Roberts v. City of Fairbanks et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
MARVIN ROBERTS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF FAIRBANKS, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 4:17-cv-00034-SLG
ORDER RE PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before the Court at Docket 167 is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. 	Defendants responded in opposition at Docket 177, and Plaintiffs
replied at Docket 181. 	Also before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment at Docket 168.1 	Plaintiffs responded in opposition at Docket 180, and
Defendants replied at Docket 186. The Court heard oral argument on both motions
on September 25, 2023. 	Prior to oral argument, three of the four Plaintiffs—
George Frese, Kevin Pease, and Eugene Vent—came to a settlement agreement
with Defendants; only Marvin Roberts remains as a Plaintiff in this case, and oral
argument focused solely on his claim against Defendants.2
1 Defendants’ memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment is found at Docket
168-1.
2 See Docket 201; Docket 202; Docket 204; Docket 205.
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BACKGROUND
The factual allegations in this case have been set forth in detail by the Ninth
Circuit3 and are included here only as necessary. Mr. Roberts and the three prior
plaintiffs (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) were convicted of the October 11, 1997, murder
of fifteen-year-old John Hartman.4 	In September 2013, Plaintiffs filed post-
conviction relief petitions in Alaska Superior Court, in part on the basis of a
confession by William Holmes naming himself and four other men as the actual
perpetrators of Mr. Hartman’s murder.5 In October and November 2015, after two
years of discovery, the state court held a five-week evidentiary hearing on the
petitions at which William Holmes testified that he and several other men had killed
John Hartman.6 	Eleven other witnesses corroborated Holmes’s account, and a
witness from the original trial testified that his testimony had been coerced by
Fairbanks Police Department (“FPD”) officers.7 The judge informed the parties at
the close of the evidentiary hearing that he would not render a decision for six to
3 Roberts v. City of Fairbanks, 947 F.3d 1191, 1193-96 (9th Cir. 2020).
4 Id. at 1193-94. This case was previously consolidated with Case No. 4:17-cv-00035-SLG; that
case has been terminated. For convenience and due to usage in the parties’ briefing, the Court
refers to all four men as Plaintiffs, though Mr. Roberts is the only remaining Plaintiff in this case.
5 Id. at 1194.
6 Id.
7 Id.
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eight months.8 	Plaintiffs allege that “[m]embers of the prosecution also stated
publicly” that if the convictions were vacated, “the State would appeal that decision
through to the Alaska Supreme Court.”9
With the judge’s decision pending, “the prosecutors offered Plaintiffs a deal:
the prosecution would consent to vacating the convictions and dismissing the
charges, but only if all four plaintiffs agreed to release the State of Alaska and the
City 	of 	Fairbanks 	(and 	their 	employees) 	from 	any 	liability 	related 	to 	the
convictions.”10 On December 9, 2015, Plaintiffs, the State of Alaska (“State”), and
the City of Fairbanks entered into a Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release of
All Claims.11 However, the approval of the release-dismissal agreement was held
in abeyance by Alaska Superior Court Judge Paul Lyle, who issued an order
questioning the legal basis for his authority to order the immediate release of the
Plaintiffs absent a finding in favor of Plaintiffs “on the substance of their [post-
conviction] claims . . . or that the State is no longer contesting the validity” of those
claims.12 	Thus, 	on 	December 	17, 	2015, 	the 	parties 	attended 	a 	judicially-
