State v. Brady Paul Jones

SECOND DIVISION
DOYLE, P. J.,
DAVIS, J., and SENIOR JUDGE FULLER

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.gov/rules

June 2, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A26A0137. THE STATE v. JONES.

DOYLE, Presiding Judge.

In 2023, 14-year-old Brady Jones was arrested in connection with the shooting

death of 14-year-old G. G.1 After being detained approximately 240 days without

indictment, Jones moved to transfer the case to juvenile court pursuant to OCGA §

17-7-50.1(a), which motion the superior court granted. The State appeals, arguing that

1
Because the superior court’s transfer order was directly appealable, see OCGA
§§ 5-7-1(a)(7) (the State may directly appeal from an order transferring a case to
juvenile court pursuant to OCGA §§ 17-7-50.1(b)), 5-7-2(b)(2) (no certificate of
immediate review required), this Court granted the State’s application for
interlocutory appeal. See Spivey v. Hembree, 268 Ga. App. 485, 486 n.1 (602 SE2d
246) (2004) (an interlocutory application from a directly appealable order will be
granted).
the order was erroneous because the superior court had granted it a valid 90-day

extension of time in which to indict. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

OCGA § 17-7-50.1(a), the statute at issue here, states that

[a]ny child who is charged with a crime that is within the jurisdiction of
the superior court, as provided in Code Section 15-11-560 or 15-11-561,2
who is detained shall within 180 days of the date of detention be entitled
to have the charge against him or her presented to the grand jury. The
superior court shall, upon motion for an extension of time and after a
hearing and good cause shown, grant one extension to the original 180
day period, not to exceed 90 additional days.

The statute also explains that “[i]f the grand jury does not return a true bill against the

detained child within the time limitations set forth in subsection (a) of this Code

section, the detained child’s case shall be transferred to the juvenile court[.]” OCGA

§ 17-7-50.1(b).

The record shows that on August 28, 2023, Jones was arrested on charges of

second degree cruelty to children, felony murder predicated on cruelty to children,

2
These Code sections describe concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction of juvenile
courts and superior courts “over a child who is alleged to have committed a
delinquent act which would be considered a crime” if committed by an adult and that
is punishable by certain sentences or that appears within a delineated list of crimes.
See OCGA §§ 15-11-560, 15-11-561.
2
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, tampering with evidence,

and possession of a firearm by a minor. The warrant affidavits stated that in the late

afternoon of August 27, 2023, Jones “knowingly and willfully during a negligent act”

caused the death of G. G. by shooting her in the head with a handgun.

On February 21, 2024, Jones had been detained 177 days and had not been

indicted, but the superior court issued an order granting the State a 90-day extension

to indict pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-50.1(a). The order stated that “[t]he State would

show that there are various reports from the GBI which the State was waiting on as

well as follow up interviews with co-defendants in said case. Therefore, the State

would move for one extension not to exceed 90 days in this case.” The State concedes

that it did not notify Jones or his attorney prior to moving for the extension and did

not file a written motion requesting the extension, instead making a verbal request and

preparing the order for the court. On April 29, 2024, a grand jury returned an

indictment against Jones on the above-referenced charges.

On May 3, 2024, Jones moved to transfer the case to juvenile court pursuant to

OCGA § 17-7-50.1(a), arguing that he had been detained for more than 240 days prior

to his April 29, 2024 indictment and that the State had failed to move for the 90-day

3
extension before expiration of the 180-day detention limit. On October 18, 2024, Jones

amended his motion to transfer, explaining that he “learned [on May 6, 2024] after

filing the Motion to Transfer on May 3, 2024, that an Ex-Parte Order was signed on

February 21, 2024, granting an extension of time for grand jury presentment.”

(Cleaned up). Jones observed that the extension order omitted language from OCGA

§ 17-7-50.1(a), stating only that “the superior court shall, upon motion for an

extension of time ... grant one extension to the original 180 day period, not to exceed

90 additional days” and omitting the language, “and after a hearing and good cause

shown.” Jones alleged that neither he nor his attorney received notice of any motion

for extension, that no motion was filed into the record, that he had no opportunity to

respond or argue against the State’s reasons for requesting the extension, and that the

resulting order violated the clear statutory prerequisites as well as his federal and state

constitutional rights to due process.

After a brief hearing on the matter, the parties submitted written briefs to the

superior court, and thereafter, the court granted Jones’s amended motion to transfer

to juvenile court. In its order, the court found that the State had moved in open court

for the extension, but that neither Jones nor his attorney was present. The State

4
prepared the extension order, which the court signed, but no notice or opportunity to

respond was given to Jones. The court found that the failure to meet the explicit

statutory requirements rendered the extension invalid.

