Massey v. State

319 Ga. 526
FINAL COPY

S24A0131. MASSEY v. THE STATE.

ORDER OF THE COURT.

The trial court’s order is vacated and the case remanded to the

trial court for reconsideration in the light of United States v. Rahimi,

602 U. S. ___ (144 SCt 1889, 219 LE2d 351) (2024).

All the Justices concur, except Ellington, McMillian, LaGrua,

and Colvin, JJ., who dissent.

LAGRUA, Justice, dissenting.

While I respect my colleagues’ decision, I must respectfully

dissent. This appeal asks a critical question: whether the Second

Amendment to the United States Constitution permits a state to

prohibit someone who has committed a violent felony from

possessing firearms during the pendency of a first-offender sentence.

See OCGA § 16-11-131 (b). We are remanding this case back to the

trial court to consider the United States Supreme Court’s recent

decision in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U. S. ___ (144 SCt 1889,
219 LE2d 351) (2024). But I do not believe that Rahimi gives any

better guidance in this case than the Supreme Court’s previous

Second Amendment decisions in New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn.

v. Bruen, 597 U. S. 1 (142 SCt 2111, 213 LE2d 387) (2022) and

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570 (128 SCt 2783, 171

LE2d 637) (2008). The trial court relied on both cases in its order

denying Appellant’s demurrer as well as on this Court’s opinion in

Spencer v. State, 286 Ga. 483, 484 (5) (689 SE2d 823) (2010) (holding

that prohibiting a defendant from possessing a firearm as a

condition of probation does not violate the Second Amendment and

citing Heller’s declaration that “‘longstanding prohibitions on the

possession of firearms by felons’ are not in doubt.” (citing Heller, 554

U. S. at 626 (III)). Looking to the facts of this case, I find that Rahimi

would not undercut the trial court’s order. Rather, Rahimi likely

supports the idea that the legislature may disarm those who have

committed violent crimes like Appellant. See Rahimi, 603 U. S. at

___ (II) (B) (3) (“[T]he surety and going armed laws confirm what

common sense suggests: When an individual poses a clear threat of

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physical violence to another, the threatening individual may be

disarmed.”); id. at ___ (II) (B) (3) (repeating Heller’s declaration that

felon-in-possession is “presumptively lawful”); id. at ___ (II) (B) (3)

(“we do not suggest that the Second Amendment prohibits the

enactment of laws banning the possession of guns by categories of

persons thought by a legislature to present a special danger of

misuse”); id. at ___ (Barrett, J., concurring) (citing her dissent in

Kanter v. Barr, 919 F3d 437, 451 (7th Cir. 2019), where she

explained that “[h]istory is consistent with common sense: it

demonstrates that legislatures have the power to prohibit dangerous

people from possessing guns”).

The United States Supreme Court has cautioned that vacating

and remanding a case without issuing an opinion is inappropriate

when the “delay and further cost entailed in a remand are not

justified by the potential benefits of further consideration by the

lower court.” Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 168 (116 SCt 604,

133 LE2d 545) (1996) (per curiam). And I am concerned that the

benefits of remanding this case are far outweighed by the delay and

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costs. More guidance from the Supreme Court may be forthcoming,

but the governing law as it stands now is sufficient to address

Appellant’s claim and (in my opinion) affirm the trial court’s order.

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

I am authorized to state that Justice Ellington, Justice

McMillian, and Justice Colvin join in this dissent.

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Ordered June 27, 2024 — Reconsideration denied July 11, 2024.

Firearm possession. Crisp Superior Court. Before Judge

Chasteen.

Rockefeller Law Center, A. James Rockefeller, for appellant.

Bradford L. Rigby, District Attorney, Lauren W. Fletcher,

Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,

Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Meghan H. Hill, Clint C.

Malcolm, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.

John R. Monroe; Mazie L. Guertin, V. Natasha Perdew Silas,

Hunter J. Rodgers, Matthew P. Cavedon; Peter J. Skandalakis,

Robert W. Smith, Jr.; Stephen J. Petrany, Solicitor-General, Ross W.

Bergethon, Deputy Solicitor-General, amici curiae.

