In the Matter of Hillman James Toombs

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the
Supreme Court of Georgia
No. S26Y0212

In the Matter of Hillman James Toombs

Decided: May 19, 2026

PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report
and recommendation of the State Disciplinary Review Board
(“Review Board”), which reviewed the report and recommenda-
tion of Special Master Adam M. Hames at the request of Hillman
James Toombs (State Bar No. 714655), pursuant to Bar Rules 4-
214, 4-215, and 4-216. The Special Master concluded that
Toombs, who has been a member of the Bar since 1988, violated
Rules 1.4(a)(2), (a)(3), and (b); 8.1(a); and 8.4(a)(4) of the Georgia
Rules of Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102(d), for
which the Special Master recommended disbarment. The maxi-
mum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.4 is public reprimand, while
the maximum penalty for a violation of Rules 8.1(a) and 8.4(a)(4)
is disbarment. The Review Board adopted the Special Master’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law but recommended that
Toombs receive a two-year suspension. The State Bar and Toombs
have both filed exceptions to the Review Board’s report. After our
careful review of the record, we agree with the Review Board and
conclude that a two-year suspension is appropriate, as more fully
discussed below.

1. Procedural History
In December 2023, the State Bar filed a formal complaint
against Toombs, alleging violations of multiple Bar Rules. A Spe-
cial Master was then appointed and after acknowledging service,
Toombs filed his answer. Following an evidentiary hearing, the
State Bar and Toombs filed post-hearing briefs, and the Special
Master then issued his report and recommendation.

2. Special Master’s Report and Recommendation

(a) Factual Findings
Based on the State Bar’s formal complaint, Toombs’s an-
swer, the evidentiary hearing, and the post-hearing briefs, the
Special Master recounted the following. In December 2021,
Toombs agreed to represent a client in a divorce case, taking over
the matter for another attorney, and the client paid a fee of $6,500
in installments for the representation. As for scope of work, the
agreement provided that the legal work included “all necessary
court appearances, research, investigation, correspondence, prep-
aration and drafting of pleadings and other legal documents, trial
preparation and related work to properly represent [the client].”
The client met with Toombs twice before trial, and Toombs told
the client that the judge likely would have each party pay their
own attorney fees. The client wanted the divorce to go to trial, and
Toombs was able to accomplish that goal. Following trial in Feb-
ruary 2022, the client was happy with the outcome of the final
judgment and decree of divorce, as he was primarily concerned
with obtaining custody of his daughter, which he received.
The final judgment entered in March 2022 also provided
that the parties could submit a request for attorney fees. The
deadline for submission was March 15, 2022, but Toombs believed
that the deadline for submitting this request was March 16, 2022.
When the client inquired about the letter brief requesting the at-
torney fees, Toombs told him that he still had time, and the client

2
testified that Toombs did not tell him he filed the letter brief a
day late. Toombs’s paralegal attempted to email the letter brief to
opposing counsel and the court. Toombs believed that the letter
brief was properly submitted to the trial court (as opposing coun-
sel had responded to the email containing his letter brief). But
Toombs’s paralegal included the wrong email address for a court
staff member, although she did not realize it at the time because
she did not get a bounce-back notification. It was not until the
paralegal saw an order awarding attorney fees to the client’s ex-
wife that she realized that the letter brief was never sent to the
court, and Toombs purportedly did not understand this until he
was deposed in this disciplinary matter years later. However,
Toombs acknowledged that he was ultimately responsible for
where his paralegal sent the letter brief.
The order for attorney fees issued on June 29, 2022, stating
that only the client’s ex-wife submitted a letter brief requesting
fees. The June 29 order awarded opposing counsel $14,900 to be
paid by Toombs’s client within 60 days of the date of the order.
The order also required the parties to split the cost of the guard-
ian ad litem’s bill for an additional $1,045.
When the client received a copy of the order, he texted
Toombs, who told him that he would look at the order when he
got back from vacation. Toombs later texted the client: “I am back;
will call you before the weekend.” However, Toombs did not call
him before the weekend or otherwise return his calls. The client
went to Toombs’s office, and Toombs avoided speaking with him.
During the next 30 days, Toombs did not do anything about the
award of attorney fees. At the hearing in this matter, Toombs ex-
plained that he interpreted the order awarding attorney fees to
be based upon the conduct of the client’s previous attorneys in

