether committed within
Florida or outside the state of Florida, and whether the act is a felony or a
misdemeanor.”
3 Florida Rule 4-4.4 (a) provides that “[i]n representing a client, a lawyer

may not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass,
delay, or burden a third person or knowingly use methods of obtaining evidence
that violate the legal rights of such a person.”
8.4 (d) (Misconduct).4 Allen observes that Florida Rule 4-4.4 (a) is

analogous to GRPC 9.4 (a), but Georgia does not have a disciplinary

rule equivalent to Florida Rule 3-4.3 or Rule 4-8.4 (d). Allen states

that in the consent judgment with the Florida Bar, he stipulated to

four aggravating factors: prior disciplinary history, pattern of

misconduct, multiple offenses, and substantial experience in the

practice of law. See ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

(“ABA Standards”) 9.22 (a), (c), (d), and (i). He asserts that the

Florida Bar stipulated to four mitigating factors: absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive, personal or emotional problems arising

from or related to his stressful divorce at the time of his misconduct,

full and free disclosure to the bar or cooperative attitude toward the

4 Florida Rule 4-8.4 (d) provides in relevant part:

A lawyer shall not . . . engage in conduct in connection with
the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice, including to knowingly, or through callous indifference,
disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against litigants, jurors,
witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers on any basis,
including, but not limited to, on account of race, ethnicity, gender,
religion, national origin, disability, marital status, sexual
orientation, age, socioeconomic status, employment, or physical
characteristic[.]
disciplinary proceedings, and remorse. See ABA Standards 9.32 (b),

(c), (e), and (l). He assures the Court that he has taken steps to

ensure that his future conduct will be professional and will comply

with disciplinary rules. Accordingly, he requests, as substantially

similar discipline, that this Court suspend his license to practice law

in Georgia for ten days, nunc pro tunc and concurrent with his

Florida suspension, and that the Court allow his reinstatement upon

the entry of its opinion.

The State Bar responds by agreeing with Allen’s recitation of

the disciplinary matters against him and by stating that it does not

contest the facts that Allen expressed remorse for his actions and

cooperated fully with the Florida Bar. Therefore, the State Bar

recommends that the Court accept Allen’s voluntary petition and

impose the requested discipline.

This Court has generally interpreted the Bar Rules governing

reciprocal discipline to require the imposition of substantially

similar discipline as was imposed in the other jurisdiction, and here,

the ten-day suspension Allen requests is identical to the suspension
he served in Florida.5 See In the Matter of Van Dyke, 316 Ga. 168,

177 (3) (886 SE2d 811) (2023) (noting “the nature of reciprocal

discipline matters[,] . . . wherein this Court must only impose

‘substantially similar’ discipline”). See also In the Matter of

Pettinato, 315 Ga. 831, 835-836 (884 SE2d 894) (2023) (accepting

attorney’s voluntary petition for reciprocal discipline and imposing

ten-day suspension, which is generally not a disciplinary sanction

available in Georgia, because the requested suspension was

“identical” to discipline imposed in Florida). However, we decline to

accept Allen’s petition at this stage for two reasons. First, although

Allen’s petition references various documents associated with the

Florida disciplinary proceeding, no such documents were attached

for our review. See In the Matter of Thompson, 310 Ga. 753, 754 (854

5 Allen is on disciplinary probation in Florida for one year, but the
Georgia Bar Rules do not provide for probation as a sanction. However, this
Court has previously approved reciprocal suspensions “without adding time for
the probationary period” imposed by other jurisdictions, so this would not
preclude our acceptance of his petition. See, e.g., In the Matter of Thompson,
315 Ga. 81, 84 (880 SE2d 214) (2022); In the Matter of Hanzelik, 294 Ga. 727,
728 (755 SE2d 758) (2014). Instead, as explained below, we reject his petition
because of his failure to make certain showings in connection with his request
for reciprocal discipline.
SE2d 522) (2021) (rejecting attorney’s voluntary petition for

reciprocal suspension for, inter alia, failing to provide documents

from his Florida disciplinary proceeding). Second, although Allen

requests that his suspension be imposed nunc pro tunc to the dates

he served his suspension in Florida, he has failed to show that he is

entitled to a retroactive suspension. This Court has held that

when an attorney requests entry of a suspension or
voluntary surrender order nunc pro tunc, it is the lawyer’s
responsibility to demonstrate that they voluntarily
stopped practicing law, the date on which their law
practice ended, and that they complied with all the ethical
obligations implicated in such a decision, such as
assisting clients in securing new counsel and facilitating
the transfer of client files and critical information about
ongoing cases to new counsel.

In the Matter of Onipede, 288 Ga. 156, 157 (702 SE2d 136) (2010).

This Court has imposed retroactive suspensions as reciprocal

discipline when the attorney made a showing that he or she stopped

practicing law in Georgia while suspended in another jurisdiction,

which the State Bar did not contest or dispute. See, e.g., In the

Matter of Van Dyke, 316 Ga. at 177 (3) (imposing retroactive

suspension as reciprocal discipline where attorney provided
evidence that he stopped practicing law in Georgia in February

2019); In the Matter of Thompson, 315 Ga. 81, 85 (880 SE2d 214)

(2022) (imposing retroactive suspension as reciprocal discipline

where attorney showed that he was not practicing law in Georgia

and the State Bar indicated that he was on inactive status). Here,

in contrast, Allen failed to provide any evidence that he stopped

practicing law in Georgia during his suspension in Florida.

Accordingly, he has not made the necessary showing to have his

suspension imposed nunc pro tunc to the dates of his Florida

suspension. When this Court finds a voluntary petition for discipline

deficient, our practice is to reject the petition. See In the Matter of

Thompson, 310 Ga. at 754 (rejecting petition for voluntary reciprocal

discipline, even though the State Bar recommended the Court accept

the petition, due to several deficiencies in the petition, including

that the attorney referenced, but failed to attach, documents

associated with his Florida disciplinary proceeding). Accordingly, we

reject Allen’s petition for voluntary reciprocal discipline.
Petition for voluntary discipline rejected. All the Justices
concur.

Decided July 2, 2024.

Petition for voluntary discipline.

Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, William D.

NeSmith III, Deputy General Counsel State Bar, James S. Lewis,

Andreea N. Morrison, Assistant General State Bar, for State Bar of

Georgia.