Glenn v. State

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In the
Supreme Court of Georgia
No. S26A0195
Aqontise Glenn
v.
The State

On Appeal from the Superior Court of DeKalb County
No. 23CR3769-5

Decided: June 16, 2026

WARREN, Presiding Justice.
Aqontise Glenn was convicted of malice murder and other
crimes in connection with the drive-by shooting death of Christo-
pher Copeland. 1 On appeal, Glenn contends that the evidence

1 Copeland was shot and killed on September 8, 2021. In November
2023, a DeKalb County grand jury indicted Glenn for malice murder, felony
murder predicated on aggravated assault, aggravated assault, possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony, and fleeing or attempting to elude
a police officer. At a jury trial held from January 16 to 22, 2024, a jury found
Glenn guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Glenn to serve life in
prison for malice murder, a consecutive five years for possessing a firearm dur-
ing the commission of a felony, and another consecutive five years for fleeing
or attempting to elude a police officer. The aggravated assault count merged
with the malice murder count for sentencing purposes, and although the trial
court purported to merge the felony murder count with the malice murder
count, it was actually vacated by operation of law. See Malcolm v. State, 263
Ga. 369, 372 (1993). Glenn timely filed a motion for new trial on January 23,
2024, which he amended on January 19, 2025. On March 28, 2025, the trial
court denied the motion. On April 7, 2025, Glenn filed a timely notice of appeal
was not sufficient to sustain his convictions as a matter of consti-
tutional due process or Georgia statutory law, and that the trial
court abused its discretion by excluding certain evidence as hear-
say, resulting in an unfairly restricted cross-examination of the
lead investigator. Each claim fails, so we affirm.
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the
evidence presented at trial showed the following. At 1:52 p.m. on
September 8, 2021, surveillance video showed Copeland arriving
at and driving towards the back of an apartment complex.
Shortly thereafter, at 1:57 p.m., a black Nissan—driven by a man
wearing a white shirt—arrived at the complex and headed in the
same direction as Copeland. At 2:07 p.m., surveillance video
showed the black Nissan speeding back through the complex, ex-
iting at 2:08 p.m., at which point someone at the complex called
911 to report a shooting.
An officer arrived at the scene and observed a deceased
man, later identified as Copeland, with multiple gunshot
wounds. 2 After speaking with witnesses at the scene, the officer
“underst[ood]” that Copeland had been shot from a black Nissan,
“possibly” a Nissan Sentra, that was no longer at the scene and
was occupied either by one man who was wearing a white shirt or
by two to three men who were wearing all black. After reviewing
footage from a license-plate reader near the entrance of the com-
plex, law enforcement confirmed that the black Nissan was a Nis-

to the Court of Appeals, which transferred his appeal to this Court on Septem-
ber 8, 2025. His appeal was then docketed to this Court’s term beginning in
December 2025 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
2 Copeland sustained three gunshot wounds, one of which was a fatal
shot to his right leg.

2
san Versa with Florida tag number “QTKV52.” A “be on the look-
out” order was issued for the vehicle.
Around 3:30 p.m., Officer Deandre Brown observed the
black Nissan Versa, driven by a man wearing a white shirt, near
the apartment complex. Officer Brown attempted to stop the ve-
hicle; the vehicle did not stop; and a “two to three minute” chase,
involving several officers, ensued. The chase ended when the ve-
hicle turned onto a dead-end street behind another apartment
complex.
Officer Brown testified that upon reaching the end of the
street, the driver of the black Nissan Versa, by then shirtless,
“park[ed] the car up against the fence, jump[ed] out, [left] the door
open, [ran] to the fence[,] and jump[ed] the fence” into the apart-
ment complex. Another officer recovered a cell phone and a pistol
magazine—containing several nine-millimeter live rounds—on
the ground between the vehicle and the fence. 3
Deborah Glenn, whose patio faced the fence where the
chase ended, was inside her apartment when she heard cars out-
side. She testified at trial that, upon opening her blinds, she saw
her nephew, Aqontise Glenn, fleeing from a black Nissan Versa.
After Glenn entered her apartment, Deborah asked him “what [he
was] doing [there]” and told him that he needed “to get out.” She
thought she recalled Glenn pleading with her: “Don’t turn me in,

3 Four nine-millimeter cartridge casings were recovered from the scene
of the shooting, and a firearm tool-mark analyst testified that three of them
had been fired from the same gun. It is unclear from the record whether the
firearm tool-mark analyst was able to determine that the fourth cartridge cas-
ing was not fired from the same gun, or whether she was not able to reach a
definitive conclusion about its origin.

