Mitchell v. Arkansas Division of Correction et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
CENTRAL DIVISION
STACEY A. MITCHELL 	PLAINTIFF
ADC #099792
v. 	No: 4:24-cv-01088-LPR-PSH
MARY REYNOLDS, et al. 	DEFENDANTS
PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
INSTRUCTIONS
The following Recommendation has been sent to United States District Judge
Lee 	P. 	Rudofsky. 	You 	may 	file 	written 	objections 	to 	all 	or 	part 	of 	this
Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain the
factual and/or legal basis for your objection, and (2) be received by the Clerk of this
Court within fourteen (14) days of this Recommendation. 	By not objecting, you
may waive the right to appeal questions of fact.
DISPOSITION
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Stacey A. Mitchell, an Arkansas Division of Correction (ADC)
inmate, filed this pro se civil rights lawsuit raising Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference and state law negligence claims against defendants Mary Reynolds,
Gaylon Lay, Joe Page, and Kenny Bolden (Doc. Nos. 12-13). He alleged that unsafe
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working conditions in an ADC work release program and a lack of training on using
a saw caused him to lose several fingers after an accident that occurred in December
of 2022. Doc. No. 12 at 1-3.
Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment, brief in support, and a
statement of undisputed facts filed by the defendants, claiming that Mitchell did not
exhaust available administrative remedies before he filed this lawsuit (Doc. Nos. 42-
44). Mitchell filed several pleadings in response (Doc. Nos. 48-51). For the reasons
described below, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be granted,
and Mitchell’s claims against them should be dismissed without prejudice for failure
to exhaust available administrative remedies.
II. Legal Standard
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is
proper if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a); Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986). When ruling on a motion for
summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. 	Naucke v. City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir.
2002). The nonmoving party may not rely on allegations or denials, but instead must
demonstrate the existence of specific facts that create a genuine issue for trial. Mann
v. Yarnell, 497 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 2007). 	The nonmoving party’s allegations
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must be supported by sufficient probative evidence that would permit a finding in
his favor on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy. 	Id. (citations
omitted). An assertion that a fact cannot be disputed or is genuinely disputed must
be 	supported 	by 	materials 	in 	the 	record 	such 	as 	“depositions, 	documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including
those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or
other materials . . .”. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). A party may also show that a fact
is disputed or undisputed by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the
absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). 	A dispute is
genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict
for either party; a fact is material if its resolution affects the outcome of the case.
Othman v. City of Country Club Hills, 671 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 2012). Disputes
that are not genuine or that are about facts that are not material will not preclude
summary judgment. 	Sitzes v. City of West Memphis, Ark., 606 F.3d 461, 465 (8th
Cir. 2010).
III. Analysis
The defendants argue that Mitchell’s claims against them should be dismissed
because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before he filed this lawsuit.
Doc. No. 43. In support of their motion, the defendants submitted the declaration of
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Terri Grigsby-Brown, the ADC’s Inmate Grievance Appeal Coordinator (Doc. No.
42-1); a copy of the ADC’s grievance policy, Administrative Directive 19-34 (Doc.
No. 42-2); Mitchell’s grievance history (Doc. No. 42-3); a copy of Grievance PB-
24-00168 (Doc. No. 42-4); the Declaration of Tabatha Thomas (Doc. No. 42-5); and
Mitchell’s Status Assignment Sheet (Doc. No. 42-6).
A. 	Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires an inmate to exhaust
prison grievance procedures before filing suit in federal court. 	See 42 U.S.C.
§1997e(a); Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 202 (2007); Burns v. Eaton, 752 F.3d 1136,
1141 (8th Cir. 2014). Exhaustion under the PLRA is mandatory. Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. at 211; Hammett v. Cofield, 681 F.3d 945, 949 (8th Cir. 2012). “[T]he PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life whether they
involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege
excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).
The PLRA does not prescribe the manner in which exhaustion occurs. See Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. at 218. 	It merely requires compliance with prison grievance
procedures to properly exhaust. See id. Thus, the question as to whether an inmate
has properly exhausted administrative remedies will depend on the specifics of that
particular prison’s grievance policy. See id.
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Pursuant to the ADC’s grievance policy, Administrative Directive 19-34,
inmates are provided Unit Level Grievance Forms as part of the Inmate Grievance
Procedure. See Doc. No. 42-2 at 5. To resolve a problem, an inmate must first seek
informal resolution by submitting a Step One Unit Level Grievance Form within 15
days after the occurrence of the incident. Id. at 6. Inmates are to “specifically name
each individual involved in order that a proper investigation and response may be
completed.” 	Id. at 5. An inmate must be “specific as to the substance of the issue
or complaint to include the date, place, personnel involved or witnesses, and how
the policy or incident affected the inmate submitting the form.” Id. at 6. A problem
solver investigates the complaint and provides a written response at the bottom of
the form. Id. at 6-7. If the inmate is not satisfied with the resolution or the problem
solver does not respond within three working days, he may then complete Step Two
of the grievance procedure and submit the form as a formal grievance. Id. at 9. If a
formal grievance is medical in nature, it is forwarded to the appropriate medical
personnel for response. Id. at 10. If the inmate receives no response, or if the inmate
is not satisfied with the response, the inmate can appeal to the Deputy Director. Id.
at 11-12. Once the Deputy Director responds or the appeal is rejected, the grievance
process is exhausted. Id. at 13. According to the ADC’s grievance policy, the entire
grievance procedure should be completed within 76 working days absent an
extension or unforeseen circumstances. Id. at 14. The grievance policy specifically
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states that inmates must exhaust administrative remedies at all levels of the
procedure before filing a federal civil rights lawsuit. Id. at 19.
