IN THE INTEREST OF D. H. et al., CHILDREN

In the
Supreme Court of Georgia
No. S25G1430
In the Interest of D.H. et al., Children
On Writ of Certiorari from the Court of Appeals of Georgia
No. A24A1822
Argued: June 16, 2026 — Decided: October 14, 2026
LAGRUA, Justice.
Following 	an 	evidentiary 	hearing 	in 	April 	2024, 	the
juvenile court determined that Dy. H. and Da. H., the minor
children 	of 	Petitioner 	Starlita 	Moore 	(the 	“Mother”), 	were
dependent 	children 	as 	defined 	by 	OCGA 	§ 	15-11-2(22)(A)
(defining a “[d]ependent child” as a child who has been “abused or
neglected and is in need of the protection of the court”). In
reaching this conclusion, the juvenile court determined that the
minor children had been neglected by the Mother because she was
“unable to provide proper parental care and control” based on her
“untreated mental health condition,” citing OCGA §§ 15-11-
2(48)(A) (defining “[n]eglect” as “[t]he failure to provide necessary
parental care or control”) and 15-11-311(a)(1) (providing that, in
determining whether a child is “without proper parental care and
control, the court shall consider, without being limited to, … [a]
medically verified deficiency of such child’s parent’s physical,
mental, or emotional health that is of such duration or nature so
as to render such parent unable to provide adequately for his or
her child”). The Mother appealed, and a divided panel of the Court
of Appeals affirmed, similarly relying on OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1)
to conclude that the juvenile court was authorized to find that the
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

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minor 	children 	were 	neglected 	by 	the 	Mother—and 	thus,
dependent—due 	to 	the 	“Mother’s 	mental 	health 	deficiency,”
which “was medically verified and of such duration or nature as
would render her unable to provide adequately for her children.”
In the Interest of D. H., 376 Ga. App. 212, 220 (2025). But see id.
at 227–30 (Pipkin, J., dissenting). We granted the Mother’s
petition for a writ of certiorari to consider what kind of evidence
is required in a dependency proceeding to support a finding of a
“medically 	verified” 	health 	deficiency 	under 	OCGA 	§ 	15-11-
311(a)(1), and whether OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1) requires only that
the health deficiency be “medically verified,” or whether the
“duration or nature” of that health deficiency must also be
“medically verified” in order for the juvenile court to determine
that it “render[ed] such parent unable to provide adequately for
his or her child.” Id.
As 	explained 	below, 	having 	considered 	the 	proper
construction of OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1), we conclude that any
competent evidence may support a juvenile court’s determination
that a parent suffers from a “medically verified deficiency of …
physical, mental, or emotional health.” We also conclude that, just
as the health deficiency must be “medically verified” (as we
describe in Division (2)(a) below), so, too, must its “duration or
nature.” It is then for the juvenile court to make the ultimate legal
determination, based on competent evidence before it, of whether
the medically verified duration or nature of a given deficiency
renders the parent unable to provide adequately for his or her
child. See id.
Here, the juvenile court and Court of Appeals concluded
that the Mother had a “medically verified deficiency” of her
“physical, mental, or emotional health”—and the juvenile court
made explicit findings in support of that conclusion based on

3
evidence presented at the dependency hearing—but the juvenile
court made no determination that the “duration or nature” of the
Mother’s mental health condition was “medically verified.” See
OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1); In the Interest of D. H., 376 Ga. App. at
220. So, while the evidence introduced at the dependency hearing
may have supported a finding that the minor children were
dependent on grounds other than those set forth in OCGA § 15-
11-311(a)(1), the evidence did not support the juvenile court’s
conclusion that the children were dependent based on grounds set
forth in the juvenile court’s order.
Accordingly, we vacate the Court of Appeals’s decision and
remand this case to the Court of Appeals with direction to remand
to the juvenile court for the juvenile court to consider whether the
evidence in the record as a whole supports a finding that Dy. H.
and Da. H. were dependent children under OCGA § 15-11-
2(22)(A).
1. 	Pertinent Factual Background and Procedural History
The record in this case demonstrates that Dy. H. and Da.
H. are the biological children of the Mother and non-party Dionte
Harvey 	(the 	“Father”) 	and 	were 	born 	in 	2017 	and 	2020,
respectively. The Mother and the Father ended their relationship
in 2021, and Dy. H. and Da. H. remained in the Mother’s care.
The Father ceased having any contact with or giving any financial
support to Dy. H. and Da. H. in November 2021. The Mother
married her current husband in the summer of 2022, and Dy. H.
and Da. H. resided with the Mother and her husband in Gwinnett
County, though it does not appear from the record that the
Mother’s husband is a “legal parent” or “guardian” of the children.
This case arises out of an incident in 2024. During the early
morning hours of February 1, 2024, the Mother was arrested in

