CourtListener 10680523

Testo completo

321 Ga. 52
FINAL COPY

S25A0086. GRIFFIN v. THE STATE.

WARREN, Justice.

Terry Griffin was convicted of malice murder, among other

crimes, in connection with the shooting death of her boyfriend,

Wesley Hudson. She appeals her conviction, arguing that her trial

counsel “unilaterally abandoned [her] innocence” after the close of

evidence “in favor of pursuing a lesser charge of voluntary

manslaughter.” Citing McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414 (138 SCt

1500, 200 LE2d 821) (2018), Griffin contends that trial counsel’s

actions violated her Sixth Amendment rights and that she is entitled

to a new trial because the error is structural in nature. For the

reasons that follow, we conclude that Griffin’s claim fails, and we

therefore affirm.1

1 The crimes occurred on December 13, 2017. In February 2018, a Fulton

apartment he shared with Griffin. Griffin was inside the apartment

when police officers responded to the shooting; she was arrested at

the scene. The record shows that, from the beginning of Griffin’s

trial, her counsel advanced alternative defenses to the charges of

malice murder and felony murder, and Griffin did not object to that

strategy. Initially, counsel tried to lay the foundation for Griffin’s

preferred theory of self-defense. In his opening statement, counsel

told the jury that Griffin would testify that, on the night of the

shooting, Hudson “tried to force sex on” Griffin, that he threatened

her with a gun, and that the evidence would show that “there was a

tussle,” “a discharge,” and afterward Griffin “was in shock.”

a trial in December 2022, a jury found Griffin guilty of all counts. The court
sentenced her to serve life in prison for malice murder and ten years to serve,
consecutively, for criminal damage to property in the first degree. The court
vacated the felony murder count, merged the aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon count with the malice murder conviction, and suspended the sentence
for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Griffin filed a
timely motion for new trial on September 20, 2022, which she later amended
on March 8, 2024. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order
denying Griffin’s amended motion on May 23, 2024. Griffin filed a timely notice
of appeal on June 5, 2024. The case was docketed to the term of this Court
beginning in December 2024 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
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Continuing with his opening statement, counsel asked the jury to

consider, in the alternative, convicting Griffin on the lesser charge

of voluntary manslaughter, arguing that “something went wrong in

that apartment on that night, but it was not malice aforethought.”

To support this alternative theory, counsel relied, in part, on

the testimony of Hudson’s neighbor, who testified that, on the night

of Hudson’s death, she heard “a woman . . . screaming . . . as if

someone was being slammed against the wall, and then she heard a

gun fired.” Counsel elicited testimony from a witness who testified

that Hudson “liked the women” and that “cheating . . . on his part”

led to conflict in his relationship with Griffin. And counsel elicited

testimony that, based on the witness’s interactions with Griffin,

“[Griffin] seemed like a nice person” and that conflict in Griffin and

Hudson’s relationship “probably triggered them to have their

differences . . . that night of [Hudson’s] death.”

Counsel initially requested jury instructions on both self-

defense and voluntary manslaughter. But at the first charge

conference, counsel conceded that “self-defense is a stretch,

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especially if [Griffin] doesn’t testify.” After the State finished

presenting its case-in-chief, Griffin decided not to testify, and the

trial court determined that there was not enough evidence to

support giving the jury a self-defense instruction.

In his closing argument, counsel focused on Griffin’s voluntary

manslaughter defense, telling the jury, “[W]hat happened in the

apartment was tragic, but it wasn’t malice murder,” and argued that

what transpired in Hudson’s apartment was in the “[h]eat of

passion, not malice aforethought, not a malignant and angry mind.”

Nevertheless, counsel also alluded to the self-defense theory,

asserting during closing argument that “[Hudson] grabbed [Griffin]

by the neck, and she is screaming and slammed against the wall,

and she puts the gun and fires, then he keeps coming.” Counsel

concluded by asking the jury to find Griffin not guilty on all five

counts in the indictment. The trial court did give the jury an

instruction on voluntary manslaughter, and the jury convicted

Griffin on all counts, including malice murder and felony murder.

(b) Represented by new counsel, Griffin filed a motion for new

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trial on September 20, 2022, which she later amended on March 8,

2024. In her motion, Griffin contended that, because counsel

“abandoned” her self-defense claim at the end of the trial, Griffin

“was denied her right to maintain her innocence and assert her

chosen defense” under McCoy, in which the United States Supreme

Court held that under the Sixth Amendment, “a defendant has the

right to insist that counsel refrain from admitting guilt, even when

counsel’s experienced-based view is that confessing guilt offers the

defendant the best chance to avoid the death penalty,” and that

“counsel may not admit [his] client’s guilt of a charged crime over

the client’s intransigent objection to that admission.” See 584 U.S.

