Edwards v. State

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In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: December 9, 2025

S25A1298. EDWARDS v. THE STATE.

BETHEL, Justice.

A jury found Jalon Dante Edwards and his co-defendants

Colton Sims and Monte Glover, Jr., guilty of malice murder and

other crimes in connection with the shooting death of DeCoby

Barlow.1 We previously affirmed Sims’s and Glover’s convictions.

1 The crimes occurred on December 8–9, 2018. On February 21, 2019, a

Henry County grand jury jointly indicted Edwards, along with Sims and
Glover, for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on aggravated
assault (Count 2), two counts of aggravated assault based on the shooting of
Barlow and shooting in the direction of a security guard (Counts 5 and 6),
respectively, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission
of a felony (Counts 9 and 10). Sims and Glover were each charged with one
count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Counts 7 and 8) and felony
murder predicated on the felon-in-possession charge (Counts 3 and 4). At a jury
trial in January through February of 2020, the defendants were found guilty
on all counts.
The trial court sentenced Edwards to serve life in prison on Count 1,
twenty years concurrent on Count 6, and five years consecutive on Count 9.
The remaining counts were vacated or merged.
Edwards filed a timely motion for new trial on February 10, 2020, which
he later amended. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the amended
See Sims v. State, 321 Ga. 627 (2025). In this appeal, Edwards

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions,

argues that the trial court erred in several respects, and asserts that

trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. For

the reasons that follow, we affirm.

1. As set forth in Sims, 321 Ga. at 628–29, and viewed in the

light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence presented at trial

showed the following.

On the evening of December 8, 2018, Sims and his friend
Colby Toles got into a dispute with Glover and co-
defendant Jalon Edwards at a nightclub. During the
ensuing scuffle between Toles and Edwards, Edwards
brandished a firearm, and the dispute moved outside. The
group and several patrons, including Barlow, likewise
exited the building.

A witness, Chris Jackson, testified that he saw Sims,
whom he knew, fire several shots in the air near the club
at the corner of the building and that he thought Sims
was “taking up” for Toles. Jackson then heard shots being
fired by another person.

motion on May 31, 2024. Subsequently, on Edwards’s motion, the trial court
vacated the order denying the motion for new trial and re-entered it on
November 7, 2024. Edwards then filed a timely notice of appeal, which was
docketed to the August 2025 term of this Court and submitted for a decision
on the briefs.
2
Security guards outside the club observed Glover retrieve
a firearm from his vehicle and then heard shots ring out
from different directions outside the club. [Landon]
Brown, one of the security guards, saw several people
with firearms, heard shots fired toward him and the other
security guards at the front of the club, and heard shots
returned between the front of the club and the adjacent
building. While fleeing the barrage of shots, Barlow was
struck in the crossfire, sustaining a fatal gunshot wound
to his back.

During the investigation into the crimes, ballistics
evidence confirmed that shots were fired between the two
locations. Police ultimately recovered a Glock handgun
belonging to Edwards, which was determined to have
fired the bullet that killed Barlow. A detective obtained
surveillance video showing the crimes, which was played
for the jury at trial, and which the detective testified
showed Edwards and Glover firing weapons. The jury also
heard testimony that one of the security guards, who was
present during the crimes and who knew Glover,
reviewed the security footage of the incident and observed
Glover fire his weapon.

Id. at 628–29.

2. In his first enumeration of error, Edwards contends that

there was not sufficient evidence “to convict [him] of the crimes

charged.” But he asserts specific argument only with respect to the

evidence supporting the felony murder count and the underlying

aggravated assault that was based on the shooting of Barlow.

3
Reviewing only those claims, see Supreme Court Rule 22 (“Any

enumerated error or subpart of an enumerated error not supported

by argument, citations to authority and citations to the record shall

be deemed abandoned.”), we conclude that Edwards’s claim fails.

The underlying aggravated assault count merged with the malice

murder count, and the felony murder count was vacated, see

footnote 1, so Edwards was not sentenced on those counts.

Edwards’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on these

counts is therefore moot. See Milton v. State, 318 Ga. 737, 742 n.5

(2024) (where charges either merged into defendant’s murder

conviction or were vacated, challenges to the sufficiency of the

evidence to support those merged or vacated crimes were moot).

