CourtListener 10846019

Testo completo

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: February 17, 2026

S25A1139. LUCID GROUP USA, INC. v. STATE OF GEORGIA et
al.

COLVIN, Justice.

This case concerns the constitutionality of two provisions of the

Georgia Motor Vehicle Franchise Practices Act, OCGA § 10-1-620 et

seq. The first of these provisions, OCGA § 10-1-664.1(c), generally

requires manufacturers to sell their new motor vehicles through a

new motor vehicle dealer (specifically, a dealer with a franchise for

such vehicles). It provides that “no manufacturer or franchisor shall

offer to sell or sell, directly or indirectly, any new motor vehicle to a

consumer in this state, except through a new motor vehicle dealer

holding a franchise for the line make covering such new motor

vehicle.” OCGA § 10-1-664.1(c). The second of these provisions,

OCGA § 10-1-664.1(a), generally prohibits manufacturers and their
affiliated entities from owning or operating a new motor vehicle

dealer, providing that, as a general matter, it is “unlawful for any

manufacturer … or any … affiliate … of a manufacturer … to own,

operate, or control, directly or indirectly, more than a 45 percent

interest in a dealer or dealership in this state.” As a result of these

two provisions (collectively referred to here as the “Direct Sales

Prohibition”), new motor vehicle manufacturers and their affiliates

generally cannot sell their vehicles in the state directly to

consumers. If they wish to sell their new motor vehicles in the state

to consumers, they must instead use an independent franchised

dealer as an intermediary to facilitate the sale.

The plaintiff in this case, Lucid Group USA, Inc. (“Lucid”),

operates retail locations in other states where it sells directly to

consumers new electric vehicles manufactured by an affiliated

entity (Lucid USA, Inc.). Seeking to open a retail location in Georgia,

Lucid submitted an application for a dealership license to the

Georgia Department of Revenue, which is tasked with licensing new

motor vehicle dealers. But the Department of Revenue denied

2
Lucid’s application based on the Direct Sales Prohibition.

Lucid then filed suit against the State, seeking declarations

that, as applied to Lucid, the Direct Sales Prohibition violates

several provisions of the Georgia Constitution, including the Due

Process Clause,1 the Equal Protection Clause, 2 and two provisions

of Article III, Section VI, Paragraph IV of Georgia’s Constitution

(“Paragraph IV”). 3 Lucid also sought a permanent injunction

prohibiting the State from enforcing the Direct Sales Prohibition

against Lucid.

The trial court, however, dismissed Lucid’s complaint. The

court concluded that Lucid’s due process and equal protection claims

were barred by Article III, Section VI, Paragraph II(c) of the Georgia

Constitution of 1983 (“Paragraph II(c)”), which provides in relevant

part that, “[n]otwithstanding the [Due Process Clause and the Equal

1 Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. I (“No person shall be deprived of

life, liberty, or property except by due process of law.”).
2 Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. II (“No person shall be denied the

equal protection of the laws.”).
3 Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. IV(a) (providing in relevant

part that “[l]aws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout
this state”); Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. IV(c) (“No special law
relating to the rights or status of private persons shall be enacted.”).
3
Protection Clause] of this Constitution,” the General Assembly is

authorized to regulate specified members of the “new motor vehicle”

industry “in order to prevent frauds, unfair business practices,

unfair methods of competition, impositions, and other abuses upon

its citizens.” And the trial court concluded that Lucid had not stated

a claim under Paragraph IV. Lucid appealed.

As explained below, we vacate the trial court’s determination

that Paragraph II(c) bars Lucid’s due process and equal protection

claims and remand for further consideration of that issue. As to the

trial court’s dismissal of Lucid’s Paragraph IV claims, we affirm in

part, vacate in part, and remand for further consideration.

1. Understanding the claims at issue in this case requires

consideration of the history and operation of the Motor Vehicle

Franchise Practices Act. In 1974, the General Assembly passed the

Motor Vehicle Franchise Practices Act, legislation designed to

regulate motor vehicle franchise practices “in order to prevent

frauds, unfair practices, discrimination, and undue control of the

independent motor vehicle dealer by motor vehicle manufacturing

4
and distributing organizations.” Ga. L. 1974, pp. 134–35. See also

Gen. GMC Trucks, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., GMC Truck & Coach

Div., 239 Ga. 373, 373 (1977). Two years later, that legislation was

repealed and replaced by the 1976 Franchise Practices Act. See Gen.

GMC Trucks, 239 Ga. at 373–74.

The 1976 Franchise Practices Act promptly faced

constitutional challenges. In 1977, we held that a provision of the

Act that limited the number of franchised dealers, thereby limiting

the available market for out-of-state manufacturers seeking to

market their products in Georgia, violated the Commerce Clause of

the United States Constitution. See Gen. GMC Trucks, 239 Ga. at

375–76, 378. In reaching this conclusion, we noted that the state

generally “may regulate under the police power where the health,

safety and welfare of its citizens are at stake,” and that the

legislature therefore may “regulate the purchase and sale of motor

vehicles for the protection and general welfare of the public,”

including to protect the public from “fraud.” Id. at 376, 379

(quotation marks omitted). But we noted that Georgia courts had

5
“traditionally limited the power of the state to regulate private

business,” that the police power does not authorize “purely

anticompetitive” legislation, which is “not affected with the public

interest,” and that “the legislature … may not indulge in arbitrary

price fixing, the destruction of lawful competition, or the creation of

trade restraints tending to establish a monopoly.” Id. at 376–77, 379

(quotation marks omitted).

The General Assembly “substantive[ly] re-enact[ed]” the 1976

Franchise Practices Act in 1979. Georgia Franchise Pracs. Comm’n

v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 244 Ga. 800, 801 (1979). That same year,

we declared the 1979 Franchise Practices Act unconstitutional “in

its entirety.” Id. at 803. We concluded that provisions of the Act,

which were not severable, violated several provisions of Georgia’s

1976 Constitution, including Article I, Section I, Paragraph I (the

Due Process Clause 4), Article I, Section I, Paragraph VII (concerning

4 Ga. Const. of 1976, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. I (“No person shall be deprived of

life, liberty, or property, except by due process of law.”).
6
laws that impair contracts5), Article III, Section I, Paragraph I

(concerning legislative power 6), Article I, Section II, Paragraph III

(concerning impartial protection of persons and property7), and

Article III, Section VIII, Paragraph VIII (concerning anti-

competitive contracts8). See id. at 801–03. And in reaching this

conclusion, we noted that the General Assembly had improperly

“restrict[ed] competition” and sought “to regulate an industry not

affected with a public interest.” Id. at 801–02.