The State appeals from the transfer order, arguing that the superior court erred

by granting it on the basis that no separate hearing occurred. The State contends that

the single statutory 90-day extension is “automatic,”citing In the Interest of C. B., 313

Ga. App. 778 (723 SE2d 21) (2012), and mandatory given the statutory language that

the extension “shall” be granted. It also contends that any error was harmless because

the extension would have been granted in light of the language in the order referencing

the outstanding GBI reports and co-defendant interviews, which it contends is “good

cause.”

In statutory interpretation cases such as this, it is well settled that
a statute draws its meaning from its text. When interpreting a statute, we
must give the text its plain and ordinary meaning, view it in the context
in which it appears, and read it in its most natural and reasonable way.
For context, we may look to other provisions of the same statute, the
structure and history of the whole statute, and the other law —
constitutional, statutory, and common law alike — that forms the legal
background of the statutory provision in question. When we construe
such statutory authority on appeal, our review is de novo.

5
State v. Harris, 319 Ga. 665, 667 (906 SE2d 402) (2024) (punctuation omitted). See

generally Clark v. State, 321 Ga. 35, 40-43(2)(a) (912 SE2d 593) (2025) (providing

extended discussion on the interpretation of “shall” in a statutory context as well as

the appropriate remedy based on the language of the statute).”If the statutory text is

clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search

for statutory meaning is at an end.” Major v. State, 301 Ga. 147, 150(1) (800 SE2d 348)

(2017) (quotation marks omitted).

In this case, the language at issue is clear and unambiguous. The State must

indict a juvenile defendant within 180 days or the case is transferred back to the

juvenile court. OCGA § 17-7-50.1. See also Nunnally v. State, 311 Ga. App. 558, 559(1)

(716 SE2d 608) (2011). The State can move for one 90-day extension to the initial 180

days, but prior to granting that extension, there must be a hearing and a showing of

good cause. OCGA § 17-7-50.1(a). The determination of whether good cause has been

shown is not a formality. That requirement was not met in this case, and in fact, the

State concedes that it failed to notify the defendant of its motion prior to entry of the

order, failed to properly serve the order on the defendant, and failed to include the

applicable language in the order itself.

6
With regard to the State’s contention that the extension is “automatic,”

rendering a hearing including the defendant unnecessary, we disagree. In the Interest

of C. B., 313 Ga. App. at 780, which the State cites in support of this contention,

reviewed an appeal in which a case had been transferred to the juvenile court pursuant

to OCGA § 17-7-50.1(a) for failure to indict within 180 days, but “the State filed a

motion [in the juvenile court] to transfer the case back to the superior court pursuant

to the provisions of OCGA § 15-11-30.2.” In the Interest of C. B., 313 Ga. App. at 779.

This Court found that the juvenile court’s re-transfer was error based on the plain

language of OCGA § 17-7-50.1(a), and that any subsequent indictment would have

been void. In the Interest of C. B., 313 Ga. App. at 780. (citing Nunnally, 311 Ga. App.

at 559(1)). This Court stated, “[m]oreover, although OCGA § 17-7-50.1 allows the

State to request one automatic 90-day extension, as we also recently decided in

Nunnally, 311 Ga. App. 558(1) this extension cannot be granted after the expiration of

the 180 days.” In the Interest of C. B., 313 Ga. App. at 780. The use of the word

“automatic” in this context, however, was not based on the statutory language, prior

case law, or the facts at issue on appeal. See, e.g., Schoicket v. State, 312 Ga. 825,

832(1) (865 SE2d 170) (2021) (“It is, of course, axiomatic that a decision’s holding is

7
limited to the factual context of the case being decided and the issues that context

necessarily raises.”) (punctuation omitted). Accordingly, it was dicta.

Additionally, the State’s contention that the extension in this case was harmless

would, if accepted, render superfluous the plain statutory requirement. See Hill v.

State, 309 Ga. App. 531, 533–35 (710 SE2d 667) (2011) (declining to interpret the

statute to mean that the 180-day period should run from the date of transfer to the

superior court rather than the date of detention as written). Indeed, the State’s

reading of the statute rewrites the 180-day period into a 270-day time period. See, e.g.,

Schoicket, 312 Ga. at 831(1). Any inclusion in the order of references to missing GBI

reports or co-defendant interviews, which could be read (at most) as an implicit

finding of good faith, does not change the outcome because Jones was not provided

an opportunity to present any argument that may have swayed the superior court to

find that the State could not show good cause for an extension. Accordingly, because

the February 21, 2024 extension order was entered without compliance with the

explicit statutory requirements, the 90-day extension was invalid, and the case was due

8
to be transferred to juvenile court for failure to indict Jones within 180 days of

detention.

Judgment affirmed. Davis, J., and Senior Judge C. Andrew Fuller concur.

9