supervised mediation with another judge and entered into a stipulation that
8 Id. at 1195.
9 Docket 40 at ¶ 121 (Second Am. Compl.).
10 Roberts, 947 F.3d at 1195 (footnote omitted).
11 See Docket 171-55.
12 Docket 171-59 at 2-4.
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incorporated 	the 	original 	release-dismissal 	agreement 	(collectively, 	the
“Settlement Agreement”). 13 	In the stipulation, the parties agreed that the original
jury verdicts and judgments were properly and validly entered based on proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. 14 They further “stipulate[d] and agree[d] that there is
sufficient new evidence of material facts that a new trial could be ordered under
[Alaska Statute (“AS”)] 12.72.010(4),” without Plaintiffs having to prove their actual
innocence by clear and convincing evidence.15 	Based on the parties’ stipulation,
and without addressing the merits of the petitions, on December 17, 2015, the state
court vacated Plaintiffs’ convictions, the prosecutors dismissed the indictments,
and Mr. Frese, Mr. Pease, and Mr. Vent were released from prison. 16
The Settlement Agreement notwithstanding, Plaintiffs filed this suit in federal
court in December 2017, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985
against the City of Fairbanks and FPD officers James Geier, Clifford Aaron Ring,
13 See Docket 171-72 at ¶ 7; Docket 171-126 (transcript of settlement hearing with Judge Lyle
after settlement conference).
14 Docket 171-72 at ¶ 2.
15 See Docket 171-72 at ¶¶ 3-4 (“The parties stipulate and agree that this Court need not make
findings of innocence under AS 12.72.020.”). AS 12.72.020(b)(2)(D) requires a criminal
defendant to establish his innocence by “clear and convincing evidence.”
16 Docket 171-126 at 4 (“[T]his is a lawful settlement conducted under lawful procedure, under
the inherent authority of the attorney general, over which this Court has no authority to -- to
review or to criticize. . . . The Petitioners will be . . . released forthwith after this hearing.”);
Docket 171-72 at ¶ 7 (providing that upon vacatur of Plaintiffs’ convictions, “the State will not
seek retrial in any of the underlying criminal cases and will file dismissals . . . of the indictments
in the above-referenced cases”).
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Chris Nolan, and Dave Kendrick (collectively, “Defendants”).17 	The district court,
“in specific reliance on the parties’ stipulation that ‘the original jury verdicts and
judgments of conviction were properly and validly entered based on proof beyond
a reasonable doubt,’” dismissed the case on the ground that Plaintiffs had not
established a favorable termination of the criminal case and that their claims were
thus barred by Heck v. Humphrey.18 	On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit held
that 	Plaintiffs’ 	claims 	were 	not 	barred 	by 	Heck, 	concluding 	that 	“where 	all
convictions underlying § 1983 claims are vacated and no outstanding criminal
judgments remain, Heck does not bar plaintiffs from seeking relief under § 1983.”19
The Court of Appeals declined to consider Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs’
claims were barred by their release of all claims in the Settlement Agreement,
noting that it was “an issue not passed upon below,” and “le[ft] that issue for the
district court.”20 	The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal order and
remanded the case for further proceedings.21
17 Docket 1; Docket 40 at ¶¶ 17-21 (Am. Compl.); Case No. 4:17-cv-00035-SLG, Docket 1.
These cases were consolidated on March 19, 2018. Docket 34.
18 Roberts, 947 F.3d at 1196 (citation omitted); see also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994); Docket 62 (vacated by Roberts, 947 F.3d 1191).
19 Roberts, 947 F.3d at 1193.
20 Id. at 1205-06.
21 Id. at 1206.
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On remand, Defendants moved to bifurcate the proceeding and requested
that the Court first rule on the Settlement Agreement’s enforceability pursuant to
Town of Newton v. Rumery22 before addressing Plaintiffs’ § 1983 and § 1985
claims on the merits, if then necessary.23 The Court granted the motion and stayed
the case on the merits.24 	The issue of the Settlement Agreement’s enforceability
is now before the Court. 	Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment,
asserting that the enforcement of the Settlement Agreement is contrary to public
policy 	and 	that 	the 	releases 	were 	involuntary 	under 	the 	Rumery 	factors.25
Defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, asserting that there is no
genuine dispute that Plaintiffs “voluntarily released the claims they are asserting in
this lawsuit” and that enforcing the Settlement Agreement “will not adversely affect
the relevant public interest.”26 	As noted above, three of the four Plaintiffs settled
the case shortly before oral argument, and only Mr. Roberts remains in this action.
22 480 U.S. 386 (1987) (plurality opinion).
