Williams v. Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
MEADOW M. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
ALLSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.
Case No. 4:22-cv-00006-JMK
OPINION AND ORDER ON CROSS-
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Before the Court are the parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. 1
The motions are opposed. 2 Oral argument was not requested and is not deemed necessary.
Both parties seek summary judgment on the issue of whether an automobile insurance
policy issued to Plaintiff by Defendant Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company
(“Allstate”) provides her with medical payment coverage for injuries she sustained in an
accident in August 2020. 3 	For the reasons described in this Order, the Court will grant
Defendant’s motion and deny Plaintiff’s cross-motion.
1 Docket 10 (Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.); Docket 11 (Def.’s Supporting Mem.); Docket 13
(Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J.); Docket 14 (Pl.’s Supporting Mem.).
2 Dockets 15 & 17 (Pl.’s Opp’n and Def.’s Reply); Dockets 18 & 19 (Def.’s Opp’n and
Pl.’s Reply).
3 See Docket 11; Docket 14.
Case 4:22-cv-00006-JMK Document 22 Filed 12/13/22 Page 1 of 14

Williams v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. 	Case No. 4:22-cv-00006-JMK
Opinion and Order re: Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment 	Page 2
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Factual Background
The material facts in this case are undisputed. 4 On August 20, 2020, Plaintiff
Meadow Williams was a passenger on a motorcycle driven by her boyfriend in Fairbanks,
Alaska. 5 	As they crossed the intersection of Gaffney Road and Cushman Street, another
driver ran a red light and crashed into them. 6 The other driver’s car collided with the right
side of the motorcycle, injuring Ms. Williams’s right leg and knee. 7 	The other driver’s
automobile insurer made a policy-limits payment of $100,000 to Ms. Williams in exchange
for her full release of all non-indemnity claims against the driver. 8
Ms. Williams also sought coverage under her family’s automobile insurance
policy through Defendant Allstate (the “Allstate Policy”). 9 Besides liability coverage, the
Allstate 	Policy 	provides 	$50,000 	of 	uninsured 	or 	underinsured 	motorist 	(“UIM”)
coverage. 10 	It also provides $100,000 of medical payments (“MedPay”) coverage. 11 	Its
general statement of coverage for MedPay payments is as follows: 12
4 Docket 11 at 1–2; Docket 14 at 1–2.
5 Docket 11 at 1; Docket 14 at 1.
6 Docket 11 at 1–2; Docket 14 at 1.
7 Docket 11 at 2; Docket 14 at 1–2.
8 Docket 14 at 1–2.
9 The Allstate Policy was held by Ms. Williams’s father and provided coverage to
residents of his household. The parties do not dispute that Ms. Williams, who was a minor residing
with her father at the time of the accident, was a “resident relative” of her father and therefore
could seek coverage under the Allstate Policy. See, e.g., Docket 14 at 2; Docket 11 at 2 (“Williams
was insured by [Allstate] under a policy issued to her father”).
10 Docker 14-1 at 4–6.
11 Id. at 4–6.
12 Id. at 17.
Case 4:22-cv-00006-JMK Document 22 Filed 12/13/22 Page 2 of 14

Williams v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. 	Case No. 4:22-cv-00006-JMK
Opinion and Order re: Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment 	Page 3
For the purposes of MedPay coverage, the Allstate Policy defines “insured person(s)” as
the policyholder and “any resident relative who sustains bodily injury while in, on, getting
into or out of, or getting on or off of, an auto . . . .” 13 The Allstate Policy defines “auto” to
mean “a private passenger land motor vehicle which has at least four wheels and is
designed for use on public roads.” 14 	This definition of “auto” applies to all parts of the
Allstate Policy unless otherwise noted. 15
The Allstate Policy also contains several exclusions precluding MedPay
coverage. 16 One such exclusion provides that the policy’s MedPay coverage does not apply
to bodily injury “to any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor
vehicle with less than four wheels” (“MedPay Exclusion #6”). 17
13 Id. at 23.
14 Id. at 11.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 17–18.
17 Id. at 18.
Case 4:22-cv-00006-JMK Document 22 Filed 12/13/22 Page 3 of 14

