USA v. Dyson et al.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHRIS A. BELTON,
Defendant.
Case No. 3:03-cr-00126-SLG-2
NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS
On May 7, 2019, Chris A. Belton filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the District
Court for the Central District of California.1 On December 19, 2019, the District
Court for the Central District of California recharacterized Mr. Belton’s petition as
a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and transferred the case to the District of
Alaska.2 This Court has reviewed Mr. Belton’s Petition, the Respondent’s Motion
to Dismiss, Magistrate Judge John D. Early’s Report and Recommendation, and
District Judge Michael W. Fitzgerald’s Order and agrees with that order that the
1 Docket 230.
2 Docket 14 of Case No. 3:19-cv-000321-SLG.
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original Petition has been properly recharacterized as a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion
and has been properly transferred to the District of Alaska.3
Mr. Belton’s § 2255 motion seeks to vacate the sentence imposed in District
of Alaska Case No. 3:03-cr-00126. The Ninth Circuit dismissed Mr. Belton’s direct
appeal on March 13, 2006.4 Thus, his § 2255 motion must have been filed by June
2007 to meet the applicable statute of limitations.5 Mr. Belton did not file his motion
until May 2019, nearly 12 years beyond the applicable statute of limitations.
Mr. Belton asserts he falls within an exception to that time limitation. His §
2255 motion raises a single claim for relief: that his prior drug convictions no longer
qualify as “serious drug offenses” after two Ninth Circuit cases—United States v.
Crawford and United States v. Lee—were issued in 2008 and 2012, respectively.6
Mr. Belton asserts that those cases establish that his prior convictions are no
longer considered “serious drug offenses.” Therefore, he maintains that he should
not have been subject to the career offender enhancement pursuant to the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines.7 The Court construes Mr. Belton’s motion to assert that
3 Dockets 1, 5, 13, and 14 of Case No. 3:19-cv-000321-SLG.
4 Docket 201 (Order in United States v. Belton, Ninth Circuit case no. 06-30004).
5 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) (“A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section.”);
Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 532 (2003) (“[F]or federal criminal defendants who do not
file a petition for certiorari with [the Supreme] Court on direct review, § 2255’s one-year
limitation period starts to run when the [90 day] time for seeking such review expires.”).
6 United States v. Crawford, 520 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2008) (overruled on other grounds by
United States v. Valencia-Mendoza, 912 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2019)) and United States v. Lee,
704 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2012).
7 Docket 230 at 8–11.
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because the Ninth Circuit did not issue Crawford and Lee until 2008 and 2012, he
could not have raised his current claim within the one-year statute of limitations.8
Having reviewed those decisions, the Court agrees with the reasoning of
Magistrate Judge John D. Early, who determined that Mr. Belton
was not precluded from arguing that the categorical approach of
Taylor [v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990)] precluded the use of
his convictions to support a career offender enhancement at the time
of his direct appeal or within the time a Section 2255 motion was
permitted. Neither Crawford nor Lee announced a new legal basis for
Petitioner’s claims; rather Crawford and Lee merely applied Taylor’s
holding in a manner consistent with Taylor.9
Accordingly, there is nothing about the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Crawford or Lee
that serves to restart or delay the statute of limitations.10 Moreover, even if the
issuance of Crawford or Lee had restarted the statute of limitations, Mr. Belton’s §
2255 motion would have been due within one year of the issuance of those
opinions, but it was not filed until 2019.11 The Court finds that Mr. Belton’s § 2255
motion is untimely.
In light of the foregoing, the Court intends to dismiss Mr. Belton’s § 2255
motion in both this case and in civil Case No. 3:19-cv-00321 as untimely 30 days
8 Docket 230 at 8–10.
9 Docket 13 of Case No. 3:19-cv-000321-SLG at 7–8.
10 See 29 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) (“The limitation period shall run from the latest of . . . the date on
which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been
newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on
collateral review.”).
11 29 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3).
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from the date of this order without further notice to him unless prior to that
date Mr. Belton files a response to this notice that provides justification as to why
the Court should address the merits of the § 2255 motion at this time.12
DATED this 17th day of January, 2020, at Anchorage, Alaska.
/s/ Sharon L. Gleason
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
12 This case also presents an additional issue that will be mooted by the dismissal of the § 2255
motion: Mr. Belton currently has an appeal of Case No. 3:03-cr-00126 pending before the Ninth
Circuit (Ninth Circuit Case No. 19-30267). The Ninth Circuit has instructed that “a district court
should not entertain a habeas corpus petition while there is an appeal pending.” United States
v. Deeb, 944 F.2d 545, 548 (9th Cir. 1991). Although Mr. Belton’s direct appeal and his § 2255
motion challenge different aspects of his case, he has not demonstrated that his case presents
“‘extraordinary circumstances’ [that] outweigh the considerations of administrative convenience
and judicial economy” that would justify the Court considering his collateral motion while a direct
appeal is pending. United States v. Taylor, 648 F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1981).
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