B. 	Grievance PB-24-00168
In her declaration, Inmate Grievance Supervisor Terri Grigsby-Brown stated
that she searched Mitchell’s grievance history from December 7, 2022 (when the
saw accident occurred), and December 11, 2024 (when Mitchell filed this lawsuit)
for non-medical grievances pertaining to Mitchell’s claims in this case or naming
any of the defendants. See Doc. No. 42-1 at ¶¶ 33-34. She identified one grievance
pertaining to Mitchell’s claims in this case, PB-24-00168. Id. at ¶ 35. Mitchell did
not identify or provide any additional grievances with his responsive pleadings. See
Doc. Nos. 48-51.
Mitchell initiated PB-24-00168 on October 7, 2024. 	Doc. No. 42-4. 	He
complained that the negligence and deliberate indifference of Lay, Page, and
Reynolds caused him to suffer a “life-altering and catastrophic accident” in 2022
resulting in the amputation of his left hand. Id. at 3. He did not name Bolden in this
grievance. Id. The grievance was rejected as untimely, with the warden noting that
the incident at issue had occurred 667 days earlier. 	Id. at 4. 	Mitchell appealed,
claiming that he could not grieve the incident within 15 days due to his injuries and
that he only recently became mentally able to do so. Id. His appeal was also rejected
as untimely. Id. at 5.
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C. 	Mitchell’s Exhaustion of Available Remedies
The defendants argue that Mitchell did not exhaust administrative
remedies with respect to his claims because he did not timely grieve his complaints
against them. 	Doc. No. 43 at 9-10. 	The defendants also claim that grievance PB-
24-00168 cannot exhaust Mitchell’s claims against defendant Bolden because he is
not named in it. Id. at 11. The defendants assert that Mitchell was released from the
Ester Unit infirmary and transferred back to the Pine Bluff Work Release Program
on January 10, 2023, but still did not file a grievance about the accident until
approximately a year and eight months later. 	Doc. No. 43 at 10; Doc. No. 42-5
(Thomas Declaration) at ¶¶ 5-7; Doc. No. 42-6 (Status Assignment Sheet) at 3.
Mitchell concedes he did not exhaust his claims as to Bolden, but argues that
the grievance procedure was unavailable to him because he was unable to grieve in
a timely manner due to his injuries. Doc. Nos. 48-49. Specifically, he claims that
he was hospitalized until December 13, 2022, and then transferred to the ADC’s
Ester Unit to recover until January 10, 2023. Doc. No. 49. He further claims that
once he was released from the hospital, he was “lulled into inaction” and the “last
thing on [his] mind was filing a grievance.” Doc. No. 48.
The Supreme Court in Booth v. Churner held that “exhaustion is required
where administrative remedies are available even if the available administrative
remedies do not provide the precise, or full, relief sought.” 	532 U.S. 731, 738–39
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(2001). 	The Eighth Circuit has found administrative remedies to be unavailable
where prison officials prevented inmates from utilizing the grievance procedures or
where officials failed to comply with such procedures. 	See Gibson v. Weber, 431
F.3d 339 (8th Cir. 2005); Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736 (8th Cir. 2001). The United
States Supreme Court held that an administrative remedy is unavailable when “it
operates as a simple dead end,” or when it “might be so opaque that it becomes,
practically speaking, incapable of use.” Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1859 (2016).
The Eighth Circuit Court has held that the Court should first analyze whether an
administrative remedy is available before addressing other possible deficiencies in
the grievances filed. See Smith v. Andrews, 75 F.4th 805, 809 (8th Cir. 2023).
The record in this case belies Mitchell’s assertion that he could not grieve his
complaints prior to October of 2024. While he claims he was “lulled into inaction,”
he does not further describe an impediment or obstacle to his using the ADC’s
grievance procedure to grieve his complaints about the defendants and their role in
the accident that caused his injuries. 	Mitchell provides no proof to support his
allegation that he could not use the grievance procedure upon his return to the Pine
Bluff 	Unit in January 2023. 	A plaintiff’s unsupported statement is insufficient to
defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. 	See Conseco Life Ins.
Co. v. Williams, 620 F.3d 902, 909 (quoting Flentje v. First Nat'l Bank of Wynne,
340 Ark. 563, 569 (2000) (“When the movant makes a prima facie showing of
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entitlement to summary judgment, the respondent must discard the shielding cloak
of formal allegations and meet proof with proof by showing a genuine issue as to a
material fact.”)). Mitchell also does not claim that he requested help from the prison
in filing a grievance but was denied, or that he was prevented from getting help if he
needed it.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the Court recommends that the defendants’
motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 42) be granted, and Mitchell’s deliberate
indifference claims against the defendants be dismissed without prejudice due to
Mitchell’s failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. 	Further, the Court
should decline to exercise jurisdiction over Mitchell’s pendent state law claims. 1
SO RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of October, 2025.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
1 See ACLU v. City of Florissant, 186 F.3d 1095, 1098-99 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[W]hen
state and federal claims are joined and all federal claims are dismissed on a motion for
summary judgment, the state claims are ordinarily dismissed without prejudice to avoid
needless decisions of state law . . . as a matter of comity.”). See also Condor Corp. v. City
of St. Paul, 912 F.2d 215, 220 (8th Cir. 1990) (“The judicial resources of the federal courts
are sparse compared to the states. We stress the need to exercise judicial restraint and avoid
state law issues wherever possible.”).
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