Williams v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. 	Case No. 4:22-cv-00006-JMK
Opinion and Order re: Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment 	Page 4
After receiving the $100,000 liability policy-limits payment from the other
driver, Ms. Williams submitted UIM and MedPay claims to Allstate under the Allstate
Policy. 18 	Allstate accepted Ms. Williams’s UIM claim and paid the full $50,000 policy
limit. 19 But Allstate denied Ms. Williams’s MedPay claim, concluding that Ms. Williams’s
injuries arose out of the “use of a motor vehicle with less than four wheels” and therefore
were excluded by MedPay Exclusion #6. 20
B. 	Procedural History
On January 10, 2022, Ms. Williams filed suit against Allstate in Alaska
Superior Court. 21 	Her Complaint alleges that Allstate committed breach of contract by
denying her MedPay claim. 22 It also seeks a declaratory judgment that Allstate wrongfully
applied MedPay Exclusion #6 and that Ms. Williams is entitled to MedPay coverage under
the Allstate Policy. 23 Ms. Williams seeks compensatory damages for medical bills related
to the accident. 24 Allstate removed the case to this Court on March 4, 2022. 25
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
This action arises under Alaska state law and invokes the Court’s diversity-
of-citizenship jurisdiction. 	As such, the Court will apply Alaska substantive law and
18 Docket 11 at 2.
19 Id.
20 Id.; Docket 15 at 5.
21 Docket 1-1.
22 Id. at 6.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Docket 1.
Case 4:22-cv-00006-JMK Document 22 Filed 12/13/22 Page 4 of 14

Williams v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. 	Case No. 4:22-cv-00006-JMK
Opinion and Order re: Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment 	Page 5
federal procedural law. 26 Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district
court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 27
Summary judgment is appropriate here because there are no genuine issues of material fact
relevant to the instant motion and the “meaning and interpretation of an insurance contract
is a question of law . . . .” 28
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Alaska Insurance Contract Interpretation
Under Alaska law, courts must construe insurance contracts according to the
principle of “reasonable expectations.” 29 This principle requires insurance contracts to be
construed “so as to provide that coverage which a layperson would have reasonably
expected from a lay interpretation of the policy terms.” 30 	An insured’s expectation of
26 See, e.g., Freund v. Nycomed Amersham, 347 F.3d 752, 761 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Under the
rule of [Erie], ‘federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction apply state substantive law and federal
procedural law.’”) (citation omitted) (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415,
427 (1996)).
27 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
28 Tomlinson ex rel. Young v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 433 F. App’x 499, 501 (9th Cir. 2011);
see also Norville v. Carr-Gottstein Foods Co., 84 P.3d 996, 1004 (Alaska 2004) (“Interpretation
of a contract is ordinarily a question of law.”). The parties agree that the case is appropriate for
summary judgment. See Docket 11 at 2–3 (“In this case, no material facts are in dispute . . . . This
case presents a question purely of law for which summary judgment is appropriate.”); Docket 14
at 1 (“The facts of this case are undisputed. We squarely face a single question of law.”).
29 Bering Strait Sch. Dist. v. RLI Ins. Co., 873 P.2d 1292, 1294 (Alaska 1994) (quoting
State v. Underwriters at Lloyds, London, 755 P.2d 396, 400 (Alaska 1988)).
30 Downing v. Country Life Ins. Co., 473 P.3d 699, 704 (Alaska 2020) (quoting United
States Fire Ins. Co. v. Colver, 600 P.2d 1, 3 (Alaska 1979)); see also Bering Strait, 873 P.2d at
1294 (defining the reasonable expectations principle as the concept that “[t]he objectively
reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance
contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have
negated those expectations”) (quoting Lloyds, 755 P.2d at 400).
Case 4:22-cv-00006-JMK Document 22 Filed 12/13/22 Page 5 of 14

