State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Charity Barnor-Cooper

FOURTH DIVISION
MCFADDEN, P. J.,
WATKINS and PADGETT, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

May 20, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A26A0526. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY v. BARNOR-COOPER.
A26A0550. GEICO INDEMNITY COMPANY v. BARNOR-
COOPER.

MCFADDEN, Presiding Judge.

After we granted their applications for interlocutory appeal, State Farm Mutual

Automobile Company and GEICO Indemnity Company filed these appeals from the

order denying their motions for summary judgment in Charity Barnor-Cooper’s

personal injury action. We hold that under the plain language of the insurance policies

at issue, Barnor-Cooper is not entitled to uninsured motorist coverage. So we reverse

in both cases.

1. Background
“In reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, we apply

a de novo standard of review, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable

conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the

nonmovant.” Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. v. Eubanks, 378 Ga. App. 837, 840(2) (927

SE2d 518) (2026) (citation modified).

So viewed, the record shows that Barnor-Cooper was injured in a motor vehicle

collision with a hit-and-run driver. At the time, Barnor-Cooper was making a delivery

for her employer, Coopers TR, LLC, her husband’s company. She was driving a Buick

Lacrosee that she had rented through the car-sharing company Turo.1

Barnor-Cooper filed a complaint for damages against the unknown other driver.

She served State Farm and GEICO with the complaint in order to seek uninsured

motorist benefits. State Farm had issued a policy to her employer, Coopers TR.

GEICO insured the Buick that Barnor-Cooper was driving at the time of the collision.

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Turo is “an online platform through which individuals can rent out their
personal vehicles.” Becky’s Broncos, LLC v. Town of Nantucket, 138 F4th 73, 77 (1st
Cir. 2025).
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State Farm and GEICO answered the complaint and each filed a motion for

summary judgment. The trial court denied the motions in a single order, we granted

the insurers’ applications for interlocutory appeal, and these appeals followed.

2. State Farm

State Farm argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because the Buick

was not a covered vehicle and because Barnor-Cooper was not an insured under the

terms of the policy it had issued to her employer. We agree.

“[A]n insurance policy is simply a contract, which should be construed as any

other type of contract.” Lima Delta Co. v. Global Aerospace, 338 Ga. App. 40, 42(1)

(789 SE2d 230) (2016) (citation modified). “If the language [in an insurance policy]

is unambiguous and but one reasonable construction is possible, the court will enforce

the contract as written.” Rucker v. Columbia Nat’l Ins. Co., 307 Ga. App. 444,

447(1)(b) (705 SE2d 270) (2010) (citation modified).

The State Farm policy issued to Coopers TR listed Coopers TR as the named

insured and listed a Dodge Grand Caravan and a Jeep Gladiator as the covered

vehicles. At the time of the collision, Barnor-Cooper was driving the Buick because

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her husband was in possession of the Jeep Gladiator and the Dodge Grand Caravan

had been sold.

Barnor-Cooper argues that she is an insured under the State Farm policy

because the Buick was a “temporary substitute car” as defined in the policy. She

argues that the Buick was a “temporary substitute car” because she was driving it due

to mechanical issues with the Dodge Caravan. But under the language of the policy,

the Buick was not a temporary substitute car because the Dodge Caravan had been

sold, regardless of the reason for the sale.

The State Farm policy defines “Insured” in the uninsured-motor-vehicle-

coverage section to mean:

a. any person while occupying:

(1) a your car for which a premium for that your car is
shown under “Coverage Symbol U” or “Coverage Symbol
UE” in the “POLICY PREMIUM” schedules on the
Declarations;
(2) a newly acquired car; or
(3) a temporary substitute car that is temporarily replacing
a car described in (1) or (2) above.

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b. any person or organization entitled to recover compensatory damages
as a result of bodily injury to an insured as defined in a. above. (Emphasis
omitted).

In the general definitions section, the policy defined “temporary substitute car” as “a

car that is the lawful possession of the person operating it and that: 1. replaces a your

car or a newly acquired car for a short time while that car is out of use due to its: a.

breakdown; b. repair; c. servicing; d. damage; or e. theft; and 2. neither you nor the

person operating it own or have registered.” (Emphasis omitted). The policy defined

“your car” as “the car or cars shown in the ‘VEHICLE SCHEDULE’ on the

Declarations[,]” and explicitly provided that, “Your Car does not include a car that you

no longer own or lease.” (Emphasis omitted and added).

It is undisputed that Coopers TR no longer owned the Dodge at the time of the

collision because it had been sold before then. So the Dodge was no longer a “your

car” under the plain language of the insurance contract (“Your Car does not include

a car that you no longer own. ...”). And since the Dodge was no longer a “your car,”

the Buick was not a temporary substitute car for a “your car”. Barnor-Cooper is not

entitled to uninsured motorist benefits under the State Farm policy.

