Kenneth Hall v. State

FOURTH DIVISION
MCFADDEN, P. J.,
WATKINS and PADGETT, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk's office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

MARCH 27, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia

A26A0176. HALL v. THE STATE.

PADGETT, Judge.

Kenneth Hall was found guilty of a single count of theft by conversion

following a jury trial and was sentenced by the trial court. Hall filed a timely motion

for new trial, which was denied. He appeals from that denial, alleging that the

evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, the trial court erred in allowing

the accusation to be redacted, the trial court erred in allowing certain evidence to be

presented to the jury, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding

no reversible error, we affirm.

1
“On appeal from a criminal conviction, the evidence must be viewed in the

light most favorable to support the verdict, and the defendant no longer enjoys a

presumption of innocence.” Rodriguez v. State, 375 Ga. App. 283, 283 (916 SE2d 10)

(2025) (citation modified). Viewed in that light, the record shows that a family that

lived in the same community as Hall and his wife saw some of Hall’s home

renovation and interior design work displayed on social media and contracted with

Hall for work they wanted to have done on their home.1 Between July 2015 and

October 2015, the family issued a series of seven checks to Hall in the total amount

of $28,244.47. These checks were issued for Hall to perform renovations on the

family’s home, restore some of their furniture, and to purchase specific furniture and

decor. Following the payments being made, Hall advised the family that the work

would be completed by the fall of 2015. Hall began to perform some of the services

agreed to, but never completed the work and never delivered most of the furniture

and decor. In addition, some of the family’s furniture which Hall was to have

reupholstered and refinished was removed from the family’s home by Hall, but never

returned.

1
The Halls contracted with Appellant and his wife to have the work
performed. Hall’s wife was named as a party to the crime within the accusation that
charged Hall with theft by conversion. However, Hall’s wife entered a guilty plea to
the charges made against her and did not proceed to trial with Hall.

2
The family contacted Hall on numerous occasions to voice their complaints

and concerns about the unfinished work and Hall assured them that he would “get

to it.” When the family became more insistent with their concerns, Hall provided a

number of excuses, including items not being shipped by the manufacturer on time,

waiting on a painter, Hall’s vehicle being inoperable, and Hall’s wife having an

injury, among other excuses. The family ultimately requested, in person and by

email, that Hall either complete the work or return their funds, but Hall did not

respond to that request. The family’s complaints and requests continued through

September 2017, when they received notice that Hall had filed for bankruptcy and

listed the family as creditors. Hall’s bankruptcy petition listed the debt owed to the

family as totaling $30,000, a sum the family agreed was owed to them.

The family ultimately contacted law enforcement and the resulting

investigation revealed that Hall never deposited the family’s checks directly into his

own account, but within days of the checks being cashed by Hall, cash deposits were

made into Hall’s bank account in the exact amount of the checks issued by the family.

Law enforcement officers were unable to identify anything other than minor

purchases made by Hall for materials or decor for the family’s home renovation, but

did find that Hall was paying his own bills using the money provided by the family.

3
Under OCGA § 24-4-404(b), evidence was offered from a former landlord of

Hall’s who testified that she had to evict the Halls from the residence she rented to

them when the rent payments became three months in arrears. The eviction

occurred in March 2015, just a few months before Hall entered into the contract with

the family.

Also under OCGA § 24-4-404(b), two other witnesses testified, who had also

contracted with Hall to have home renovation work performed. One witness testified

that she paid Hall $6,000 to have work performed on her home in 2015, but that Hall

never did the work. A second witness testified that he contracted with Hall in 2010

to perform renovations on his home. That witness testified that he paid Hall

$115,000 for the renovations, but when the house was destroyed by fire during the

renovation period, he asked Hall for an accounting and Hall never provided any

accounting. Ultimately, that witness reported the events to law enforcement and

both Hall and his wife were charged in that case, and an order was entered requiring

payment of restitution totaling $60,000.2

1. Hall alleges that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support

his conviction. Our Supreme Court has held that

2
We assume that Hall’s wife was ordered to pay restitution in that separate
case as the parties stipulated that Hall has no prior convictions.