23 Docket 81 at 2.
24 Docket 109 at 24-25.
25 Docket 167 at 21-39.
26 Docket 168-1 at 8-9.
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JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this is a
civil action with certain claims arising under federal law: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
§ 1985.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) directs a court to “grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 	The burden of
showing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact lies with the movant.27
If the movant meets this burden, the non-moving party must demonstrate “specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”28 When considering a motion
for summary judgment, a court views the facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party and draws “all justifiable inferences” in the non-moving party’s
favor.29 In reviewing cross-motions for summary judgment, a court “review[s] each
separately, giving the non-movant for each motion the benefit of all reasonable
inferences.” 30
27 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
28 Id. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-
49 (1986).
29 Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)).
30 Flores v. City of San Gabriel, 824 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Ctr. for Bio-Ethical
Reform, Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780, 786 (9th Cir. 2008)).
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DISCUSSION
In Rumery, the Supreme Court held in a plurality opinion that a release-
dismissal agreement “in which a criminal defendant releases his right to file an
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in return for a prosecutor’s dismissal of pending
criminal charges” is not per se invalid.31 Rather, after analysis of the relevant facts,
the Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff’s release-dismissal agreement in
that case was enforceable because (1) the “agreement was voluntary”; (2) “there
[was] no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct”; and (3) “enforcement of this
agreement would not adversely affect the relevant public interests.”32
In Rumery, the plaintiff, Bernard Rumery, was arrested and accused of
tampering with a witness who was a victim of an aggravated sexual assault.33
Rumery promptly retained “an experienced criminal defense attorney,” after which
he and the prosecutor reached a release-dismissal agreement, “under which [the
prosecutor] would dismiss the charges against Rumery if Rumery would agree not
to sue the town, its officials, or [the victim] for any harm caused by the arrest.”34
The parties all “agreed that one factor in [the prosecutor’s] decision not to
prosecute Rumery was [the prosecutor’s] desire to protect [the victim] from the
31 480 U.S. at 389, 397.
32 Id. at 398.
33 Id. at 389-90.
34 Id. at 390.
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trauma she would suffer if she were forced to testify.”35 A plurality of the Supreme
Court determined that Rumery’s decision to enter into the release-dismissal
agreement was voluntary because “(1) Rumery was a sophisticated businessman;
(2) he was not in custody when he agreed to the release; (3) he was represented
by an experienced criminal defense attorney, who drafted the agreement; and (4)
he considered the agreement for three days before signing it.” 36 	And while the
plurality 	declined 	to 	adopt 	a 	per 	se 	rule 	against 	such 	agreements, 	it 	did
acknowledge that the “availability of such agreements may threaten important
public interests”; “[t]hey may tempt prosecutors to bring frivolous charges, or to
dismiss meritorious charges, to protect the interests of other officials.”37 	In
Rumery’s case, however, the plurality concluded that “the prosecutor had an
independent, legitimate reason to make this agreement directly related to his
prosecutorial responsibilities.”38
Justice O’Connor concurred with the opinion of the Court, stating that it
should be the defendants to a potential § 1983 suit who should bear the burden of
proving the validity of such release-dismissal agreements.39 	Justice O’Connor
35 Id.
36 Lynch v. Alhambra, 880 F.2d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Rumery, 480 U.S. at 394).
37 Rumery, 480 U.S. at 395.
38 Id. at 398.
39 Id. at 401 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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identified five factors for consideration when determining whether a release-
dismissal agreement “was voluntarily made, not the product of prosecutorial
overreaching, and in the public interest”:
(1) the knowledge and experience of the criminal defendant; (2) the
circumstances of the execution of the release, including whether the
defendant had the benefit of counsel; (3) the nature of the criminal
charges pending; (4) the existence of a legitimate criminal justice
objective for obtaining the release; and (5) whether the agreement
was executed under judicial supervision. 40
In Lynch v. City of Alhambra, the Ninth Circuit discussed Rumery and
articulated 	a 	two-part 	test 	for 	whether 	a 	release-dismissal 	agreement 	is
enforceable.41 	Such an agreement is enforceable only if “(1) it was entered into
voluntarily; and (2) its enforcement is in the public interest.”42 “Both elements are
required.”43 The Ninth Circuit further held that the burden “to plead and prove that
the agreement serves the public interest” lies with the civil rights defendants.44