3
this case, as Toombs himself had represented the client in his di-
vorce proceeding for only three months.
Nevertheless, at some point the client and Toombs dis-
cussed a motion for reconsideration (“MFR”), which was prepared
by Toombs and verified by the client on August 19, 2022. Toombs’s
paralegal claimed that she attempted to e-file the MFR but then
discovered later by inquiry that it was not filed. It was not until
June 2023 — almost a year later — that Toombs and his paralegal
attempted to re-file the MFR and received notice that because it
had been more than 30 days after the order awarding attorney
fees had issued, a new action would have to be filed. Toombs filed
the MFR as a new civil action in June 2023, but he failed to file a
complaint and never served the defendant (the client’s former
wife) because he did not have a current address for her, so the
action was dismissed for want of prosecution. The MFR was even-
tually filed in the original case in December 2023 — over a year
after the client filed his grievance in this matter and after Toombs
believed he had been fired.
Toombs claimed that he submitted the December 2023
MFR to protect the client’s interests. Toombs’s paralegal stated
that it took so long to file it because the practice was having com-
puter issues that obscured the fact that the MFR was not properly
e-filed in August 2022. The Special Master concluded the parale-
gal’s testimony was “unlikely and implausible.” The Special Mas-
ter found that if there was any question of whether the MFR was
filed or not, a simple check of the docket would have confirmed
this.
The client testified that the award of attorney fees was dif-
ficult for him financially. At the evidentiary hearing, Toombs took
responsibility for the trial court having awarded attorney fees
without the trial court first hearing from the client. The Special

4
Master also found that the client was a combat veteran, disabled,
and suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), anx-
iety, and panic attacks, and Toombs was aware that the client
was on a fixed income for disability. Toombs testified that alt-
hough he was aware that the client was on a fixed income for dis-
ability, he was uncertain about the nature of the client’s disabil-
ity, which the Special Master found “not believable.”
In his December 2022 response to the initial disciplinary
investigation, Toombs responded that he had filed an MFR and
enclosed a copy of the MFR dated August 19, 2022, the (never-
filed) letter brief, and the March 2022 final decree, but the final
decree was missing the page that stated letter briefs had to be
filed by March 15, 2022. Toombs also did not mention the court’s
order that found that Toombs had not filed a letter brief. In a sec-
ond response, Toombs claimed that he completed the “job” when
the final decree was entered, and he only submitted the letter
brief and the subsequent MFR as a courtesy to the client.
A number of character witnesses testified at the hearing in
this matter that Toombs was a founding member of a mentoring
organization, had impeccable character, and was honest, trust-
worthy, hardworking, and always responsive. The Special Master
further noted that Toombs himself is a decorated combat veteran.

(b) Rule Violations
The Special Master concluded that the State Bar met its
burden by clear and convincing evidence that Toombs violated
Rule 1.4(a)(2) (lawyer shall reasonably consult with the client
about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be accom-
plished), by failing to consult with the client about the client’s
other available options for addressing the attorney fees award,
such as filing a motion for new trial or an appeal; and Rule