4
[w]hen evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
view all of the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to
the prosecution and ask whether any rational trier of fact could have
found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of
which he was convicted. This evaluation essentially addresses whether
the [State’s] case was so lacking that it should not have even been
submitted to the jury. Our limited review leaves to the jury the
resolution of conflicts in the evidence, the weight of the evidence, the
credibility of witnesses, and reasonable inferences to be made from
basic facts to ultimate facts.

McGruder v. State, 303 Ga. 588, 590(II) (814 SE2d 293) (2018) (citation modified).

Hall claims that the State failed to prove criminal intent and, instead, merely

established a breach of contract. We disagree.

Georgia law is clear that the theft by conversion statute, OCGA § 16-8-4, is

“intended to punish fraudulent conversion, not breach of contract, and in order to

avoid the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt, the State must

prove fraudulent intent.” Scarber v. State, 211 Ga. App. 260, 260 (439 SE2d 83)

(1993) (citation omitted). Theft by conversion requires proof of criminal intent

which we define as “the knowing appropriation of funds or property belonging to

another.” Ward v. State, 376 Ga. App. 531, 536(1) (920 SE2d 151) (2025) (citation

omitted). “It is the presence of a fraudulent intent that distinguishes theft by

conversion from a simple breach of contract.” Id. (citation omitted).

5
The question of intent is peculiarly a question of fact for determination
by the jury, which may infer a defendant’s intent from the evidence
presented at trial. The jury may find the requisite intent upon
consideration of the words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and all other
circumstances connected with the act. Further, the jury is authorized to
discredit the defendant’s statements about his motivations and find,
instead, that the defendant possessed the requisite criminal intent.
Where the jury finds the requisite intent, that finding will not be
reversed on appeal provided there is some evidence supporting the
jury’s inference.

Id. at 537–38(1)(b) (citation modified).

Here, the State provided evidence from which the jury could conclude that

Hall was experiencing financial distress and took money from the family but instead

of providing the promised goods and services, he used the funds for other

unauthorized purposes, including payment of his personal obligations. The State’s

case included evidence establishing that Hall was unable to pay his existing

obligations at the time he contracted with the family. The evidence also included

testimony from other individuals who contracted with Hall, for whom Hall failed to

provide promised services notwithstanding those witnesses’ payments to him. The

evidence also established that Hall provided a number of excuses to the family for

his failure to perform, concluding with Hall making no response to written and oral

communications from the family. The evidence was undisputed that Hall received

6
money from the family and that he did not use that money for the purpose specified.

See Cox v. State, 275 Ga. App. 895, 895–96 (622 SE2d 11) (2005). Under these

circumstances, the jury was authorized to infer that Hall acted with fraudulent intent

and to find him guilty of theft by conversion under OCGA § 16-8-4.

Hall contends that this case should be controlled by our holding in Myrick v.

State, 210 Ga. App. 393 (436 SE2d 100) (1993). In Myrick, the defendant was a

contractor who was paid to perform home improvements to include concrete work,

but there was no specific application of funds anticipated by the underlying contract.

Id. at 393–94. The homeowners in that case sought a criminal warrant after an

approximate four-month wait, during which time there was a series of rain storms

that may have impeded the concrete work. Id. at 394. We held that the evidence did

not support a conviction for theft by conversion under the facts presented in the

record. Id. at 395. In contrast, the contract in this case did anticipate specific

applications for the funds paid to Hall. The family here waited over three years to

have the work performed at their residence, attempted to discuss the situation with

Hall which were met with excuses and, eventually, a complete lack of

communication. Hall also took furniture belonging to the family for refinishing which

he never returned.

7
The facts of this case are much more in line with those in Ward, supra, where

a contractor took a deposit to construct a swimming pool and went out of business

without ever returning the deposit. Ward, 376 Ga. App. at 532. After filing for

bankruptcy, the defendant there was criminally charged and convicted of theft by

conversion. Id. at 532–33. The State provided evidence, under OCGA § 24-4-

404(b), from other customers who had paid for a pool and their pools were not

completed or, in some cases, never started. Id. at 534. In finding that the evidence in

that case supported the conviction, this Court held that the jury was authorized to

infer that the defendant “used the funds to pay either his personal expenses or his

company’s expenses on unrelated matters.” Id. at 538(1)(c). Under OCGA § 16-8-

4(a), the offense of conversion involves “a person knowingly converting the funds

ʻto his own use in violation of the agreement.’” Ward, 376 Ga. App. at 538(1)(c).