40 Lynch, 880 F.2d at 1126 (citing Rumery, 480 U.S. at 401-02 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
41 Id. (citing Rumery, 480 U.S. 386).
42 Id. The Ninth Circuit also held that “affirmative prosecutorial misconduct is not an essential
element of [a] plaintiff’s case,” because “the second prong of the Rumery test is whether the
public interest is served by the agreement, not whether the prosecutor acted with pure motives.”
Id. at 1128.
43 Id. at 1126.
44 Id. at 1128 (citing Rumery, 480 U.S. at 401 (O’Connor, J., concurring)) (other citations
omitted).
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In Lynch, the plaintiff, Richard Lynch, sustained multiple injuries inflicted by
the arresting officer while Lynch was being arrested for a crime he did not commit. 45
Lynch—an off-duty officer at the time of his arrest—“specifically alleged that he did
not resist [the officer], or otherwise impede the officers in the performance of their
duties.”46 However, after Lynch made several complaints to the police department
regarding his treatment during the arrest, the city’s prosecutor told Lynch that there
were sufficient grounds to prosecute him for resisting arrest, “and that such
prosecution would be initiated unless Lynch released his civil claims against the
city.”47 	Lynch’s attorney then drafted a release-dismissal agreement that the city
approved, and after “more than four weeks of consideration, Lynch signed the
agreement.” 48 The district court held that Lynch had voluntarily signed the release,
but that court “did not decide whether the agreement violate[d] public policy.” 49
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that Lynch’s
decision to enter into the release-dismissal agreement was voluntary, pointing out
that Lynch, as a long-time peace officer, was familiar with the criminal process; he
45 Id. at 1123.
46 Id. at 1123, 1128.
47 Id. at 1123-24.
48 Id. at 1124.
49 Id. The district court did not address the public interest factor because “it interpreted Rumery
to require an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct, and dismissed Lynch’s complaint for failure
to make such an allegation.” Id. at 1127.
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was represented by an attorney; his attorney drafted the agreement; Lynch was
not in custody while considering the release; and he considered the proposed
release-dismissal agreement for four weeks before signing it.50 	The Ninth Circuit
then remanded the case to the district court “to address whether the enforcement
of Lynch’s agreement would be in the public interest.”51 	On the public interest
issue, the Circuit Court observed that in addition to specifically alleging that he did
not resist the arrest, Lynch also maintained that the arresting officer “fabricated the
allegations contained in the police report to justify the arrest,” and that “the
defendants conspired to force him to sign the agreement upon the threat of
prosecution and that the prosecution was not based on legitimate facts.”52 	The
Ninth Circuit held that these allegations were “sufficient to raise the public interest
issue,” with “the burden [on] the defendants to plead and prove that the agreement
serves the public interest.”53 	The Ninth Circuit further emphasized that Rumery
requires “a case-by-case analysis of the propriety of release agreements,” and that
the district court must “hear the evidence and evaluate whether the public interest
50 Id. at 1126-27.
51 Id. at 1129.
52 Id. at 1128 (citations omitted).
53 Id. (citations omitted).
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is served by enforcement of the release-dismissal agreement,” because “each
case involves unique facts and policy considerations.” 54
In holding that “affirmative prosecutorial misconduct is not an essential
element of plaintiff’s case,” the Ninth Circuit explained that “[t]he public interest in
vindicating constitutional rights and deterring police misconduct is undermined
where officials other than the prosecutor fabricate or exaggerate allegations of
criminal conduct in order to facilitate the release of civil rights claims through
release-dismissal agreements.” 55 	Thus, “the second prong of the Rumery test is
whether the public interest is served by the agreement, not whether the prosecutor
acted with pure motives.”56
The Court therefore reviews the unique facts of this case and the parties’
cross-motions 	for 	summary 	judgment 	with 	respect 	to 	the 	Rumery 	factors,
beginning with whether Defendants have met their burden of proving that the
Settlement Agreement in this case serves the public interest. 	The Court focuses
on two key points: 	(1) the parties agreed that there was sufficient new evidence
for a new trial; and (2) the Settlement Agreement was conditioned on all four
Plaintiffs agreeing to it.