5
1.4(a)(3) (lawyer shall keep the client reasonably informed about
the status of the matter), by being dismissive of the client’s in-
quiries about attorney fees before the letter brief was due. The
Special Master further concluded that Toombs violated Rule
1.4(b) (lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably nec-
essary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding
the representation).
Next, the Special Master concluded that Toombs had vio-
lated Rule 8.1(a) (lawyer shall not knowingly make a false state-
ment of material fact in connection with a disciplinary matter), in
that he mispresented to the Bar in December 2022 that he had
filed an MFR on the attorney fees issue, when in fact he had not
done so. It was not until June 2023, after he believed his repre-
sentation of the client had ended, that Toombs could demonstrate
an actual documented attempt to file the MFR, which the Special
Master characterized as an attempt “to cover [Toombs’s] prover-
bial backside.” 1 Finally, the Special Master concluded that the
Bar had shown by clear and convincing evidence that Toombs vi-
olated Rule 8.4(a)(4) (it is a violation for a lawyer to engage in
professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or mis-
representation), by lying to his client and the State Bar that he
had filed an MFR on the attorney fees issue in August 2022.

(c) ABA Standards
Next, the Special Master considered the American Bar As-
sociation Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Stand-
ards”) in determining the appropriate level of discipline in this
case. See In the Matter of Morse, 266 Ga. 652, 653 (1996). The
Special Master found that Toombs had violated his duty to his

1 According to the Special Master, Toombs believed that his represen-
tation ended when the client filed a grievance against him in November 2022.

6
client and to the legal system and that he acted knowingly and
intentionally in his violations. See ABA Standard 3.0 (stating that
“a court should consider the following factors: (a) the duty vio-
lated; (b) the lawyer’s mental state; (c) the potential or actual in-
jury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct; and (d) the existence of
aggravating or mitigating factors”). Moreover, the Special Master
noted that although it was not clear if the award of attorney fees
would have changed significantly had Toombs timely filed a letter
brief or MFR, it was clear that the trial court awarded a signifi-
cant amount of attorney fees against the client without his posi-
tion being presented and that the award injured him financially.
In considering the aggravating factors, the Special Master
concluded that most of them applied to Toombs, including ABA
Standard 9.22(a) based on an investigative panel reprimand that
Toombs received in 2002 and a review panel reprimand he re-
ceived in 2004. The Special Master further noted that under Bar
Rule 4-103, a third disciplinary infraction constitutes a discre-
tionary ground for suspension or disbarment and that there is no
time limitation in this Rule. In addition, the Special Master noted
Toombs’s dishonesty, see ABA Standard 9.22(b), and stated that
although every lawyer has made a mistake such as filing some-
thing a day late or using the wrong email address, Toombs made
a bad situation worse by lying and failing to communicate with
the client, instead of simply trying to remedy his mistakes. The
Special Master concluded that Toombs engaged in a pattern of
misconduct and committed multiple offenses, see ABA Standards
9.22(c), (d), by lying to the client about the MFR being filed and
then lying to the Bar about this twice; that he continued to main-
tain his position throughout the disciplinary process; and that nu-
merous positions of Toombs were not supported and often contra-
dicted by the evidence, including his claim that he was uncertain
about the client’s disability. Moreover, the Special Master found

7
that the client was a vulnerable victim, that Toombs made nu-
merous false statements during the disciplinary process, that
Toombs refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his con-
duct, and that he had substantial experience in the practice of
law, having practiced for over 36 years, see ABA Standards
9.22(f), (g), (h), and (i).
As for mitigating factors, the Special Master noted that
Toombs otherwise had a significantly good character and reputa-
tion, see ABA Standard 9.32(g), as evidenced by the number and
“quality” of individuals from the community that came to testify
on his behalf, including lawyers and law enforcement officers, and
that his prior disciplinary offenses were remote. See ABA Stand-
ard 9.32(m).