Williams v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. 	Case No. 4:22-cv-00006-JMK
Opinion and Order re: Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment 	Page 6
coverage must be “objectively reasonable.” 31 The court need not find the policy ambiguous
to construe it under the reasonable expectations doctrine. 32
To determine the parties’ reasonable expectations, Alaska law directs courts
to “look[] to (1) the language of the disputed provisions in the policy, (2) other provisions
in the policy, (3) extrinsic evidence, and (4) case law interpreting similar provisions.” 33
“[B]ecause of inequities in bargaining power, [Alaska law] construe[s] coverage broadly
and exclusions narrowly, in favor of insureds.” 34 	Alaska law, however, will recognize a
coverage restriction “if . . . plain language limits the coverage of [the] policy.” 35 Insurance
policy language is construed “in accordance with ordinary and customary usage.” 36
B. 	The Parties’ Arguments
Both parties agree that the disposition of this case turns solely on the
interpretation of the Allstate Policy’s MedPay provisions. 37 	Allstate asserts that MedPay
Exclusion #6 unambiguously excludes coverage for Ms. Williams’s injuries because they
“[arose] out of the . . . use of a motor vehicle with less than four wheels.” 38 Allstate notes
that Ms. Williams was riding a motorcycle at the time of the accident, observing that the
31 West v. Umialik Ins. Co., 8 P.3d 1135, 1138 (Alaska 2000) (quoting Lloyds, 755 P.2d at
400); see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bongen, 925 P.2d 1042, 1047 (Alaska 1996) (“[S]ince
most insureds develop an expectation that every loss will be covered, the reasonable expectation
doctrine ‘must be limited by something more than the fervent hope usually engendered by loss.’”)
(quoting Millar v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 804 P.2d 822, 826–27 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990)).
32 West, 8 P.3d at 1138.
33 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Teel, 100 P.3d 2, 4 (Alaska 2004).
34 Devine v. Great Divide Ins. Co., 350 P.3d 782, 786 (Alaska 2015) (first alteration in
original) (quoting Whittier Props., Inc. v. Alaska Nat’l Ins. Co., 185 P.3d 84, 88 (Alaska 2008)).
35 Whittier Props., 185 P.3d at 88.
36 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Falgoust, 160 P.3d 134, 139 (Alaska 2007).
37 See Docket 11 at 2–3; Docket 14 at 1.
38 Docket 11 at 5–6.
Case 4:22-cv-00006-JMK Document 22 Filed 12/13/22 Page 6 of 14

Williams v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. 	Case No. 4:22-cv-00006-JMK
Opinion and Order re: Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment 	Page 7
motorcycle indisputably had fewer than four wheels. 39 	It cites to decisions from various
jurisdictions, including Alaska, that suggest that the phrase “arising out of the use of” in an
automobile insurance policy broadly encompasses any occurrences that have at least some
causal connection to the vehicle in question. 40 Allstate also asserts that the MedPay policy
does not provide coverage because Ms. Williams did not suffer her injuries while on an
“auto,” observing that the liability, MedPay, and vehicle portions of the policy all define
an “auto” as “a private passenger land motor vehicle which has at least four wheels.” 41
Allstate concludes that Ms. Williams cannot reasonably have expected the policy to
provide MedPay coverage for her injuries. 42
Ms. Williams opposes Allstate’s motion and cross-moves for summary
judgment in her favor. 43 Ms. Williams asserts that the “sole issue” on summary judgment
is the applicability of MedPay Exclusion #6 because (1) the term of “auto” does not appear
in the Allstate Policy’s general statement of coverage for MedPay, and (2) Allstate waived
the argument that the Allstate Policy’s definition of “auto” precludes coverage by not
including the definition of “auto” as a rationale for denying coverage in its August 31,
2021, MedPay Coverage Declination Letter. 44 Further, noting that Alaska law requires the
Court to interpret policy exclusions narrowly in her favor, Ms. Williams maintains that
MedPay Exclusion #6 does not bar MedPay coverage for her injuries because the fact that
39 Id.
40 Id. at 6–10.
41 Id. at 7.
42 Id. at 5–11.
43 Docket 14; Docket 15.
44 Docket 15 at 2–6; Docket 15-1.
Case 4:22-cv-00006-JMK Document 22 Filed 12/13/22 Page 7 of 14