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Hall County following a series of overnight incidents in which the
Mother: (1) drove to an apartment complex and rammed through
its metal security gate with her vehicle; 1 (2) crashed into another
vehicle inside the apartment complex; (3) beat on the doors of
several apartments, screaming for the residents to let her inside;
(4) retrieved a firearm from her vehicle and, while sitting down in
the stairwell of one of the apartment buildings, loaded the firearm
with ammunition, dropping ammunition inside the stairwell in
the process; and (5) returned to her vehicle with the firearm 2 and
fled 	the 	scene 	as 	law 	enforcement 	officers 	arrived 	at 	the
apartment complex. 3 The Mother then drove two to three miles
with law enforcement officers in pursuit until she reached a lake;
attempted to drive her vehicle into the lake; exited the vehicle and
started running into the lake; and returned to shore, where she
was eventually apprehended by law enforcement officers. After
being arrested and advised of her Miranda 4 rights, the Mother
told law enforcement officers that “she was looking for her kids,”
who were “with the devil.” While being held at the police station,
the Mother made several phone calls to family members in which
she said that “God had sent her to save Gina’s son”—though law
enforcement officers were never able to connect the Mother or any
of the residents of the apartment complex to a person named
“Gina.”
On 	the 	morning 	of 	the 	Mother’s 	arrest, 	her 	husband
contacted the Mother’s niece about allowing Dy. H. and Da. H. to
1 The record reflects that the Mother did not reside at this apartment
complex or appear to know anyone who resided there.
2 Law enforcement officers later recovered a loaded firearm inside the
Mother’s vehicle.
3 Several residents of the apartment complex called 911 during this
incident.
4 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966).

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temporarily stay in her home, and the Mother’s niece brought the
children to her home later that day.
On February 9, 2024, the juvenile court held an emergency
hearing to address the care and custody of Dy. H. and Da. H. in
light of the February 1 incident involving the Mother, 5 and the
Mother testified at the hearing. Immediately after the hearing,
the 	juvenile 	court 	issued 	a 	“Dependency 	Removal 	Order,”
determining that, “based on the evidence presented in court[,]
emergency removal [wa]s necessary based on the [Mother]’s
recent 	mental 	health 	breakdown 	and 	arrest 	… 	leaving 	the
children without a legal parent or guardian to care for them.” The
juvenile 	court 	further 	determined 	that 	“continuation 	of 	the
children in the [Mother’s] home [wa]s contrary to their welfare,”
and “[r]emoval [wa]s in their best interest.” The juvenile court
ordered the children placed in the temporary custody of the
Gwinnett County Department of Family and Children Services
(“DFCS”), and Dy. H. and Da. H. remained in the physical custody
of the Mother’s niece, who was “vetted” as a placement by DFCS.
The 	juvenile 	court 	also 	scheduled 	a 	preliminary 	protective
hearing to take place on February 12, 2024.
DFCS subsequently filed dependency petitions for Dy. H.
and Da. H. in the juvenile court, and on February 12, 2024, the
parties 	appeared 	for 	the 	scheduled 	preliminary 	protective
hearing. At that time, DFCS requested a continuance to conduct
an investigation since it had only become involved with the family
a few days earlier. The juvenile court granted DFCS’s request;
ordered that the Mother would have periodic visitation with the
minor children; and scheduled the preliminary protective hearing
5 It is not clear from the record how this hearing was initiated, and
there is no transcript of the hearing in the record.