In 1992, following our rulings “striking down previous statutes

5 Ga. Const. of 1976, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. VII (“No bill of attainder, ex post

facto law, retroactive law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or
making irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities, shall be passed.”).
6 Ga. Const. of 1976, Art. III, Sec. I, Par. I (“The legislative power of the

State shall be vested in a General Assembly ….”).
7 Ga. Const. of 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. III (“Protection to person and

property is the paramount duty of government, and shall be impartial and
complete.”). This provision in the 1976 Constitution did not yet include what
we commonly refer to as the Equal Protection Clause of the 1983 Constitution.
See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. II (“Protection to person and property
is the paramount duty of government and shall be impartial and complete. No
person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws.” (emphasis added)).
8 Ga. Const. of 1976, Art. III, Sec. VIII, Par. VIII (“All contracts and

agreements, which may have the effect, or be intended to have the effect, to
defeat or lessen competition, or to encourage monopoly, shall be illegal and
void. The General Assembly of this State shall have no power to authorize any
such contract or agreement. The General Assembly shall enforce the provisions
of this Paragraph by appropriate legislation.”).
7
regulating motor vehicle franchise practices” as unconstitutional,

the people of Georgia ratified a constitutional amendment that

“expressly authorize[d] the General Assembly to regulate new motor

vehicle manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and their

representatives doing business in Georgia” notwithstanding certain

“constitutional provisions that litigants had relied on to challenge

previous motor vehicle franchise laws.” WMW, Inc. v. Am. Honda

Motor Co., 291 Ga. 683, 686 & n.3 (2012) (cleaned up). See Ga. L.

1992, p. 3342, § 1, ratified Nov. 3, 1992. As relevant here, the 1992

constitutional amendment — which is now codified as Paragraph

II(c) of Georgia’s Constitution — provides:

9 Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. III (“Each person has the natural

and inalienable right to worship God, each according to the dictates of that
person’s own conscience; and no human authority should, in any case, control
or interfere with such right of conscience.”).
8
Anti-Competitive Contracts Clause 10] of this
Constitution, the General Assembly in the exercise of its
police power shall be authorized to regulate … new motor
vehicle manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and their
representatives doing business in Georgia, including
agreements among such parties, in order to prevent
frauds, unfair business practices, unfair methods of
competition, impositions, and other abuses upon its
citizens.

Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. II(c). Following ratification

of Paragraph II(c), “the General Assembly invoked its new

constitutional authority when it substantively reenacted the

Franchise Practices Act.” WMW, 291 Ga. at 686 (cleaned up). See

Ga. L. 1993, p. 1586, § 1 (“It is the intent of the General Assembly

to substantively reenact certain legislation relating to distribution

of tractors, farm equipment, heavy equipment, and motor vehicles

subsequent to the ratification at the 1992 general election of a

10 Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. V(c)(1) (“The General
Assembly shall not have the power to authorize any contract or agreement
which may have the effect of or which is intended to have the effect of
encouraging a monopoly, which is hereby declared to be unlawful and void.
Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (c)(2) of this Paragraph, the
General Assembly shall not have the power to authorize any contract or
agreement which may have the effect of or which is intended to have the effect
of defeating or lessening competition, which is hereby declared to be unlawful
and void.”).
9
constitutional amendment declaring that such distribution vitally

affects the general economy of the state and the public interest and

public welfare and authorizing the General Assembly to regulate

such distribution.”).

This case concerns several provisions of the Motor Vehicle Fair

Practices Act, OCGA § 10-1-660 et seq., a subdivision of the Georgia

Motor Vehicle Franchise Practices Act, OCGA § 10-1-620 et seq. By

way of background, Georgia law prohibits anyone from operating as

a new motor vehicle dealer in the state without first obtaining a

dealer license from the Georgia Department of Revenue. See OCGA

§ 40-2-39(b)(1) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in any

activity as a new motor vehicle dealer unless and until such person

has registered with the commissioner and obtained a dealer’s

number license plate ….”); OCGA § 40-2-1(2) (“‘Commissioner’

means the state revenue commissioner.”). And the Motor Vehicle

Fair Practices Act restricts who may obtain a dealer license by

10
restricting who may own or operate a “dealer”11 or “dealership”12 in

the state.

As relevant here, OCGA § 10-1-664.1(a) — the first component

of the Direct Sales Prohibition — generally prohibits manufacturers

and affiliated entities from owning or operating a dealer or

dealership, providing that, subject to certain exceptions, “[i]t shall

be unlawful for any manufacturer … or any parent, affiliate, wholly

or partially owned subsidiary, officer, or representative of a

manufacturer … to own, operate, or control, directly or indirectly,

more than a 45 percent interest in a dealer or dealership in this

state.”

As noted above, the other component of the Direct Sales

Prohibition is OCGA § 10-1-664.1(c), which provides that, as a

general matter, “no manufacturer or franchisor shall offer to sell or

11 See OCGA § 10-1-622(1) (“‘Dealer’ means any person engaged in the

business of selling, offering to sell, soliciting, or advertising the sale of new
motor vehicles and who is licensed or otherwise authorized to utilize
trademarks or service marks associated with one or more makes of motor
vehicles in connection with such sales.”).
12 See OCGA § 10-1-622(2)(A) (defining “[d]ealership” as including “[t]he

dealer, if the dealer is a corporation, partnership, or other business
organization.”).
11
sell, directly or indirectly, any new motor vehicle to a consumer in

this state, except through a new motor vehicle dealer holding a

franchise for the line make covering such new motor vehicle.” By its

plain terms, this provision only regulates the sale to consumers of

“new motor vehicle[s].” OCGA § 10-1-664.1(c). And, as explained

below, because the statutory definition of that term has changed

over the years, so too has the effect of OCGA § 10-1-664.1(c).

Prior to a 2015 amendment, the Motor Vehicle Franchise

Practices Act defined “[n]ew motor vehicle” as “a motor vehicle

which has been sold to a dealer and on which the original motor

vehicle title has not been issued.” OCGA § 10-1-622(11) (2010). But

in 2015, the General Assembly amended this definition, removing

the phrase “which has been sold to a dealer,” and defining “[n]ew

motor vehicle” simply as “a motor vehicle on which the original

motor vehicle title has not been issued.” OCGA § 10-1-622(11). See

Ga. L. 2015, Act 159, § 1.

The change to the statutory definition of “new motor vehicle”

had a significant impact on the operation of OCGA § 10-1-664.1(c).

