Tangwall et al v. Satterberg et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
BARBARA TANGWALL, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
WILLIAM R. SATTERBERG, JR., et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 4:20-cv-00040-SLG
ORDER RE MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
Before the Court at Docket 43 is Defendants Paul Lyle, Brent Bennett, and
Ruth Meier’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees. The motion requests an award of
enhanced attorney’s fees in their favor. Plaintiffs filed no response to the motion.
Oral argument was not requested and was not necessary to the Court’s
determination.
In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs do not clearly specify the sources of
law under which their claims arise.1 Because they allege that Defendants
interfered with “Plaintiffs’ equal access to the courts by denying their constitutional
right to defend a lawsuit in court,” the Court first addresses attorney’s fees in the
context of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.2
1 Docket 4.
2 Docket 4 at 4; see also Docket 19 at 2 (“[T]he complaint clearly states the court has jurisdiction
to hear the complaint for violation of civil rights guaranteed by the constitution of the United States,
i.e. access to the courts for redress of grievance.”).
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42 U.S.C § 1988 provides that “[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a
provision of section[] . . . 1983 . . . of this title, . . . the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs . . . .”
However, “[a] prevailing defendant in a § 1983 action is entitled to an award of
attorney’s fees under § 1988 only when the plaintiff’s action is ‘frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation.’”3
Here, the Court found that Defendants Lyle, Bennett, and Meier were
entitled to absolute immunity for their judicial and quasi-judicial acts, which was
“clear from the Amended Complaint’s allegations.”4 In their Amended Complaint
and their response to Defendants’ motions to dismiss, Plaintiffs failed to articulate
any theory as to why those three Defendants would not be entitled to such
immunity.5 Likewise, none of the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint or
appended exhibits suggest that these three Defendants acted in the “clear
absence of all jurisdiction” or performed acts that were not “judicial” in nature.6
3 Citizens for Free Speech, LLC, 953 F.3d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Tutor-Saliba Corp. v.
City of Hailey, 452 F.3d 1055, 1060 (9th Cir. 2006)). Under § 1983, “a defendant does not need
to obtain a judgment on the merits in order to be a ‘prevailing party’ for fee purposes.” Id. (citing
CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. E.E.O.C., 136 S. Ct. 1642, 1651 (2016)) (holding Younger-based
dismissal did not preclude § 1988 attorney’s fees for defendant even though dismissal was
jurisdictional rather than on merits). Having secured dismissal, Defendants here are prevailing
parties for the purposes of § 1988.
4 Docket 41 at 6, 7–8.
5 See Dockets 4 and 19.
6 See Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S.
335, 351 (1871) and Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 360 (1978)) (explaining the limited
exceptions to judicial immunity).
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This fact is not contradicted by the conclusory statement in the Amended
Complaint that the state court’s screening order was entered “in want of all
jurisdiction,” as the Amended Complaint lacks any cogent theory as to why the
state court would not have jurisdiction over the interpretation and application of its
own orders.7 It was eminently clear when the Amended Complaint was filed that
Plaintiffs are not entitled by the Constitution to sue judges for what they believe to
be an incorrect disposition of their case. As such, this case was frivolous from its
inception.
The Court next turns to the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees requested
by these three Defendants pursuant to § 1988. Determining a reasonable fee
under § 1988 is a two-step process: “First, courts generally ‘apply . . . the ‘lodestar’
method to determine what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee. Second, ‘[t]he
district court may then adjust [the lodestar] upward or downward based on a variety
of factors.”8 To compute the “lodestar,” a court “multiplies the number of hours the
prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly
rate.”9 The prevailing party “bears the burden of producing both (i) detailed time
records to establish that the number of compensable hours requested is
reasonable, and (ii) “satisfactory evidence” that the requested hourly rate comports
7 Docket 4 at 4.
8 Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013) (alterations in original).