6
and an adjudication of dependency hearing for March 1, 2024.
After another request for a continuance by the Guardian ad
Litem, who was appointed by the juvenile court to represent the
interests 	of 	Dy. 	H. 	and 	Da. 	H. 	in 	these 	proceedings, 6 	the
preliminary protective hearing and adjudication of dependency
hearing were rescheduled again for April 15, 2024.
At the outset of the April 15 hearing, DFCS advised the
juvenile court that it was not yet prepared to address “final
disposition” because several witnesses were needed to testify at
that 	phase 	of 	the 	proceedings 	and 	because 	the 	pertinent
evaluations—psychological, parental fitness, etc.—needed to be
finalized and submitted to DFCS. The juvenile court ruled that it
would 	proceed 	with 	the 	preliminary 	protective 	hearing 	and
dependency portions of the hearing but would stay the final
disposition and schedule it to be heard on a later date.
The evidentiary portion of the hearing proceeded with
DFCS calling the law enforcement officers who responded to the
incident on February 1 to testify about the events leading up to
the Mother’s arrest, as well as her statements and behavior before
and at the time of her arrest. The Mother also testified, and while
she invoked her Fifth Amendment right under the United States
Constitution in response to most of the questioning about the
February 1 incident, she testified that, following the incident, a
psychologist at the hospital diagnosed her as having experienced
“a manic episode.” The Mother also testified that, when this
incident 	occurred, 	she 	had 	been 	“feeling 	overwhelmed 	with
motherhood”; she “had been having brain fog” for two years; and
she had been blacking out. And she stated that the “brain fog
came from … metal … that was left in [her] tooth” during a root
6 Under OCGA § 15-11-104(a), “[t]he court shall appoint a guardian ad
litem for an alleged dependent child.”

7
canal in 2021. According to the Mother, the metal was surgically
removed from her mouth on January 13, 2024, about two weeks
prior to the incident, and it was her “understanding that [the
surgery] … possibly led to the incident that happened.” The
Mother also testified that she was prescribed antibiotics following
the surgery and theorized that the “antibiotic could have led to
the brain fog, … as well.”
A DFCS social services supervisor then testified and noted
that, because of concerns about the Mother’s mental health, the
Mother had undergone a psychological evaluation, but the results
had not yet been returned to DFCS. Additionally, the social
services supervisor testified that the Mother would be undergoing
a parental fitness exam, which had not yet been completed.
According to the social services supervisor, these evaluations
were necessary for DFCS to make a final “recommendation about
[the] return of custody” of Dy. H. and Da. H. to the Mother. No
evidence was presented at the hearing to establish what a medical
professional or other provider had determined to be the potential
cause of the Mother’s February 1 manic episode or any kind of
assessment, medical or otherwise, about the likelihood that such
an episode would reoccur or continue into the future and, if so,
with what frequency.
Following the hearing, the juvenile court entered an order
of adjudication and temporary disposition, finding by clear and
convincing evidence that Dy. H. and Da. H. were “dependent
children as defined in OCGA § 15-11-2(22)” because “the Mother
ha[d] neglected these children” through her “failure to provide
necessary parental care and control,” OCGA § 15-11-2(48)(A). In
support of this conclusion and after noting that OCGA § 15-11-
311(a) defines “proper parental care and control” as, among other
things, “a medically verified health deficiency of such child’s

8
parent’s physical, mental, or emotional health that is of such
duration or nature so as to render such parent unable to provide
adequately for his or her child,” id. at (a)(1), the juvenile court
made the following findings: (1) the “Mother has behavioral
instability as evidenced by the mental breakdown that she had on
February 	1, 	2024[,] 	that 	resulted 	in 	her 	felony 	arrest”; 	(2)
“[a]lthough the children were not present when [the] Mother had
her mental breakdown, her mental health problems reduce her
ability to cope with her parenting responsibilities and result in
[the] Mother’s mental incapability to care for her children”; (3)
“although the children were not with the Mother, the children
were involved in that the Mother believed that the devil had the
children and that [the] Mother needed to save them”; (4) the
“Mother previously testified that the cause of her breakdown was
from being overwhelmed as a parent”; and (5) the “Mother’s
mental breakdown on February 1, 2024[,] was not an isolated
incident.” The juvenile court further found that the Mother
“testified that she ha[d] been in a brain fog for two years,”
“suffered from blackouts and memory loss,” and “had a manic
episode,” 	and 	that, 	“despite 	the 	recommendation 	of 	a
psychologist[,] ha[d] failed to seek treatment.” “Based on [the]
Mother’s untreated mental health condition,” the juvenile court
concluded that “she is unable to provide proper parental care and
control for her children.” The juvenile court further ordered that
Dy. H. and Da. H. would remain in the legal custody of DFCS with
the Mother’s niece and that the final disposition hearing would
occur on July 11, 2024. 7
The Mother appealed the juvenile court’s order to the Court
of Appeals. On appeal, the Mother argued that the Court of
7 The final disposition hearing ultimately did not proceed because the
Mother appealed.