Williams v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. 	Case No. 4:22-cv-00006-JMK
Opinion and Order re: Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment 	Page 8
she was riding a motorcycle had no “casual connection” to her injuries. 45 Williams asserts
the other driver would have hit her regardless of whether she had been on the motorcycle
or a four-wheeled vehicle. 46 	She therefore concludes that her injuries “arose out of” the
other driver’s use of his car, not her use of the motorcycle. 47 	Ms. Williams moves for a
summary judgment ruling that Allstate breached the Allstate Policy by declining her
MedPay claim and that MedPay Exclusion #6 does not preclude MedPay coverage for her
injuries. 48
C. 	Analysis
After examining the language of MedPay Exclusion #6, other relevant
provisions of the Allstate Policy, and case law interpreting similar contractual language,
the Court finds that, under MedPay Exclusion #6, Ms. Williams could not reasonably have
expected her policy to provide MedPay coverage for her injuries. 49 MedPay Exclusion #6
45 Docket 14 at 8–10.
46 Id. at 9.
47 Id. at 10.
48 Id. at 9–10; Docket 15 at 6–10. Ms. Williams does not assert ambiguity in any of the
Allstate Policy’s provisions. See Docket 15 at 6–10.
49 In addition to the Allstate Policy and the Coverage Declination Letter, Ms. Williams
submitted three nearly identical affidavits, all asserting that the “MVA did not ‘arise out of the
ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle with less than four wheels.’ Rather this MVA
100% arose out of Mr. Sampson’s misuse of a 4-wheel Subaru sedan.” 	See Docket 14-3;
Docket 14-4; Docket 14-5. Ms. Williams also submitted a letter from the driver’s insurer, which
stated that the driver “was at fault” for the accident. Docket 14-6. This extrinsic evidence restates
the undisputed facts but does not support the contention that Ms. Williams had an objectively
reasonable expectation of coverage under the Allstate Policy. 	See United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v.
Neary, 307 P.3d 907, 912 (Alaska 2013) (“We have looked in the past to such evidence as
statements by the insurer’s sales representatives and the insurer’s printed flyers or brochures for
an indication of the reasonable expectations of the insured seeking coverage.”); Whittier Props.,
185 P.3d at 92 (concluding that the reasonable expectations doctrine did not assist Plaintiffs where
extrinsic evidence did not suggest that the parties reasonably believed that damages stemming
from leaked gasoline would be covered under the relevant insurance policies). Similarly, Allstate
Case 4:22-cv-00006-JMK Document 22 Filed 12/13/22 Page 8 of 14

Williams v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. 	Case No. 4:22-cv-00006-JMK
Opinion and Order re: Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment 	Page 9
precludes MedPay coverage for bodily injury “arising out of the ownership, maintenance,
or use of a motor vehicle with less than four wheels.” 50 	The Alaska Supreme Court has
interpreted the phrase “bodily injury . . . arising out of the use of” a vehicle in an auto
insurance policy to mean that “there must be some causal connection between the ‘use’ of
the vehicle and the injury.” 51 	According to the Alaska Supreme Court, determining
whether a bodily injury arose out of the use of a vehicle involves a fact-specific analysis
that turns on the following three factors:
(1) The extent of causation between the [vehicle] and
the injury;
(2) Whether 	an 	act 	of 	independent 	significance
occurred, breaking the causal link between “use” of the vehicle
and the injuries inflicted; and
(3) What type of “use” of the [vehicle] was involved. 52
Under these three factors, Ms. Williams’s bodily injuries arose out of the use
of her boyfriend’s motorcycle. 	First, the motorcycle had a direct causal connection with
Ms. Williams’s injuries because it was an “active accessory” to them. 53 Unlike other cases
in which no causal connection existed because the bodily injury resulted from a post-
presents arguments relating to the rate of motorcycle accidents as extrinsic evidence but does not
suggest that Ms. Williams was aware of this increased risk when forming her expectations
regarding coverage. Docket 15 at 10–11. As such, neither party’s extrinsic evidence is helpful to
the Court’s reasonable expectation analysis.
50 Docket 14-1 at 18.
51 Kalenka v. Infinity Ins. Cos., 262 P.3d 602, 609 (Alaska 2011) (quoting Shaw v. State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 19 P.3d 588, 591 (Alaska 2001)).
52 Id. (quoting Shaw, 19 P.3d at 592).
53 See id. (explaining that “the vehicle must be an ‘active accessory’ for there to be an
adequate causal relationship”) (quoting Shaw, 19 P.3d at 592 n.28).
Case 4:22-cv-00006-JMK Document 22 Filed 12/13/22 Page 9 of 14

