USA v. Stoltenberg et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF ALASKA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
EDWIN ALLEN STOLTENBERG,
Defendant.
3:18-cr-00109-TMB-MMS
FINAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION ON
“PROPOSED MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR LACK OF
“JURISDICTION””1
On January 27, 2021, the defendant, Edwin Allen Stoltenberg, aka Jessie
Wayne Ripley [hereinafter, Ripley], filed a motion captioned ““Jurisdiction””
[internal 	quotations 	original”.2 The 	defendant 	asserts 	that 	this 	Court 	lacks
jurisdiction to hear his case, and therefore demands that it be dismissed. The
Government responded in opposition to the defendant’s motion on February 2,
2021.3
For the reasons set forth below, the defendant’s motion should be DENIED.
1 This report and recommendation is being issued as a final report and recommendation.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3), any objections will be considered by the District Court
Judge, who will accept, reject, or modify the recommendation, or resubmit the matter to the
Magistrate Judge for additional consideration and recommendations.
2 Dkt. 594-1. The court notes that this motion was docketed by Gregory Heritage, counsel for
Mr. Ripley. As noted at Docket 594, the motion is filed by Mr. Ripley “in proper person”, i.e.
pro se. The court acknowledges and thanks Mr. Heritage for his courtesy in assisting the
defendant to make this pro se filing.
3 Dkt. 595.
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I. 	Factual Background.
Ripley is charged by superseding indictment with various drug and firearms
offenses.4 His case was first indicted on September 20, 2018.5 Since that time, he
has, by turns, been represented by appointed counsel, represented himself, and more
recently, followed a scheme of ‘hybrid representation’ in which he continued to be
represented by counsel, but was given leave by the court to file certain pleadings
that, in his attorney’s professional judgment, were not well grounded in fact or law.6
Without exception, Ripley’s filings [not those made by this attorney on his behalf]
present claims or arguments that are not cognizable under the law. Many of them
present what could broadly be termed ‘sovereign citizen’ arguments.7 It is noted that
Ripley disavows the sovereign citizen label.
II. 	Discussion.
In the instant filing, Ripley cites a single authority in support of his argument,
Williams v. United States, 77 L.Ed. 1372 (1933). This case can only be described as
inapposite to the case at bar. His motion further relies on a “1993 investigation by
4 Dkt. 207.
5 Dkt. 2.
6 Examples of the Defendant’s self-filed motions include: Motion Waiving Right to Counsel
Enter Sworn Affidavit of Mistake Into the Record as Evidence and Revoke and Remove Not
Guilty Plea Immediately [Dkt. 100]; Claim Against the Federal Government [Dkt. 155]; Non-
Negotiable Accepted for Value Approved for Payment [Dkt. 157]; Admit Attached Affidavit
Into Evidence and Request for Immediate Identify Hearing [Dkt. 543]; Compel Criminal
Charges on Officers Involved in the Illegal Intercepts of Attorney Client Phone Calls [Dkt. 576].
7 For a discussion of the sovereign citizen movement, see
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereign_citizen_movement.
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the CIA” for the proposition that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear his case. Details
of this CIA investigation are not provided in the “Jurisdiction” motion.8 Ripley
concludes that this Court “is without jurisdiction and must now dismiss the foregoing
immediately”9 [emphasis original].
The Government correctly points out that courts have uniformly rejected
defendants’ theories concerning lack of jurisdiction based on status as a ‘sovereign
citizen’10.
a. 	This Court has Personal Jurisdiction over the Defendant.
A district court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant simply by virtue of
the defendant being brought before it, and charged with a federal offense.11 “The
personal presence of a defendant before a District Court gives that court complete
jurisdiction over him, regardless of how his presence was secured”12. Here, Ripley
has appeared before this court at regular intervals since his arrest and initial
appearance in 2018. His appearances number in the dozens. It is beyond dispute that
this Court has personal jurisdiction over him.
8 It is also not apparent how or why the nation’s top foreign-intelligence gathering agency would
be rendering opinions about the jurisdiction of federal courts within the borders of the United
States. For CIA mission, see https://www.cia.gov/about/mission-vision/.
9 Dkt. 594-1. It is not evident from defendant’s argument that if he were correct that this court,
in fact, lacked jurisdiction, how it could dismiss a case over which it did not have purview.
10 Dkt. 595.
11 See, United States v. Marks, 530 F.3d 799, 810 (9 th Cir. 2008).
12 See, Stamphill v. Johnston, 136 F.2d 291, 292 (9 th Cir. 1943).
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b. 	This Court has Subject Matter Jurisdiction over the Instant
Offenses.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.13 There must, therefore, be
specific subject-matter jurisdiction for a criminal case to proceed federally.14 There
are a variety of pathways by which a criminal case can become federal, one being 8
U.S.C. 3231, which provides that federal district courts “shall have original
jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the states, of all offenses against the laws of
the United States.” Federal courts, therefore, have original criminal jurisdiction over
the federal criminal laws promulgated by Congress.
Here, the defendant faces a superseding indictment which alleges violations
under Titles 18 and 21 of the United States Code, a body of law, it need hardly be
said, passed by Congress.15 Again, it cannot be disputed that this Court has subject
matter jurisdiction over these offenses.
III. Conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court recommends Ripley’s motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction be DENIED with prejudice.
DATED this 22nd day of February, 2021, at Anchorage, Alaska.
s/ Matthew M. Scoble
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
13 See, Marks, 530 F.3d at 810.
14 Id.
15 Dkt. 207.
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Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(2) and D. Alaska Loc. Mag. R. 6(a), a party seeking to object
to this final finding and recommendation shall file written objections with the Clerk of Court no
later than the CLOSE OF BUSINESS on March 8, 2021. Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3),
objections will be considered first by the District Court Judge, who will then accept, reject, or
modify the recommendation, or resubmit the matter to the Magistrate Judge for additional
consideration. 	Failure to object to a magistrate judge’s findings of fact may be treated as a
procedural default and waiver of the right to contest those findings on appeal. 	Miranda v.
Anchondo, et al., 684 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2012). The Ninth Circuit concludes that a district court
is not required to consider evidence introduced for the first time in a party’s objection to a
magistrate judge’s recommendation. 	United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 2000).
Objections and responses shall not exceed five (5) pages in length, and shall not merely reargue
positions presented in motion papers. Rather, objections and responses shall specifically designate
the findings or recommendations objected to, the basis of the objection, and the points and
authorities in support. Response(s) to the objections shall be filed on or before the CLOSE OF
BUSINESS on March 15, 2021. The parties shall otherwise comply with provisions of D. Alaska
Loc. Mag. R. 6(a). The shortened objection and response deadlines are necessary due to the
looming trial date. D. Alaska Loc. Mag. R. 6(a) authorizes the Court to alter the standard
objection deadlines.
Reports and recommendations are not appealable orders. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed.
R. App. P. 4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. See Hilliard v.
Kincheloe, 796 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1986).
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