9
Appeals should reverse the juvenile court’s order adjudicating
dependency on the following grounds: (1) “the juvenile court’s
reliance on OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1) was misplaced”; (2) the record
was “devoid of the detail necessary to make conclusions about the
mother’s medical condition[], its effect on [her] parenting skills,
or the likelihood that it would continue”; and (3) “the juvenile
court’s order [wa]s insufficient because the State did not present
testimony 	from 	a 	medical 	professional 	as 	to 	[the] 	Mother’s
diagnosis and prognosis.” In the Interest of D. H., 376 Ga. App. at
218–19.
The 	Court 	of 	Appeals 	affirmed 	the 	juvenile 	court’s
adjudication of dependency, concluding that clear and convincing
evidence had been presented to show that the Mother neglected
Dy. H. and Da. H. through her “failure to provide proper care and
control” under OCGA § 15-11-2(48). In the Interest of D. H., 376
Ga. App. at 219. The court further concluded that, in determining
whether these children were “without proper parental care and
control,” the juvenile court could properly consider the “medically
verified health deficiency of such child’s parent’s physical, mental,
or emotional health that is of such duration or nature so as to
render such parent unable to provide adequately for … her child.”
Id. at 219–20 (citing OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1)).
In support of these conclusions, the Court of Appeals
explained that testimony from a medical professional regarding
the 	Mother’s 	medical 	diagnosis 	and/or 	prognosis 	was 	not
necessary to satisfy the statutory requirement that the Mother
suffered from a “medically verified health deficiency of … [her]
physical, mental, or emotional health” because OCGA § 15-11-
311(a)(1) “does not specify any particular type of evidence that is
required to support a juvenile court’s finding of a medically
verified mental health deficiency that renders a parent unable to

10
meet the needs of her children.” In the Interest of D. H., 376 Ga.
App. at 219. Additionally, the Court of Appeals determined that
“the lack of such testimony in the instant case” did not warrant
reversal because the evidence of the Mother’s
admitted 	medical 	diagnosis, 	coupled 	with 	the
extreme 	nature 	of 	the 	February 	2024 	incident
(which included a loaded firearm, a police pursuit,
and delusions directly pertaining to the children),
authorized 	the 	juvenile 	court 	to 	find 	that 	[the]
Mother’s mental health deficiency was medically
verified and of such duration or nature as would
render her unable to provide adequately for her
children.
Id. at 219–20 (emphasis omitted). On this basis, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s finding that Dy. H. and Da.
H. were dependent children. See id. at 220.
Judge Pipkin wrote a dissenting opinion in which he
concluded 	that, 	even 	accepting 	the 	juvenile 	court’s 	factual
findings as true, DFCS presented insufficient evidence to support
the juvenile court’s legal conclusions because—while the evidence
“undoubtedly” showed that the Mother “reported some concerning
physical ailments” and that the February 2024 incident was
“patently disturbing”—“nothing presented at trial was medically
verified” 	through 	the 	testimony 	of 	medical 	experts 	or 	the
presentation of medical evaluations, as required by OCGA § 15-
11-311(a)(1). Interest of D. H., 376 Ga. App. at 228, 230.
We granted the Mother’s request for certiorari review to
consider whether any specific kind of evidence is required to
support a finding of a “medically verified deficiency of such child’s
parent’s physical, mental, or emotional health” under OCGA § 15-