“ʻHis own use’ does not refer exclusively to using the funds for unapproved personal

expenses; rather, it refers to using the funds for a chosen use other than the purpose

specified in the agreement.” Id.

The jury in this case was authorized to find that Hall agreed to provide the

family certain goods and services that he did not provide, and that he deposited their

funds into his own personal account from which he satisfied his personal financial

8
obligations. There was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that Hall

committed the charged offense, rendering this enumeration of error meritless.

2. In a related argument, Hall argues that because the accusation in this case

included language relating to prior convictions which were not established, the

evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. We are not persuaded.

The accusation in this case charged Hall

with the offense of THEFT BY CONVERSION OCGA § 16-8-4, for
the said accused, in the County of Fulton and State of Georgia, on the
16th day of July, 2015 through 5th day of October, 2015, as a part [sic]
to the crime with [his wife], did, after having lawfully obtained United
States Currency, the property of [the family to whom he was to provide
renovation work] of a value of at least $5[,]000 but less than $25[,]000[
], under an agreement and known legal obligation to make specified
disposition of such property, knowingly and unlawfully convert
property to accused’s own use in violation of said agreement and legal
obligation; the accused having two prior convictions for a violation of Code
Sections 16-8-2 through 16-8-9.

(emphasis added).

Under Georgia law, the punishment for theft offenses is governed by OCGA

§ 16-8-12. The mandated sentence changes depending on the monetary value of the

property which was subject of the theft. See OCGA § 16-8-12(a)(1)(A)–(C). For

example, in this case, it was alleged that the monetary value of the theft was more

9
than $5,000 but less than $25,000. Under OCGA § 16-8-12(a)(1)(B), the sentence

range is not less than one year to ten years of imprisonment. If the amount of the

theft had been less than $5,000 or more than $25,000, a different subsection of the

statute would have been applicable, and the sentence range would have changed

accordingly. OCGA § 16-8-12(a)(1)(A) and (C). OCGA § 16-8-12 also has a different

punishment scheme if the defendant previously has been convicted of two or more

theft offenses, regardless of the monetary value of the theft. OCGA § 16-8-

12(a)(1)(D). If the defendant has two or more prior convictions for any violation of

OCGA §§ 16-8-2 through 16-8-9, the defendant is guilty of a felony and the

applicable sentencing range is one to five years. Id.

This Court previously held that the charging instrument alleging that a

defendant committed a theft offense need not allege the amount of the theft or allege

prior convictions to withstand a demurrer. Roman v. State, 300 Ga. App. 526, 527(1)

(685 SE2d 775) (2009) (value of the stolen property is not an essential element of the

crime of theft by taking but, instead, is only relevant to sentencing); White v. State,

265 Ga. App. 302, 303–04(1) (596 SE2d 9) (2003) (prosecution not required to prove

recidivism as an element of theft crime). Unlike other criminal offenses, “there are

not two theft by taking crimes, one being a misdemeanor and the other being a

felony.” Roman, 300 Ga. App. at 528(2) (quotation marks omitted). “Rather, ʻthere

10
is only one such crime, and upon conviction for it, the punishment only is determined

by the value of the property taken.’” Id. The same is true for recidivism. Redd v.

State, 281 Ga. App. 272, 274 (635 SE2d 870) (2006).

It is uncontroverted that Hall had no prior convictions for any crime. The

language appearing with emphasis above as part of the accusation was simply

inapplicable to Hall’s case and should not have appeared in the accusation. Hall’s

counsel did not raise any issue with the accusation prior to trial. However, the trial

court agreed to Hall’s trial counsel’s request for a curative instruction on the issue

and ordered the prosecutor to redact any reference to prior convictions from the

accusation. Hall’s trial counsel did not object to the accusation being redacted, the

redacted version being read to the jury, or voice any objection when the curative

instruction was provided to the jury.