Williams v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. 	Case No. 4:22-cv-00006-JMK
Opinion and Order re: Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment 	Page 10
vehicle-crash fight, not the crash itself, 54 in the present case Ms. Williams was actively
riding on the motorcycle when the other driver’s car struck and injured her leg.
Next, no “act of independent significance” broke the causal link between
Ms. Williams’s riding of the motorcycle and her injuries. Another driver’s intentional act
is not automatically an act of independent significance. 55 	An act has independent
significance and breaks the causal chain when, for example, a tortfeasor leaves or exits his
vehicle before he injures an insured. 56 	Had Ms. Williams dismounted the motorcycle
before the other driver struck her, such an act might have broken the causal chain between
her use of the motorcycle and her injuries.
Lastly, by riding the motorcycle, Ms. Williams was “using” it in a manner
relating to “its inherent status as a vehicle.” 57 The ordinary meaning of the word “use” is
“to put into action or service, avail oneself of, employ.” 58 	Under this ordinary meaning,
Ms. Williams was plainly “using” her boyfriend’s motorcycle when she was injured by
riding it as a means of transportation. Unlike other cases in which a vehicle was not used
in its “inherent status as a vehicle” because it was, for example, used as a gun rest from
54 See id. (“[T]he vehicle driven by [the tortfeasor] was not an ‘active accessory’ to [the
insured]’s injuries. The collision between [the tortfeasor]’s and [the insured]’s vehicles was only
the subject of their fight; the vehicles played no part in the fight itself. 	Accordingly, there was
insufficient causation for [the insured]’s death to have arisen out of the ‘use’ of the vehicle [the
tortfeasor] was driving.”).
55 Id. (quoting Shaw, 19 P.3d at 593).
56 See id. at 609–10.
57 See Shaw, 19 P.3d at 591–92 (explaining that the Alaska Supreme Court approves of
“those ‘more recent cases’ which ‘refuse[d] to interpret “use” as meaning other than the use of the
vehicle in its inherent status as a vehicle.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Criterion Ins. Co. v.
Velthouse, 751 P.2d 1, 4 (Alaska 1986)).
58 Use 	(v.), 	Merriam-Webster 	Online 	Dictionary 	(2022), 	available 	at
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/use.
Case 4:22-cv-00006-JMK Document 22 Filed 12/13/22 Page 10 of 14

Williams v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. 	Case No. 4:22-cv-00006-JMK
Opinion and Order re: Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment 	Page 11
which a tortfeasor shot an insured, Ms. Williams was riding her boyfriend’s motorcycle as
a passenger when she was injured. 59 	In Criterion Insurance Company v. Velthouse, the
Alaska Supreme Court concluded that “[b]ecause the accident could just as easily have
occurred in a field or in the home as in [the insured’s] parked truck . . . it had no connection
with the ‘use’ of [the insured’s] vehicle as a matter of law.” 60 Here, Ms. Williams’s injuries
could not have occurred in a field or in the home—her leg was injured precisely because
she was a passenger on a motorcycle when it was struck by another car.
Together, these three factors confirm that the bodily injuries Ms. Williams
suffered to her right leg and knee arose out of her use of a motorcycle. 	Because it is
undisputed that the motorcycle had fewer than four wheels, MedPay Exclusion #6 excludes
MedPay coverage for her bodily injuries. 61 	It would have been objectively unreasonable
for Ms. Williams to expect otherwise.
Other 	provisions 	of 	the 	Allstate 	Policy 	support 	this 	conclusion.
Ms. Williams’s policy provides MedPay coverage for reasonable expenses incurred by an
“insured person” for medical services. 62 	An “insured person” is defined as the policy-
holder or a resident relative who sustains a bodily injury “while in, on, getting into or out
59 See Criterion Ins. Co. v. Velthouse, 751 P.2d 1, 3 (Alaska 1986) (collecting cases).
60 See Shaw, 19 P.3d at 592 (citing Velthouse, 751 P.2d at 5).
61 Other jurisdictions have interpreted “less-than-four-wheel” exclusions similarly. 	See,
e.g., Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Henault, 879 P.2d 994, 999 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (“When [the
insured] was injured, she had been riding her motorcycle, which had, of course, less than four
wheels. . . . Because the injuries that [she] sustained as a result of being thrown from her
motorcycle were causally connected to her use of her motorcycle, the exclusion in the PIP portion
of [her] policy precludes her from receiving PIP coverage.”), aff’d, 905 P.2d 379 (Wash. 1995).
62 Docket 14-1 at 17.
Case 4:22-cv-00006-JMK Document 22 Filed 12/13/22 Page 11 of 14