(d) Recommended Discipline
The Special Master noted that this Court has repeatedly
imposed a sanction on lawyers who make false statements, espe-
cially during a disciplinary investigation, and that this Court has
held that a false statement is “a very serious matter which typi-
cally results in, at least, a significant suspension from the practice
of law.” In the Matter of Iwu, 303 Ga. 539, 540–41 (2018) (quota-
tion marks omitted) (“[T]hrough Iwu’s choice to lie to the Bar dur-
ing the disciplinary proceedings in an effort to avoid taking re-
sponsibility for his actions, he only exacerbated his own problems
by subjecting himself to more serious sanctions.”); In the Matter
of Nicholson, 299 Ga. 737, 741 (2016) (holding that the Court has
“little tolerance for a lawyer who lies during disciplinary proceed-
ings or engages in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation” (quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly,
based upon the entire record and the number of aggravating fac-
tors, the Special Master recommended that Toombs be disbarred.

8
See In the Matter of Stephens, 318 Ga. 375, 388–89 (2024) (agree-
ing with Special Master and disbarring lawyer who repeatedly
lied to court over the course of several years and initially made
misrepresentations to the Bar when it began investigating); In
the Matter of Eddings, 314 Ga. 409, 409–10 (2022) (agreeing with
Special Master and Review Board and disbarring attorney who
made multiple false statements in connection with representation
of a client and in disciplinary proceedings); In the Matter of Minsk,
296 Ga. 152, 153 (2014) (on notice of discipline, disbarring attor-
ney who was in default on allegations that he engaged in a pat-
tern of making knowingly false statements to his clients, to the
court, and to third parties in connection with a bankruptcy case).

3. Toombs’s Exceptions to the Special Master’s Report
Toombs requested review by the Review Board and raised
a number of exceptions to the Special Master’s report related to
the Special Master’s factual findings regarding the client’s disa-
bilities, the Special Master’s credibility determinations, and the
Special Master’s finding that he was being dishonest or know-
ingly made a false statement of material fact in his response to
the grievance — specifically by failing to include the trial court
order awarding attorney fees and including a copy of the final de-
cree that had a page missing. He contended that it had not been
proven by clear and convincing evidence that he violated any of
the Bar Rules as found by the Special Master. He contended that
there was no Rule 1.4 violation because both he and the client
testified that there had been consistent communication through-
out the representation, arguing that the client’s testimony that
communication stopped after the attorney fees award issued
should be discredited “due to demonstrated memory issues.”
Next, he contended that there was no Rule 8.1(a) violation be-
cause he did not misrepresent to the Bar that he filed an MFR on

9
the attorney fees issue. He claimed that, at the time of his Decem-
ber 2022 response to the grievance, he truly believed the MFR
had been filed in August 2022. He also contended that he did not
violate Rule 8.4(a)(4) for the same reasons listed above.
Finally, Toombs contended that even if the Review Board
believed he violated the Rules, it should find that the recom-
mended punishment is excessive. Toombs contended that he did
not abandon the client and he did not knowingly cause harm to
him. He claimed that although he experienced problems with the
submission of his letter brief and the filing of the August 2022
MFR, he was always acting in the interests of his client and kept
him reasonably informed at all stages of the representation.
Toombs contended that at most he acted negligently in this mat-
ter — the least culpable mental state. See In the Matter of
Breault, 318 Ga. 127, 139 (2024).

4. Review Board’s Report and Recommendation
The Review Board adopted the Special Master’s findings as
supported by the record and incorporated them by reference in
the report. The Review Board also concluded that the Special
Master’s conclusions of law were correct and incorporated them
by reference in the report. The Review Board agreed with the Spe-
cial Master’s analysis and adopted his findings regarding the du-
ties violated, Toombs’s mental state, the potential or actual injury
caused, and the analysis of the aggravating and mitigating fac-
tors. However, the Review Board concluded that the recommen-
dation of disbarment was excessive and that a reprimand was also
not the appropriate discipline. Instead, it concluded that a two-
year suspension was appropriate given this Court’s recent opinion
in In the Matter of Hood, 320 Ga. 440, 447 (2024) (accepting peti-
tion for voluntary discipline and imposing two-year suspension
where attorney admitted to violating Rules 5.5(a), 8.1(a), and

10
8.4(a)(4); attorney admitted that he lied to disciplinary authori-
ties in his initial responses to grievances). The Review Board con-
cluded that Hood’s conduct in two separate disciplinary matters
and Toombs’s conduct in this case were similar and that the ag-
gravating and mitigating factors shared many similarities.