at 417, 426.2 At the motion for new trial hearing, counsel testified

that, despite his earlier efforts to develop a self-defense claim, he

decided to “change strategy from self-defense to voluntary

2 In her amended motion for new trial, Griffin asserted a McCoy claim

based on her “right to maintain her innocence and assert her chosen defense
in accordance with the Sixth Amendment.” She also claimed that her trial
counsel provided ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984), in a number of ways. The trial
court denied both claims. Because Griffin has not raised the ineffective
assistance of counsel claims in her brief to this Court, we deem them
abandoned. See Bannister v. State, 306 Ga. 289, 297 n.7 (830 SE2d 79) (2019).
5
manslaughter” after Griffin decided not to testify at trial because

without Griffin’s testimony, “there was no argument with regard to

self-defense because only two people were in the apartment” and “no

one else could testify as to the self-defense [claim].” Given that he

“didn’t believe that based on the State’s evidence . . . there was

[proof] of malice,” and believing that the evidence supported a lesser

charge of voluntary manslaughter, counsel “moved forward with”

that theory. He testified that the decision to “change strategy from

self-defense to voluntary manslaughter” was his alone and that he

had not discussed the decision with Griffin at any point in the trial.

In its May 23, 2024 order, the trial court concluded that Griffin

had failed to show that she was entitled to a new trial under McCoy

because counsel “did not concede [Griffin’s] guilt to the charges

alleged” and because Griffin had failed to show that she had made

an “intransigent and unambiguous objection” to counsel’s shift in

strategy.

2. On appeal, Griffin’s sole enumeration of error is that her

trial counsel made a “McCoy-style error” by “unilaterally

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abandon[ing]” her innocence “at the end of trial in favor of pursuing

a lesser charge of voluntary manslaughter.”3

(a) In McCoy, the defendant was charged with three counts of

murder, and the State sought the death penalty. Throughout trial,

the defendant “vociferously insisted that he did not engage in the

charged acts and adamantly objected to any admission of guilt.” 584

U.S. at 417. At the guilt stage of trial, the defendant instructed his

counsel not to make a concession that defendant “was the killer,” id.

at 418; counsel was aware of the defendant’s complete “opposition

to” counsel “telling the jury that [the defendant] was guilty of killing

the three victims,” id. at 419 (cleaned up); and the defendant

“pressed [counsel] to pursue acquittal,” id. When, during opening

statements, counsel conceded the defendant’s guilt by telling the

3 We are aware of no case in which this Court has applied McCoy in a

non-capital case, and Griffin has cited none. Because Griffin’s claim fails in
any event, we assume (without deciding) for purposes of her appeal that McCoy
applies to non-capital cases. But see McCoy, 584 U.S. at 433 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (“[I]t is hard to see how the right could come into play in any case
other than a capital case in which the jury must decide both guilt and
punishment.”). See also Harris v. State, 358 Ga. App. 802, 809 n.7 (856 SE2d
378) (2021) (assuming without deciding that McCoy “is not limited to capital
cases”); Pass v. State, 361 Ga. App. 350, 354-355 n.3 (864 SE2d 464) (2021)
(same).
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jury that the defendant “was the cause of [the victims’] death[s],” the

defendant “protested,” telling the court “out of earshot of the jury . .

. that [counsel] was selling him out by maintaining that [the

defendant] murdered his family.” Id. (cleaned up). Then, during

trial, the defendant “testified in his own defense, maintaining his

innocence,” even though the alibi he presented was “difficult to

fathom.” Id. at 420. The jury “returned a unanimous verdict of guilty

. . . on all three counts.” Id. During the penalty phase of trial, counsel

“again conceded [defendant] committed these crimes but urged

mercy in view of [his] serious mental and emotional issues,” and the

jury nonetheless “returned three death verdicts.” Id. (cleaned up).

The United States Supreme Court concluded that, under the

circumstances presented in that case, the defendant’s rights under

the Sixth Amendment had been violated.4 Specifically, it held that

“[a]utonomy to decide that the objective of the defense is to assert

innocence” is “reserved for the client” and “[w]hen a client expressly

4 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in

relevant part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right .
. . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defen[s]e.” U.S. Const. Amend. VI.
8
asserts that the objective of his defen[s]e is to maintain innocence of

the charged criminal acts, his lawyer must abide by that objective

and may not override it by conceding guilt.” See McCoy, 584 U.S. at

422-423 (cleaned up). Noting that the defendant had opposed

counsel’s “assertion of [ ] guilt at every opportunity, before and

during trial, both in conference with his lawyer and in open court,”

id. at 424, the Court concluded that the defendant’s Sixth

Amendment rights had been violated and that because a “[v]iolation

of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment-secured autonomy” constitutes

“[s]tructural error,” the Court’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel

jurisprudence under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (104

SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984), did not apply. 584 U.S. at 427.

(b) We begin our analysis by assuming, without deciding, that

trial counsel “conceded” Griffin’s guilt in the same manner that trial

counsel did in McCoy. See 584 U.S. at 423 (“When a client expressly

asserts that the objective of his defen[s]e is to maintain innocence of

the charged criminal acts, his lawyer must abide by that objective

and may not override it by conceding guilt.”) (cleaned up). Even so,

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we conclude that Griffin’s claim fails because the record does not

support her contention that she made an “intransigent and

unambiguous objection” to counsel’s assumed concession like the

defendant did in McCoy. See id. at 426 (“[C]ounsel may not admit

[his] client’s guilt of a charged crime over the client’s intransigent

objection to that admission.”).