3. Edwards next complains that the trial court erred when

instructing the jury on justification, transferred justification, and

excessive force. Because Edwards did not object to these instructions

at trial, we review this claim only for plain error. See Hill v. State,

310 Ga. 180, 194 (2020); OCGA § 17-8-58(b).

4
To prevail on plain-error review, an appellant must show
that the alleged instructional error was not affirmatively
waived; was clear and obvious, rather than subject to
reasonable dispute; likely affected the outcome of the
trial; and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.
Hill v. State, 321 Ga. 177, 181 (2025) (quotation marks omitted). And

“the appellant squarely bears the burden of satisfying the exacting

standard required by plain-error review, a task that is difficult, as

it should be.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

At trial, Edwards raised a justification defense, arguing that

he fired his weapon in self-defense only after shots were fired at him

and the security guards outside the club. And because Barlow was

not the aggressor but, rather, an unintended victim caught in the

crossfire, Edwards relied on the principle of transferred justification

to support that defense. See Howard v. State, 307 Ga. 12, 22 (2019)

(noting that under “the principle of transferred justification,” “no

guilt attaches if an accused is justified in shooting to repel an

assault, but misses and kills an innocent bystander” (quotation

marks omitted)), disapproved on other grounds by Johnson v. State,

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315 Ga. 876, 889 n.11 (2023). To that end, Edwards requested that

the trial court charge the jury on justification and transferred

justification. When charging the jury on these principles, the trial

court also gave the pattern charge on excessive force, instructing the

jury that

[t]he use of excessive or unlawful force while acting in self
defense is not justifiable and the defendant’s conduct in
this case would not be justified[ ] [i]f you find that the
force used exceeded that which a defendant reasonably
believed was necessary to defend against the victim’s use
of unlawful force, if any[.]
See Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal) § 3.16.20

(2019). Though Edwards raised no objection to this instruction at

trial he complains on appeal that the reference to “the victim’s use

of unlawful force” was misleading to the jury because Barlow, while

the victim, was not the aggressor. Instead, Edwards says, the charge

should have referred to “the aggressor’s use of unlawful force,” not

“the victim’s.” Considering the excessive force instruction in the

context of the entire jury charge, as we must, see Gold v. State, 319

Ga. 149, 151 (2024), we conclude that Edwards has failed to show

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that the alleged instructional error likely affected the outcome of the

trial.

To begin, the trial court’s initial charge on the affirmative

defense of justification — that “a defendant is justified to kill

another person in the defense of self or others” (Emphasis added.)—

made clear that the jury should acquit Edwards “if it determined he

was justified in firing his weapon, regardless of whom the bullet

struck.” Allen v. State, 290 Ga. 743, 746 (2012). The trial court’s

subsequent charge on excessive force, which tracked the pattern

charge, was correct in substance and sufficiently apprised the jury

that it was required to determine whether the force used by Edwards

was excessive. See Robbins v. State, 320 Ga. 19, 25–26 (2024). And

immediately after giving the excessive force charge, the trial court

instructed the jury that: “[U]nder the principle of transfer[red]

justification, no guilt attaches if a defendant is justified in shooting

to repel an assault, but misses and kills an innocent bystander,” but

that transferred justification is inapplicable where the defendant

“shot carelessly, and in a wanton and reckless disregard of the

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danger resulting to the bystander.” This charge fairly covered the

legal principles that Edwards requested regarding transferred

justification. See Howard, 307 Ga. at 22; Allen, 290 Ga. at 746. Thus,

considered as a whole, the trial court’s charge made clear to the jury

that it should acquit Edwards if it determined he was justified in

firing his weapon, regardless of whom the bullet struck and

regardless of whose unlawful force Edwards was responding to. See

Patel v. State, 278 Ga. 403, 405 (2004) (“[T]he trial court adequately

covered the principle of transferred justification when it charged the

jury on the twin principles of transferred intent and justification.”

(quotation marks omitted)). As such, Edwards has failed to show

that the use of “victim” rather than “aggressor” in the excessive force

instruction likely affected the outcome of his trial, and this claim

fails.