5. The State Bar’s Exceptions
The State Bar has filed exceptions here to the Review
Board’s report and argues that the Special Master properly ana-
lyzed the recommended sanction based on the ABA Standards
and case law. In addition, the Bar notes that pursuant to its rules,
any finding of a disciplinary infraction in this matter shall be
grounds for suspension or disbarment. See Bar Rule 4-103 (“A
finding of a third or subsequent infraction under these Rules
shall, in and of itself, constitute discretionary grounds for suspen-
sion or disbarment.”); In the Matter of Eddings, 314 Ga. at 414
(noting that disbarment was appropriate, “particularly given ap-
plication of Bar Rule 4-103”). In this case, the Bar notes that alt-
hough Toombs’s disciplinary history is somewhat remote in time,
one of the prior sanctions was imposed on account of his dishon-
esty to a client — the same misconduct committed by Toombs in
this case. See In the Matter of Hemmann, 304 Ga. 632, 635 (2018)
(noting that “particularly if the prior misconduct was similar in
nature, a higher level of discipline would be appropriate”). More-
over, the Bar argues that the Special Master correctly identified
and cited several cases for the well-established principle that dis-
honesty to a client and dishonesty during the disciplinary process
are serious offenses that warrant disbarment. The Bar argues
that the Review Board’s sole reliance on Hood to recommend a
two-year suspension is misplaced because Hood filed a petition for
voluntary discipline and admitted making false statements and

11
admitted rule violations. 320 Ga. at 441, 444. In addition, alt-
hough Hood made misrepresentations regarding his conduct,
here, the Bar contends that Toombs also engaged in a multi-part
“cover up” including filing an MFR after he believed the represen-
tation had ended to protect not the client, but his own interests.
Instead, the Bar contends, this case is more in line with Stephens,
in which the respondent attorney was disbarred after she engaged
in a deceptive cover-up that lasted several years and culminated
in the respondent making false statements to the Bar in response
to the grievance. 318 Ga. at 388. In sum, the Bar asks this Court
to disbar Toombs.

6. Toombs’s Exceptions to the Review Panel’s Report
In his Exceptions to the Review Panel’s Report, Toombs
again argues that the Special Master’s factual findings related to
the client’s PTSD, anxiety, and panic attacks should be stricken
as clearly erroneous. Toombs also continues to argue that the Spe-
cial Master’s finding that he violated Rule 8.1(a) and 8.4(a)(4) by
being dishonest or knowingly making false statements of material
fact is clearly erroneous. Toombs notes that the client’s grievance
(dated November 2022) is premised in part on his contention that
a letter brief had not been submitted by Toombs. He notes that
when he initially submitted his response to the grievance in De-
cember 2022, it was his belief that the letter brief had been
properly submitted via email and that the MFR had been properly
submitted in August 2022. In addition, he states that by the time
of his next communication with the State Bar, he realized that
the August 2022 MFR had been rejected by the court, and so he
told the Bar that, in order to rectify this, he “opened a new case
for [the client] and filed an [MFR].” Toombs contends that he
could not have violated Rule 8.1(a) or 8.4(a)(4) because he did not
knowingly make a false statement of material fact to the State

