Rendon v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Sergio Rendon,
Plaintiff,
v.
Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
No. CV-22-00570-PHX-JAT
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Sergio Rendon’s Motion for Attorney Fees
under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) and Memorandum in support thereof. (Docs. 23, 24). The
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) filed a response
indicating it “neither supports nor opposes counsel’s request.” (Doc. 25 at 2). The Court
now rules.
I. BACKGROUND
The Commissioner initially denied Plaintiff’s claim for benefits, and Plaintiff filed
this action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision. (Doc. 1 at 2, 4). The
parties filed a Stipulated Motion to Voluntarily Remand the case for further proceedings,
and stipulated that Plaintiff be awarded $4,722.50 under the Equal Access to Justice Act
(“EAJA”). (Doc. 18; Doc. 21). Pursuant to those stipulations, the Court: (1) reversed the
Commissioner’s decision and remanded for further proceedings, and (2) awarded Plaintiff
$4,722.50 in fees. (Doc. 19; Doc. 20 (Clerk of the Court entered judgment); Doc. 22).
On remand, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found Plaintiff was entitled to
Case 2:22-cv-00570-JAT Document 26 Filed 10/28/25 Page 1 of 4

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Social Security disability benefits beginning in March 2020. (Doc. 24-1 at 5). The
Commissioner issued a Notice of Award stating that $29,000.25 had been withheld for
payment of attorney fees. (Doc. 24-1 at 7 (stating that the Commissioner “usually
withhold[s] 25 percent of past-due benefits” and had withheld $29,000.25)). According to
Plaintiff’s counsel, counsel that represented Plaintiff before the agency petitioned for a fee
of administrative services under 42 U.S.C. § 406(a) in the amount of $8,200, leaving
$20,800.25 for potential attorney fees. (Doc. 24 at 2).1
Plaintiff’s counsel now seeks a fee award of $14,200.00 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1406(b). (Doc. 24 at 1).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A court entering judgment in favor of a Social Security claimant represented by
counsel “may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such
representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the
claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). Though “[t]he
statute does not specify how courts should determine whether a requested fee is
reasonable,” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009), the Supreme Court
has made clear that the first step is to respect “the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee
agreements,” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 793 (2002). A court may deviate
downward from a requested fee award “if the attorney provided substandard representation
or delayed the case, or if the requested fee would result in a windfall.” Crawford, 586 F.3d
at 1151. “Because the [Commissioner] has no direct interest” in how the award is
apportioned between client and counsel, district courts must independently “assure that the
reasonableness of the fee is established.” Id. at 1149.
In determining whether fees sought under § 406(b) are reasonable, the Court
considers the contingent-fee agreement, the character of the attorney’s representation, and
the achieved result. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808. Although not controlling, courts may also
1 Plaintiff’s counsel does not provide documentation to support this statement, but the
Commissioner does not dispute it. Accordingly, the Court accepts Plaintiff’s counsel’s
representation and assumes such documentation is available for review if this fact is ever
disputed.
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consider the number of hours spent representing the claimant and the attorney’s normal
hourly billing rate for non-contingent-fee cases in determining reasonableness. Id. at 808–
09. Finally, if a claimant’s attorney receives fees under both the EAJA and § 406(b), the
attorney must “refund to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee.” Id. at 796 (citation
omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Applying the Gisbrecht factors, the Court finds that the requested fee is reasonable.
Plaintiff contracted to pay 25 percent of the past-due benefits on a contingent fee basis for
work performed by Plaintiff’s counsel in this action, and the fee requested is in fact less
than 25 percent of the past-due benefits. (Doc. 24-2 at 1; Doc. 24 at 1). Plaintiff’s counsel’s
itemization of services indicates 20.1 hours of services rendered. (Doc. 24-3 at 3).
Plaintiff’s counsel requests an hourly rate of $706.46 per hour ($14,200.00/20.1 hours),
(Doc. 24 at 6), which is in line with effective hourly rates previously approved in this
Circuit. See Young v. Colvin, No. CV-11-538-PHX-SMM, 2014 WL 590335, at *2 (D.
Ariz. Feb. 14, 2014) (citing Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1153) (noting approval of effective
hourly rates of $519, $875, and $902).
On the instant record, there is no indication of any substandard performance by
Plaintiff’s counsel. There is also no indication of substandard performance or undue delay
in prosecuting Plaintiff’s case. Indeed, through Plaintiff’s counsel’s efforts, Plaintiff was
awarded all benefits for which Plaintiff applied. Thus, upon consideration of the Gisbrecht
reasonableness factors, in addition to the risk involved in the contingency fee arrangement
in this case, the Court concludes that a fee award of $14,200.00 is reasonable and will
approve an award in this amount.
Because Plaintiff’s counsel “must refund to the claimant the amount of the smaller
fee [between the attorney fees payable under both the EAJA and § 406(b)],” Gisbrecht,
535 U.S. at 796, the Court will order Plaintiff’s counsel to refund the $4,722.50 EAJA
award to Plaintiff upon Plaintiff’s counsel’s receipt of the attorney fees awarded by this
Order.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s counsel’s Motion for Attorney Fees under 42
U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A), (Doc. 23), is GRANTED in the amount of $14,200.00.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s counsel shall, after receipt of the
above-awarded fee, refund to Plaintiff the fee previously awarded under the EAJA, in the
amount of $4,722.50.
Dated this 28th day of October, 2025.
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