54 Id. at 1127-28.
55 Id. at 1128.
56 Id.
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I. 	Sufficient New Evidence for New Trial
As part of the Settlement Agreement, the parties “stipulate[d] and agree[d]
that there is sufficient new evidence of material facts that a new trial could be
ordered under AS 12.72.010(4).”57 AS 12.72.010(4) provides that
[a] person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime may
institute a proceeding for post-conviction relief if the person claims . .
. that there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented
and heard by the court, that requires vacation of the conviction or
sentence in the interest of justice[.]
In addition, the “parties stipulate[d] and agree[d] that this Court need not make
findings of innocence under AS 12.72.020.”58 AS 12.72.020(b)(2)(D) provides that
a party seeking post-conviction relief must establish actual innocence by “clear and
convincing evidence.” 	This case thus is factually distinct from both the Rumery
and Lynch cases. 	For the Settlement Agreement in this case was not about a
dismissal of potential or pending charges in exchange for releasing the City of
Fairbanks and its employees from liability, but rather involved the vacatur of
convictions, the continuing validity of which the parties agreed was called into
question in light of newly discovered evidence.
Although the parties did not specify what the “new evidence of material facts”
consisted of in their stipulation, the Ninth Circuit detailed the following evidence
57 Docket 171-72 at ¶ 3. The parties also stipulated and agreed that “the original jury verdicts
and judgments of conviction were properly and validly entered based on proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Docket 171-72 at ¶ 2.
58 Docket 171-72 at ¶ 4.
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that was adduced at the post-conviction relief (“PCR”) hearing shortly before the
parties entered into their Settlement Agreement:
• 	William Holmes testified that he, Jason Wallace, and three other
men had murdered Hartman;
• 	Eleven witnesses corroborated Holmes’ account;
• 	Four witnesses testified that Wallace had confessed to killing
Hartman 	and 	provided 	consistent, 	interlocking 	accounts
corroborating that fact;
• 	Arlo 	Olson, 	the 	sole 	witness 	who 	had 	identified 	Plaintiffs 	as
assailants in an unrelated attack on Frank Dayton the night of the
Hartman 	murder, 	testified 	that 	[Fairbanks 	Police 	Department]
officers coerced him into giving a false statement;
• 	Frank Dayton, the individual who had also been assaulted on the
night of the murder, testified that his assailants had not been in
Roberts’ car, as had been asserted by the prosecution;
• 	An 	Alaska 	State 	Trooper 	testified 	that 	an 	investigation
corroborated key elements of Holmes’ confession and failed to find
any evidence of Plaintiffs’ guilt;
• 	Alibi 	witnesses 	provided 	accounts 	of 	the 	activities 	and
whereabouts of Plaintiffs on the night of the murder, establishing
that Plaintiffs were never together that night and could not have
murdered Hartman or assaulted Dayton; and
• 	Forensic 	experts 	testified 	that 	the 	prosecution 	improperly
advanced “evidence” that Frese’s boot print matched the injuries
on Hartman’s face, stating that there was no scientifically reliable
way to make this determination. 59
59 Roberts, 947 F.3d at 1194-95. The State granted immunity to one contrary witness, Jason
Wallace, so he could be compelled to testify at the PCR hearing. See Docket 180-43 (grant of
immunity to Mr. Wallace). After being granted immunity, Mr. Wallace then “testified at the
hearing on Friday, October 30 and Monday, November 2, 2015 and denied any involvement in
the Hartman murder.” Docket 168-1 at 26 n.68.