12
Bar, nor act with the “implicit intent element” of Rule 8.4(a)(4).
In the Matter of West, 301 Ga. 901, 904 (2017).
Toombs further argues that the Special Master clearly
erred in determining that he violated Rule 1.4 by failing to consult
with the client. The client’s uncontradicted testimony was that
his first two divorce attorneys failed to follow his direction or com-
municate with him in a reasonable fashion, but the same was not
true for Toombs, who communicated consistently with the client
during the representation, Toombs insists. Finally, he contends
that the disciplinary recommendations of the Special Master and
the Review Board are both excessive. He notes that this Court has
“recognize[d] that an attorney’s refusal to acknowledge the
wrongful nature of his or her behavior should not automatically
be considered a factor in aggravation of punishment, particularly
in the face of an honest and objectively reasonable belief in one’s
own innocence.” In the Matter of Suttle, 288 Ga. 14, 16 (2010).
Toombs contends that the Special Master should have rec-
ognized additional mitigating factors, including the absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive in trying to assist the client at no ad-
ditional cost, timely good faith efforts to rectify the consequences
of the misdirected letter brief, and full and free disclosure to the
Bar and Review Board. He claims that in addition to Hood there
are several other cases that support the conclusion that the levels
of discipline recommended here are too harsh. See, e.g., In the
Matter of Henry, 318 Ga. 272 (2024) (accepting petition for volun-
tary discipline and imposing a public reprimand for attorney who
violated Rule 8.4(a)(4) by lying to his client; attorney was experi-
encing significant personal problems at the time); In the Matter
of Brantley, 299 Ga. 732 (2016) (accepting Special Master’s report
and recommendation and imposing a 180-day suspension where

13
lawyer with prior disciplinary history admitted various rule vio-
lations primarily involving client communication issues during a
time of great personal stress and/or physical impairment and
failed to respond accurately to the State Bar about the status of
one of her underlying cases). In conclusion, Toombs states that
although he recognizes this Court’s repeated pronouncement that
making false statements to a court or the State Bar during the
disciplinary process is a very serious matter, he vigorously dis-
putes any contention that he intended to deceive the client, the
Court, or the Bar, and claims that to the extent he made any mis-
statements, he was merely negligent. He argues that if discipline
is to be imposed, it should not adversely impact his “ability to
practice law and conclude his lengthy legal career with dignity.”

7. The State Bar’s Response to Toombs’s Exceptions
The State Bar responds that the Special Master’s credibil-
ity determinations were sound and supported by the record. See
Eddings, 314 Ga. at 416 (this Court will not second guess a special
master’s credibility determinations if they are supported by the
record). In addition, the Bar claims that the Special Master’s fac-
tual finding that Toombs lied and in doing so violated Rules 8.1(a)
and 8.4(a)(4) is supported by the record. Specifically, the Bar
claims that in his December 2022 response to the State Bar,
Toombs submitted a letter unequivocally claiming that he had
filed the enclosed MFR; however, he then admitted at the eviden-
tiary hearing that the MFR was not actually filed until December
2023 — a year later. Although Toombs asserts in his exceptions
that he believed that the MFR was filed in August 2022, the Bar
claims he provides no record cites to support this assertion. More-
over, the State Bar contends that the Special Master found that
although Toombs testified that he brought the award of attorney
fees to the client’s attention shortly after the order was issued,

14
this testimony was not credible given that the record shows that
the client was the one who notified Toombs of the attorney fees
award.
Next, the State Bar argues that the Special Master also
correctly found that Toombs violated Rule 1.4(a)(2), (a)(3), and (b),
as the record shows that he failed to inform the client of the ad-
verse attorney fees award; that he conceded that he failed to dis-
cuss all of the client’s options for dealing with the adverse attor-
ney fees ruling; and that long after the representation ended,
Toombs filed a new lawsuit on behalf of the client without dis-
cussing it with him. Moreover, there was ample testimony from
the client that he had difficulty reaching Toombs.
Finally, the State Bar again claims that the appropriate
sanction for Toombs’s misconduct is disbarment because the rec-
ord establishes without a doubt that he was deceitful. Further, a
violation of Rule 8.4(a)(4) does not require a showing of subjective
intent. See In the Matter of Davis, 303 Ga. 564, 565 (2018) (“to the
extent that Rule 8.4(a)(4) contains an implicit intent element,
that element is not focused on whether the attorney intended to
violate the Rule”). The Bar claims that Toombs created his own
predicament by failing his client in multiple ways and then lying
about it, and the Special Master’s recommendation of disbarment
is appropriate, supported by the decisions of this Court, and
should be affirmed.