4. Edwards next argues that the trial court erred in denying

his motion to sever his trial from his co-defendants. Edwards argues,

as he did below, that evidence of his co-defendants’ prior felony

convictions created a “spillover” effect that unfairly prejudiced the

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jury against him. He also argues that his defense strategy diverged

from that of his co-defendants and that the trial court failed to

conduct the proper analysis in rejecting his motion. We disagree.

We review the trial court’s denial of a motion to sever for an

abuse of discretion. Campbell v. State, 320 Ga. 333, 339 (2024). And

as we have explained,

[a] trial court has broad discretion to grant or deny a
motion to sever in a murder case in which the death
penalty is not sought. When ruling on such a motion, a
court should consider: (1) the likelihood of confusion of the
evidence and law; (2) the possibility that evidence against
one defendant may be considered against the other
defendant; and (3) the presence or absence of antagonistic
defenses. To show that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying a motion to sever, a defendant must
do more than raise the existence of antagonistic defenses
or the possibility that a separate trial would have given
him a better chance of acquittal. The defendant must
make a clear showing that a joint trial was so prejudicial
as to amount to a denial of his right to due process.

Saylor v. State, 316 Ga. 225, 230–31 (2023) (citations and quotation

marks omitted).

Edwards has failed to make this showing. 2 This case involved

2 Edwards does not go so far as to argue in his appellate brief that the

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only three defendants who were tried for largely the same offenses

relating to the same incident, with the only variance in charges

being that Glover and Sims were charged with possession of a

firearm by a convicted felon and felony murder predicated on the

felon-in-possession charges. Moreover, the law and the evidence

were substantially the same for all three defendants, and the State

argued that the defendants were all involved in the singular

shooting incident underlying the charges. See Saylor, 316 Ga. at 231

(holding that the trial court did not abuse discretion in denying

defendant’s motion to sever when the case “involved only three

defendants who were tried for almost all the same offenses relating

to the same incidents,” and “[t]he law and evidence were

substantially the same for all of them”); Bolden v. State, 278 Ga. 459,

462 (2004) (“[T]he evidence with which each appellant takes issue

defendants had antagonistic defenses — just “different” ones. Regardless, to
prevail on a claim that the trial court erred by denying a motion to sever, a
defendant must show more than the mere existence of antagonistic defenses;
he must also make a showing of resulting prejudice arising from those
antagonistic defenses. See Chapman v. State, 322 Ga. 237, 247 (2025). This
Edwards has failed to do also.
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was admissible against both of them inasmuch as each played a

separate role in the aggravated assaults and murder, and the

evidentiary facts and the law applicable to each were substantially

the same.”).

In advancing this enumeration, Edwards emphasizes the

perceived prejudice to him arising from the admission of his co-

defendants’ prior felony convictions. It is true that the State

introduced into evidence certified copies of Sims’s and Glover’s prior

convictions — Sims for tampering with evidence and Glover for

trafficking a controlled substance, trafficking a controlled substance

near a school, and tampering with physical evidence. But on their

face, these prior convictions were non-violent, the underlying details

about the prior convictions were not admitted into evidence, and the

jury was instructed about the limited purpose for which it could

consider evidence of the prior convictions. Under these

circumstances, even if Edwards suffered some prejudice from the

admission of his co-defendants’ prior convictions, “it did not amount

to the denial of due process necessary to constitute an abuse of

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discretion.” Smith v. State, 290 Ga. 428, 430 (2012). See also Guffie

v. State, 304 Ga. 352, 355 (2018) (no abuse of discretion in denial of

motion to sever where jury did not hear underlying details of co-

defendant’s prior convictions).

Finally, Edwards complains in passing that the trial court

failed to make findings on the record before denying his motion to

sever. But “[a] trial court is not required to make explicit findings

with respect to the severance factors when it is obvious from the

transcript that the trial court properly considered these factors

when denying the defendant’s motion to sever.” Tabor v. State, 315

Ga. 240, 251 (2022) (punctuation omitted). And here, Edwards

argued the applicable law and facts in his motion to sever, which the

trial court took under advisement before later orally denying the

motion. “When, as here, a trial court makes no explicit findings in

ruling on a motion that does not require such findings to be made,

we presume that the trial court implicitly made all the findings in

support of its ruling that the record would allow.” Id. Accordingly,

this claim fails.