11
11-311(a)(1) 	and 	to 	decide 	whether 	OCGA 	§ 	15-11-311(a)(1)
requires only that the health deficiency be “medically verified,” or
whether the statute also requires the “duration or nature” of that
health deficiency to be medically verified. Id.
2. 	Legal Analysis
When we review questions of statutory construction on
appeal, “our review is conducted under a de novo standard.”
Bowen v. Savoy, 308 Ga. 204, 205 (2020) (quotation marks
omitted). So, we turn to the statutory language, mindful that “we
must give the text its plain and ordinary meaning, view it in the
context in which it appears, and read it in its most natural and
reasonable way.” State v. Cook, 317 Ga. 659, 660 (2023) (quotation
marks omitted). “Of course, while the common and customary
usages of the words are important, so is their context.” Id.
(cleaned up) (citing May v. State, 295 Ga. 388, 391 (2014) (“In our
search for the meaning of a particular statutory provision, we look
not only to the words of that provision, but we consider its legal
context as well.”)).
The statute at issue here, OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1), appears
in Georgia’s Juvenile Code, 8 OCGA § 15-11-1 et seq., and is a
statute juvenile courts may look to when determining whether a
minor child is dependent. See OCGA § 15-11-2(22)(A) (defining a
“dependent child” as a child who has been “abused or neglected
8 In 2013, the General Assembly amended Title 15 of the Georgia Code
“so as to substantially revise, supersede, and modernize provisions relating to
juvenile 	proceedings and 	enact 	comprehensive 	juvenile justice 	reforms
recommended by the Governor’s Special Council on Justice Reform in Georgia,”
Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, and the provisions became effective on January 1, 2014.
See Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 5–1 (“This Act shall become effective on January 1,
2014, and shall apply to all offenses which occur and juvenile proceedings
commenced on and after such date.”). See also OCGA § 15-11-1, et seq.

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and is in need of the protection of the court”); OCGA § 15-11-
2(48)(A) (defining “[n]eglect” as, among other things, “[t]he failure
to provide necessary parental care or control”). To that end,
OCGA 	§ 	15-11-311(a) 	provides 	a 	non-exclusive 	list 	of
circumstances that courts “shall consider in determining whether
a child is without proper parental care and control” in the
dependency 	context. 	Id. 	As 	relevant 	here, 	OCGA 	§ 	15-11-
311(a)(1), provides that courts “shall consider … [a] medically
verified deficiency of such child’s parent’s physical, mental, or
emotional health that is of such duration or nature so as to render
such parent unable to provide adequately for his or her child.” 9
Generally, a juvenile court’s determination that a minor child is
9 OCGA § 15-11-311(a) also provides several more circumstances
courts must consider in determining whether a child is “without proper
parental care and control,” including, but not limited to, the following:
(2) Excessive use of or history of chronic unrehabilitated
substance abuse with the effect of rendering a parent of such
child incapable of providing adequately for the physical,
mental, emotional, or moral condition and needs of his or her
child;
(3) A felony conviction and imprisonment of a parent of such
child for an offense which has a demonstrably negative effect
on the quality of the parent-child relationship …
(4) Egregious conduct or evidence of past egregious conduct of
a physically, emotionally, or sexually cruel or abusive nature
by such parent toward his or her child or toward another child
of such parent;
(5) Physical, mental, or emotional neglect of his or her child or
evidence of past physical, mental, or emotional neglect by the
parent of such child or another child of such parent; and
(6) Serious bodily injury or death of a sibling of his or her child
under circumstances which constitute substantial evidence
that such injury or death resulted from parental neglect or
abuse.
OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(2)–(6).

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dependent—whether based on the considerations set forth in
OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1) or otherwise—significantly impacts the
family in question, as it can potentially necessitate a child’s
removal from the custody and care of his or her parent and
placement into foster care, the therapeutic or medical treatment
of the parent, and the implementation of a detailed case plan to
assist in reunification, among other things. See OCGA §§ 15-11-
130, et seq., 15-11-180, 15-11-200, et seq., 15-11-210, et seq.
Notably, in such cases, DFCS is required to prove the dependency
of the minor child by clear and convincing evidence. See OCGA §
15-11-180 (“The petitioner shall have the burden of proving the
allegations of a dependency petition by clear and convincing
evidence.”).
(a) Having considered the legal context in which OCGA §
15-11-311(a)(1) appears, we turn to the first question of statutory
construction here: whether any particular kind of evidence is
required for a court to be able to determine that a parent suffers
from a “medically verified deficiency of … physical, mental, or
emotional health.” OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1). We conclude that,
although such a determination must be supported by competent
evidence, the statute does not require any particular kind of
evidence. As a general rule, absent a law that says otherwise, no
particular kind of evidence is required to prove a fact in court. See
Garay v. State, 314 Ga. 16, 21 (2022) (concluding that, in the
criminal sufficiency-of-the-evidence context, “although the State
is required to prove its case with competent evidence, there is no
requirement that it prove its case with any particular sort of
evidence” (cleaned up)); Weed v. Davis, 25 Ga. 684, 686 (1858)
(concluding 	that, 	in 	the 	civil 	fraudulent-conveyance 	setting,
because the fraudulent-conveyance statute said nothing about the
kind of evidence needed to prove fraudulent intent, it imposed no
restriction on the evidence a party could offer to establish such