8. Analysis and Conclusion
This Court generally recognizes that a special master is in
“the best position to determine the witnesses’ credibility” and
“generally defers to the factual findings and credibility determi-
nations made by the special master unless those findings or de-
terminations are clearly erroneous.” In the Matter of Tuggle, 317

15
Ga. 255, 258 (2023) (quotation marks and emphasis omitted). See
also In the Matter of Braziel, 306 Ga. 385, 387 (2019) (this Court
does not second-guess a special master’s credibility determina-
tions if they are supported by the record). However, the Court af-
fords no deference to the conclusions of law made by a special
master or the Review Board, instead reviewing de novo what
rules were violated and what level of discipline is appropriate.
Tuggle, 317 Ga. at 258.
Here, the Special Master’s factual findings and credibility
determinations generally are supported by the record. Toombs ar-
gues that the Special Master’s findings regarding the client’s
PTSD and related conditions should be stricken as clearly errone-
ous. But regardless of whether the record supports the Special
Master’s finding that the client suffered from PTSD specifically,
the Special Master did not clearly err in finding that the client
was a vulnerable victim by virtue of some disability. The record
shows that the client testified at the evidentiary hearing that he
was disabled as a result of his military service and had “major
depression[,] … chronic low back pain, anxiety, panic attacks, mi-
graine headaches … [and] suicidal ideation.” In addition, Toombs
acknowledged at the hearing in this matter that he knew the cli-
ent was on a “fixed income” and that the client “may have men-
tioned” that he had a disability, and the record contains a text
message from the client to Toombs indicating that the client was
taking medicine for anxiety and depression. Moreover, we do not
second-guess the Special Master’s decision to credit the client’s
testimony over Toombs’s testimony evincing some uncertainty
about the nature of the client’s disability.
As to the Rules violations, the Special Master did not err in
finding that Toombs violated Rule 1.4, given his failure to com-
municate with the client regarding the award of attorney fees and

16
possible means to accomplish the goal of reversing the attorney
fees award. And although it appears that Toombs did provide con-
sistent communication throughout the representation in the di-
vorce proceedings before the attorney fees issues, the Special
Master’s determination that Toombs failed to adequately com-
municate with the client after the attorney fees award was issued
is supported by the record, given text message evidence showing
that the client inquired with Toombs about the attorney fees
award and the client’s testimony that Toombs did not call upon
returning from vacation as promised and failed to return “every
voicemail” and “every message” he left with Toombs’s secretary.
Toombs’s arguments that the Special Master erred in find-
ing that he violated Rules 8.1 and 8.4(a)(4) also lack merit. Rule
8.1(a) provides that it is a violation of the Rules for a lawyer to
“knowingly make a false statement of material fact” in connection
with a disciplinary matter, and Rule 8.4(a)(4) provides that it is a
violation of the Rules for a lawyer to engage in professional con-
duct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
The ABA Standards define “[k]nowledge” as being when a lawyer
acts with “conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circum-
stances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or pur-
pose to accomplish a particular result.” ABA Standards at III
(Definitions). The Special Master found that Toombs told the
State Bar in December 2022 that he filed an MFR regarding the
court’s order requiring the client to pay attorney fees, attaching a
copy that was dated August 2022. However, as the Special Master
concluded, there was no documentary evidence that there was
any attempt to file the motion in August 2022. Although Toombs’s
paralegal claimed they had computer problems that obscured the
fact that the motion was not e-filed in August 2022, the Special
Master’s finding that this explanation was unlikely and implau-
sible is not clearly erroneous, nor is the finding that a check of the