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In addition, Jason Gazewood, a former Fairbanks prosecutor and then-
defense 	counsel 	for 	Jason 	Wallace, 	“wrote 	a 	letter 	to 	the 	post-conviction
prosecutors,” expressing that Plaintiffs’ “convictions were likely to be vacated and
that a retrial would be ‘virtually unwinnable.’” 60
He noted that the lead investigator of the murder, Detective Clifford
Aaron Ring, had “edit[ed] his recordings in such a way as to not record
exculpatory information while using coercive techniques to obtain
confessions,” and that the Fairbanks Police Department . . . was well
aware of Detective Ring’s “use of deceptive interviewing techniques.”
For these reasons, among others, Gazewood warned the prosecutors
that Plaintiffs were likely to seek—and win—tens of millions of dollars
in a civil-rights suit against those involved in procuring their wrongful
convictions.61
Mr. Roberts and Defendants continue to dispute Mr. Roberts’s actual
innocence for Mr. Hartman’s murder.62 But the Court need not reach that question.
Instead, based on the parties’ 2015 agreement that “there is sufficient new
evidence of material facts that a new trial could be ordered,”63 and based on the
extensive exculpatory evidence noted above, the Court finds that enforcing the
Settlement Agreement so as to preclude Mr. Roberts from seeking compensation
would disserve the public interest. 	Defendants note that Rumery does not
60 Roberts, 947 F.3d at 1194.
61 Id.
62 See Docket 177 at 10; Docket 167 at 23.
63 Docket 171-72 at ¶ 3.
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foreclose enforcing a release-dismissal agreement against an innocent person, but
both Rumery and Lynch involved defendants who were never convicted, much less
incarcerated.64 	In contrast, Mr. Roberts was convicted and incarcerated for 18
years.65 His three co-defendants were still incarcerated when the agreement was
reached.66 	To require Mr. Roberts to release his civil claims in order for his co-
defendants to achieve their freedom when Defendants agreed that there was
sufficient new evidence for all four men to receive a new trial—regardless of Mr.
Roberts’s actual innocence—does not serve the public interest.
Defendants also assert that the Settlement Agreement is in the public
interest 	because 	settling 	the 	four 	cases 	would 	“conserv[e] 	state 	resources,
[promote] community healing, and [bring] finality.”67 However, the Court does not
find these interests to override the interest in permitting an individual to seek
redress when that individual may have been wrongfully imprisoned for nearly two
decades of his life. 	After all, one of the “fundamental value determination[s]” of
American society is “that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a
64 Docket 177 at 6.
65 See Docket 40 at ¶ 92 (Am. Compl.) (alleging that Plaintiffs “each served more than 18 years
in custody”); Docket 103 at ¶ 92 (Answer to Am. Compl.) (admitting that “Plaintiffs each served
approximately 18 years in custody”).
66 See Roberts, 947 F.3d at 1195 n.2 (“Roberts had already been released from prison and was
on supervised parole, but the prosecution refused to release any of the other three plaintiffs
from prison unless Roberts agreed to the same arrangement.”).
67 See Docket 168-1 at 127-28; Docket 171-139 at 19, 41, 53.
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guilty man go free.”68 	Given that the parties agreed that there was enough
evidence for a new trial, which plainly means that the outcome for Mr. Roberts
could 	be 	an 	acquittal 	rather 	than 	a 	finding 	of 	guilty, 	Defendants 	have 	not
demonstrated how it is in the public interest to require Mr. Roberts to give up his
potentially 	legitimate 	§ 	1983 	claims 	in 	order 	for 	his 	co-defendants 	to 	be
immediately released from prison and his own potentially unlawful conviction to be
set aside.69 	In sum, for the State to require a release of all civil claims by Mr.