14
intent); 	OCGA 	§ 	24-4-402 	(“All 	relevant 	evidence 	shall 	be
admissible, except as limited by constitutional requirements or as
otherwise 	provided 	by 	law 	or 	by 	other 	rules, 	as 	prescribed
pursuant to constitutional or statutory authority, applicable in
the court in which the matter is pending.”). And neither OCGA §
15-11-311 nor any other part of the Juvenile Code says that any
particular type of evidence is required to prove that a deficiency
is medically verified.
OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1) refers to a “medically verified
deficiency” of a parent’s health. To “verify” something can mean
affirming it by affidavit or under oath. See Verify, The American
Heritage Dictionary (5th ed. 2012) (defining “verify” as “to attest
to the truth of (something) formally or under oath” or “to establish
or demonstrate the truth or accuracy of”); Verify, New Oxford
American Dictionary (3rd ed. 2010) (defining “verify” as “to testify
or affirm formally or upon oath” or “to ascertain or test the
accuracy 	or 	correctness 	of”). 	But 	nothing 	in 	this 	statutory
provision suggests that the term “verified” means that here. For
one thing, the provision requires the deficiency to be verified in a
more specific way: “medically,” that is, by a physician or other
medical 	professional. 	See 	OCGA 	§ 	15-11-311(a)(1). 	See 	also
Medical, 	The 	American 	Heritage 	Dictionary 	(5th 	ed. 	2012)
(defining “medical” as “of or relating to the study or practice of
medicine”); Medical, New Oxford American Dictionary (3rd ed.
2010) (defining “medical” as “of, relating to, or designating the
science or practice of medicine in general, or its practitioners”). If
the statute simply referenced a “verified” deficiency, that might
be best understood as a deficiency that is authenticated by an
affidavit or otherwise sworn under oath, but here, “medically”
modifies “verified” such that we know it is a specific type of
verification best understood as something that is diagnosed or
otherwise identified by a medical professional. See Medical, The

15
American Heritage Dictionary (5th ed. 2012); Medical, New
Oxford American Dictionary (3rd ed. 2010); Verify, The American
Heritage Dictionary (5th ed. 2012); Verify, New Oxford American
Dictionary (3rd ed. 2010). And nothing in this statutory provision
indicates that such a diagnosis must be proved by any particular
kind 	of 	evidence 	to 	satisfy 	OCGA 	§ 	15-11-311(a)(1). 10 	Any
competent and relevant evidence can serve as a basis for the
juvenile court’s determination that a health deficiency under
subsection (a)(1) has been medically verified. And the juvenile
court is still tasked with weighing the evidence and determining
the credibility of the witnesses. See In re A.C., 285 Ga. 829, 836
(2009).
(b) The second question of statutory construction here is
whether the “duration or nature” of the subject health deficiency
must also be “medically verified.” See OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1).
The answer to that question is yes.
(1) OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1) describes a “medically verified
deficiency of [a] parent’s ... health that is of such duration or
nature so as to render such parent unable to provide adequately
for 	his 	or 	her 	child.” (Emphasis 	supplied). 	So, 	to 	determine
whether such a deficiency has been established, a juvenile court
must consider the deficiency’s “duration or nature”—facts which
must be based in evidence, not a juvenile court’s own speculation.
And, if the deficiency itself must be “medically verified,” meaning
10 We need not decide here what kinds of medical professionals or
medical evidence could provide evidence of a “medically verified” deficiency to
satisfy OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1), or whether something short of a formal
diagnosis may suffice. That is because, in this case, there was evidence from
which the court could conclude that a psychiatrist—a medical doctor—
diagnosed the Mother with a manic episode, and whatever the bounds of the
phrase “medically verified” are, a medical doctor’s diagnosis would certainly be
sufficient.