17
docket would have confirmed that the MFR was not in fact filed
in August 2022. All of this supports the Special Master’s findings
that Toombs lied to the Bar about the MFR being filed, acting
knowingly and intentionally. Additionally, the Special Master
found that Toombs had the client verify a draft of the MFR in
August 2022 but did not successfully file the MFR until the fol-
lowing year. This supports the Special Master’s finding that
Toombs lied to the client by informing him that he had filed the
MFR and was dishonest and deceitful with the client regarding
the attorney fees issue. And together these findings support the
Special Master’s conclusions that Toombs violated Rule 8.1(a) by
knowingly making a false statement of material fact in connection
with a disciplinary matter and violated Rule 8.4(a)(4) by engaging
in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or mis-
representation.
Moreover, there is no clear error in the Special Master’s
determination in aggravation that Toombs acted with a dishonest
or selfish motive given that instead of simply trying to remedy his
mistakes, he made a bad situation worse by failing to communi-
cate openly and honestly with the client and the State Bar. And
his claim that this Court should consider in mitigation that he
made timely good faith efforts to rectify the consequences of his
misdirected letter brief and full and free disclosure in the disci-
plinary proceedings is unpersuasive, as it took him over a year to
file an MFR in the original case, and he did so only after the griev-
ance in this matter was filed.
However, as for the level of discipline, we agree with the
Review Board that disbarment based on the circumstances of this
case is excessive. Toombs did offer significant evidence of good
character, and his two prior offenses are remote in time. Moreo-
ver, Toombs’s decision to refuse to concede all inferences that

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might be drawn against him based on the record does not warrant
a harsher discipline. See generally In the Matter of Meyers, 302
Ga. 742, 745 (2017) (agreeing with Review Panel’s “implicit con-
clusion that a lawyer’s decision to put up a defense in a discipli-
nary proceeding — whether by disputing evidence against him or
refusing to concede whatever inferences the State Bar argues may
be drawn therefrom — is not always an aggravating factor that
counsels imposition of harsher discipline” and imposing two-year
suspension for attorney’s conduct in submitting altered bills to
corporate client, where he refused to admit any wrongdoing and
steadfastly denied any knowing participation in scheme to de-
fraud the client). And although we agree with the State Bar that
Hood is distinguishable given that in that case the attorney even-
tually admitted his wrongdoing, including admitting that he ini-
tially lied in his response to the grievance, see Hood, 320 Ga. at
442–43, additional case law supports a suspension as opposed to
disbarment based on the unique circumstances of this case and
the particular misconduct at issue. See In the Matter of Moore,
300 Ga. 407 (2016) (one-year suspension with conditions for vio-
lations of Rules 3.3, 4.1, and 8.4(a)(4) where attorney failed to
serve opposing party with pleadings, falsely stated in certificates
of service that he had done so, misrepresented communications
with the opposing party, denied wrongdoing in the disciplinary
proceedings, and expressed neither remorse nor acceptance of re-
sponsibility); In the Matter of Reddick-Hood, 296 Ga. 95 (2014)
(three-year suspension with conditions for violations of various
Rules including 1.4, 8.1, and 8.4(a)(4), despite prior disciplinary
history, where attorney provided restitution and expressed re-
morse and other mitigating factors were present). Compare In the
Matter of David-Vega, 318 Ga. 600 (2024) (on Special Master’s
recommendation of a suspension of at least two years, disbarring
attorney who violated multiple rules, including 1.4, 8.1(a), and

19
8.4(a), where she fabricated evidence during underlying discipli-
nary proceedings to make it appear as though client had termi-
nated her representation prior to statute of limitation expiring on
client’s personal injury claim). Accordingly, it is hereby ordered
that Hillman James Toombs is suspended from the practice of law
in this State for a period of two years from the date of this opinion.
Toombs is reminded of his duties under Bar Rule 4-219(b).
Two-year suspension. All the Justices concur.

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