On appeal, Griffin does not argue that she made the type of

“intransigent and unambiguous objection” the defendant in McCoy

made. Instead, she contends that “an in-court interruption of

proceedings in front of a jury cannot be a standard or procedural

requirement for every defendant when asserting a McCoy claim,”

and asserts that she “nonetheless left no ambiguity in her

maintenance of innocence.” On that point, she contends that her

maintenance of innocence and insistence on her chosen
defense can be found in multiple parts of the record,
including not only her plea of “not guilty,” but also trial
counsel’s opening statement at trial laying out [Griffin’s]
claim of self-defense and maintenance of innocence, and
the trial attorney’s testimony at the motion for new trial
hearing,
during which counsel testified that he “alone chose to concede guilt

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and did not discuss this decision with [Griffin] beforehand.”

We disagree that the showing Griffin has made is sufficient to

establish the Sixth Amendment violation the defendant suffered in

McCoy. That is because the record does not show that Griffin made

the type of “intransigent and unambiguous objection” the defendant

made in McCoy. In reaching that conclusion, we need not (and do

not) attempt to define the parameters of what types of, or how much,

record evidence is necessary for a defendant to satisfy whatever

McCoy requires with respect to showing an “intransigent and

unambiguous objection.” Instead, we conclude that whatever must

be shown for a defendant to avail herself of a claim under McCoy

with respect to establishing an “intransigent and unambiguous

objection” has not been shown here. Indeed, the record evidence

Griffin points to—her plea of “not guilty,” trial counsel’s

advancement of Griffin’s self-defense claim and her “maintenance of

innocence,” and trial counsel’s testimony at the motion-for-new-trial

hearing—is unlike the defendant’s “vociferous[ ] insiste[nce] that he

did not engage in the charged acts,” and defendant’s “adamant[ ]

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object[ion] to any admission of guilt,” 584 U.S. at 417, which he made

“at every opportunity, before and during trial, both in conference

with his lawyer and in open court.” Id. at 424.

Because Griffin has not shown that she made an “intransigent

and unambiguous objection” to the concession of guilt we have

presumed her counsel made, see 584 U.S. at 420, her McCoy claim

fails.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

Decided February 18, 2025.

Murder. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Krause.

Cody J. Jung, for appellant.

Fani T. Willis, District Attorney, Kevin C. Armstrong, Assistant

District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Beth A.

Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Clint C. Malcolm, Meghan H. Hill,

Senior Assistant Attorneys General, Grace G. Griffith, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: February 18, 2025

S25A0086. GRIFFIN v. THE STATE.

WARREN, Justice.

Terry Griffin was convicted of malice murder, among other

crimes, in connection with the shooting death of her boyfriend,

Wesley Hudson. She appeals her conviction, arguing that her trial

counsel “unilaterally abandoned [her] innocence” after the close of

evidence “in favor of pursuing a lesser charge of voluntary

manslaughter.” Citing McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414 (138 SCt

1500, 200 LE2d 821) (2018), Griffin contends that trial counsel’s

actions violated her Sixth Amendment rights and that she is entitled

to a new trial because the error is structural in nature. For the

reasons that follow, we conclude that Griffin’s claim fails, and we
therefore affirm.1

1. (a) Hudson was shot and killed on December 13, 2017, in the

apartment he shared with Griffin. Griffin was inside the apartment

when police officers responded to the shooting; she was arrested at

the scene. The record shows that, from the beginning of Griffin’s

trial, her counsel advanced alternate defenses to the charges of

malice and felony murder, and Griffin did not object to that strategy.

Initially, counsel tried to lay the foundation for Griffin’s preferred

theory of self-defense. In his opening statement, counsel told the

jury that Griffin would testify that, on the night of the shooting,

1 The crimes occurred on December 13, 2017. In February 2018, a Fulton

County grand jury indicted Griffin for malice murder, felony murder,
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, criminal damage to property in the
first degree, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. At
a trial in December 2022, a jury found Griffin guilty of all counts. The court
sentenced her to serve life in prison for malice murder and ten years to serve,
consecutively, for criminal damage to property in the first degree. The court
vacated the felony murder count, merged the aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon count with the malice murder conviction, and suspended the sentence
for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. «V7-323» Griffin
filed a timely motion for new trial on September 20, 2022, which she later
amended on March 8, 2024. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court
entered an order denying Griffin’s amended motion on May 23, 2024. Griffin
filed a timely notice of appeal on June 5, 2024. The case was docketed to the
term of this Court beginning in December 2024 and submitted for a decision
on the briefs.
2
Hudson “tried to force sex on” Griffin, that he threatened her with a

gun, and that the evidence would show that “there was a tussle,” “a

discharge,” and afterwards Griffin “was in shock.” Continuing with

his opening statement, counsel asked the jury to consider, in the

alternative, convicting Griffin on the lesser charge of voluntary

manslaughter, arguing that “something went wrong in that

apartment on that night, but it was not malice aforethought.”