3
don’t turn me in.” 4
Investigator Julian Brim, the lead investigator on the case,
ran the Nissan’s license plate through the Georgia Crime Infor-
mation Center and discovered that it was registered to a rental
company and was, at that time, being rented by Glenn’s wife. Af-
ter searching the car, officers located Glenn’s social security card,
identification card, and birth certificate. They were also able to
lift fingerprints from the vehicle, two of which matched Glenn.
The cell phone recovered next to the vehicle was pro-
grammed with the name “QonsBooty”; its owner was listed as
“QON Glenn”; and the primary email associated with the phone
contained “aquontiseglenn” in the address. Cell site location data
and data from the GPS chip inside the phone were consistent with
the phone entering the apartment complex where the shooting oc-
curred at the same time surveillance cameras showed that the
black Nissan Versa arrived; being at the crime scene when the
shooting occurred; leaving the apartment complex when the black
Nissan Versa left; and generally tracking the location of the black
Nissan Versa as the chase transpired. 5 Glenn was on the run for
several weeks before eventually being apprehended by the US
Marshals Service in Alabama on September 24, 2021.
2. Glenn argues that the evidence presented at trial was
“wholly circumstantial” and not sufficient as a matter of constitu-

4 During a recorded interview with a detective immediately following
the car chase, Deborah said that Glenn made this statement. However, when
asked at trial if Glenn said, “Don’t turn me in, don’t turn me in,” she testified,
“I think, I’m not sure.”
5 The detective who analyzed the cell phone data testified that the
phone data was not exact and that the phone could have been within approxi-
mately 60 feet of the identified locations.

4
tional due process or under OCGA § 24-14-6. Because the evi-
dence was sufficient in both respects, this claim fails.
(a) In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter
of constitutional due process, we view all of the evidence pre-
sented at trial in the light most favorable to the verdicts and con-
sider whether any rational juror could have found the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was
convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US 307, 319 (1979). “We
leave to the jury the resolution of conflicts or inconsistencies in
the evidence, credibility of witnesses, and reasonable inferences
to be derived from the facts.” Moulder v. State, 317 Ga. 43, 47
(2023) (quotation marks omitted).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evi-
dence discussed above was sufficient as a matter of constitutional
due process to support Glenn’s convictions for malice murder, pos-
session of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and fleeing
or attempting to elude a police officer. See OCGA §§ 16-5-1(a)
(malice murder); 16-11-106(b) (possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony); 40-6-395(B)(5)(A) (2021) (fleeing or at-
tempting to elude a police officer). Surveillance video showed that
a man wearing a white shirt drove a black Nissan Versa into the
apartment complex where the shooting occurred shortly after
Copeland drove in; drove towards the back of the complex where
Copeland was getting out of his car; and sped quickly out of the
apartment complex immediately following the shooting. While
surveillance video did not capture the shooting, witnesses re-
ported that the shooter was wearing a white shirt and driving a
black Nissan, and Glenn’s cell phone location data was consistent
with being at the crime scene when the shooting occurred. And
although at least one witness indicated that the vehicle from
which shots were fired was “possibly” a Nissan Sentra—rather