Notwithstanding that Hall failed to preserve the issue for our review, he

argues that the erroneous language in the accusation should result in a fatal variance

between the allegations of the accusation and the proof at trial. Even if he had not

waived this argument by failing to raise it during his trial, it is one that this Court has

squarely rejected. The State is not required to prove recidivism as an element of a

theft crime. White, 265 Ga. App. at 303–04(1). And although the State may choose

to allege prior convictions in a charging instrument, “it is error for the jury to be

11
made aware of the prior convictions during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial.”

Id. at 304(1) (citation modified). In fact, we have specifically held that a charging

instrument that includes information relating to recidivism should be redacted. Id.

Because recidivism is not an element of the offense of theft by conversion and is only

relevant to sentencing, and because the trial court correctly provided a redacted copy

of the accusation to the jury without objection, there could be no fatal variance under

the facts of this case and Hall’s enumeration of error provides no basis for reversal.

See id.; Redd, 281 Ga. App. at 274. See also Brinson v. State, 289 Ga. 551, 552–53(4)

(713 SE2d 862) (2011) (appellant cannot claim error in trial court sending redacted

copy of indictment to jury where he made no objection before the trial court).

3. Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in allowing other acts

evidence under OCGA §§ 24-4-404(b) (“Rule 404(b)”) and 24-4-403 (“Rule

403”). Under Rule 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible

only under limited circumstances. Such evidence is not admissible to prove that the

defendant acted with a certain propensity under prior similar facts, but it is

admissible for other purposes. The statute provides a non-exhaustive list of

permissible uses of such evidence, including as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. OCGA §

12
24-4-404(b). To be deemed admissible, such evidence must meet the familiar three-

part test:

(1) the other acts evidence is relevant to an issue in the case other than
the defendant’s character, (2) the probative value is not substantially
outweighed by undue prejudice under [Rule 403], and (3) there is
sufficient proof that a jury could find by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant committed the acts.

Lofland v. State, 357 Ga. App. 92, 94(1) (850 SE2d 175) (2020) (citation modified).

Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion that allows extrinsic evidence unless it tends to

prove only criminal propensity. Booth v. State, 301 Ga. 678, 682(3) (804 SE2d 104)

(2017).

“With regard to intent, a defendant puts his intent in issue when he pleads not

guilty unless he takes affirmative steps to withdraw intent as an element to be proved

by the State.” Ward, 376 Ga. App. at 539(2)(a) (citation modified). “Motive is the

reason that nudges the will and prods the mind to indulge the criminal intent.”

Wilson v. State, 351 Ga. App. 50, 55(2) (830 SE2d 407) (2019) (citation modified).

Rule 403 plays an overarching role as to the admission of all evidence, but is

particularly applicable to evidence offered under Rule 404(b). Rule 403 authorizes a

trial court to prohibit the admission of relevant evidence if the probative value of that

evidence is “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion

13
of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of

time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” OCGA § 24-4-403. “[I]n a

criminal trial, inculpatory evidence is inherently prejudicial; it is only when unfair

prejudice substantially outweighs probative value that the rule permits exclusion.”

Harris v. State, 314 Ga. 238, 263(3)(a) (875 SE2d 659) (2022) (citation modified).

It should be reiterated that the exercise of discretion under Rule 403 is
case-specific and usually turns on the trial court’s assessment of the
probative value and prejudicial effect of the particular evidence at issue.
But we also recall that exclusion of evidence under Rule 403 is an
extraordinary remedy that should be used only sparingly to prohibit
matter of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels
for the sake of its prejudicial effect.

Nails v. State, 357 Ga. App. 515, 519(1) (851 SE2d 144) (2020) (citation modified).

On appeal, a trial court’s decision regarding admissibility of evidence under Rule

404(b) is reviewed for a clear abuse of discretion. Wilson, 351 Ga. App. at 55(2)

(citing Kirby v. State, 304 Ga. 472, 479(4) (819 SE2d 468) (2018)).