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Barnor-Cooper argues that, in effect, she was the named insured under the

policy because Coopers TR, the named insured as shown on the policy, is simply a

trade name; her husband is its sole owner; and she is a manager. Coopers TR is a

domestic limited liability company registered under Georgia law, not simply a trade

name for an individual. “[A] limited liability company is a separate legal entity from

its owners. ...” Sentinel Ins. Co./The Hartford v. USAA Ins. Co., 335 Ga. App. 664, 667

(782 SE2d 718) (2016). And a limited liability company, “unlike [a] sole

proprietorship [is] capable of being the true named insured on a contract.” Id. Barnor-

Cooper is not effectively a named insured on the policy.

Barnor-Cooper argues that State Farm is estopped from denying coverage

because Coopers TR was still paying insurance premiums for the Dodge, and State

Farm accepted the payments. But she fails to point to any evidence that Coopers TR

informed State Farm or that State Farm otherwise knew of Coopers TR’s sale of the

Dodge when it accepted any premium payments. See Christian v. Allstate Ins. Co., 239

Ga. 850, 852-53 (239 SE2d 328) (1977) (insurer could not deny coverage on a vehicle

as a non-owned vehicle when it knew vehicle was not owned by named insured but

collected premiums on the vehicle anyway); S.C. Ins. Co. v. Hunnicutt, 105 Ga. App.

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257, 259(2) (124 SE2d 315) (1962) (insurer waived exclusion when it had knowledge

of the facts creating the exclusion and, with such knowledge, accepted and retained

increased premiums). Absent evidence of such knowledge, Barnor-Cooper has not

shown an estoppel.

The trial court erred in denying State Farm’s motion for summary judgment.

3. GEICO

GEICO argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary

judgment because, contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the undisputed evidence

showed that Barnor-Cooper rented the Buick through Turo, and therefore the Buick

was excluded from coverage. We agree.

“[I]f the policy exclusions are unambiguous they must be given effect even if

beneficial to the insurer and detrimental to the [purported] insured. We will not strain

to extend coverage where none was contracted or intended.” Philadelphia Indemnity

Ins. Co., 378 Ga. App. at 841(2) (citation modified). The GEICO policy expressly

excluded uninsured motorist coverage for “any motor vehicle operated, maintained

or used as part of personal vehicle sharing facilitated by a personal vehicle sharing

program.” It defined “personal vehicle sharing program” as “a business,

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organization, network or group facilitating the sharing of private passenger vehicles

for use by individuals or businesses.”

Barnor-Cooper testified at her deposition that she rented the Buick through the

car-sharing company Turo. So under the plain language of the exclusion, she is not

entitled to uninsured motorist benefits under the GEICO policy.

Without citing support in the record, Barnor-Cooper argues that the owner of

the Buick allowed her to borrow it, so her use of the car was not “facilitated” by “a

personal vehicle sharing program.” She bases her argument on the fact that when she

went to pick up the car she had reserved with Turo, the owner gave her a different car

to use, the Buick. But she unequivocally testified that she rented the Buick through

Turo when the other car was not available. She points to no evidence that the owner

of the Buick allowed her to use the Buick without payment. In any event, even though

Barnor-Cooper reserved a different car through Turo, her rental of the Buick was still

“facilitated” by Turo and so falls within the exclusion. See

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/facilitate (retrieved May 5, 2026)

(defining “facilitate” as “to make (something) easier” or “to help bring (something)

about”).

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Barnor-Cooper argues that the exclusion is contrary to Georgia law. We

disagree. Georgia law specifically provides that a motor vehicle liability insurer “may

exclude any and all coverage[, including uninsured motorist coverage,] for any claim

afforded under a shared vehicle owner’s motor vehicle liability insurance policy. ...”

OCGA § 40-1-223(a)(3). See also OCGA §§ 40-1-220(11) (defining “shared vehicle

owner” as “the registered owner of a vehicle made available for sharing through a

peer-to-peer car-sharing program”); 40-1-223(b) (“Nothing in this part shall be

construed to invalidate or limit an exclusion contained in a motor vehicle liability

insurance policy ... that excludes coverage for motor vehicles made available for rent,

sharing, or hire. ...”). The exclusion was permissible under Georgia law.

Because Barnor-Cooper rented the Buick through Turo, it was excluded from

coverage under GEICO’s policy, and the trial court erred in denying GEICO’s motion

for summary judgment.

Judgments reversed. Watkins and Padgett, JJ., concur.

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