16
diagnosed or otherwise identified by a medical professional as
explained in Division (2)(a), it is hard to read this provision as
requiring anything different with respect to the evidence of that
deficiency’s “duration or nature.” In other words, just as the
deficiency must be medically verified, so, too, must its “duration
or nature,” which the juvenile court must consider in making the
ultimate determination of whether the deficiency in question
renders a parent unable to provide adequately for a child under
OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1).
(2) As noted above, OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1) is part of a list
of circumstances that, if established, a juvenile court “shall
consider” in “determining whether a child is without proper
parental 	care 	and 	control.” 	See 	id. 	§ 	15-11-311(a). 	That
determination is equivalent to a finding of neglect, see id. § 15-
11-2(48)(A), which in turn permits a finding that a child is
dependent, see id. § 15-11-2(22)(A). In short, subsection (a)(1)
provides a basis for a juvenile court’s determination that a child
is 	dependent. 	And, 	given 	the 	particular 	language 	of 	that
subsection, if the circumstances it sets out are established, it may
serve as a conclusive basis for a dependency finding (as it did in
this case in the view of the juvenile court). Given the juvenile
court’s 	role, 	it 	would 	be 	inconsistent 	with 	this 	statutory
framework—of which OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1) is a part—for
subsection (a)(1) to wholly delegate a determination of whether a
child has been neglected (and is thus dependent) to someone other
than the juvenile court—whether that someone is a medical
professional 	or 	anyone 	else. 	After 	all, 	that 	same 	statutory
framework makes clear that any finding that a child is dependent
(based on neglect or otherwise) is a finding that must be made by
the juvenile court. See OCGA § 15-11-181(e). Thus, although the
duration or nature of the deficiency must be medically verified,
the ultimate finding of whether the duration or nature of that

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deficiency “render[s] [a] parent unable to provide adequately for
his or her child” is one for the juvenile court to make. OCGA § 15-
11-311(a)(1).
(c) In this case, the juvenile court relied on OCGA § 15-11-
311(a)(1) to conclude that Dy. H. and Da. H. were “dependent”
children as defined by OCGA § 15-11-2(22) because they had been
neglected by the Mother, who was “unable to provide proper
parental care and control” based on her “untreated mental health
condition,” and the Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling on
appeal. See In the Interest of D. H., 376 Ga. App. at 219. The
juvenile court made explicit findings in support of its conclusion
that the Mother suffered from a medically verified mental health
deficiency—findings that were largely based on the Mother’s
testimony at the dependency hearing that she was diagnosed by
a psychiatrist as having a manic episode on the night of her arrest
and her struggles with brain fog and periodic blackouts over the
prior two years. But none of the evidence presented at the
dependency 	hearing 	that 	established 	the 	Mother’s 	medically
verified mental health deficiency gave any indication as to the
“duration or nature” of that health deficiency. As we explained in
Division (2)(b)(1), there has to be some evidence from a physician
or other medical professional about the duration or nature of the
deficiency that has been diagnosed. And, because there was no
such evidence here, there was no evidence from which the juvenile
court could have reached the ultimate legal conclusion that the
medically verified “duration or nature” of the Mother’s mental
health deficiency was such “as to render [her] unable to provide
adequately” for Dy. H. and Da. H. under OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1),
or 	that, 	in 	turn, 	these 	children 	were 	neglected 	and 	thus
dependent based strictly on this subsection.
Because OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1) was the only basis the

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juvenile court gave for its dependency finding, we vacate the
Court of Appeals’s decision and remand this case to the Court of
Appeals with direction to remand to the juvenile court for that
court to determine whether the evidence in the record as a whole
established the dependency of Dy. H. and Da. H. 11 See OCGA §§
15-11-2(22)(A) and 15-11-181.
Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. All
the Justices concur.
11 The grant of certiorari encompassed whether the lower courts
applied the correct standard for assessing whether the children were
dependent under OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1). Nothing in this opinion is intended
to limit the evidence that the juvenile court may consider on remand or the
statutory grounds—including statutes other than OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1)—
upon which the children may be deemed dependent.