9 Id. (quoting Ballen v. City of Redmond, 466 F.3d 736, 746 (9th Cir. 2006).
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with prevailing market rates for attorneys in the forum district with similar skill,
experience, and reputation.”10
Based on a review of the detailed records submitted in support of this
motion, the Court is satisfied that these three Defendants have met their burden of
establishing the reasonableness of their fee request.11 Defendants’ records
indicate 52.6 hours of attorney time, as well as two hours of paralegal time; this is
a reasonable amount of time for two successful motions to dismiss combined with
general case management, and none of the time entries appear to be duplicative
or unreasonable.12 Moreover, the Court finds that the hourly rates of $300 for an
experienced attorney and $125 for paralegals indicated in Defendants’
documentation is reasonable in light of the prevailing rate for “similar work
performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation”13 in the
District of Alaska; Defendants have submitted affidavit evidence that the rates are
“calculated at market rates approved by the Attorney General.”14 Multiplying these
hours by the applicable rates produces a total attorney’s fee of $16,030. However,
10 G&G Closed Circuit Events LLC v. Alexander, Case No. CV-18-02886-PHX-MTL, 2020 WL
3574552, *1 (D. Ariz. July 1, 2020) (citing Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1202–06).
11 Dockets 43-1 (Aff. of Susan M. West) and 43-2 (Ex. B).
12 See Citizens for Free Speech, LLC v. Cnty. of Alameda, Case No. C 18-00834 SBA, 2019 WL
11005503, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2019), aff’d 953 F.3d 655 (finding 100 billed hours reasonable
for a successful motion to dismiss).
13 Chalmers v. City of L.A., 796 F.2d 1205, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465
U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984).
14 Docket 43-1 at 2 (Aff. of Susan M. West).
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Defendants are only requesting 50 percent of the reasonable fees they incurred,
which is an award of $8,015. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds an award in
this amount under § 1988 reasonable.
To the extent that Plaintiffs based their claims in Alaska state tort law, the
Court applies Alaska state rules regarding attorney’s fees.15 Alaska Rule of Civil
Procedure 82 provides that “[i]n cases in which the prevailing party recovers no
money judgment, the court . . . shall award the prevailing party in a case resolved
without trial 20 percent of its actual attorney’s fees which were necessarily
incurred.”16 However, “[t]he court may vary an attorney’s fee award . . . if . . . the
court determines a variation is warranted” based on factors including “vexatious or
bad faith conduct,” “the extent to which a given fee award may be so onerous to
the non-prevailing party that it would deter similarly situated litigants from the
voluntary use of the courts,” and “other equitable factors deemed relevant.”17
The Court agrees with Defendants that based on the factors in Rule 82, an
enhanced award of attorney’s fees is justified. As explained above, Plaintiffs’
claims against these three Defendants were frivolous from the outset of this action.
Moreover, the typical course for a plaintiff who disagrees with the handling of her
15 Alaska Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Avis Budget Grp., Inc., 738 F.3d 960, 974 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82 governing attorney’s fees “properly applies to diversity cases
brought in or removed to the United States District Court for the District of Alaska.”).
16 Alaska R. Civ. P. 82(b)(2).
17 Alaska R. Civ. P. 82(b)(3).
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claims by a trial court is to seek appellate review. Instead, Plaintiffs here chose to
sue two state court judges and a court clerk who were involved in the disposition
of their claims. Retaliatory lawsuits against judicial officers interrupt and distract
public servants from their duties to the justice system. And as Defendants note,
retaliatory actions may well be designed to intimidate court personnel and
improperly influence judicial proceedings.18 These concerns justify modifying the
standard 20 percent provided for in Rule 82(b)(2) upward to the 50 percent
requested by these three Defendants in order to dissuade Plaintiffs from filing
further frivolous actions against court personnel; this is particularly true given
Plaintiffs’ history of vexatious litigation.19 Moreover, the resulting amount is not so
onerous that it would prevent other litigants from seeking redress for nonfrivolous
claims.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ motion at Docket 43 is
GRANTED. Because the State of Alaska provided a defense to Defendants Lyle,
Bennett, and Meier, attorney’s fees in the amount of $8,015 are awarded to the
State of Alaska and against Plaintiffs, jointly and severally. The Clerk of Court is
instructed to amend the judgment to reflect this award.
Dated this 29th day of March, 2021, at Anchorage, Alaska.
/s/ Sharon L. Gleason
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
18 Docket 43 at 4–5.
19 See, e.g., Docket 4-1 (Screening Order by Alaska Superior Court).
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