68 Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325 (1995) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
69 Defendants contend that prosecutorial decisions are often based on a number of factors, and
that courts “normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute” and have
been “properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute.” Docket 177 at 25, 27
(quoting Rumery, 480 U.S. at 396); Docket 168-1 at 136-37. However, the plurality in Rumery
used this language to explain why a “per se rule invalidating release-dismissal agreements” is
inappropriate, because such a rule improperly “assumes that prosecutors will seize the
opportunity for wrongdoing” when “tradition and experience justify [the] belief that the great
majority of prosecutors will be faithful to their duty.” See Rumery, 480 U.S. at 396-97. And yet
Rumery also holds that in the context of release-dismissal agreements, judicial oversight of
prosecutorial discretion is warranted. See Lynch, 880 F.2d at 1128 & n.9 (holding that
“Rumery requires the district court to hear the evidence and evaluate whether the public interest
is served by enforcement of the release-dismissal agreement” and noting that “the public
interest is disserved when a prosecutor negligently fails adequately to investigate and evaluate
the allegations of criminal conduct made by arresting officers as well as when a prosecutor
intentionally brings trumped-up charges to extort a release of civil claims”).
Defendants also assert that this case “does not implicate the core harm to the public interest
that concerned the Court in Rumery,” because it is not about police officers or prosecutors filing
unfounded criminal charges to pressure Plaintiffs into releasing their claims. Docket 168-1 at
132. The Court agrees that the context here is different but disagrees that there is no harm to
the public interest simply because the fact pattern is not the same. If anything, when a release-
dismissal agreement is involved, prosecutorial decisions in the post-conviction relief context
when exculpatory information has come to light may warrant greater judicial scrutiny than initial
charging decisions.
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Roberts when it had agreed that there was sufficient new evidence to warrant
vacating his conviction and according him a new trial is not in the public interest.
II. 	Requiring Waivers by All Co-Defendants
There is no dispute that “the prosecution would consent to vacating the
convictions and dismissing the charges, but only if all four plaintiffs agreed to
release the State of Alaska and the City of Fairbanks (and their employees) from
any liability related to the convictions.” 70 	At the time, Mr. Roberts “had already
been released from prison and was on supervised parole, but the prosecution
refused to release any of the other three plaintiffs from prison unless Roberts
agreed to the same arrangement.”71 While the parties also discuss this fact under
the voluntariness factor of the Rumery test, the Court considers it here with respect
to the public interest factor.
Defendants contend that the “all four” requirement “was reasonable under
the 	circumstances 	and 	motivated 	by 	legitimate 	concerns 	about 	finality 	and
community healing” and was not “a ploy to ‘exploit each man’s commitment to the
others’ freedom.’”72 	However, given that Defendants agreed that sufficient new
70 Roberts, 947 F.3d at 1195; see also Docket 167-40 at 1 (“The AG just officially extended the
Skidmore offer. Exoneration with no $. All four must accept.”); Docket 167-41 at 1 (email from
former Attorney General (“AG”) Craig Richards discussing the potential Settlement Agreement
and requiring that “[a]ll four must agree”).
71 Roberts, 947 F.3d at 1195 n.2.
72 Docket 177 at 57 (quoting Docket 167 at 18); Docket 171-139 at 32-33 (testimony of AG
Richards that the “all four” requirement was to end the litigation and “begin a process of being
done fighting and healing the community”).
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evidence existed for all four men to get a new trial, and given the Court’s finding
above that “finality and community healing” are not sufficient public concerns to
outweigh Mr. Roberts’s civil rights,73 the “all four” requirement adversely affects the
important public interest in the fair and just administration of criminal prosecutions.