5
than a Versa—occupied by several men wearing black—as op-
posed to just one man wearing white—the jury was entitled to
discredit this description, particularly in light of the surveillance
video. Glenn was observed shortly after the shooting wearing a
white shirt and in the same black Nissan Versa, and when law
enforcement attempted to conduct a stop, Glenn sped away and
led the police on a chase. See McClain v. State, 303 Ga. 6, 9 (2018)
(acknowledging that “the jury could have considered [flight] as an
act reflecting consciousness of guilt”). After the chase concluded,
Glenn fled from the vehicle before breaking into his aunt’s apart-
ment and asking her not to turn him in. Additionally, a magazine
with several nine-millimeter live rounds was recovered where
Glenn abandoned the car after the police chase. Three nine-mil-
limeter cartridge casings that were fired from the same gun were
recovered at the crime scene, and Copeland sustained three gun-
shot wounds. This evidence, albeit circumstantial, was sufficient
as a matter of constitutional due process. See Moss v. State, 323
Ga. 143, 146 (2025) (“[C]ircumstantial evidence alone can be con-
stitutionally sufficient, and the circumstantial evidence in this
case met that standard.” (cleaned up)).
(b) “To warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence,”
Georgia law requires that “the proved facts … not only be con-
sistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but … exclude every other
reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.”
OCGA § 24-14-6. “Whether a hypothesis is reasonable or not is
for the jury to decide.” Moulder, 317 Ga. at 47 (quotation marks
omitted). And like our constitutional sufficiency analysis above,
we view all of the evidence presented at trial in the light most
favorable to the verdicts. Montgomery v. State, 323 Ga. 188, 190–
91 (2025).
Viewed in this light, the evidence presented at trial was

6
also sufficient under OCGA § 24-14-6. Glenn appears to assert
two alternative hypotheses: that the shooting was committed by
two or three men driving a black Nissan Sentra, rather than a
black Nissan Versa, based on some of the witness statements to
law enforcement; or that the shooting was committed by the
driver of the black Nissan Versa that Glenn later occupied, but
that Glenn was not driving the vehicle at the time of the shooting.
Given the evidence recounted above—specifically, surveillance
video showing a black Nissan Versa driven by a man wearing a
white shirt, as Glenn was later found, that arrived at the complex
shortly before the shooting and sped away immediately after-
wards, and Glenn’s cell phone’s location being consistent with his
presence at the crime scene when the shooting occurred—the jury
was authorized to reject these hypotheses as unreasonable. See
Wilson v. State, 319 Ga. 550, 553 (2024) (affirming, in an OCGA §
24-14-6 challenge, the jury’s rejection of appellant’s alternate hy-
potheses that his vehicle was not involved in the shooting or that
someone else was driving the vehicle at the time when, among
other things, evidence placed the vehicle and appellant near the
crime scene shortly before the shooting occurred, appellant was
seen driving a car matching the vehicle’s description later that
day, and appellant owned a firearm that used the type of round
matching a shell casing found at the crime scene). Accordingly,
Glenn’s sufficiency claims fail.
3. Glenn asserts that the trial court abused its discretion
in excluding as hearsay certain testimony he sought to elicit from
Investigator Brim and that, as a result, the trial court unfairly
limited his cross-examination of Investigator Brim. Seeing no
abuse of discretion, we conclude that this claim fails.
Hours after the shooting, Investigator Brim authored a re-

7
port that detailed the following. Investigator Brim had been in-
formed by another detective, who had been informed by an ATF
agent, who had been informed by a Confidential Informant (“CI”),
that the CI received a call from an individual who lived in the
apartment complex where the shooting occurred. The individual
told the CI that he had “just killed someone[.]” When Glenn
sought to question Investigator Brim on the contents of this re-
port at trial, the State made a hearsay objection. At a lengthy
bench conference, Glenn’s counsel represented that he wanted to
question Investigator Brim about the report because it would lead
“to the possibility of an additional suspect outside of [Glenn].”
The trial court allowed Glenn’s counsel to refresh Investigator
Brim’s recollection with the report, but advised that if the report
did not refresh the Investigator’s recollection, counsel could not
elicit testimony about the substance of the report because it would
be hearsay. Counsel objected, stating that information the Inves-
tigator learned during the course of his investigation was not
hearsay, and then asked Investigator Brim: “Did you receive any
information during your investigation as it relates to other poten-
tial suspects in this case?” Investigator Brim responded, “I did
not.” As counsel began to ask a follow-up question about the con-
tents of the report, the State lodged a hearsay objection, to which
the trial court responded: “I’m going to sustain that objection.
You asked him the question. He said he did not. Now I’m not
going to allow you to go into the contents, based on my instruc-
tions.”
We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse
of discretion. See Anglin v. State, 302 Ga. 333, 335 (2017). Hear-
say is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted.” OCGA § 24-8-801(c). Subject to
certain statutory exceptions, see OCGA § 24-8-803, “[h]earsay