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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA
Case No. S24A0131

June 27, 2024

The Honorable Supreme Court met pursuant to adjournment.

The following order was passed:

CHRISTOPHER MASSEY v. THE STATE.

Upon consideration, the Court has revised the deadline for
motions for reconsideration in this matter. It is ordered that a
motion for reconsideration, if any, including motions submitted via
the Court’s electronic filing system, must be received in the
Clerk’s Office by 12:00 p.m. on Friday, July 5, 2024.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA
Clerk’s Office, Atlanta

I certify that the above is a true extract from the
minutes of the Supreme Court of Georgia.
Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto
affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk
SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA
Case No. S24A0131

June 27, 2024

The Honorable Supreme Court met pursuant to adjournment.

The following order was passed:

CHRISTOPHER MASSEY v. THE STATE.

The trial court’s order is vacated and the case remanded to the
trial court for reconsideration in the light of United States v. Rahimi,
602 U.S. ____ (2024).

All the Justices concur, except Ellington, McMillian, LaGrua,
and Colvin, JJ., who dissent.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA
Clerk’s Office, Atlanta

I certify that the above is a true extract from the
minutes of the Supreme Court of Georgia.
Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto
affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk

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LAGRUA, Justice, dissenting.

While I respect my colleagues’ decision, I must respectfully

dissent. This appeal asks a critical question: whether the Second

Amendment to the United States Constitution permits a State to

prohibit someone who has committed a violent felony from

possessing firearms during the pendency of a first-offender sentence.

See OCGA § 16-11-131 (b). We are remanding this case back to the

trial court to consider the United States Supreme Court’s recent

decision in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S ___ (___ SCt ____, ___

LE2d ___) (No. 22-915) (June 21, 2024). But I do not believe that

Rahimi gives any better guidance in this case than the Supreme

Court’s previous Second Amendment decisions in New York State

Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (142 SCt 2111,

213 LE2d 387) (2022) and D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (128 SCt 2783,

171 LE2d 637) (2008). The trial court relied on both cases in its order

denying Appellant’s demurrer as well as on this Court’s opinion in

Spencer v. State, 286 Ga. 483, 484 (5) (689 SE2d 823) (2010) (holding

that prohibiting a defendant from possessing a firearm as a

3
condition of probation does not violate the Second Amendment and

citing Heller’s declaration that “‘longstanding prohibitions on the

possession of firearms by felons’ are not in doubt.” (citing Heller, 554

U.S. at 626 (III)). Looking to the facts of this case, I find that Rahimi

would not undercut the trial court’s order. Rather, Rahimi likely

supports the idea that the legislature may disarm those who have

committed violent crimes like Appellant. See Rahimi 603 U.S. at ___

(II) (B) (3) (“the surety and going armed laws confirm what common

sense suggests: When an individual poses a clear threat of physical

violence to another, the threatening individual may be disarmed.”);

id. at ____ (repeating Heller’s declaration that felon-in-possession is

“presumptively lawful”); id. at ___ (“we do not suggest that the

Second Amendment prohibits the enactment of laws banning the

possession of guns by categories of persons thought by a legislature

to present a special danger of misuse”); id. at ___ (Barrett, J.,

concurring) (citing her dissent in Kanter v. Barr, 919 F3d 437, 451

(7th Cir. 2019), where she explained that “[h]istory is consistent

4
with common sense: it demonstrates that legislatures have the

power to prohibit dangerous people from possessing guns.”).

The United States Supreme Court has cautioned that vacating

and remanding a case without issuing an opinion is inappropriate

when the “delay and further cost entailed in a remand are not

justified by the potential benefits of further consideration by the

lower court.” Lawrence on Behalf of Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S.

163, 168 (116 SCt 604, 133 LE2d 545) (1996) (per curiam). And I am

concerned that the benefits of remanding this case are far

outweighed by the delay and costs. More guidance from the Supreme

Court may be forthcoming, but the governing law as it stands now

is sufficient to address Appellant’s claim and (in my opinion) affirm

the trial court’s order. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

I am authorized to state that Justice Ellington, Justice

McMillian, and Justice Colvin join in this dissent.

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