Thompson v. Allard et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
CARL K. THOMPSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARJORIE K. ALLARD, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 3:22-cv-00075-SLG-KFR
ORDER RE SCREENING ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court at Docket 1 is Plaintiff Carl K. Thompson’s Prisoner’s Complaint
under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and at Docket 3 is Mr. Thompson’s
Application to Waive Prepayment of the Filing Fee. These matters were referred to the
Honorable Magistrate Judge Kyle F. Reardon. 	At Docket 5, Judge Reardon issued a
Screening Order and Report and Recommendation, in which he recommended 1) this
action be dismissed with prejudice, because the complaint failed to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted and for the futility of amendment; 2) all pending motions be
denied as moot; and 3) a dismissal under these circumstances should be a strike as
required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, et al., 590 U.S. ___, 140
S. Ct. 172 (2020).1 Plaintiff filed objections to the Report and Recommendation at
Docket 6.
1 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) prohibits a prisoner who has filed more than three actions or appeals in any
federal court in the United States that are dismissed as frivolous or malicious or for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted from bringing any other actions without prepayment of fees
unless the prisoner can demonstrate that he or she is in “immediate danger of serious physical injury.”
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These matters are now before this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). That
statute provides that a district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part,
the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.”2 	A court is to “make
a de novo determination of those portions of the magistrate judge’s report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.”3 However, Section
636(b)(1) does not “require district court review of a magistrate’s factual or legal
conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party objects to those
findings.”4
Plaintiff makes four objections to the Report and Recommendation. 	First, he
objects to the magistrate judge’s finding that the named defendants, three state court
appellate judges, have judicial immunity.5 Second, he objects to the magistrate judge’s
finding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Plaintiff’s complaint.6 	Third, he objects
to the magistrate judge’s recommendation that the dismissal be with prejudice.7 Fourth,
he objects to the magistrate judge’s finding that granting leave to amend would be
futile.8
2 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
3 Id.
4 Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985); see also United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,
1121 (9th Cir. 2003).
5 Docket 6 at 2–3.
6 Docket 6 at 2–4.
7 Docket 6 at 2, 4.
8 Docket 6 at 2, 4–5.
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The Court has considered the objections on de novo review and finds each to be
without merit. 	As to the first objection, on de novo review the Court agrees with the
magistrate judge that the state court judges are accorded absolute immunity for their
judicial acts pursuant to the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1983).9 Additionally, this immunity extends to both injunctive and declaratory
relief against judicial officers.10 	The case Plaintiff cites, Moore v. Urquhart, 899 F.3d
1095, 1105 (9th Cir. 2018), is inapposite, as it held that unlike a judicial officer, a sheriff
was a “quintessential executive branch official” when carrying out a judge’s order and
hence was not immune from liability.
Further, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	the 	Rooker-Feldman 	doctrine 	serves 	as 	an
independent 	basis 	for 	dismissal 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	case. 	Federal 	district 	courts 	lack
jurisdiction to exercise appellate review over final state court judgments.11 The Rooker-
Feldman doctrine prohibits federal district courts from reviewing claims brought by
litigants who have lost in state court and allege injuries caused by the state court.12 The
case Plaintiff cites, Weilberg v. Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2007), is inapposite,
9 See also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (holding that the common law principle of judicial
immunity is well established); Lund v. Cowan, 5 F.4th 964, 970–72 (9th Cir. 2021) (discussing how
judicial immunity applies to official judicial acts).
10 Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1243-44 (9th Cir. 1996), superseded by statute on other grounds;
Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct. for Dist. of Nev., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987); Rote v. Comm. on Jud.
Conduct & Disability of Jud. Conf. of United States, 577 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1126 (D. Or. 2021).
11 Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923)); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482–
86 (1983).
12 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
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as it addressed whether the Supreme Court’s ruling in Heck v. Humphrey, 51 U.S. 477
(1994), bars prospective plaintiffs from bringing a Section 1983 action that is based
upon a violation of extradition law.
As to the third and fourth objections, the Court finds on de novo review that
Plaintiff cannot plausibly allege a viable legal claim arising out the State of Alaska’s
Court of Appeals July 2021 ruling. The Court’s aforementioned reasoning as to why the
first and second objections fail precludes Plaintiff’s objection that his legal arguments
are meritorious and can succeed, or in the alternative that any weaknesses in pleading
can be cured by amending the complaint. 	As explained above, Defendants are
absolutely immune from suit and this Court lacks jurisdiction. 	Futility exists when “the
allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure
the deficiency[.]”13 	No viable claim can be asserted against the state judicial officers
and no other defendants may be substituted under these facts; therefore, amendment
is futile.14
In light of the foregoing, the Court ACCEPTS AND ADOPTS the Report and
Recommendation at Docket 5 in its entirety, and IT IS ORDERED that this action is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted and the futility of amendment. The application to waive prepayment of the filing
fee is DENIED AS MOOT. 	This dismissal shall be counted as a STRIKE as required
13 Schreiber Distributing Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986).
14 Hartmann v. California Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A district court
may deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile.”).
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by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, et al. 590 U.S. ___, 140 S.Ct. 172
(2020).
The Clerk of Court shall enter a final judgment accordingly.
DATED this 6th day of September, 2022, at Anchorage, Alaska.
/s/ Sharon L. Gleason
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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