12
Prior to the 2015 amendment, when “new motor vehicle” was defined

as including only new vehicles that had been sold to a dealer, the

plain language of OCGA § 10-1-664.1(c) did not require

manufacturers to sell new motor vehicles through independent

franchised dealers. It only prohibited a manufacturer from selling a

new motor vehicle to consumers through a non-franchised dealer,

providing that a manufacturer could not “offer to sell or sell, directly

or indirectly, any new motor vehicle [i.e., any motor vehicle which

has been sold to a dealer and on which the original motor vehicle

title has not been issued] to a consumer in this state, except through

a new motor vehicle dealer holding a franchise for the line make

covering such new motor vehicle.” OCGA § 10-1-664.1(c). After the

2015 amendment redefined “new motor vehicle” more broadly as any

motor vehicle without an issued title, however, the plain language

of OCGA § 10-1-664.1(c) applied differently, prohibiting

manufacturers from selling new motor vehicles directly to

consumers and requiring that manufacturers instead sell new motor

vehicles through independent franchised dealers. Specifically,

13
OCGA § 10-1-664.1(c) now provides that manufacturers cannot

“offer to sell or sell, directly or indirectly, any new motor vehicle [i.e.,

a motor vehicle on which the original motor vehicle title has not been

issued] to a consumer in this state, except through a new motor

vehicle dealer holding a franchise for the line make covering such

new motor vehicle.”

As alleged in the amended complaint, prior to the 2015

amendment, Tesla Motors, Inc. (“Tesla”) — a manufacturer of new

electric motor vehicles that (like Lucid and its manufacturing

affiliate) sells its electric vehicles in other states directly to

consumers without using independent franchised dealers as

intermediaries — obtained a dealer license to sell new motor

vehicles directly to customers in Georgia. As further alleged in the

amended complaint, once the General Assembly redefined “new

motor vehicle” in 2015, OCGA § 10-1-664.1(c) would have prohibited

Tesla from selling new vehicles in the state directly to customers

without utilizing a franchised dealer as an intermediary. But the

same amendment that redefined “new motor vehicle” also added a

14
new provision to OCGA § 10-1-664.1 that created an exception to the

Direct Sales Prohibition for a limited class of electric motor vehicle

manufacturers who were operating dealerships in the state as of

January 1, 2015 — a class that (as appears undisputed on appeal)

includes, and could only ever include, Tesla. Specifically, the 2015

amendment added a new subsection — OCGA § 10-1-664.1(a)(8) —

which provides that OCGA § 10-1-664.1(a) “shall not be construed to

prohibit”:

The ownership, operation, or control by a manufacturer of
not more than five locations licensed as new motor vehicle
dealerships for the sale of new motor vehicles and any
number of locations that engage exclusively in the repair
of such manufacturer’s line make of motor vehicles,
provided that such manufacturer was selling or otherwise
distributing its motor vehicles at an established place of
business in this state as of January 1, 2015, and:

(A) The manufacturer manufactures or assembles
zero emissions motor vehicles exclusively and has
never sold its line make of motor vehicles in this
state through a franchised new motor vehicle dealer;
and

(B) The manufacturer has not acquired a controlling
interest in a franchisor or a subsidiary or other
entity controlled by such franchisor, or sold or
transferred a controlling interest in such

15
manufacturer to a franchisor or subsidiary or other
entity controlled by such franchisor.

OCGA § 10-1-664.1(a)(8); Ga. L. 2015, Act 159, § 2.

2. As noted above, Lucid sued the State, challenging the Direct

Sales Prohibition under the Due Process Clause, the Equal

Protection Clause, and Paragraph IV of Georgia’s Constitution

(which places certain limitations on the passage of general and

special laws). As to the Paragraph IV claim, Lucid alleged that the

Direct Sales Prohibition “arbitrarily distinguishes between classes

that are similarly situated in all material respects,” and that it

therefore violates Paragraph IV(a), “because it is not a law of a

general nature that has a uniform operation throughout this state.”

And Lucid alleged that the Direct Sales Prohibition violates

Paragraph IV(c) “because it is a special law relating to the rights or

status of private persons.”

Over Lucid’s objection, the trial court permitted the Georgia

Automobile Dealers Association (“GADA”) to intervene as a

defendant. And the State and GADA each moved to dismiss the

16
complaint. The defendants argued that Lucid’s due process and

equal protection claims were barred by Paragraph II(c), which

authorizes the General Assembly to regulate the new motor vehicle

industry notwithstanding the Due Process and Equal Protection

Clauses. GADA argued that the same constitutional provision also

preempted Lucid’s claim under Paragraph IV. And the defendants

argued that Lucid’s Paragraph IV claim failed because the

challenged laws operated uniformly upon all people within their

ambit.

Following a hearing, the trial court issued an order granting

the defendants’ motions to dismiss. First, the trial court concluded

that the “plain, unambiguous language of Paragraph II(c)

mandate[d] the dismissal” of Lucid’s due process and equal

protection claims because the Direct Sales Prohibition was enacted

pursuant to Paragraph II(c), and because Paragraph II(c) grants the

General Assembly the authority to regulate new motor vehicle

manufacturers “notwithstanding” the Due Process and Equal

Protection Clauses. In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected

17
Lucid’s argument that the language in Paragraph II(c) stating that

the General Assembly could issue such regulations “in order to

prevent frauds, unfair business practices, unfair methods of

competition, impositions, and other abuses upon [Georgia’s]

citizens” limited the General Assembly’s authority to regulate new

motor vehicle manufacturers pursuant to Paragraph II(c). According

to the trial court, this language was merely an inoperative

“statement of purpose,” not a “limitation,” because the framers

would have used “more precise language” if they had meant for the

language “to function as a limitation”; reading the language “as a

limitation is not a natural reading of the text”; and reading the

language as a limitation “would force the courts to evaluate the

exercise of the General Assembly’s police power,” which is “precisely

not the role of the courts … where the General Assembly can

regulate without regard to the Equal Protection Clause or Due

Process Clause.”

Second, the trial court concluded that Lucid could not show

that the Direct Sales Prohibition violated Paragraph IV because

18
Paragraph IV only requires that a general law operate alike with

respect to all who come within its scope, “it is beyond dispute that

the Direct Sales Prohibition” is a “general law,” and “the Direct

Sales Prohibition applies with equal force to all who fall within its

terms throughout the State.” The trial court concluded that it was

irrelevant that the Direct Sales Prohibition provided for exceptions

because general laws can have exceptions. The trial court also

rejected Lucid’s argument that the exception tailored to Tesla was

an unconstitutional special law, noting that even a law that applies

in only one instance can be a general law. And the court noted that

a challenge to the exception to the Direct Sales Prohibition that

applied only to Tesla could not redress Lucid’s grievance because, if

the court concluded that the exception was unconstitutional, “the

proper remedy would be to declare it [unconstitutional] and enjoin

[its] enforcement,” not to declare “the remainder of the statute”

prohibiting direct sales unconstitutional.