Williams v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. 	Case No. 4:22-cv-00006-JMK
Opinion and Order re: Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment 	Page 12
of, or getting on or off of, an auto . . . .” 63 The Allstate Policy consistently defines “auto”
to mean “a private passenger land motor vehicle which has at least four wheels and is
designed for use on public roads.” 64 As described above, it is undisputed that Ms. Williams
suffered her bodily injuries while on her boyfriend’s motorcycle, which does not have “at
least four wheels.” 65 Ms. Williams’s assertions that Allstate has waived arguments relating
to the Allstate Policy’s definition of “insured person” and “auto” or that these definitions
are “irrelevant” to MedPay coverage are unavailing. Allstate acknowledges that the “issue
here is the interpretation of [MedPay] Exclusion #6.” 66 	The Allstate Policy’s definitions
of “insured person” and “auto” undermine any argument that Ms. Williams reasonably
could have expected the Allstate Policy to provide MedPay coverage for her injuries.
Citing Devine v. Great Divide Insurance Co., 67 Ms. Williams argues that
“Alaskan courts look to Worker’s Compensation law” when giving meaning to the phrase
“arising out of.” 68 	Ms. Williams also points to a Supreme Court of Kansas case which
interprets the phrase arising “out of” and “in the course of” of employment in the Kansas
workmen’s compensation act. 69 	But these cases do not support the proposition that the
phrase “arising out of the scope of employment” and “arising out of the . . . use of a motor
vehicle” have the same meaning. The Devine court was interpreting a contract’s definition
63 Id.
64 Id. at 11 (noting that this definition “appl[ies] to all part of the policy except where
otherwise noted”).
65 Docket 11 at 1; Docket 14 at 1.
66 Docket 17 at 3–4.
67 350 P.3d 782 (Alaska 2015).
68 Docket 14 at 6–7.
69 Newman v. Bennett, 512 P.2d 497, 501 (Kan. 1973)
Case 4:22-cv-00006-JMK Document 22 Filed 12/13/22 Page 12 of 14

Williams v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. 	Case No. 4:22-cv-00006-JMK
Opinion and Order re: Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment 	Page 13
of employer liability, which was limited to situations involving bodily injury to an
employee “arising out of and in the course of . . . employment.” 70 In that case, the Alaska
Supreme Court held that the phrase “arising out of and in the course of employment” had
the 	same 	meaning 	in a commercial 	general 	liability 	policy 	as it has 	in worker’s
compensation law because “[t]he intent of the employment exclusion in a commercial
general liability policy appears to be to avoid duplication of coverage provided under
Workers’ 	Compensation 	and 	Employers 	Liability 	policies.” 71 	No 	similar 	concern
regarding duplication of coverage exists here because Ms. Williams’s injuries are wholly
unconnected to her employment. 	Similarly, Ms. Williams’s analogy to the statutory
language analyzed Newman is inapposite because Ms. Williams is not seeking worker’s
compensation.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that, under the language of the
MedPay Exclusion #6, it would have been objectively unreasonable for Ms. Williams to
expect the Allstate Policy to provide MedPay coverage for the injuries she suffered while
riding the motorcycle. 	Allstate is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
Ms. Williams’s breach of contract and declaratory judgment claims. Accordingly, because
both parties have agreed that all material facts are undisputed, the Court will grant
Allstate’s summary judgment motion and deny Ms. Williams’s cross-motion.
70 Devine, 350 P.3d at 790.
71 Id. (quoting 21 Eric Mills Holmes, Holmes’ Appleman on Insurance § 132.5[C][1], at
66–67 (2d ed. 1996)).
Case 4:22-cv-00006-JMK Document 22 Filed 12/13/22 Page 13 of 14

Williams v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. 	Case No. 4:22-cv-00006-JMK
Opinion and Order re: Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment 	Page 14
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For 	the 	reasons 	described 	in 	this 	opinion, 	the 	Court 	concludes 	that
Ms. Williams could not have had an objectively reasonable expectation that her Allstate
automobile insurance policy would provide MedPay coverage for the bodily injuries she
sustained while riding her boyfriend’s motorcycle.
Accordingly, Allstate’s Motion for Summary Judgment at Docket 10 is
GRANTED, and Ms. Williams’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at Docket 13 is
DENIED. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter a final judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 12th day of December, 2022, at Anchorage,
Alaska.
/s/ Joshua M. Kindred
JOSHUA M. KINDRED
United States District Judge
Case 4:22-cv-00006-JMK Document 22 Filed 12/13/22 Page 14 of 14