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5. In his fourth enumeration of error, Edwards contends that

the trial court erred by failing to remove a juror who expressed

concerns about her personal safety. But the record reflects that

Edwards expressly requested that the juror at issue remain on the

jury. As such, Edwards has waived appellate review of this claim.

See Sims, 321 Ga. at 632; Draughn v. State, 311 Ga. 378, 385–86

(2021) (defendant affirmatively waived right to appellate review of

issue where he invited the complained-of action).

6. Lastly, Edwards asserts that his trial counsel provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to seek removal of

the concerned juror and by failing to object to the excessive force jury

instruction discussed in Division 3 above. Edwards’s claims fail.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, an appellant

must show both that his trial counsel performed deficiently and that

the deficiency prejudiced his defense. Smith v. State, 315 Ga. 357,

365 (2022) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 687

(1984)). The deficiency prong requires the appellant to “show that

his attorney performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way

13
considering all the circumstances and in light of prevailing

professional norms.” Williams v. State, 316 Ga. 304, 314–15 (2023)

(quotation marks omitted). And because an appellant “must

overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell

within a wide range of reasonable professional conduct, and that

counsel’s decisions were made in the exercise of reasonable

professional judgment,” this is no easy showing. Payne v. State, 313

Ga. 218, 223 (2022). The prejudice prong requires the appellant to

show a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

Smith, 315 Ga. at 365. Showing that the error had “some conceivable

effect on the outcome of the proceeding” is not enough; the appellant

instead must “establish a reasonable probability of a different result,

which means a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Neuman v. State, 311 Ga. 83, 96–97 (2021) (quotation

marks omitted). Demonstrating ineffective assistance is a “high

bar,” and if an appellant fails to make the required showing on

either the deficiency or the prejudice prong, we are not required to

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consider the other. Mohamed v. State, 307 Ga. 89, 93 (2019).

(a) Edwards first argues that trial counsel performed

deficiently by failing to seek the removal of the juror who expressed

concern for her safety. “[J]uror selection is a matter of trial tactics

and strategy,” and “a decision implicating trial tactics and strategy

can serve as the basis for an ineffectiveness claim only if it is so

patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made

such a decision.” Capps v. State, 300 Ga. 6, 12–13 (2016). Edwards

has not made that showing here.

As an initial matter, at the motion for new trial hearing,

Edwards never asked trial counsel why he did not seek the juror’s

removal. Of course, “when trial counsel does not testify at the motion

for new trial hearing about the subject, it is extremely difficult to

overcome the presumption that his conduct was reasonable.” Shaw

v. State, 292 Ga. 871, 876 (2013) (quotation marks omitted). And the

circumstances of this case reflect that it was objectively reasonable

for trial counsel not to seek the juror’s removal. Indeed, as recounted

in Edwards’s co-defendant’s appeal in which this same claim was

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raised and rejected, Sims’s trial counsel testified that

he did not think the alternate jurors would be favorable
to the defense and that he was “more afraid of the
alternate” than he was of the juror at issue here. Counsel
also noted that, despite her safety concerns, the juror
indicated that she could remain impartial and, for that
reason, he did not think a motion to excuse her from
service would succeed.

321 Ga. at 635–36. Accordingly, Edwards has not met his burden of

showing that counsel’s failure to seek the juror’s removal was so

unreasonable that no competent lawyer would have done the same,

and this claim fails. See id.

(b) Edwards’s next claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

likewise fails. Edwards argues that trial counsel should have

objected to the trial court’s instruction that the jury must assess

justification by determining whether the victim, Barlow, used

unlawful force. As we explained above in Division 3, there was no

plain error because Edwards cannot demonstrate that the use of

“victim” rather than “aggressor” in the excessive force instruction

likely affected the outcome of his trial. Coextensive with that

determination, he cannot demonstrate prejudice in regard to this

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claim. See Hampton v. State, 302 Ga. 166, 168–69 (2017) (“[T]his

Court has equated the prejudice step of the plain error standard

with the prejudice prong for an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim.”).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

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