3. In its first of two enumerations of error on appeal, Lucid

argues that the trial court misinterpreted Paragraph II(c), and, as a

19
result, applied an incorrect standard in concluding that Paragraph

II(c) barred Lucid’s due process and equal protection claims. We

agree.

When interpreting the Constitution, we generally “afford the

constitutional text its plain and ordinary meaning, view the text in

the context in which it appears, and read the text in its most natural

and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language

would.” Hollis v. City of LaGrange, 320 Ga. 451, 453–54 (2024)

(quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, our construction of

Paragraph II(c) begins with the text itself, which, as noted above,

states in relevant part:

The distribution of … new motor vehicles … in the State
of Georgia vitally affects the general economy of the state
and the public interest and public welfare.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I, Section I,
Paragraphs I [the Due Process Clause], II [the Equal
Protection Clause], and III [the Freedom of Conscience
Clause] or Article III, Section VI, Paragraph V(c) [the
Anti-Competitive Contracts Clause] of this Constitution,
the General Assembly in the exercise of its police power
shall be authorized to regulate … new motor vehicle
manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and their
representatives doing business in Georgia, including
agreements among such parties, in order to prevent

20
frauds, unfair business practices, unfair methods of
competition, impositions, and other abuses upon its
citizens.

Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. II(c).

The plain language of Paragraph II(c) establishes that,

pursuant to its “police power,” the General Assembly may pass

certain statutes that “regulate … new motor vehicle manufacturers,

distributors, dealers, and their representatives doing business in

Georgia,” and that it may pass such statutes “[n]otwithstanding” —

that is, despite — any limitation that the enumerated constitutional

provisions, such as the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection

Clause, might otherwise impose on the General Assembly’s police

power. See Notwithstanding, Merriam Webster’s Collegiate

Dictionary 795 (10th ed. 1997) (defining “notwithstanding” as

meaning “despite”); Notwithstanding, Webster’s Ninth New

Collegiate Dictionary 808 (1988) (same). Because Paragraph II(c)

authorizes certain regulations despite any limitations imposed by

the enumerated constitutional provisions, the trial court correctly

determined that claims based on the enumerated constitutional

21
provisions that challenge regulations authorized by Paragraph II(c)

are barred by the Constitution. That much is undisputed on

appeal.13

The dispute here concerns which regulations Paragraph II(c)

authorizes. The trial court concluded that Paragraph II(c)

authorizes any regulation of “new motor vehicle manufacturers,

distributors, dealers, and their representatives doing business in

Georgia.” In reaching this conclusion, however, the trial court

disregarded Paragraph II(c)’s “in order to” clause, which states that

the General Assembly is authorized to regulate the new motor

vehicle industry “in order to prevent frauds, unfair business

13 While unclear, GADA appears to claim that Paragraph II(c) bars not

only claims arising under the constitutional provisions it expressly enumerates
but also claims arising under other constitutional provisions if the claims
resemble claims arising under the enumerated constitutional provisions.
Specifically, GADA argues that, because Lucid’s Paragraph IV claim resembles
an equal protection claim, and because Paragraph II(c) enumerates the Equal
Protection Clause, Paragraph II(c) bars Lucid’s Paragraph IV claim. This
argument, however, is misguided. It is a well-established canon of construction
that “[t]he express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another.” Allen
v. Wright, 282 Ga. 9, 13–14 (2007) (quotation marks omitted). And Paragraph
II(c) expressly enumerates several constitutional provisions, while excluding
Paragraph IV from the list. Accordingly, even assuming the legislation at issue
here is the type of regulation authorized by Paragraph II(c), Paragraph II(c)
would not bar a Paragraph IV-based challenge to that legislation.
22
practices, unfair methods of competition, impositions, and other

abuses upon [Georgia’s] citizens.” As explained below, the trial court

erred in disregarding this language.

A constitutional provision “should be construed to make all its

parts harmonize and to give a sensible and intelligent effect to each

part.” Camden County v. Sweatt, 315 Ga. 498, 509 (2023) (quotation

marks omitted). And because it is presumed that no part of the text

is “without meaning,” a court “generally should avoid a construction

that makes some language mere surplusage.” Id. (quotation marks

omitted).

Here, the trial court relied on the converse of these well-

established canons of construction in concluding that Paragraph

II(c)’s “in order to” clause was not a limitation on the General

Assembly’s authority under Paragraph II(c). The trial court was

correct insofar as it concluded that, when Paragraph II(c) was

ratified, the phrase “in order to” was generally understood to mean

“for the purpose of.” Order, Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary

818 (10th ed. 1997) (defining “in order to” as “for the purpose of”);

23
Order, Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 830 (1988)

(same). But rather than presuming that the “in order to” clause had

operative effect and reading the provision in the most natural way

based on that presumption, the trial court presumed that the clause

was mere surplusage and concluded that, absent “more precise

language,” that presumption could not be rebutted. This reasoning

was erroneous.

Properly applying the surplusage canon, Paragraph II(c)’s “in

order to” clause is naturally read as a limitation on the police power

authorized by the provision. Presuming that the “in order to” clause

has meaning and effect, as we should, the plain language of

Paragraph II(c) authorizes the General Assembly to exercise its

“police power” to pass regulations on the “new motor vehicle”

industry that are for the purpose of “prevent[ing] frauds, unfair

business practices, unfair methods of competition, impositions, and

other abuses upon [Georgia’s] citizens.” And so long as a regulation

of the “new motor vehicle” industry is for the purpose of preventing

the types of “abuses upon [Georgia’s] citizens” specified in the

24
provision, Paragraph II(c) renders the regulation immune from

challenge under the constitutional provisions enumerated in

Paragraph II(c).14

This textual interpretation of Paragraph II(c) is also supported

by the legal and historical context in which the provision was

ratified. As explained above, Paragraph II(c) was ratified in

response to our decisions striking down portions of the prior

Franchise Practices Act. In those decisions, we had indicated that

“the power of the state to regulate private business” is “limited,”