Then-Deputy Attorney General John Skidmore testified that he knew Plaintiffs “had
problems with all four having to agree.”74 	Mr. Roberts stated he initially was “not
on board with” the terms of the agreement and asked if he could “separate [himself]
from this deal,” but he was told that “it was all or nothing.”75 When faced with that
scenario, Mr. Roberts testified, “And what am I going to do? I’m going to leave my
three brothers in prison . . . ? . . . [S]o I had to sign.”76
Separate 	from 	the 	relevance 	of 	this 	requirement 	on 	the 	issue 	of
voluntariness, the Court finds that Defendants have not shown how the public
interest is served or what “legitimate criminal justice objective” is attained by
requiring all four men to agree to a release-dismissal agreement instead of
allowing each one to make an individual choice.77 Requiring all four men agree to
Defendants’ terms was possible only because Defendants held nearly all the
73 See discussion supra Section I.
74 Docket 167-57 at 23.
75 Docket 167-42 at 1; Docket 167-62 at 3.
76 Docket 167-62 at 3.
77 See Rumery, 480 U.S. at 399 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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power in this context.78 	As the Lynch court noted, release-dismissal agreements
are 	“particularly 	troublesome” 	when 	police 	misconduct 	may 	have 	occurred,
because the police officer, “facing potential civil liability, has every incentive to
arrest on a marginal or nonexistent violation, and push for a charge and release.”79
Mr. Roberts in this case alleges both police and prosecutorial misconduct, and
while an initial charging decision is not at issue here, the Settlement Agreement in
this 	case 	is 	similarly 	“troublesome” 	because 	Defendants, 	who 	were 	“facing
potential civil liability,” had “every incentive” to condition the other three Plaintiffs’
release from prison on Mr. Roberts’s release of Defendants from all damages and
liability.80 	In sum, Defendants have not demonstrated a legitimate public interest
in requiring Mr. Roberts to give up any claim for damages for the 18 years he
78 See Docket 167-59 at 6-7 (George Frese testifying that he “never felt like [he] had the power
to demand” Defendants remove the “all four” requirement); Docket 167-62 at 3 (Mr. Roberts
testifying that he felt “forced to sign” because otherwise he would have to “leave [his] three
brothers in prison”); Docket 167-61 at 4 (Kevin Pease testifying that he “had no choice but to
sign it to get out,” because he could not see himself “going back to jail and waiting for [the PCR
judge to make a decision], and then if [he lost], wait for more appeals”).
79 Lynch, 880 F.2d at 1127.
80 See id. While Defendants analogize the “all four” requirement to the use of package plea
deals by prosecutors in their discussion on the voluntariness factor, the Court notes that the
situation here is distinct. See Docket 177 at 61-62; Docket 186 at 17-23. The cases
Defendants identify are ones in which prosecutors used a package plea deal to, for example,
offer more lenient sentences if all co-defendants pleaded guilty, but not to secure a release from
civil damages liability for alleged wrongful incarceration. Further, whereas a judge must advise
a defendant of his rights and the consequences of a plea of guilty, release-dismissal
agreements may be executed outside the presence of a judge and without judicial oversight.
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.
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claims he was wrongfully incarcerated for the murder of John Hartman in order to
obtain the immediate release of his co-defendants.81
Based upon the undisputed facts set forth above, the Court finds that
Defendants have not met their burden in showing that enforcing the Settlement
Agreement is in the public interest.82
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment at Docket 167 is GRANTED as to Marvin Roberts and that
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at Docket 168 is DENIED. 	The stay
on the merits of this case is LIFTED. The parties shall promptly meet and confer
and, within 14 days of the date of this order, jointly or separately set forth a
proposed scheduling order for the resolution of Mr. Roberts’s claims on the merits.
DATED this 4th day of January, 2024, at Anchorage, Alaska.
/s/ Sharon L. Gleason
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
81 See Docket 180 at 111-12 (“Enforcing the release in this case would undermine the important
deterrence purpose of § 1983: it does not deter misconduct if officers can fabricate evidence,
cause decades of wrongful incarceration, have a State investigation suggest the gravity of
errors, and yet suffer no consequence whatsoever. Nor does it serve the public interest to
deprive innocent Plaintiffs of any compensation for 18 years each of wrongful incarceration.”).
82 Because the public interest factor has not been met, the Court need not reach the
voluntariness factor since both factors must be met. See Lynch, 880 F.2d at 1126. And while
many facts in this case are disputed, this ruling is based on the undisputed facts discussed
herein, which the Court finds dispositive of the public interest requirement for this release-
dismissal agreement.
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