8
shall not be admissible” at trial, OCGA § 24-8-802. See also
OCGA § 24-8-805 (“Hearsay included within hearsay shall not be
excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined
statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule.”). It
follows that absent a statutory exception, testimony from an in-
vestigating officer as to what others told him during the course of
his investigation may be excluded as inadmissible hearsay if such
testimony is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. See
Anglin, 302 Ga. at 340 (acknowledging that officer’s testimony
about a security video was hearsay where it “was not based on his
personal knowledge, but based on what a different officer, who
reviewed the video, told him”); Jackson v. State, 301 Ga. 866, 870
(2017) (“[A]n investigating officer may not testify about what oth-
ers told him during his investigation merely under the guise of
explaining the officer’s conduct.” (quotation marks omitted)).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded
as hearsay the testimony Glenn sought to elicit about the sub-
stance of Investigator Brim’s report. As an initial matter, Glenn’s
counsel was permitted to refresh the Investigator’s recollection
with the report and ask him whether he received any information
regarding other suspects in the case. Hearsay issues arose, how-
ever, after the Investigator said he “did not” receive such infor-
mation and Glenn’s counsel attempted to elicit testimony about
the contents of the report, which contained multiple layers of
hearsay. The Investigator’s report consisted of an out-of-court
statement that was made by a non-testifying witness to a CI and
was relayed, at a minimum, by the CI to an ATF agent, and then
by the ATF agent to the testifying witness, Investigator Brim.
And the record indicates that the testimony Glenn sought to elicit
was being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted—that
there was another person who lived near the crime scene and had
confessed to committing a murder around the time that Copeland

9
was killed.
Glenn has never asserted—at trial or on appeal—that this
testimony was offered for a non-hearsay purpose, nor has he as-
serted that it falls within a statutory exception to the general pro-
hibition against hearsay. Instead, he asserts—without support-
ing authority—that this testimony would not have been hearsay
at all, as “[t]he collective knowledge of police investigations, in-
cluding potential suspects, is not hearsay.” But this Court’s prec-
edent has explained that testimony from one police officer—re-
peating what another officer told him about an investigation out-
side of court—may be excluded as hearsay. See Anglin, 302 Ga.
at 340; Jackson, 301 Ga. at 870. Because the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in excluding this testimony as hearsay, this
claim fails. 6

6 Glenn also seems to assert that his rights under the Confrontation
Clause contained in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
were violated by the exclusion of this testimony. Because he raises this claim
for the first time on appeal, we review it for plain error only. See Upshaw v.
State, 323 Ga. 257, 272 (2026). To establish plain error, Glenn must demon-
strate, among other things, that the alleged error “was clear or obvious, rather
than subject to reasonable dispute.” Pugh v. State, 318 Ga. 706, 717 (2024).
Glenn has failed to carry that burden here. The Confrontation Clause guaran-
tees the right of the accused “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”
US Const. Amend. VI.
Reading Glenn’s argument generously, he seems to claim that the trial
court’s exclusion of the hearsay evidence and corresponding restriction on his
cross-examination of Investigator Brim denied him a “meaningful opportunity
to present a complete defense.” See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 US 683, 690 (1986)
(“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth
Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense.” (cleaned up)). Coexisting with
Glenn’s right to a “meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense,” id.,

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Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

is the principle that “state and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under
the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials,”
United States v. Scheffer, 523 US 303, 308 (1998) (quotation marks omitted).
See also Benson v. State, ___ Ga. ___ (2026), S26A0425, slip op. at 20 (Ga. May
19, 2026). “Such rules do not abridge an accused’s right to present a defense
so long as they are not arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are
designed to serve.” Scheffer, 523 US at 308 (quotation marks omitted). “Only
rarely” has the Supreme Court “held that the right to present a complete de-
fense was violated by the exclusion of defense evidence under a state rule of
evidence.” Nevada v. Jackson, 569 US 505, 509 (2013) (collecting four cases).
Considering the above and applying plain error review, Glenn has not met his
burden of showing that the application of Georgia’s rule against hearsay to
Investigator Brim’s testimony clearly and obviously violated his rights under
the Sixth Amendment.

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