Gen. GMC Trucks, 239 Ga. at 376, and that it was improper for the

14 In concluding that the “in order to” clause was not a limitation on the

General Assembly’s authority under Paragraph II(c), the trial court also
reasoned that, because Paragraph II(c) exempts regulations of the new motor
vehicle industry from scrutiny under the enumerated constitutional
provisions, and because reading the “in order to” clause as a limitation “would
force the courts to evaluate the exercise of the General Assembly’s police
power,” it would not make sense to read “in order to” clause as a limitation on
the General Assembly’s authority. This reasoning, however, confuses the
nature of the limitation imposed by Paragraph II(c)’s “in order to” clause. That
clause is not a limitation on the General Assembly’s police power, but it limits
the ways the police power may be exercised that are immune from challenge
under the enumerated constitutional provisions. Paragraph II(c) requires an
assessment of whether the regulation in question fits within the category of
regulations immune from such challenges. That said, a determination that a
given regulation is not within that category does not mean that it is invalid,
only that it is not immune from challenges under the enumerated
constitutional provisions.
25
General Assembly to seek “to regulate [the new motor vehicle]

industry,” which is “not affected with a public interest,” Massey-

Ferguson, Inc., 244 Ga. at 802. We had struck down a prior version

of the Franchise Practices Act as violative of several provisions of

the Georgia Constitution, including provisions that addressed due

process, equal protection, and anti-competitive contracts. See

Massey-Ferguson, 244 Ga. at 801–03. And we had noted the well-

established principle that the police power permits the General

Assembly to pass regulations “where the health, safety and welfare

of its citizens are at stake,” including where “fraud” in “the purchase

and sale of motor vehicles” puts the “general welfare of the public”

at stake. Gen. GMC Trucks, 239 Ga. at 376, 379.

The text of Paragraph II(c) addresses each of these points.

First, contrary to our decisions indicating that the new motor vehicle

industry was not affected with the public interest and could not be

regulated, Paragraph II(c) clarifies that the “new motor vehicle”

industry “vitally affects the general economy of the state and the

public interest and public welfare,” and that the “police power”

26
authorizes the General Assembly to “regulate” the “new motor

vehicle” industry. Second, in response to our decisions striking down

the Franchise Practices Act under specific provisions of Georgia’s

Constitution (including the Due Process Clause, the Equal

Protection Clause, and the Anti-Competitive Contracts Clause),

Paragraph II(c) specifies that the General Assembly may pass

certain regulations of the new motor vehicle industry

“[n]otwithstanding” those constitutional provisions. Finally,

Paragraph II(c) clarifies that the scope of the police power

authorized in the provision is consistent with the traditional police

power (which authorizes legislation designed to protect the health,

safety, and welfare of Georgia citizens) in that the General Assembly

can pass regulations of the new motor vehicle industry that are for

the purpose of “prevent[ing] … abuses upon [Georgia’s] citizens,”

such as “frauds, unfair business practices, unfair methods of

competition, [and] impositions.”

Because the trial court dismissed Lucid’s due process and equal

protection claims under Paragraph II(c) without first considering

27
whether the Direct Sales Prohibition was enacted for the purpose of

preventing the types of abuses specified in Paragraph II(c), the

court’s dismissal was premature.15 We therefore vacate the trial

court’s dismissal of Lucid’s due process and equal protection claims

and remand for further consideration of those claims consistent with

this opinion.

4. In its second and final enumeration of error on appeal, Lucid

challenges the trial court’s dismissal of its claims challenging the

Direct Sales Prohibition under Paragraph IV(a) and (c), which, as

relevant here, provide:

(a) Laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation throughout this state and no local or special law
shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been
made by an existing general law ….

Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. IV(a), (c). 16 As explained

15 On remand, the trial court should consider in the first instance which

party has the burden to establish the challenged legislation’s purpose and what
showing is required to establish that purpose under Paragraph II(c).
16 Although Paragraph IV(c) was included for the first time in Georgia’s

28
below, we affirm in part and vacate in part the trial court’s dismissal

of Lucid’s Paragraph IV claims.

(a) At the outset, we note that the portions of Paragraph IV(a)

and (c) quoted above contain a total of three separate provisions that

are relevant here, each of which concerns “general” or “special” laws,

and each of which requires a different analysis.

As a general matter, whether a law is a “general law” or a

“special law” under Paragraph IV turns on the legislative

1983 Constitution, the portion of Paragraph IV(a) relevant here has been
included in Georgia’s Constitution in materially similar form since the Georgia
Constitution of 1877. Compare Ga. Const. of 1877, Art. I, Sec. IV, Par. I (“Laws
of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout the State, and no
special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by
existing general law. No general law affecting private rights shall be varied in
any particular case by special legislation, except with the free consent, in
writing of all persons to be affected thereby; and no person under legal
disability to contract is capable of such consent.”), Ga. Const. of 1945, Art. I.,
Sec. IV (“Laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout
the State, and no special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision
has been made by an existing general law. No general law affecting private
rights, shall be varied in any particular case, by special legislation, except with
the free consent, in writing, of all persons to be affected thereby; and no person
under legal disability to contract, is capable of such consent.”), and Ga. Const.
of 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. VII (same), with Ga. Const. of 1868, Art. I, Sec. 26
(“Laws shall have a general operation, and no general law, affecting private
rights, shall be varied, in any particular case, by special legislation, except with
the free consent, in writing, of all persons to be affected thereby; and no person
under legal disability to contract is capable of such free consent.”).
29
classification drawn by the law. A “special law” is a law that draws

a “legislative classification” that is “arbitrary or unreasonable” in

relation to the “purpose” of the legislation, Dev. Auth. of DeKalb

County v. State, 286 Ga. 36, 39–40 (2009) (quotation marks omitted).

See Walker v. Cromartie, 287 Ga. 511, 513 (2010) (noting that “[a]

special law is a law that only affects a limited area or class” and thus

does not “appl[y] uniformly to the subject with which it purports to

deal”); Gliemmo v. Cousineau, 287 Ga. 7, 8 (2010) (“This Court has

found a statute to be a special law where it deals with a limited

activity in a specific industry during a limited time frame.”