During the trial, the State offered evidence from a former landlord and two

prior clients of Hall’s. The testimony offered by the landlord tended to establish

motive, showing that Hall was having difficulty meeting his financial obligations in

the months leading up to his interaction with the family against whom he committed

theft by conversion. The testimony offered by his two prior clients tended to

14
establish intent as he obtained payment from those clients and did not fulfill his

obligations. Because Hall pleaded not guilty to the charged offense and did not take

any affirmative steps to withdraw his intent as an element that had to be proven by

the State, his intent was at issue. He made his intent a primary point of contention

throughout the trial, arguing to the jury that this case was really a civil breach of

contract matter and did not constitute criminal theft by conversion. As noted

previously, intent is the element that separates a breach of contract from a criminal

theft by conversion. Ward, 376 Ga. App. at 536(1). The evidence was relevant to an

issue other than Hall’s character, the probative value was not substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and there was no question that Hall

was involved in the other acts involving his former landlord and both of his former

clients. Moreover, the trial court minimized the risk of undue prejudice by giving the

jury a limiting instruction on the use of the evidence offered under Rule 404(b). See

Ward, 376 Ga. App. at 541(2)(a). The trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion

in admitting the evidence under Rule 404(b).

4. Hall also argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in four

separate ways. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant

must show both that counsel rendered deficient performance and that the deficient

performance prejudiced his defense. Roberts v. State, 322 Ga. App. 659, 663(3) (745

15
SE2d 850) (2013). To satisfy the first prong of this test, an appellant must show that

trial counsel performed in “an objectively unreasonable way, considering all the

circumstances, and in light of prevailing professional norms.” Crider v. State, 356

Ga. App. 36, 41(1) (846 SE2d 205) (2020). The second prong requires an appellant

to establish that there is a reasonable probability that the trial outcome would have

been different in the absence of the alleged ineffective assistance provided by trial

counsel. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id. (citation modified).

“[T]his burden — though not impossible to carry — is a heavy one.” Mulkey

v. State, 366 Ga. App. 427, 437(4) (883 SE2d 173) (2023) (citation modified). There

is a strong presumption that the performance of trial counsel falls within the wide

range of reasonable professional assistance and the reasonableness of counsel’s

conduct is viewed from the perspective known at the time of trial and under the

unique circumstances of the appellant’s case. Roberts, 322 Ga. App. at 663(3).

“Decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy may form the basis for an

ineffectiveness claim only if they were so patently unreasonable that no competent

attorney would have followed such a course.” Burse v. State, 377 Ga. App. 326,

328(3)(b) (922 SE2d 479) (2025) (citation modified). If the appellant fails to establish

16
either prong of this familiar test, we are not required to evaluate the remaining prong.

Smith v. State, 373 Ga. App. 33, 45(3) (907 SE2d 327) (2024).

(a) Hall alleges that trial counsel was deficient for failing to move to strike the

inaccurate portion of the accusation prior to trial and in failing to object to the

redaction of the accusation during trial. As discussed above, the accusation that

charged Hall with theft by conversion included an allegation that he previously had

been convicted of two or more counts of theft. That allegation was inapplicable to

Hall. The trial court read the accusation, including the inapplicable portion, to the

jury as a part of voir dire. At the conclusion of the evidence and outside the presence

of the jury, counsel discussed with the trial court that the accusation included the

inapplicable allegation relating to prior convictions. The trial court suggested that it

would advise the jury that the State made an error in its charging instrument and that

Hall did not have any prior convictions. When offered an opportunity to respond,

Hall’s trial counsel indicated that there was no objection to the court’s suggested

remedy and that counsel’s only request was a curative instruction which the trial

court agreed to give. The trial court then directed the prosecutor to redact the

accusation so that it could be provided to the jury during its deliberations. The trial

court later specifically instructed the jury that the State had made an error in the

charging instrument and that Hall had no prior convictions. When asked whether the

17
redaction and curative instruction was sufficient, Hall’s trial counsel responded that

it was sufficient and made no further objection.

As noted previously, whether Hall had prior convictions was not an element

of the crime of theft by conversion. Those facts would be relevant for sentencing but

the jury was not required to determine whether the State had proven those facts. The

jury was instructed to ignore the improper allegations of the accusation and were

specifically told that Hall had no prior convictions by the trial judge. Hall has failed

to establish prejudice. Juries “are presumed to follow curative instructions in the

absence of proof to the contrary.” Lewis v. State, 314 Ga. 654, 667(4)(b) (878 SE2d

467) (2022) (citation modified). The accusation charged Hall with a crime but

contained inapplicable language. As noted above, prior convictions are not essential

elements of the crime. This enumeration therefore affords no basis for reversal.