(quotation marks omitted)); Lasseter v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm’n,

253 Ga. 227, 229 (1984) (noting that “special laws affect[ ] special

classes”); Sasser v. Martin, 101 Ga. 447, 453–54 (1897) (explaining

that not all “public law[s]” are “general law[s],” and that “[a] public

statute is special, not only when it is local, but also when it is

confined in its subject to less than a class of persons or things”). By

contrast, a “general law” is a law that is “framed in general terms”

and applies to a “[non]arbitrary” class of “objects” that “are

30
distinguished by characteristics sufficiently marked and important

to make them a class by themselves” with respect to the legislation’s

“subject-matter” and “purpose.” Sasser, 101 Ga. at 455–57

(quotation marks omitted) (noting that a general law draws “a

substantial distinction, having reference to the subject-matter of the

proposed legislation, between the objects or places embraced in such

legislation and the objects or places excluded”). In other words, a law

is “general” if “the classes included or excluded from its general

effect are reasonable and not arbitrary” with respect to the subject

matter of the legislation. McAllister v. Am. Nat. Red Cross, 240 Ga.

246, 248–49 (1977). See Zarate-Martinez v. Echemendia, 299 Ga.

301, 311 (2016) (noting that a “general law” makes “classification[s]”

that are “not arbitrary or unreasonable” (cleaned up)).17

The first provision of Paragraph IV that is relevant here

17 See also Walter McElreath, A Treatise on the Constitution of Georgia

§ 123 (“One of the most important limitations placed upon legislative action
was the provision that ‘no special law should be enacted in any case where
provision had been made by general law.’ This has given prominence to the
theory of the classification of subjects [sic] matter of legislation and the
enactment of what are known as ‘General laws of local application,’ based upon
a classification, in many cases, so nearly arbitrary that it amounts to little
more than a subterfuge.”).
31
appears in subsection (a). It provides that “[l]aws of a general nature

shall have uniform operation throughout this state.” Ga. Const. of

1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. IV(a). “[T]o violate this constitutional

provision, the statute in question must … be [1] a general law which

[2] lacks uniform operation throughout the state.” Gliemmo, 287 Ga.

at 8 (cleaned up). As to the uniformity component of Paragraph

IV(a), we have explained that a general law has uniform operation

for purposes of Paragraph IV(a) so long as it “operates alike on all

who come within the scope of its provisions,” meaning that it

“appl[ies] to all persons, matters, or things which it is intended to

affect.” Zarate-Martinez, 299 Ga. at 311 (quotation marks omitted).

See Sasser, 101 Ga. at 452 (explaining that a general law satisfies

the uniformity requirement if it is “uniform in its operation or

capable of being made uniform in its operation upon the subject or

class of subjects with which it purported to deal”). See also Walter

McElreath, A Treatise on the Constitution of Georgia § 1136 (1912)

(noting that the “[t]erritorial test of whether a law is general law is

that it shall operate in every part of the State upon every person or

32
transaction embraced within its terms”). “When a [general law]

purports to do this, but in application lacks uniform operation, it

runs afoul of [Paragraph IV(a)].” Lasseter, 253 Ga. at 229.

The second provision of Paragraph IV relevant here also

appears in subsection (a). Specifically, Paragraph IV(a) provides

that “no local or special law shall be enacted in any case for which

provision has been made by an existing general law.” Ga. Const. of

1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. IV(a). We have explained that this

provision “was intended to ensure that once the legislature entered

a field by enacting a general law, that field must thereafter be

reserved exclusively to general legislation and could not be open to

special or local laws.” City of Atlanta v. Mays, 301 Ga. 367, 376

(2017) (punctuation and quotation marks omitted). See also

Gliemmo, 287 Ga. at 8 (“[T]o violate [this provision of Paragraph

IV(a)], the statute in question must … [be] a special law for which

provision has been made by existing general law.” (quotation marks

omitted)).

The third provision of Paragraph IV relevant here is Paragraph

33
IV(c), which provides that “[n]o special law relating to the rights or

status of private persons shall be enacted.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art.

III, Sec. VI, Par. IV(c). And our precedent clarifies that the term

“special law” carries the same meaning in Paragraph IV(c) as it does

in Paragraph IV(a). See Gliemmo, 287 Ga. at 10 (concluding that a

statute did not violate Paragraph IV(c) because it was a general law

for purposes of Paragraph IV(a)); State v. Martin, 266 Ga. 244, 246

(1996) (same).

This description of Paragraph IV makes clear that Paragraph

IV “does not prohibit special laws per se.” Lasseter, 253 Ga. at 229

(addressing Paragraph IV’s predecessor in Georgia’s 1976

Constitution). The first provision of Paragraph IV(a) has no bearing

on special laws, requiring only that “general law[s]” have “uniform

operation throughout the state.” Zarate-Martinez, 299 Ga. at 310–

11 (quotation marks omitted). The second provision of Paragraph

IV(a) prohibits only “special law[s] for which provision ha[s] been

made by existing general law.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). And

Paragraph IV(c) prohibits only “special law[s]” that “relat[e] to the

34
rights or status of private persons.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. III, Sec.

VI, Par. IV(c).

(b) Here, the trial court did not fully analyze Lucid’s Paragraph

IV claim under any of these three provisions. The trial court

performed only a partial analysis under the first provision of

Paragraph IV(a), which requires that laws of a general nature apply

uniformly throughout the state. Specifically, the trial court analyzed

whether the Direct Sales Prohibition applied uniformly, concluding

that it “applies with equal force to all who fall within its terms

throughout the State.” But the trial court did not analyze whether

the Direct Sales Prohibition was a general or special law, asserting

without any explanation or analysis that it was “beyond dispute”

that the Direct Sales Prohibition was a “general law.”

While the trial court’s focus on Paragraph IV(a) is

understandable, given Lucid’s characterization of its own claims,

that focus may have been misguided. Lucid purports to claim that

the Direct Sales Prohibition violates Paragraph IV(a) “because [the

Direct Sales Prohibition] is not a law of a general nature that has a

35
uniform operation throughout this state.” But it is clear from Lucid’s

complaint and its arguments on appeal that Lucid’s primary

challenge to the Direct Sales Prohibition does not actually arise

under this provision. This is because Lucid’s theory of why the

Direct Sales Prohibition violates this provision is that the law

“creates … arbitrary classifications” — a theory that, if successful,

would show only that the Direct Sales Prohibition is a special law.

And as explained above, the first provision of Paragraph IV(a) does

not address special laws: it places limitations only on general laws.

Attempting to fit its challenge to the Direct Sales Prohibition

within the scope of the first provision of Paragraph IV(a), Lucid

argues that a law that draws unreasonable classifications

necessarily violates Paragraph IV(a)’s prohibition on general laws

that lack uniform application. To support this argument, Lucid cites

our decisions in Lasseter, 253 Ga. at 227, Celotex Corporation v. St.

Joseph Hospital, 259 Ga. 108 (1989), and Hix v. Ramey, 214 Ga. 464

(1958). But as our description of the law set out above shows, Lucid’s

interpretation of Paragraph IV(a) is incorrect. And none of the cases

36
cited by Lucid support that interpretation.

First, in Lasseter, which addressed Paragraph IV’s predecessor

in the 1976 Constitution, 18 we concluded that, because the

challenged law “deal[t] with a limited activity in a specific industry

during a limited time frame,” it was a “special law.” Lasseter, 253

Ga. at 229. But we did not hold that the “special class[ification]”

drawn by the statute rendered it unconstitutional under Paragraph

IV’s predecessor. Id. Instead, we noted that Paragraph IV’s

predecessor “d[id] not prohibit special laws per se” and concluded

that the special law did not violate Paragraph IV because it was not

“preempted” by a general law. Id. at 229–30. Further, although

Lasseter acknowledged that the General Assembly lacks authority

to pass a law “if the classification of those affected is unreasonable,”

we explained that the Equal Protection Clause, not Paragraph IV’s

predecessor, prohibited such legislation. Id.

18 Ga. Const. of 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. VII (providing, as relevant here,

that “[l]aws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout the
State, and no special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has
been made by an existing general law”).
37
Second, in Celotex, we explained that the law at issue was a

“special law” because it unreasonably “single[d] out for special

treatment property claims against manufacturers and suppliers of

asbestos.” Celotex, 259 Ga. at 110. But we did not hold that the law

violated Paragraph IV(a) simply because it was a special law that

drew an unreasonable classification. Instead, we held that the

special law violated Paragraph IV(a) because the special law was

“preempt[ed]” by a general law applicable to “all other claims that

might be based upon other hazardous or toxic substances.” Id.

(quotation marks omitted).

Third, our decision in Hix did not hold, as Lucid argues, that

legislation affording special treatment to school bus drivers who had

contracts during certain years violated Paragraph IV’s predecessor

because the law rested on a “purely arbitrary” classification. Hix,

214 Ga. at 466. It is true that Hix concluded that the law was a

“special law” because it employed an arbitrary classification. Id. But

the reason Hix concluded that the law was unconstitutional was not

because it drew an arbitrary classification but instead because it

38
conflicted with a general law regarding school bus drivers. See id. at

464–66 (holding that the challenged law was a special law “limited

by its express terms to the bus drivers who had 1951–52 contracts,”

and that the law was “invalid for the reasons urged,” namely that

the law was “a special law made in derogation of existing general

law” providing that the “salary schedule shall be uniform for all bus

drivers transporting twelve or more school children”).

Even if Lucid’s amended complaint could be construed as

claiming that the Direct Sales Prohibition violates Paragraph IV(a)’s

prohibition on general laws that lack uniformity, the claim fails

because, as a matter of law, the Direct Sales Prohibition is a general

law with uniform operation throughout the state.19 First, the Direct

Sales Prohibition is a general law because the classifications it

draws are reasonable and relevant to the purpose of the legislation

19 As noted above, the portions of OCGA § 10-1-664.1(a) and (c) that
constitute the Direct Sales Prohibition and that Lucid challenges in this case
generally prohibit manufacturers and franchisors from selling new motor
vehicles directly to consumers in the state and prohibit manufacturers and
franchisors from owning, operating, or controlling a dealer or dealership. We
express no opinion about other portions of OCGA § 10-1-664.1(a) and (c).
39
at issue. Specifically, the classifications that are the subject of

OCGA § 10-1-664.1(a) and (c) are “manufacturer[s]” and

“franchisor[s].”20 The Direct Sales Prohibition therefore applies to

broad categories of entities that “are distinguished by

characteristics sufficiently marked and important to make them a

class by themselves,” Sasser, 101 Ga. at 456–57 (quotation marks

omitted), in that manufacturers and franchisors are readily

identifiable entities that play important roles in Georgia’s new

motor vehicle industry. And it is not arbitrary or unreasonable to

identify broad classes of important players in Georgia’s new motor

vehicle industry as the subject of legislation concerning who may

own a new motor vehicle dealer or dealership and who may sell new

motor vehicles in the state to customers. Thus, the Direct Sales

Prohibition is a “general” law, not a “special” one.

Second, as the trial court correctly concluded, the Direct Sales

20 OCGA § 10-1-664.1(a) also includes a catchall phrase that applies to

certain entities or persons affiliated with a manufacturer or franchisor. See
OCGA § 10-1-664.1(a) (providing that it applies to “any manufacturer or
franchisor or any parent, affiliate, wholly or partially owned subsidiary, officer,
or representative of a manufacturer or franchisor” (emphasis added)).
40
Prohibition operates uniformly for purposes of Paragraph IV(a)

because it “operates alike on all who come within the scope of its

provisions.” Zarate-Martinez, 299 Ga. at 311 (quotation marks

omitted). The plain language of the Direct Sales Prohibition applies

to any “manufacturer or franchisor” in the state. Specifically, the

challenged portion of OCGA § 10-1-664.1(a) applies equally to “any

manufacturer or franchisor” in the state, prohibiting such entities

from “own[ing], operat[ing], or control[ling] … more than a 45

percent interest in a dealer or dealership in this state.” And the

challenged portion of OCGA § 10-1-664.1(c) likewise applies equally

to any “manufacturer” or “franchisor” in the state, prohibiting such

entities from “sell[ing] … any new motor vehicle to a consumer in

this state, except through a new motor vehicle dealer holding a

franchise for the line make covering such new motor vehicle.” And

Lucid does not claim that, although the plain language of these

provisions “purport[ ] to” apply uniformly to all manufacturers and

franchisors, they fail to apply to all manufacturers or franchisors “in

application.” Lasseter, 253 Ga. at 229.

41
Because the Direct Sales Prohibition is a general law with

uniform operation, Lucid’s claim that the Direct Sales Prohibition

violates Paragraph IV(a)’s requirement that “[l]aws of a general

nature … have uniform operation throughout this state” fails as a

matter of law. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. IV(a).

Further, because the Direct Sales Prohibition is a general law,

rather than a special law, Lucid’s claim that the Direct Sales

prohibition violates Paragraph IV(c)’s prohibition on enacting any

“special law relating to the rights or status of private persons”

likewise fails as a matter of law.21 Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. III, Sec.

VI, Par. IV(c) (emphasis added). See Gliemmo, 287 Ga. at 10 (holding

that, because the challenged law was “a general law, it does not

violate [Paragraph IV(c)], which prohibits special laws relating to

the rights or status of private persons” (quotation marks omitted)).