(b) Hall argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to

request a non-pattern jury charge clarifying that theft by conversion requires more

than a mere breach of contract. The trial court instructed the jury on the elements of

the crime and gave several different charges of the requisite criminal intent which

must be established by the evidence. These pattern charges sufficiently covered the

issue of criminal intent and explained that a mere breach of an “agreement or legal

obligation” is insufficient to support a verdict of guilty.

18
“When a claim of ineffective assistance is based on the failure to request a jury

charge, the relevant inquiry is whether the charge, if it had been requested, was

warranted by the evidence, and if it had been given, whether there is a reasonable

probability that it would have changed the outcome of the trial.” Mullins v. State, 364

Ga. App. 200, 202(a) (874 SE2d 378) (2022) (citation modified). Assuming, without

deciding, that the evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury charge suggested by

Hall, he has failed to establish prejudice. Trial counsel extensively argued that the

State was required to prove criminal intent and that the entire matter was really a

civil breach of contract case. The charge as a whole sufficiently covered the concept

of criminal intent. The enumeration thus provides no basis for reversal.

(c) During the testimony of a prior client who testified, under Rule 404(b),

about his experiences with Hall and Hall’s wife, the State asked the witness whether

his case involving the Halls had been indicted. Hall’s trial counsel objected and that

objection was overruled. After indicating that the case involving him and the Halls

had been indicted, the witness was asked whether there was a conviction. In a

somewhat unresponsive answer, the witness testified that the prosecutor in that case

told the witness that a plea offer had been made but that Hall was gravely ill. Trial

counsel then lodged another objection which the trial court sustained and which

interrupted the witness’s response. The State then asked the witness whether there

19
was an order of restitution issued in the witness’s case involving the Halls. The

witness indicated that a restitution order of $60,000 had been entered. When the

State attempted to delve into the issue of restitution further, trial counsel made an

objection which was sustained and the State asked no additional questions on this

topic.

Hall argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the

witness’s use of the phrase “plea agreement” under OCGA § 24-4-408.3 Trial

counsel lodged a number of appropriate objections to the entire line of questioning

and those objections were sustained. The testimony that was given on the topic of

the resolution of that separate case involving Hall and his wife consisted only of a

single reference to the fact that a plea agreement was offered to both Hall and his

wife but that the prosecutor learned that Hall was gravely ill. The substance of the

plea agreement offer was not conveyed and the State did not seek to have the witness

describe what offer had been made. The State’s question did not attempt to establish

the terms of any plea agreement and the witness did not reveal any such terms.

Under these circumstances, OCGA § 24-4-408 was not implicated by this exchange.

Rule 408 generally excludes evidence of compromise and offers to
3

compromise except in situations not applicable here.

20
Hall argues that the State attempted to use his wife’s “guilty plea” involving the

Rule 404(b) witness to convict him. Our review of the record shows that no

supporting documentation involving the resolution of that separate case involving

the Rule 404(b) witness and the Halls was offered into evidence, no party mentioned

what plea agreement had been extended or the terms of any plea agreement which

Hall’s wife ultimately accepted. The enumeration is without merit.

(d) Finally, Hall argues that we should consider the cumulative effect of

certain errors, as established by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10 (838 SE2d 808) (2020). To

establish cumulative error, Hall must show that at least two errors were committed

during the course of his trial and, when considered along with the entire record, the

multiple errors so infected the jury’s deliberation that they denied him a

fundamentally fair trial from a due process perspective. Buenrrostro v. State, 370 Ga.

App. 659, 668–69(4) (897 SE2d 626) (2024). We have considered collectively any

alleged errors by Hall’s trial counsel and the trial court, and conclude that the

cumulative prejudicial effect of such errors, if any, does not warrant a new trial. See

St. Germain v. State, 358 Ga. App. 163, 169(5) (853 SE2d 394) (2021).

Judgment affirmed. McFadden, P. J., and Watkins, J., concur

21