21 To the extent that Lucid claims that the Direct Sales Prohibition
violates Paragraph IV(a)’s prohibition on enacting any “special law … in any
case for which provision has been made by an existing general law,” that claim
fails as a matter of law for the same reason: the Direct Sales Prohibition is a
general law, not a special law. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. IV(a)
(emphasis added).
42
(c) Lucid argues that it has stated a claim under Paragraph IV

based on OCGA § 10-1-664.1(a)(8), which, as described above,

permits a limited class of electric vehicle manufacturers who were

operating dealerships in the state as of January 1, 2015, to sell their

vehicles directly to consumers in Georgia without using a franchised

dealer as an intermediary. Lucid contends that OCGA § 10-1-

664.1(a)(8) can only ever apply to Tesla and is therefore a special

law that “arbitrarily distinguishes between manufacturers and their

affiliates (like Lucid) that cannot sell cars in Georgia and

manufacturers and their affiliates (like Tesla) that can.” And Lucid

also contends that the 2015 amendment (Ga. L. 2015, Act 159),

which simultaneously created the Direct Sales Prohibition and the

exception for Tesla, was invalid “special legislation.” As explained

below, the trial court correctly dismissed Lucid’s challenge to OCGA

§ 10-1-664.1(a)(8) but failed to adequately consider whether Lucid

had stated a Paragraph IV claim challenging the 2015 amendment.

To the extent that Lucid claims that OCGA § 10-1-664.1(a)(8)

is a special law that violates Paragraph IV, Lucid lacks

43
constitutional standing to raise the claim. “Standing is a

jurisdictional prerequisite necessary to invoke a court’s judicial

power under the Georgia Constitution.” Cobb County v. Floam, 319

Ga. 89, 91 (2024) (citing Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. I).

As the party seeking to invoke a court’s jurisdiction, the plaintiff

bears the burden of establishing its constitutional standing as to

each claim of relief sought. See Republican National Committee v.

Eternal Vigilance Action, Inc., 321 Ga. 771, 775 (2025). To do so, the

plaintiff must show that it has “a cognizable injury that can be

redressed by a judicial decision.” Sons of Confederate Veterans v.

Henry Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 315 Ga. 39, 39 (2022). And a plaintiff

has a “cognizable injury” at stake in the litigation only if the plaintiff

“assert[s] a violation of [the plaintiff’s] legal rights — a legal injury.”

Wasserman v. Franklin County, 320 Ga. 624, 624, 638–39 & n.8

(2025) (quotation marks omitted) (“[W]ithout a right at stake, there

is no actual controversy between the parties for a court to resolve.”).

Finally, in the context of a constitutional challenge to a state statute,

like the one at issue here, “it is generally not sufficient to assert only

44
the generalized violation of a public right, which is by definition not

individualized, at least absent a right of action granted by the

legislature for vindicating the public right at issue.” Id. at 643 n.10.

Here, Lucid has not asserted that enforcement of OCGA § 10-

1-664.1(a)(8) in particular (as opposed to the Direct Sales

Prohibition) causes any particular injury to its legal rights by itself.

Lucid generally claims that its right to engage in the lawful business

of selling new motor vehicles directly to consumers has been

violated, but it is enforcement of the Direct Sales Prohibition (which

prohibits manufacturers and their affiliates from selling new motor

vehicles directly to consumers in the state) that is the source of that

asserted legal injury. OCGA § 10-1-664.1(a)(8), which is an

exception to the Direct Sales Prohibition that does not apply to

Lucid, has no impact on Lucid’s asserted right to sell new vehicles

directly to consumers in the state. And Lucid has not identified any

other infringement of an asserted legal right of Lucid’s that results

from enforcement of OCGA § 10-1-664.1(a)(8)’s alleged

unconstitutional feature. See Wasserman, 320 Ga. at 642–43

45
(explaining that a plaintiff cannot “challenge a statute on

constitutional grounds unless he c[an] show that its enforcement is

an infringement upon his right of person or property, and that such

infringement results from the unconstitutional feature of the statute

upon which he bases his attack” (quotation marks omitted)).

Accordingly, Lucid lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality

of OCGA § 10-1-664.1(a)(8) by itself. 22 Cf. Republican Nat’l Comm.,

321 Ga. at 787–88 (holding that individual voters lacked standing to

challenge rules concerning poll watchers and daily reporting of

votes, where the individual voters had not shown that the “rules

would ever infringe on the right to vote” and “identif[ied] no other

private right that those two rules violate”).

By contrast, Lucid has constitutional standing to challenge the

enforcement of the 2015 amendment to the Motor Vehicle Franchise

Practices Act, Ga. L. 2015, Act 159. As explained above, that

22 We express no opinion about whether OCGA § 10-1-664.1(a)(8) may be

relevant to Lucid’s claims that the Direct Sales Prohibition violates Lucid’s
rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, should the trial
court reach that question after further considering whether Paragraph II(c)
bars Lucid’s equal protection and due process claims.
46
amendment simultaneously created the Direct Sales Prohibition

(which is the source of Lucid’s asserted legal injury) by redefining

“[n]ew motor vehicle” and created a carveout from the Direct Sales

Prohibition for Tesla. See Ga. L. 2015, Act 159, §§ 1 & 2. But the

trial court did not consider whether it was possible for Lucid to prove

within the framework of the complaint that the 2015 amendment as

a whole, or a non-severable component of it, is a “special law … for

which provision ha[d] been made by an existing general law”

(namely by the then-existing, unamended version of OCGA § 10-1-

664.1), in violation of Paragraph IV(a), or a “special law relating to

the rights or status of private persons,” in violation of Paragraph

IV(c).

Accordingly, although we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of

Lucid’s Paragraph IV claim to the extent that Lucid directly and

separately challenged enforcement of the Direct Sales Prohibition

codified in OCGA § 10-1-664.1(a) and (c) and the exception for Tesla

codified in OCGA § 10-1-664.1(a)(8), we vacate the trial court’s

dismissal of Lucid’s Paragraph IV claim to the extent that Lucid

47
challenged the enforcement of the 2015 amendment (Ga. L. 2015,

Act 159). And we remand the case for further consideration of

Lucid’s Paragraph IV challenge to the enforcement of the 2015

amendment.

***

As explained above, we affirm in part and vacate in part the

trial court’s dismissal of Lucid’s Paragraph IV claim. We vacate the

trial court’s dismissal of Lucid’s due process and equal protection

claims. And we remand the case for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case
remanded with direction. All the Justices concur, except Warren, P.
J., not participating.